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LANGUAGE KNOWLEDGE AND ONTOLOGY

K.K. BANERJEE



PROFESSOR KALL KRISHNA BANERJII
1919-1988

LANGUAGE, KNOWLEDGE AND ONTOLOGY

A Collection of Essays
by Professor K. K. Banerjee

Edited by
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KRISHNA ROY

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Foreword

Professor Kali Krishna Banerjee was one of the leading philosophers of contemporary India. His untimely passing away came as a shock to most of us. Both in Indian and Euro-American philosophy his interest was broad, deep and interpretative. His ability to creatively synthesize the ideas drawn from different sources is marked by originality and insight. Though prolific as a writer, Professor Banerjee was evidently not very particular about the style of his presentation. Besides, he was rather indifferent to the uneven quality of the journals in which he published his professional papers.

This volume could not be published without the co-operation of his son, Shri Kishore Krishna Banerjee, who preserved the manuscripts of his father with exceptional care and was pleased to hand them over to the ICPR. Dr Kalyan Sen Gupta and Dr Krishna Roy, the editors of this volume, had the privilege to work with Professor Banerjee intimately and for a long time. It was not an easy task to convert the author's manuscripts in the form of a book; for their painstaking editorial work I am especially grateful to them. In this difficult scholarly work they have been greatly assisted by Dr Tapan Chakraborty, Professor S. R. Saha and Shrimati Srilekha Dutta. Shri P. K. Ghosh, the printer of this volume, gladly took upon himself the unconventional and academic responsibility of helping the editors to change, in some places, the form of the author's presentation in order to improve its intelligibility. Professor J. N. Mohanty's Introduction to this volume has added to its value.

I take this opportunity to thank, on behalf of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, all those who have worked so dedicatedly in making this publication possible.

D. P. CHATTOPADHYAYA

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Introduction

A year or so after I finished my M.A. at the University of Calcutta, Professor Kali Krishna Banerjee joined the post-graduate faculty as a part-time lecturer. That must be around 1951. I did not, however, get to know him personally until I returned from Göttingen and started teaching in the same department. His reputation as an erudite scholar, brilliant teacher and subtle thinker had reached me. As I got to know him, I began to discover another aspect of his personality: he was a charming person with an unfailing sense of humour. We were colleagues for several years until he left for Jadavpur as a Reader. Our friendship continued. Whenever we met, we talked. He was an incomparable conversationist, with an inexhaustible store of stories, anecdotes, jokes, philosophical titbits; and of course we discussed philosophy. I knew of the deep tragedies in his life and the many physical illnesses he had suffered. I knew that these experiences had added, sometime in the late fifties and early sixties, a new dimension to his thinking. The Naiyāyika became also an existentialist. For the rest of his life, as the papers reprinted in this volume show, he moved between these two extremes: Navya-Nyāya and Kierkegaard. Even in choosing his end, he showed faithfulness to analytic thinking and existentialist freedom.

These essays show Kali Krishna Babu's scholarship in both Indian and Western philosophies. He moved in and between these domains with mastery and confidence—always to the point, always with an analytic spirit, and never failing to be original. In fact, in these essays he succeeds in making several interesting points. He recognizes, along with current philosophical preoccupations, the importance of language in philosophy, but refuses to use analysis of language for the purpose of demolishing metaphysics. On the contrary, he sees in language the possibility of meaning a transcendent reality. The categorical scheme of a metaphysical system, he insists, has to be gleaned not from language alone but also from common sense and

experience (*anubhava*). He is not afraid of saying that some thesis of a powerful Indian system is mistaken. In fact, he argues as much against the Advaita Vedānta thesis that ignorance is a positive entity as against the Bhāṭṭa theory of 'knownness'. On other issues, he takes an intermediate position: neither the Nyāya theory of *anuvyavasāya* nor the Vedānta thesis that knowledge is self-manifesting—he argues—can be proved or disproved. These assertions, he contends, are neither empirical nor *a priori* nor linguistic nor meaningless, but basic to the system concerned so that one's choice has both theoretical and extra-theoretical reasons. An Indian *darśana*, he insists, is a large point of view grounded in a pre-logical insight into reality: this conception of philosophical system is absent in Western thought. A metaphysical system should be creative and grounded in one's deeper quest for identity. Philosophy, as he eventually came to look at it, is a personal and also a historical search for Being.

As I heard him over the years, his was an incessant quest to keep logical analysis and existential search for meaning together in proper balance. I trust this search will continue with those of us who are left behind.

J. N. MOHANTY

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Editors' Introduction

It is only in a trivial sense that Professor Kali Krishna Banerjee is no more with us, that he is far above the sphere of our sorrow. But in a more significant sense he is with us, and will always remain with us through his prolific writings, which will speak eloquently of his store of learning, his deep philosophical thought and rich imagination. He is above the mortal frame of temporality, but he lives more profoundly in the atemporal glory of creativity where it is death that is dead. The range of his philosophical canvas was wide; he was always eager to strive, to seek and to find within a vast horizon; he always had the devotion to something afar—beyond the bounds of narrow specialization in a particular field. He took active and creative interest in any philosophical problem—whether in the field of ontology or of epistemology, whether in philosophy of science or in philosophy of language, whether in the field of religion or of art. Consequently we have from him innumerable papers of diverse flavour, all of which cannot be squeezed into a small slot like the present volume. So we have selected only some of the papers which he contributed especially to the realms of Language, Knowledge and Ontology, and which present with distinction important aspects of contemporary thinking.

Section I contains four papers on Language. Here Professor Banerjee draws our attention to several problems—what it means to speak clearly, how language is related to reality, and whether Indian, especially Navya-Nyāya, deliberation about language can be understood within the context of Western philosophy, particularly ordinary language philosophy.

'To Speak Clearly' is an attempt to explore the conditions that promote clear speaking. Starting from the basic assumption that to speak is to speak clearly, or that the distinction between speaking and speaking clearly is unreal, his measured conclusion is that to speak clearly is to make use of a categorical scheme. We can speak clearly of something if it can be identified or differentiated, and this identification or differentiation

is possible only in terms of categories or categorial properties, in terms of 'ultimate predicates' as Aristotle would call it. This explains why we can speak (or speak clearly) only of facts, and why any attempt to speak of fictions culminates in inevitable frustration.

But Professor Banerjee does not confine himself to a careful and detailed elaboration of the point that we cannot speak unless we are able to make use of a categorial scheme; he goes deeper to consider the pressing question of how to capture the categories and find justification of them. Categories are embedded in the structure of language, even ordinary language. Should we then attend to language for a proper analysis of categories, as many philosophers including Ryle have done? Professor Banerjee is not, however, fully satisfied with this stance. He explicitly sets his mind against any theory of categories based on a consideration of language only. Rather he turns towards common sense, *anubhava* or noetic sentience for the necessary identification and justification of the categories of language.

Analytic philosophers are generally fond of appealing to language in their thrust to eliminate metaphysics. Linguistic evidence, they think, puts all metaphysics to flames. The essay 'Language and Reality', however, conveys the hollowness of this anti-metaphysical gesture. It is shot with the unwavering conviction that language does not move away from reality but towards it. Professor Banerjee starts by reflecting on the nature of metaphysical thought, and declares that what fulfils this metaphysical thought or metaphysical élan is the beyond, the transcendent. In this sense, metaphysical thinking or the linguistic form in which it is couched is transcendence-initiated. First, it goes beyond the world of senses to find its fulfilment in the world of essences. But when it concentrates on the essences, it goes further beyond; and this process continues until it arrives at the real first, the decisively transcendental as pure immediacy. Like Bradley he does not think that thought and language being relational cannot capture this pure immediacy. Rather, invoking the aid of the Advaitins, he tries to sketch a theory of language that reveals the adequacy of language to mean the immediate.

In 'Navya-Nyāya and Ordinary Language', Professor

Banerjee asserts that though philosophers of the Navya-Nyāya school make abundant use of a host of technical terms, their language is not artificial or semi-artificial; rather it is 'technical but ordinary', or an extension of ordinary language. The chief reason for their using technical terms is to be clear and precise. Taking a concrete example, Professor Banerjee shows that to make a particular statement unambiguous and precise there is need for using a number of technical terms which have their roots in ordinary language, but which are used in a slightly different way, thus making the terms technical. He says that in any language there are both technical and non-technical terms, and it is very difficult to distinguish between them. Even terms which appear to be clearly technical are in a way ordinary, but were converted into technical by addition and omission etc. Thus some technical terms like *pratiyogitā* (negatum-ness), *nirūpaka-nirūpita* (specifier-specified) and *avacchedaka-avacchinna* (limitor-limited) which are used in Navya-Nyāya were also words of ordinary language, but were converted into technical for the purpose of precision of expression. In the case of many ordinary words that are of interest to a philosopher, we cannot say what they mean precisely. Philosophers attempt to state what they mean. They try to give non-stipulative or descriptive definitions of words used in ordinary language. A classical example of arriving at such definitions is to be found in the Socratic search for definitions. Nyāya philosophers also did the same thing.

Professor Banerjee points out that the approach and attitude of Nyāya philosophers are comparable to those of Professor Moore. Like Professor Moore they appealed to *lokavyavahāra* and *lokayātrā* which can be equated with ordinary language usage and common sense. But there is also a difference. Ordinary language usage or common sense is not to them the final court of appeal. Their reference to common sense was primarily a reference to what was intuitive; and this intuition is behaviour-oriented. They made such reference only as a part of the traditional style of philosophizing common to philosophers of a realistic bias.

'Wittgenstein *versus* Naiyāyika' appears in the form of a dialogue containing an exchange of ideas between a follower of Wittgenstein and a Naiyāyika about words and their meanings.

The way Professor Banerjee unfolds the theme shows a rare combination of cogency and sensitivity, a remarkable range of study, understanding and imagination.

Section II consists of a collection of papers on Knowledge. In these papers, Professor Banerjee addresses himself to various issues in epistemology. In 'The Nature of Philosophical Reasoning in Indian Thought', his aim is to have a tolerably right understanding of the nature of reasoning as exemplified in the different systems of Indian philosophy. Philosophical reasoning of all the Indian systems rests on (1) *pramāṇa*, (2) *pravṛtti*, and (3) *vicāra*.

A science of *pramāṇas* forms an integral part of every system of Indian philosophy. All systems agree in holding *pratyakṣa* (perception) to be a *pramāṇa*, and it is tailored to meet ontological needs. Obviously deliberation on perception varies in different systems in tune with their different ontological positions.

Pravṛttis of a *śāstra* are *uddeśya*, *lakṣaṇā* and *parikṣā*. Every system of Indian thought first mentions the topics it proposes to discuss, then gives definitions of them, and finally examines these definitions. In this connection, Professor Banerjee deals with the intriguing question how the appropriate definienda of a definition are known.

Vicāra takes three forms, viz. *vāda*, *jalpa*, and *vitaṇḍā*. In the first form, the objective is to ascertain what is the truth. In *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* the primary aim is to win by establishing one's point and by dis-establishing the contrary position the other person holds.

Now all philosophical reasoning, Professor Banerjee points out, is directed ultimately to cessation of restlessness and suffering and attainment of *mokṣa* by showing the inauthentic character of the habitual being.

In 'Perception and Direct Awareness' he begins with the question: Do we see a colour or a coloured thing? This leads him straight into the vigorous debate that goes on unabated between common sense and phenomenalism. And when he tries to settle the issue, he is definitely inclined towards a reconstruction of the commonsense belief that what we perceive or are directly acquainted with is a coloured thing, and not, as

the phenomenalist would suppose, a colour. This he seeks to achieve by developing an empiricist but non-phenomenalistic theory of direct acquaintance that is in consonance with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition.

In 'The Nature of Knownness' (*Jñātātā*) Professor Banerjee discusses the arguments for and against the concept of knownness (*jñātātā*). The Bhāṭṭas maintain that knownness is not among the seven kinds of knowables recognized by the Naiyāyikas, viz. substance, quality, action, universal, inherence, particularity and negation, and that it is a *new* kind of knowable. Their arguments are both perceptual and inferential. The perception of an object as a known object is the perception of the knownness of the object also.

Besides perception, inference is also invoked as a proof of the existence of knownness. The object of knowledge is named *viśaya*. The property of being an object (*viśayatā*) is pervaded by knownness. No *viśayatā* without *jñātātā*. As the presence of smoke proves the presence of fire, so the fact-hood of *viśayatā* proves the fact-hood of *jñātātā*.

Knowledge is an illuminating activity and transitive in character. The knownness activity illuminates the real nature of the object, and as a result of that activity the object comes to possess a new quality—knownness. As fire is validly inferred from smoke, so knownness is validly inferred from the object—the object being the object of cognition.

In order to defend their position the Bhāṭṭas are obliged to consider *novelty* as the definean of a true cognition (*pramā*). The Naiyāyikas try to show that the Bhāṭṭas' definition of *pramā* is too narrow and fails to explain the *persistence* of knowledge.

The Bhāṭṭas recognize the fact-hood of knownness in the interest of their doctrine concerning knowledge of knowledge. The cognition, according to them, is non-sensuous and non-perceptible. Knowledge is known by means of an inference of which the ground is knownness.

Having established the fact-hood of knownness, the Bhāṭṭas try to establish that it is a *new* kind of knowledge. It is not a substance because it qualifies a quality. For the same reason it cannot be an action either. It is not a universal; for a univer-

sal may be its locus. For the same reason knownness is neither particularity, nor inherence, nor negation.

The Naiyāyikas reject the Bhāṭṭas' theory of knownness and the supporting arguments. According to them, knownness is the relation between knowledge and its object; it is called *svarūpa*; and it is not a new kind of knowable. The knowledge of the object is related to the object of knowledge by the relation of *viśayatā*, while the object of knowledge is related to the knowledge of it, by the relation of *viśayitā*. As knownness is nothing but the relation between knowledge and its object, it is not a new kind of knowable over and above the seven kinds already mentioned.

What is really meant when it is said that the knownness of an object is simply the relation that obtains between the knowledge of the object and the object of knowledge? The Naiyāyikas answer the question by saying that the name known object connotes the object as qualified by the knowledge that knew it. The Bhāṭṭa doctrine of knownness is said to be lacking in confirmation or vitiated by infinite regress.

The Naiyāyikas maintain that *viśayatā* is to be defended in terms of *svarūpa sambandha* and not in terms of knownness (*jñātatā*). In this connection Professor Banerjee refers to the views of Stout and Alexander, who think that the *act* character of cognition is essentially in the nature of conation. From the fact that knowing is an activity one cannot logically infer that it will produce a property which will characterize the object of it.

What is perceived when an object is perceived as known is not the object as qualified by knownness, but the object as qualified by the knowledge that knew it. The Naiyāyikas affirm, against the Bhāṭṭas, that what the proposition 'knowledge qualifies the knower (self)' means is that knowledge is related to the knower by the relation of inherence. It implies that knowledge cannot be related to the object by the relation of inherence. But it is never implied that knowledge cannot be related to the object of it by some other relation. Knowledge is related to its object and the relation that relates it to its object is its own nature (to have an object or the relation of *viśayatā*).

One can distinguish one cognition from another by taking

into account their respective objects, i.e. the objects which qualify them or are related to them by the relation of *viśayatā*.

To perceive an object as a known object is to perceive the object as related to the knowledge of it by the relation of *viśayatā*. When a cognition is cognized, the object of that cognition is also present to the cognition that is cognizing the cognition. For example, when the knowledge of the pot is known, not only is the *knowledge* of the pot present to consciousness, but the *pot* also is present. Knownness is nothing but the knowledge of the object related to the object of knowledge by the relation of *viśayatā* and therefore it is not a new kind of knowable.

'Knowledge and Jñāna' is a very long paper where Professor Banerjee makes it clear that '*jñāna*' is not synonymous with 'knowledge'. For when we say that we know *p*, *p* is true. But the Indian thinkers include the term '*mithyājñāna*' in their vocabulary and they often talk about it without any blinkers. Again, they can easily subscribe to the doctrine of *svataḥ prāmānya* together with the contention that there are *mithyājñānas*. This will inevitably carry with it an air of paradox if we translate *mithyājñāna* as false knowledge. For if truth is intrinsic to knowledge, how can *jñāna* or knowledge be false? Yet the Indian philosophical systems like the Sāṃkhya and others turn towards *svataḥ prāmānya* and *mithyājñāna* with equal loyalty. Professor Banerjee tries to account for it by developing a causal account of *jñāna*.

In 'Knowledge of Knowledge: A Meta-hypothetical Study of the Nyāya Theory of Knowledge of Knowledge' Professor Banerjee deals with the controversial view, held by the Naiyāyikas, that when a piece of knowledge is known, it is known just in the same way as tables, chairs and trees are known. He says that though this position has been supported by a number of arguments, critics find the arguments unconvincing and the position untenable; on the contrary the Naiyāyikas fail to see why this view should be regarded as untenable.

In the first section of this paper the author discusses the five arguments offered by Gaṅgeśa in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* to prove that cognition is non-reflexive, and arrives at the conclusion that the Nyāya thesis can neither be proved nor disproved; and that the same is true of the opposite view that cognition is

reflexive. Thus an assertion about the nature of knowledge of knowledge is unprovable.

In the second section he analyses the nature of such assertion and says that an assertion is neither empirical nor *a priori* nor linguistic nor nonsense. It is, he says, a perspective proposition. Perspective propositions are those propositions which are basic to a particular system. They are basic, not in the sense of being axiomatic or necessarily true, but in the sense of being primitive. Such primitive propositions are unprovable. According to him, Gaṅgeśa was wrong in trying to prove the proposition that cognition is non-reflexive, which is a primitive proposition. What we should demand of primitive philosophical propositions is not proof but construction. They should be sufficient for constructing a comprehensive philosophical system. Now, Professor Banerjee says that the system-builder is compelled to accept as primitive a number of propositions which may not be regarded as primitive by others. Since the selection of primitive propositions is influenced not only by facts but also by interest, emotion, unconscious motives, etc., primitive propositions in one philosophical system may not find place in another. This is the reason for such irresolvable difference of opinion on the issue of knowledge of knowledge.

'Pramā-Pramāṇa and Knowledge-Justification' is concerned with the question of *justification* of knowledge. In Western philosophy the concepts of 'knowledge', 'claim to know', 'evidence', 'justification', 'truth', 'belief' and some other allied concepts go together and form a group. Correspondingly in Indian philosophy the concepts of *jñāna*, *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, *tarka* and some other allied concepts go together and form a group. Professor Banerjee compares the two groups of concepts and tries to ascertain what light the comparison may throw on the question of justification. He first strives to show how the concepts of the two groups are correlated. Next he considers the role that *tarka* plays in justification. *Tarka* is not a *pramāṇa*. Nevertheless, it is of considerable help to a *pramā* or *pramāṇa*. *Tarka* favours a *pramāṇa* broadly in two ways: (i) by removing the obstacles against the use of a *pramāṇa*, thus preparing the conditions favourable to its use; and (ii) by removing the doubts that may remain even after and in the course of the use of a *pramāṇa*. Professor Banerjee also attempts to answer the

sceptics who deny that any claim to know may be adequately grounded. He does it by taking a Nyāya stance. He observes that *pramā* (or *pramāṇa*) is ultimately dependent on successful action. To identify a *pramā* (or a *pramāṇa*) a person acts upon his cognition of the object, and if the action is successful he treats his cognition as a *pramā*. Of course, the sceptics would insist on some in-built contradictions in the concepts of *pramā*, *pramāṇa*, etc. They would argue in the following way: (1) *Pramā*, *pramāṇa*, etc. are fictitious like a rabbit's horn, for like it they are neither prior to nor posterior to nor contemporary with any furniture of the universe. (2) If a *pramāṇa* or a *pramā* is self-certifying, then why is not a *prameya* so? Now if a *prameya* is self-founding, a *pramāṇa* or a *pramā* is not needed. But if a *pramāṇa* or a *pramā* is not self-founding, then there would be infinite regress. And (3) a definition of a *pramāṇa* is given in terms of a *pramā*, and to avoid a circle a *pramā* should be defined or identified independently. But this is not possible, for the attempt to do so in terms of 'being conducive to successful action' will fail since even a false cognition may have a successful action as its consequence. In reply Professor Banerjee argues that the in-built contradictions of the concepts of *pramāṇa* etc. as referred to by the sceptics are the outcome of confused thinking.

'The Nature of Ignorance' is a critical review of the Advaita contention about ignorance. The Advaitins analyse the phenomena called awareness of ignorance, cognitive manifestation and dreamless sleep, and argue that ignorance is neither a positive fact like consciousness nor a negative fact like the absence of a pot; it is, strictly speaking, a quasi-positive fact. Professor Banerjee, however, does not agree with this Advaita contention—the contention that does not grow in accordance with the verdict of common sense. And in this respect he steps into the shoes of the Naiyāyikas.

Here is a brief résumé of how he moves inexorably towards the Nyāya conclusion. Professor Banerjee considers particularly the phenomena of awareness of ignorance and cognitive manifestation. First, *awareness of ignorance*. According to the Advaitins, when we are aware that we are ignorant, the object of our ignorance is not a negative fact called absence of awareness. For absence, i.e. a negative fact, cannot be perceived, percep-

tion being always a sense-object contact. So what we are aware of, when we are aware that we are ignorant, is not absence of awareness. Professor Banerjee then criticizes the Advaita theory of perception and develops the Nyāya contention in favour of the negative fact. He points out that absence may be perceived: 'The absence of jars may be said to be an attribute of its locus, the ground; and I may see the absence as my eyes will be related to the absence through the ground.' Thus ignorance may be a negative fact, and there is nothing in our awareness of ignorance that can prevent it and lend support to the contrary view of the Advaitins.

Again, the Advaitins undertake an in-depth analysis of the phenomenon of *cognitive manifestation* to show that ignorance is a quasi-positive fact. In every manifestation, there is a removal of the positive, concealing, covering fact. So a cognition makes a hitherto unmanifested object manifest by removing the quasi-positive ignorance responsible for the non-manifestation of the object. This obviously cannot please Professor Banerjee, who belongs inalienably to the Nyāya tradition. And so he gets over the Advaita contention in the following way: 'removal of ignorance and manifestation of the object are synchronous, or rather synonymous. And this is unintelligible if ignorance is positive.'

Section III contains a number of papers on Ontology. In these papers, Professor Banerjee considers various things: whether the notion of truth, especially the Nyāya notion of truth, presupposes any 'blue-blooded' ontology; in what sense truth is *subjective*; why metaphysical systems occupy the central place in Indian philosophy; whether metaphysical systems are outmoded; how one can learn profitably from the ontological traditions of both East and West; and how man's eternal quest for Being is *personal* and historical.

In 'Truth, Ontology and Subjectivity', Professor Banerjee first refers to two senses of truth—(a) truth as understood in common life, and (b) truth as understood in the deeper philosophical sense.

Hegel draws the distinction between the two and, at the same time, tries to show that in the depth of philosophical thought the difference tends to vanish. In the commonsense discourse the independence or, at any rate, the quasi-

independence of an ontological realm is somewhat uncritically postulated.

A refined form of commonsense ontology survives in the logico-epistemological notion of truth. Hegel points out that this notion is aligned to a correspondence theory of truth, correspondence between thought and its contents. But, following Molina, Professor Banerjee points out that, strictly speaking, the content of thought cannot be independent of the thought itself. For example, when one uses some such expressions as 'a true soldier' nothing is said of the soldier which is independent of him and with reference to which the propositional form of the expression 'true soldier' turns out to be true. Elaborating this line of argument, Professor Banerjee seeks to demonstrate the inadequacy of 'independent ontology' from a deeper Hegelian point of view.

Professor Banerjee examines the meanings of truth as found in Nyāya literature. Referring to *Nyāya-Kośa*, which opts for a strong realistic position, he delineates its uncompromising claim in favour of independent ontology. While some meanings of truth espoused by the Naiyāyikas are ontologically 'blue-blooded', there are other meanings which give different impressions, if not a diluted form, of ontology. He painstakingly analyses the concept of *yathārtha jñānam* (cognition adequate to its object) which gives initially a 'hard' ontological impression, but is not inconsistent with the commonsense view of the matter, which is rather 'soft' in its character. To buttress the point Professor Banerjee refers to the Nyāya concept of *lokayātrā* (everyday behaviour of the common folk) and *loka-vyavahāra* (ordinary language). In fact he tries to show that the 'blue-blooded' (strongly realistic) ontology of Nyāya has a trans-ontological ring about it. In this connection, he refers understandably to the views of the Buddhists and of idealists like Bosanquet. The other meaning of truth which proves very handy to Professor Banerjee is non-contradiction (*trikālabādhyam*). This too is a pointer to a diluted or weak ontology. In other words, the Nyāya notion of truth, contrary to a widespread belief, does not presuppose any 'blue-blooded' ontology.

To vindicate the subjective notion of truth Professor Banerjee makes a detour, criticizing the Advaita concepts of non-contradiction (*abādhitā*) and certainty (*niścaya*). The objectivity

or the object is not denied, but, being qualified by the said two concepts, the Advaita ontology considerably loses its so-called independence or externality. In brief, if all is consciousness, the knower-known or subject-object distinction becomes a sort of difference grounded in identity, and the division between ontological truth and logico-epistemological truth tends to disappear. Given this position, the supposed division between ontology, on the one hand, and epistemology, on the other, also gets systematically blurred.

From this position to the position of truth as subjectivity is not far off. Existentialists like Kierkegaard assert that truth is both ontological and epistemological. But according to Professor Banerjee, it would be more appropriate to say that truth is subjectivity. This is purported to establish the ontological primacy of subject or man. And the notion of propositional truth is assimilated under it.

In 'A Characteristic of Indian Philosophies and Its Interpretation' Professor Banerjee wants to capture the essential characteristic of Indian philosophies. He observes that 'the philosophies in India developed in the form of systems in which metaphysical doctrines occupy the central place'. Obviously one would be curious to know why Indian philosophies developed in that manner. Professor Banerjee explains that for Indian philosophers metaphysics is the science of all that is man. The purpose of philosophy was said to be liberation, and an essential condition for attaining liberation was thought to be knowledge of the proper being of man. To know man fully we should know what he is in essence and also in relation to the universe into which he is thrown and where he suffers. In other words, the science that strives to know all that is man also strives to know all that is, and metaphysics is fundamentally this science of the proper being of man. This being the subject matter of philosophy, it is only natural that philosophy should be cultivated in the form of a system.

In the paper 'Metaphysical Systems', Professor Banerjee strives to bring out the credentials of metaphysical systems without letting himself be stifled by the suffocating limitations of the much eulogized anti-metaphysical manoeuvres of the empiricists. He observes that metaphysical systems are not outmoded; they have not outlived their utility. They will remain

so long as we are what we are, viz. creative and engaged in a perpetual quest of identity. Professor Banerjee drives home his point by exploring the proper significance of the Kantian review of metaphysics. He argues that the Kantian treatment of metaphysics is a request for 'doing metaphysics in systems or, to borrow a term from the ecologists, for systematic thinking in metaphysics'.

What does a student of Western philosophy miss in Indian philosophy and vice versa? Professor Banerjee poses this question in 'East and West in Philosophy'. His profound response is the result of his unwearied explorations within the vast terrain of philosophy—both East and West. On the one hand, he observes, the Indian thinkers do not pay any heed to the concept of essence that is ingrained in Western tradition. Of course they were deeply concerned with the problem of universals. But the problem of universals does not run close to that of essence. On the other hand, the Western thinkers miss the flavour that constitutes the essence of *darśana* with its emphasis on something wider and deeper, a fully alive way of living based on some prelogical insight into the nature of true being, viz. the self. Still, as Professor Banerjee concludes, a study of Western philosophy by a student of Indian philosophy is really rewarding and vice versa; for an awareness of the contrast deepens the appreciation and enables one to learn from the two different traditions with greater profit.

In the long paper on 'Philosophy and History of Philosophy' Professor Banerjee works out the intimate relation between philosophy and history. In stating that philosophy is something *personal*, and so it is *historical*, Professor Banerjee obviously draws our attention to two crucial propositions: (1) Philosophical truths are personal, and (2) they are also historical. These two propositions are independent of one another, but they stand in premise-conclusion relation in the sense that a persuasion in favour of the first proposition is also a persuasion in favour of the second. Professor Banerjee's paper is an in-depth elaboration of this point.

In what sense are philosophical truths personal? Not in the sense that they spring from personal idiosyncrasies. But in the sense that philosophy is the story of man's eternal quest for Being that originates from his uneasy, painful and distinctly

unpleasant sense of non-Being. It is not the pain of what he *has not*, it is the pain of what he *is not*; this restlessness or disquiet is due to the call of the deeper level of Being to the surface level of Being. And philosophy is ultimately an attempt to record the call. But 'the call' is differently heard; as there are different levels of non-Being, there are different recipients, different kinds of recipients, different convictions, and accordingly different philosophies. Philosophy is thus something personal.

But if philosophical truths are personal, they are also historical. A philosopher documents his conviction as a member of what Professor Banerjee calls 'a confessional group', situated at a particular point of history. What gives shape to his conviction, his philosophy, is the confessional group he belongs to. It is his constant dialogue with the like-minded of his confessional group as well as with the opponents from the different camps that constitutes the story of his philosophical growth. And it is this that purges his philosophical conviction of all idiosyncrasies of subjective elements and makes it impersonal in a sense.

Our brief review of the papers included in this volume makes two things clear. First, Professor Banerjee's unwavering loyalty to ontology. He believed that all philosophical ventures, whether in language or in knowledge, are firmly anchored in ontology. Secondly, all his polemic reactions and attitudes stem fundamentally from the rich background of Indian thought and culture which had constantly nourished his thought. One may not always resonate in sympathy with his ideas, but nonetheless one will find in them a thrill that makes philosophy fun and the fun wonderful.

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I LANGUAGE

I

To Speak Clearly

I

We shall assume that the distinction between speaking and speaking clearly is unreal, and so either we can speak clearly, or we cannot speak. We shall also assume that in philosophy either we can speak in ordinary language, grooming it as and when necessary, or we cannot speak. And we shall argue the following propositions:

1. A fiction cannot be spoken of, as it has no nature of its own and so cannot be either identified or differentiated.
2. A fact can be spoken of, as it has a nature of its own, can be identified and differentiated, and has categorial and sub-categorial properties besides the unique properties that bestow on it its facthood and the properties that cut across categorial distinctions.
3. To speak clearly is to make use of a categorial scheme.
4. Ordinary language has the scheme as its structure, and so, though an analysis of it gives us a clue to the scheme it has structured, to identify the categories and also to detect the category-mistakes, we cannot depend on it alone.
5. What we require besides ordinary language to get the categories, and what may be said to evidence them, or to be their source, is what the Indian logicians termed *anubhava*, which may roughly be translated, by borrowing an expression from Stout, as noetic sentience, and *loka-yātrā*, which may similarly be translated as common sense, or on-goings of everyday life.¹

II

A Fiction Cannot Be Spoken Of

'Sky-lotus', 'rabbit's horn' and words or expressions like these are regarded as symbols for fictions. Such words are a bit

queer. We do not ordinarily use them in predicative sentences, affirmative or negative, and this is not without a significance of its own. Thus, a sentence is a grammatical fact, but what figures in it as a subject, or as a predicate, has an epistemological character as well. Thus viewed, the predicate gives a determination to the subject, and distinguishes or differentiates it. But a fiction-symbol does not either determine or differentiate. So no useful purpose is served by using a fiction-symbol as a predicate or a predicate-factor. For the same reason it is not used as a subject or a subject-factor. In short, a fiction-symbol does not determine or distinguish, and what it purports to symbolize has no nature to be identified or distinguished.

But this is not the case with a fact. It has a nature of its own. It has, as the Vaiśeṣikas put it, *asitā*,² is-ness. This is-ness should be distinguished from both *sattā*, existence, and *bhāvatva*, being. 'Being' may roughly be defined as the property of an object of yes-consciousness. But there are objects of yes-consciousness which have this property but do not cease to be. Only the objects that cease to be, and others which do not cease to be but are objects of the same category or categories—the categorial distinction among objects not being a function of occurring or ceasing to occur—have existence as their property.³ It is a class-property, simple and unanalysable, and may be present in more than one object. Being is not a class-property, for a class-property is an object of yes-consciousness, and if it were a class-property inhering in a class-property, that would have been a case of a universal of universal, and the harmful consequence of infinite regress would have been the result. But though not a class-property, it is also simple and unanalysable, is more comprehensive than existence, and is a property of more than one object. But is-ness is not such a property. The is-ness that one object has is not the is-ness that another object has.⁴ When a sky-flower is said to be a fiction, what precisely is meant is that it has no is-ness, or a property that it alone has. So it may be said to have every property (except is-ness, or a property like it) as well as no property. This is not the case with a fact. It is definite, has a nature of its own, and can be identified and differentiated.⁵

III

Every Fact Can Be Clearly Spoken Of

Every fact has is-ness. This may be treated as a definition of a fact in that what has no is-ness or a property like it cannot have any property, and so cannot be a fact, cannot be defined; and some definitions give us the use of a word or an expression.⁶ Now, if a fact had this property or properties of this type only, it would be unique, and as unspeakable as a fiction is. So though is-ness bestows on it its facthood, it does not ensure its speakability. To be spoken of, it should have other properties as well. And we should now make an attempt to see what they are, or what sort of properties they are.

So we may consider the case of a table which is definite, or a fact, and can be spoken of. When we say that an object is a table we distinguish it from what is not a table. That is, we identify it as a member of the class of all tables, and distinguish it from what is a member of a co-ordinate class. And, if the classification is not arbitrary, all the members of the class of all tables have a common property, that is, a property that is a property of every member of this class, and is not a property of any member of a co-ordinate class. It is table-ness, a simple and unanalysable property, given to noetic sentience, and in terms of it we distinguish a table from a chair, or from any object that is a member of a co-ordinate class.

But do we or can we always identify and distinguish an object in terms of such a property? Let us see. We may distinguish one table from another table, and we do this after taking into account qualities like colour, shape, size, texture, etc. of the two tables. So we may say that a quality may also help us to distinguish. But such a statement would be inadequate. For the two tables may be to a great extent alike in qualities, and in that case a quality would not be of any help. Again, if the two tables have different qualities, as when one is brown and the other is black, we think that we distinguish them in terms of the different colours they have, but actually we distinguish in terms of some simple property or properties. That is, we have to identify the two colours and distinguish them, and this we do in terms of the simple properties, viz.

brown-ness and black-ness. Besides, the brown colour of this table may be almost similar to the brown colour of another object—another table, or a cricket ball—and we distinguish them in terms of the objects they qualify. So there are occasions when we distinguish one quality from another quality in terms of the objects they qualify, and quality does not provide us with the criterion of identification and differentiation we are in search of.

It may be suggested that the space or the positions that the tables occupy may help us in distinguishing them. But that would not be a happy suggestion. For such space cannot be the space a geometrician studies, or a physicist speaks of. It should be what a layman understands as space. That is, to a layman what accounts for the use of expressions like 'near', 'to the left of', 'eastwards', etc. is space. It is a partless, ubiquitous and imperceptible thing.⁷ It is not what is immediately given to us. The points, or the so-called parts, of space are ideal divisions of it, and if it is not confused with extension, the question of dividing it, and that too infinitely, does not arise. Besides, the points of space are identified in terms of the objects that are said to occupy them, and so the objects are to be identified independently of them. This is borne out by re-identification, or re-cognition. When an object is re-cognized at a place different from the place where it was cognized, and the re-cognition is expressed as 'this is that object', 'this' stands for the object in the place where it is re-cognized, and 'that' for the object at the place where it was cognized; and though the two places differ, the difference between 'this' and 'that' is ignored, and the object is regarded as the same identical object; and to account for this we require something that is not separable from the object, or is an inseparable property of the object. The Vaiśeṣikas thought that when an object is a compound object—and such an object is always categorially a substance⁸—it is distinguished from another compound object in terms of its constituent parts; and that therefore when an object is simple, or indivisible, and categorially a substance, it is distinguished from another simple substance belonging to the same class and having similar qualities and actions in terms of an ultimate differentium⁹ which is self-differentiating. We need not consider whether by introducing something self-differentiating

they failed to cut the Gordian knot, or begged the issue. We would be content with the observation that a compound object like a table may be more satisfactorily distinguished from another almost similar table in terms of its parts than in terms of its positions in space, and shall consider the question whether a table is not distinguished from table-ness, or from its brown colour or from objects of that type in a way that differs from the way it is distinguished from another table, or a chair, and for that matter, any object like paper, or a pencil, or a broomstick.

We think that the question should be answered affirmatively. A table is not distinguished from table-ness, or from a colour in the same way as it is distinguished from a chair, or a sofa. The class of all chairs is a co-ordinate class of all tables. This is not the case with the class of all browns. Neither is the class of all browns either super-ordinate or sub-ordinate to the class of all tables. Besides, though its colour occasionally distinguishes a table from another table, it is also distinguished from another almost similar colour in terms of the table of which it is a quality. Similarly with table-ness. Now, the objects that may be members of co-ordinate classes (or sets), or members of classes (or sets) that may be arranged by way of super-ordination or sub-ordination may be said to be in or under the same tree, and objects of one tree are distinguished in a different way from the objects of a different tree, and may be said to be categorially different—a categorial property being the property which is the property of all the members of the most comprehensive class (or set) of the tree, other than the properties of 'being an object', 'being', and 'existence'. That is, 'being an object' is not a categorial property in that it does not differentiate, and the objects having it cannot be given the tree-type arrangement. Similarly, 'being' is a property that every positive fact has, and though it differentiates the objects having it, they cannot be arranged in the way spoken of above. This is true also of 'existence'. But properties like 'being a substance', 'being a quality', etc. are not of this sort. And they are the categorial properties.

Thus, a property like 'is-ness' that confers uniqueness on a fact and enables it to have or not to have some other properties is of no help in clear speaking. Similarly, a property like 'being'

that may be a property of objects of many trees does not mark off objects in the way required for clear speaking. A category or a categorial property does it. They help us to identify objects in a broad way. They are the 'ultimate predicates', to use an Aristotelian term, and all predications in terms of them are 'essential predications'. Anyway, when we say that an object is a substance, or a quality, and so on, we in a broad way identify it, and we make the identification more specific when we ascribe the sub-categorial, less comprehensive properties—the least comprehensive such property being the property to which the narrower or the less comprehensive property is is-ness or a property like it.

IV

To Speak Clearly is to Make Use of a Categorial Scheme

From what has been said above, it would be obvious that to speak clearly we should use a categorial scheme, and we need not dwell on this point any more. We may now ask the question whether when we use categories we speak of facts as they are or as they are known. In other words, if the categorial and sub-categorial properties are the contributions of imagination or understanding, then when to speak clearly we use categories, we do not speak of the facts as they are but as they are known. This is a well-known doctrine, and we cannot here discuss it fully. We would only say a few words against it, and also a few words in support of the contrary doctrine that we endorse.

Thus, against the doctrine we would say that it is difficult to understand how one may distinguish the two kinds of unspeakables, viz. the fictions and the facts as they are. A fiction is without a nature of its own, and a fact, it ought to be said, has a nature, but its nature is not categorial. That is, in our mode of speaking, a fact as it is has is-ness, but no other property. But there is hardly any reason for distinguishing between properties in this way. That the other properties are comprehensive, i.e. they may be properties of more than one object, is not puzzling, if a property is not understood on the model of a quality. So also the distinction between what has a property and the property is not unintelligible if we do not try to understand what has a property as something to be under-

stood as something with a property but without it. And the question of the relation between them presents difficulties if relations are treated as terms, or if it is not seen that the fundamental relation is one in which the nature of either of the relata may function as a relation. Besides, the facts as they are, are distinguished from facts as they are known, and if this is sought to be accounted for in terms of having or not having categorial properties, the account would be self-defeating in that even if 'having a categorial property' is treated as a property, it will not distinguish, and besides 'not having a categorial property' will be a property different from a property like *is-ness* and co-ordinate with 'having a categorial property' and so will be either a categorial property, or a more comprehensive, super-categorial property like *'being'*.

It may be argued that our mode of speaking is misleading us, and is at the root of the above considerations which are or look like sophistries. But the argument would be a lame one. For our mode of speaking has for its basis common sense, or the on-goings of everyday life. Thus, a sub-categorial property like *table-ness*, if it is a property of the object and not an imposition, ensures that classification is not arbitrary; and so an object is a member of a class not because we are pleased to make it its member, but because it demands to be recognized or coerces us into recognizing it as such. To deny this, or to hold that classification is always arbitrary is to deny the distinction between the world of facts and the world of fancy, and this makes the on-goings of everyday life impossible. Besides, noetic sentience evidences the reality or the non-impositional character of these properties.

Another point, a technical one in Indian logic, may be mentioned. To hold that properties other than *is-ness* and its like are constructions of the imagination is to hold also that every inference is a positive-contrapositive.¹⁰ But a careful analysis of inference shows that only in the case of purely contrapositive inference, the fact-implicate may figure as the qualificand of an inferential judgement, and the relation between a contrapositive application and the inferential judgement consequent upon it differs radically from the relation between a positive application and the inferential judgement consequent upon it, and the difference is so radical that the

causal character of the two types of application has to be separately stated, that is, it cannot be assimilated and expressed in a single formula.¹¹ Indeed, the relation of implication flowing from smoke to fire is different from the relation of implication flowing from absence of fire to absence of smoke. From 'p implies q' we may by transposition obtain 'not-q implies not-p'. But this is to educe; and no such eduction or transposition is permissible when the factual implicative relation (FIR), or the inductive relation is asserted from the nature of the case on positive instances only, or on negative instances only; and it is questionable if without being exceedingly artificial one definition of FIR may cover two types of FIR.

V

Categories and Ordinary Language

On the basis of what we have said we may assert that the categories are embedded in ordinary language, or that an analysis of ordinary language gives us a clue to the categories involved in speaking. So it is only natural that many philosophers interested in the question of categories have given considerable attention to language, and we have neither the requisite scholarship nor space at our disposal to review the outcomes of these efforts in this paper. We would only spell out our qualms about any theory of categories based on a consideration of language only. Thus, we may ask whether such a theory would be based on a consideration of uncombined expressions or words, or on a consideration of combined expressions or sentences. When it is based on a consideration of the first type it may provide us with ultimate predicates. But if the ultimate predicates are the predicates generalized, then they are all that may in the final analysis be said of an individual. This implies that only individuals may figure as subjects. Whether from a strictly logical point of view it is reasonable to hold this, we do not know. But undoubtedly from the epistemological point of view this cannot be maintained. It also implies that the categorial distinctions are not absolute in the sense required for clear speaking. Thus, an individual table may be said to be a substance, a member of the class of all tables, brown and so on. But when we say that table is a member of the class of all

tables we do not distinguish it from another substance, say, a chair, in the same way as we distinguish it from table-ness, or from its colour etc. In other words, 'being a substance', 'being a quality', etc. are, as we have argued before, properties of all the members of the co-ordinate and comprehensive classes (or sets), and so what has one such property cannot have another such property. But the table of categories provided by Aristotle and based on a consideration of uncombined expressions, when interpreted in the above manner, denies this, and so cannot be very helpful in clear speaking. Possibly this was the reason for his scholastic followers converting his theory of categories into a theory of ultimate types of nameable objects. But then such a theory cannot be based on a consideration of language merely. We should seek the help of experience. It would have been very unfortunate if language was not adequate for experience. But then it cannot decide whether it is adequate. An extra-linguistic criterion is necessary. Besides, a theory of categories when based on a consideration of uncombined expressions cannot do justice to the objects of no-consciousness. 'No', 'not' and similar words, when uncombined, do not give any clue to the kind of objects they stand for. When combined with words but not made parts of a sentence, they can convey only something indefinite, or otherness. This defect may be partly remedied when we base our theory of categories on a consideration of sentences. But then also we do not do full justice to the objects of a no-consciousness. The subject of negative facts is too large to be discussed here. We should only observe that a negative fact satisfies all the conditions for being called a fact that a positive fact satisfies. It has is-ness, is definite, distinguishes and can be distinguished. Besides, we cannot say that a no-consciousness can be reduced to a yes-consciousness, or that it denies or declares to be false what a corresponding yes-consciousness asserts or that it is non-intentional. And a no-consciousness shows a negative fact as abiding in a locus, and a consideration of an ordinary predicative sentence cannot bring this out. Indeed, the only kind of negative fact on which it may throw some light is what the Nyāya logicians call mutual absence. If we consider sentences only, we should deny constant absence, and we cannot do it.¹²

Again, when we base our theory of categories on a considera-

tion of sentences, we should ask the question whether the sentences are to be considered as expressions of some knowledge or judgement, or just as they are. If we adopt the first course, we perilously approach a theory of categories of the Kantian type, the consequence of which is that we can talk clearly of facts as they are known and not as they are. But we have already argued that this is not a satisfactory position to hold. But if we adopt the second course, we seem to claim that language unaided by experience can lay down its criterion of adequacy. And we have already argued that this is a very tall claim on the nature of language and it cannot be met. In substantiation of it we may refer to the criterion of absurdity on which Prof. Ryle relied heavily to identify the categories or the category-mistakes, and to the opinion of competent thinkers that he was not successful.

VI

Noetic Sentience and Categories

Though categories are embedded in language and language may provide us with clues about categories, yet, if not aided by noetic sentience, language cannot be of any help. Noetic sentience is experience uncorrupted by obscure and artificial metaphysical views, and is at the basis of the on-goings of everyday life. What is given to it is never a bare particular, but particulars with properties that may be arranged hierarchically in respect of their comprehensiveness. We have discussed before in what way the on-goings of everyday life justify us in holding that a class-property like table-ness is a property of the object, and so is not an imposition, and that this is true of every categorial or sub-categorial property. We have also argued that is-ness or a property like it is not a property of a fiction, and so no categorial or sub-categorial property is also a property of it. But this is not the case with a fact. A fact is definite. It would not have been definite if it had no is-ness. But it would not be adequately definite if it had it only and not the categorial and sub-categorial properties. And if it is not adequately definite it is hardly definite. That is, there is no opposition between is-ness and the comprehensive properties. 'Not having is-ness' does not imply 'having comprehensive

properties' and vice versa; otherwise a fiction would have either is-ness or some comprehensive property. Similarly, 'having is-ness' does not imply 'not having comprehensive properties' and vice versa. For a comprehensive property is referred, not to a fiction but to a fact which on receiving it as a predicate does not cease to be a fact. Besides, we may affirm or deny any comprehensive property of a fiction. But we cannot do this with a fact. We affirm or deny some comprehensive properties of some facts, and the distinction between affirmative and negative judgements is not arbitrary, but based on the nature of facts. So what has is-ness, has some comprehensive properties and does not have some others. 'Having is-ness' does not imply 'not having any comprehensive property'. Every fact has is-ness and one or other categorial property or properties, and can be clearly spoken of.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers hold that *vācyatā* or nameability (speakability) is an unnegatable property, *kevalānvayīdharma*. They also formulate a theory of categories. There is a connection between the two. But they do not work out the connection. This paper attempts to do it as a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher would have done if asked to do so, and it has done this from the standpoint of a speaker. But then it is not just a paper on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy, but on a philosophical question.
2. 'astitā' as used by Praśastapāda has been interpreted differently by different writers on him, and we have followed Śrīdhara and Jagadīśa.
3. *dhvaṃsakāraṇatāvaccchedakatayā sattājatisiddheḥ*: This way of constructing *sattā* has some limitations, but they may be overcome by suitable insertions.
4. *ubhayāvṛttidharma*: see K. Tarkācārya on *Bhāṣaratnam* (Calcutta, 1936), p. 63.
5. In fables, myths, stories, etc. we seem to talk clearly on fictions. But actually we do not. For whereas a sentence like 'A tiger tore him to pieces' yields knowledge, a sentence like 'A dragon tore him to pieces' does not. In the first case, 'tiger' figures as the qualificand, *viśeṣya*, and its state or condition of being a qualificand, *viśeṣyatā*, is limited, *avacchinna*, by the limiting property, *avacchedakadharmā*, 'tigerness', a simple and unanalysable property given to noetic sentience. But in the second case no such qualificand-ness-limiting property is available. 'Dragon-ness' is not given to noetic sentience, nor is it a cause-ness limiter, *kāraṇatāvaccchedaka*, or an effect-ness limiter, *kāryatāvaccchedaka*. And there

cannot be any knowledge if qualificand-ness is not limited. Similarly, barring the case of sensations, qualificand-ness should be described by qualifier-ness, *prakāratā*. In the first case, 'tearing him to pieces' figures as the qualifier-ness and it describes the qualificand-ness residing in a tiger, as it permits itself to be described. But in the second case, it does not describe, for the so-called qualificand-ness residing in 'a dragon' does not permit itself to be described.

6. A definition, so the Indian logicians think, serves either of the two purposes, viz. *vyavahāra* and *vyāvṛtti*. The first gives the use of a word or expression, and the second states how the definiendum is to be differentiated. 'What has earth-ness, is earth' illustrates the first type, and 'What has smell, is earth' illustrates the second type. It is the orthodox view that the types are irreducibly different. But it should be mentioned that even the first type of definition is not stipulative or nominal. It is real as it is given in terms of the property which every definiendum has. The definition of fact given in the paper is of the first type. A definition of the second type is not available. For a fiction does not differentiate. Besides, the word 'fiction' is not a fiction. And so a definition of the first type for both 'fiction' and 'fact' may be given.
7. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account of *dik* when read between the lines is an account of a layman's use of such expressions, or of the experiences at their back.
8. Rightly viewed, the question of distinguishing is the question of distinguishing what is categorially a substance. A quality or an action is distinguished in terms of the substance of which it is a quality or an action. A class-property or its analogue distinguishes that of which it is a property from that of which it is not a property. But it may be given to us only as the property of the object of which it is a property. So, the problem of distinguishing is in the ultimate analysis a problem of distinguishing between substances.
9. *viśeṣa*.
10. *anvayī-vyatirekī*. We have adapted some expressions of Mill and Johnson and have translated *vyāpti* as factual implicative relation, FIR, or as inductive relation; *sādhya* as fact-implicate; *hetu* as fact-implicans; *parāmarśa* as application or applicative judgement; *anumati* as inferential judgement; and following Stcherbatsky, *anvayī* as purely positive; *vyatirekī* as purely contrapositive; and *anvayī-vyatirekī* as positive-contrapositive; and following Ingalls, *viśeṣya* as qualificand; *viśeṣyatā* as qualificandness; *prakāra* as qualifier; *prakāratā* as qualificierness; *avacchedaka-dharma* as limiter. And throughout the paper we have used the term property as the English equivalent of *dharma*, and knowledge as that of *jñāna*.
11. Jāgadiśa, *Pakṣatā* (Chowkhamba edition), pp. 117-118; Jāgadiśa, *Śabda-śaktiprakāśikā* (Calcutta edition), p. 5.
12. *anyonyābhāva*, mutual absence; *atyantābhāva*, constant absence.

Language and Reality

This paper proposes to discuss the question of the relation between language and reality. Considered abstractly, it seems that three relations are possible, viz. identity, adequacy and inadequacy. Thus, one may hold that language is reality, or one may either assert or deny that language is adequate to reality. This is how Lord Russell once stated the case. He observed that on the question of the relation between language and reality a philosopher may hold one of the following positions: (i) that language reveals or expresses reality so that an analysis of the structure of language is also an analysis of the structure of reality; (ii) that language conceals or falsifies reality; and (iii) that language is reality. It is not clear, however, whether he intended his observation to be descriptive or logical; and fortunately it is not necessary to dig deep into his intentions. This paper does not propose to discuss his views. Neither does it intend to formulate its problem as he did. Besides, if the question is not considered in an abstract way, that is, if reference is made to the development of metaphysical thought in history, or if such thought is subjected to critical analysis, it will become apparent that on this issue philosophers have held other positions also; though the question of reducing these positions, and for that matter, the position that this paper proposes to uphold, to the three positions mentioned above will remain an open one. This is rather unfortunate. But the idea of improving, at least partially, by formulating the thesis of this paper through a critical examination of the three theses mentioned above should be given up as impracticable. For, in the first place, this cannot be done within the limited space of this paper. Secondly, it is not unlikely that the exegetical analysis of the different views may bring out that their proponents use 'language' and 'reality' differently and so differ.

To put it in the non-linguistic mode, there are different views on the relation between language and reality as there are different views on their nature. And it is neither feasible nor useful to *subject the different uses or views to a critical examination*. It is not feasible because the task cannot be undertaken within the compass of the paper. And it is not useful because the different uses are decisional (in the non-linguistic mode, the different views are alogically founded). But does not this condemn this paper never to start? Yes and no. Yes, because without making a decision it cannot proceed. No, because the decision will be made in a conventional framework. Thus, to take a decision, the paper will start from somewhere, and the starting-point will be describable by words used in their conventional senses; and though the starting-point may be neither self-evident nor capable of being shown to be the only starting-point, an unsophisticated person may admit that it has a claim to be a starting-point. Thus, this paper proposes to discuss the issue by analysing foundational thinking or the metaphysical élan. Indeed it is the metaphysical élan that creates the problem of this paper, and so we refuse to discuss the issue in an abstract way; and in our attempt to take the decisions we propose to start with the statement that what fulfils the metaphysical élan is reality and its communication-instrument is language. In this statement 'metaphysical élan' and 'communication-instrument' have been used in their familiar senses, and in our attempt to take our decisions we need only refer to representative metaphysical thoughts and try to gather what fulfilled them and how they communicated. True, 'metaphysics' owes its origin to what may with some propriety be called chance, and there is no reason for disputing the contention that its etymology, though not unfair to Greek thought, is false in that what is of importance in its use is not 'physics' but 'meta'. Metaphysics is going beyond—ordinarily beyond common sense and science, and so beyond *physis*, the sensible natural world, and in metaphysics of metaphysic beyond metaphysics. So what fulfils the metaphysical élan is 'the beyond', the transcendent; and a perusal of the history of philosophy confirms that the transcendent may be understood either objectively or subjectively. All this, as has already been observed, is true; but instead of standing in the way of our

taking the decisions, it provides us with a convenient point of departure. Thus, we propose to define 'reality' as what transcends; and if it can be shown that responsible metaphysical, i.e. foundational, thinking has always been occupied with the transcendent, the definition will get all the support that it needs, and the question of defining the 'transcendent', an indispensable aspatial metaphor, will also not arise. And it may be added parenthetically that it is not unlikely that in our attempt to get our definitions we may formulate our question and get the answer also. But has metaphysical thinking been always occupied with the transcendent? Yes. Thus, if we begin at the beginning, that is, if we consider the case of the Milesians, we shall find that they not only brought metaphysics into existence, but also gave it its subject matter, viz. transcendent being. That these thinkers were cosmologists and so metaphysicians may not be objected to. Similarly it may be said that that they were concerned with reality is a philosophical commonplace. But the contention that the transcendent fulfilled the metaphysical élan working in them may be questioned, and a few words are necessary in support of it. Thus, the fundamental idea of the Milesians was that of transformation, and when an attempt was made to formulate it precisely, as, for example, in Anaximenes, in terms of condensation and rarefaction, the Milesian philosophy revealed its true character, which was the Pythagorean philosophy of forms in its rudiments. Thus, to the question why different kinds of things behaved differently the answer of the Pythagoreans (and also of Plato and Aristotle) was that they exhibited different forms, and Anaximenes' doctrine of condensation and rarefaction was this doctrine in its rudimentary form. Now, in relation to the things which embody them, the forms are essences, and in relation to the human mind that studies them, they are intelligibles. They are objects of a different order. They are, so to say, in a world of their own, and one unable to suspend the naturalistic attitude knows nothing of this world. But a person in whom the metaphysical élan is working cannot help noting that besides *physis* there is the world of the intelligibles, and it is the latter world that provides the foundation for the former. Roughly, this is the Pythagorean doctrine of forms, or what it implies; and it is well known that the Greek thinkers developed

this view with rare skill and boldness. And what is important for this paper is that even the philosophy of the Milesians in which *physis* occupied the most important place was this philosophy in its rudiments. So it may be said that metaphysical thinking is *transcendence-initiated*. The naturally given world does not satisfy it. It functions to be situated in the transcendent. Indeed, the transcendent and metaphysical thinking situate each other. The transcendental world is the world of the unchanging essence, and metaphysical thinking likes to express it as the world of the uncovered. That is, the essences do not change, and so like the inherently transitory sensible things of the everyday world, they do not deceive people by making them think what they are not. The world of forms is the world of the undeceptive and the unhidden. It alone satisfies metaphysical thinking and accordingly is held by the Milesians as the real world, the world that essentially is, the world of being, the world that provides the foundation of the natural world, the world-apparent, the world that existentially is, the world of becoming. Thus, metaphysical thinking situates the transcendent. Similarly, the transcendent situates metaphysical thinking. If metaphysical thinking downgrades the natural world by making the essential world or the transcendent stately, the transcendent also confers dignity on it by challenging and in the process by reconstructing the popular ideas of knowledge and truth. That is, it persuades the theorists of knowledge to formulate the following thesis: What completely is, is completely knowable; the sensible world is perpetually changing, and so it is only incompletely; the senses, therefore, do not show what completely is, and being condemned to the worlds of belief and opinion, are the sources of inferior evidence; the source of superior evidence is pure or *metaphysical thought*—*thought that has freed itself from the snares of the senses*; metaphysical thought alone gives knowledge and truth. Thus, it is clear that metaphysical thought and the transcendent situate each other and one is adequate for the other. Only the transcendent satisfies metaphysical thought and only metaphysical thought evinces the transcendent.


This is the first step in the analysis of the metaphysical *élan*. What it amounts to may be summed up as follows. The relation between reality (the transcendent) and (metaphysical)

thought is one of adequacy. To put it in the Hegelian mode, what is real is rational, and what is rational is real. Before the second step is taken it may be in order that the bearing of this proposition on this paper is briefly worked out. Thus, this thought is embedded in words. It is *logos*. Language is its essence and conversely. This language need not be some ideal language. It is any historical language. True, historical languages contain a host of symbols referring to the sensibles. But this is unimportant. For it is in its encounter with the sensibles that thought goes beyond them and finds its fulfilment, its other in the intelligibles. Besides, such symbols also mean forms, and it is this feature unique to language that makes the relation between language and thought unique and gives birth to the problem whether it is possible to think or speak of the unique particular. Be that as it may, the transcendent affixes its seal on language as on thought, and unifies them uniquely. Indeed, the transcendent also gets uniquely unified with them, and a unique and comprehensive unity of thought, language and the transcendent is formed. Thus, the upshot of the first level analysis of the metaphysical élan is that language is adequate to reality, if not essentially identical with it. And the fact that there are many historical languages always developing does not offer any difficulty; for, considered transcendently, i.e. in respect of their essences, the languages do not differ; and learning being a form of recollection, the development is only existential, or a ceaseless tearing away of the cover of the uncovered.

Now an attempt may be made to take the second step in the analysis. It has to be taken for transcending the transcendent, though from a certain point of view such an attempt is impossible, for one may say that it is impossible to transcend the transcendent. Yet if the reciprocal appropriateness of metaphysical thinking and the transcendent dealt with at the first level is made the subject of metaphysical thinking in the sense of foundational thinking, attempts must be made to transcend the transcendent. Indeed, the attempt at going beyond constitutes the essence of metaphysical thinking. When it focuses its attention on *physis*, it goes beyond it to find its fulfilment in the essences. But when it is focused on the essences and therefore on the metaphysical thinking just dealt with, henceforth to be

spoken of as essential thinking, it goes beyond them. This process of going beyond should continue unless it arrives at the real first, the decisively transcendent. In other words, essential thinking is appropriate for the essences and conversely. But are they the real first? Is it not necessary that knowledge and being, essential thinking and the essences, should be founded in something higher, something that goes beyond both of them, something that transcends the transcendent? Plato's answers to these questions are well known. He attempted to go beyond the Ideas and arrived at the Idea of the Good which transcends both being and knowledge in dignity and power. Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists had followed him in this. The proposition that this school of thinkers wanted to make was that metaphysical thinking is open (to use a word of Heidegger but in the sense given by the context) not to *physis*, nor again to the essences, but to what transcends the transcendent, the super-transcendent. It is its source and origin; its movement towards the beyond is, so to say, a journey towards its home. Anyway, the evidences of essential thinking are not the best evidences. Essential thinking is not the real first. The real first is the decisively transcendent, which is always more than what one can think or speak of. It is the ineffable. Here nothingness is more full than being and silence is more eloquent than speech. This is the second step, rather the second step in one direction, in the analysis of the metaphysical élan, and it may be named 2a; and before the steps in the other directions are taken into account, it is advisable that the bearings of this step on this paper may be briefly indicated.

It has already been stated that the real in 2a is ineffable. It is more than what one can think or speak of. But then the statement cannot be taken literally, for that would amount to a plain self-contradiction. Can thought think of something beyond it? Can speech speak of anything beyond speech? Does not one remain on this side of thought and speech when one asserts that something is beyond them and so gets involved in self-contradiction? The answer to these questions is obvious. The statement cannot be taken literally; though in view of the above considerations it cannot be held improper. It may be suggested that the only way out lies in drawing a distinction between two kinds of thought or language, thus holding



that though one cannot think or speak of the decisively transcendent in one sense of 'thought', and 'language', in the other sense one can. There is nothing wrong with the suggestion, but everything depends on how the distinction is drawn. It is clear that it is not accessible to essential thought or rational language. But to what kind of thought or language is it accessible? It seems that a consideration of the thought or language that is associated with our ways of thinking or speaking about it may be of some help here. Thus, it is found that we think of it negatively and speak of it in metaphorical language which from the philosophic point of view is rather coarse and undeveloped. The implications of it may be indicated in the following way. Negative thinking is, so to say, a withdrawal, a retreat, a falling back, a rupture, and is thus successful in marking the distance between it and thought. In other words, affirmative thinking creates the myth of union, but negative thinking explodes it and so is closer to the decisively transcendent, though in its decisive transcendence it is not accessible to it. This is also the case with the metaphorical language found in the scriptures in abundance. Such language may sometimes be affirmative grammatically. But then it is written on its forehead that it is inappropriate. And the consciousness of its inappropriateness is also a consciousness of its distance from the decisively transcendent. Moreover, the fact that this language is metaphorical suggests that the super-transcendent is open to the poetic or aesthetic consciousness, though not to logical or essential thought. Again, this language sometimes takes the form of injunction or command, and it is also a fact that ethical consciousness seeks a foundation in the decisively transcendent.¹ So it seems that it is open to aesthetic or ethical language, but not to rational or conceptual language.

Now an attempt may be made to introduce 2b, the second step in the other direction. The second step, as already mentioned, is taken as at the first level essential thinking is taken for granted and the question whether it is really the first is not asked. But the question is unavoidable and so the second step is taken. In 2a metaphysical thought moves exteriorwise and finds its fulfilment in the great without. But it is not clear if this great without is immediate also. It seems to end the restless attempt at going beyond on the part of metaphysical thinking

by insensitizing it as it were. So it is doubtful if it is decisively transcendent on account of its immediacy. It may be aesthetically, or ethically, or religiously immediate. But this is beside the point. For only metaphysical immediacy is relevant and it is doubtful if it is so. Indeed, the approach in terms of negation as well as metaphorical language suggests that its distance alone can be within the ken of thought, it remaining outside. So it is in order that the second step be taken in the reverse direction. Instead of moving towards the exterior an attempt may be made to move towards the interior, to move beyond the objectively transcendent to the subjectively transcendent, the transcendental.

It may be mentioned at the outset that 2b moves on many lines, and it is not necessary that this paper should pay attention to all of them. Thus, the subjectivist analysis as found in phenomenology or existentialism has no bearing on this paper, and so it may ignore this analysis. That is, in Husserl phenomenology is essentially a method and the question that is of importance to him is one of meaning. In other words, phenomenology at its beginnings was anti-metaphysical. It was concerned with the foundation of all knowledge and the intentional structure of consciousness. Undoubtedly it was ontologically committed, and in the course of its development it was found formulating the ontology that was at its back. This may not be evident in Husserl, but in Heidegger it is. But Heidegger does not move beyond phenomenology. Like Husserl he is also not interested in the traditional ontological question on *what there is*; his question being 'what is the meaning of being?' True, his later philosophical views remind one more of Plotinus and the mystics than of Husserl in that the world of being and meaning is no longer for him the human world which phenomenology holds, and his remark that 'Eckhart is the ancient Master of destiny and life' must annoy a phenomenologist. But this is irrelevant. For his fundamental ontology condemns metaphysics. Existentialism also is anti-metaphysical. Indeed, contemporary philosophy in the continent or in England or in America is on the whole anti-metaphysical. And this paper aims to be a metaphysical essay. It holds that the metaphysicians have a case. The problem it is discussing, construed metaphysically, is a genuine problem. Neither is it unformul-

able nor is its discussion unrewarding. Formulated in a general way, it is possible to go beyond a metaphysics of objects, i.e. the kind of metaphysics that essential thinking builds. A critic of metaphysics may study this problem to liquidate metaphysics. This paper proposes to take a different attitude. It does not agree that an external criticism of metaphysics may be successful. If metaphysics of objects is to be transcended, it should be done from within. If the great without does not satisfy, a subjectivistic turn may be taken, but it will not do to situate it in something contingent like the life-world, or the human intellect, or a consciousness embedded in history. Be that as it may, we are metaphysically intrigued and so will not discuss the phenomenological and similar turns towards subjectivity, though we hold in high esteem phenomenological analyses of language. Thus, we appreciate Heidegger's attempt to dig into the everyday meaning of words to find out the buried meanings and to situate language at its source. Similarly, we hold in high esteem Merleau-Ponty's analysis of speech, particularly the distinction that he draws between authentic speech and second order expression, as well as the point he makes that a word is a gesture and gives its existential meaning also. We hold that his analysis of speech is successful in solving the vexed questions of communication and teaching of language as well as in explaining the pre-scientific opinion that naming an object is causing it to exist or to change. But then this has little bearing on this paper. It will accordingly consider the subjectivist turn which is decidedly metaphysical.

The second step in the analysis that is taken as evidence of essential thinking is not adequate. So in 2a an attempt was made to go beyond it, and the foundation of all thinking and being was found in the great without. But it was not clear if this without was immediate. Indeed, 2a seems to be an attempt to go beyond metaphysics of objects in the direction of objectivity, though of a higher order. If this is denied, if it is held that the great without is immediate also, then there is no reason why this should not be held as the great within also. Thus, 2a may develop into 2b. But 2b may also be independently worked out. Thus, the doubt concerning essential thinking may be construed as a radical doubt, and it may be asked if it is possible to overcome it. The Cartesian treatment of the ques-

tion is well known and this paper need not dwell on it. It needs only to confirm it by giving it a formulation that suits it. Thus, the Cartesian argument shows that if being and thought of being are not unified in an undifferentiated immediacy, the radical doubt cannot be overcome. It may be elaborated by contrasting this unity with essential unity, i.e. the unique kind of unity that holds between essential thinking and the essences, and was dealt with when the first step of analysis was presented. Thus, essential unity is a relational unity. Essential thinking is appropriate for the essences and conversely. But the thinking is objective. It is intentional and relational. It refers and relates. The distance between thought and being remains. The equations between thought of being and being of thought, between thought of the being of thought and being of the thought of thought, between thought of thought of being and being of thought of being, and so on, do not hold. It is not an immediate unity. Here being and thought cohere and form a comprehensive unity. But then being does not think. Here we have a thought-being correlation and thought is of being and not of itself. And it is precisely this that calls the evidences of essential thinking in question. In other words, essential thinking shows the essences and not itself, and if essential thinking is the only form of thinking, infinite regress is unavoidable. This regress cannot be overcome by holding that what is necessary is that the essences be shown. For this is just the point at issue. For it is essential thinking that evinces the essences, and if it is not given, the question whether the evidences are superior becomes meaningless. Similarly, the attempt at uncovering the nature of essential thinking through a reflection on the essences does not meet the demand. For the reflective consideration of essential thinking presupposes a non-reflective awareness of it. To think differently is not possible. That is, if essential thinking is not given, if it is *aprasiddha*, the question of considering it reflectively does not arise. If it is said that essential thinking is accompanied by an accessory pre-essential thinking which shows it, then the turn towards subjectivity is taken, though only half-heartedly, in that only a self-illuminating, eternally accomplished immediacy can meet the demand. Indeed, essential thinking is not thinking proper. It is not self-illuminating and therefore not different in this respect from the

physis beyond which it goes. It is unconscious. It is the human spontaneity which may be termed imagination or *tr̥ṣṇā* or *avidyā* according to the mode of expression that suits the speaker, and it is no wonder that some subjectivists situate it in the life-world or history. The metaphysical élan cannot find its fulfilment in it. It must condemn it as *dṛśya* or appearance. When the nominalist, being annoyed by the doctrine of essences, uses his dialectical skill to demonstrate the contradiction it involves, he is guided by a sound metaphysical instinct. And the realist's attempt to refute him on the ground that his doctrine puts everyday language and everyday life in jeopardy only proves how metaphysically insensitive he is, in that this is not the way to overcome radical doubt. Be that as it may, it is necessary that essential thinking should be transcended and that pre-essential, self-revealing, eternally accomplished immediacy should be accepted as the real first. This is annoying to some thinkers and it is no use denying this. But then the point must be made that this annoyance rests on a misunderstanding. For it is due to the belief that the alternative to essential thinking is lived experience or the ineffable. But this belief is wrong. For the immediacy under consideration may be talked of. True, its nature is not linguistic. In the language of Yoga philosophy it is *smṛtiśāṃkarya parīsuddha*, that is, meanings recollected by verbal symbols are not mixed with it. But that does not imply that it cannot be talked of or that it should be talked of only negatively or in metaphorical language to mark its distance from linguistic thought. That is, the idea that language gives rise to mediate knowledge or is concerned with relational meanings is not securely founded. The Advaitins have shown how illusory the idea is. It is not necessary for this paper to formulate the Advaita theory of language. Its purpose will be served if it develops a few salient points of the theory in the mode of speaking it has adopted. Thus, the idea that a sentence means objects in relation rests chiefly on a theory of word meaning according to which a word gives its meaning through differentiation. But this theory is defective. It cannot account for the differences in the awareness consequent upon sentences like 'This is a table' and 'This is a table and not a chair'. That is, a consideration of the differences in these awarenesses suggests that a word gives its meaning and the

meaning differentiates. The word does not differentiate. The differentiation is consequential. It follows the apprehension of the *svarūpa*, the true nature of the object meant, and if this nature is an undifferentiated unity, the differentiation does not follow as a consequence.² That is, to understand the meaning of a sentence it is not necessary that the hearer should adopt a relational frame of mind. What is necessary is that he should take into account the intention of the speaker or the context (*upakarma*, etc.) of the sentence.³ Indeed, when in a sentence more than one non-synonymous, uninflected name word occurs and they purport to mean an undifferentiated unity, it is successful in giving the meaning it intends to give. To deny this will entail the denial of the validity of the recognitive consciousness.⁴ That a word means a universal, and so cannot mean the immediate, does not constitute an objection. For it may be said in reply that a word means not a disembodied universal but a universal embodied in a particular, and so when one is given the sentence, 'the table is an occurrent', one understands its meaning and the fact that tableness is a universal and non-occurrent does not stand in the way of one's apprehension. That is, he relates occurrentness to the particular and ignores the universal and is successful in apprehending the meaning of the sentence.⁵ If in objection to this it is said that a word means the universal only, then the reply will obviously be that by *lakṣaṇā*, or in terms of the secondary meaning of the word, the meaning of the sentence will be apprehended. Besides, it has already been stated that the sentence under consideration contains more than one uninflected name word. That is, what one name word cannot do, a number of name words functioning together can.⁶ It should not be objected that if one name word is competent to give the meaning in question, the others are unnecessary; and that if one is not competent to give the meaning, the others taken together can do so only by differentiating. For if this objection is valid against the kind of sentence under consideration, it is also valid against recognition. So if it proves anything, it proves too much.⁷ Besides, the differentiation spoken of may be admitted, but then it is to be emphasized that it is just a means (*dvāra*) and is not a part of the meaning of the sentence.⁸ Accordingly an *akhaṇḍārthaka vākya* can speak of the immediacy which fulfils the metaphysi-

cal élan completely. So it is concluded that one may go beyond metaphysics of objects but the consequence of it is not that one should hold one's tongue, or talk only negatively or in metaphorical language. Every sentence is not appropriate for it, but a sentence with undifferentiated meaning is.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. It does not intend to contradict the views of Maurice Pardenis, who holds that religion and morality are in principle incompatible, for he also admits that morality seeks a foundation in the divine.
2. *Nyāyaratnāvali* (Rajen Ghose's edn.), p. 810.
3. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Pratyakṣa-paricchedaḥ.
4. *Vivaranaprāmēyasamgraha* (Basumati edn.), vol. iv, p. 91.
5. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Āgama-paricchedaḥ.
6. *Naiṣkarmyasiddhiḥ* (Udbodhan edn.), p. 151.
7. As in n. 4 above
8. *Tattvapradīpikā* (Udasina edn.), p. 198.

Navya-Nyāya and Ordinary Language

1. *Introduction*

The philosophers of the NN (Navya-Nyāya) school make abundant use of a host of technical terms. This has been considered by many to be remarkable and there has been an attempt to state the defining or distinguishing attribute of NN in terms of it.¹ And obviously this has not been relished by many, particularly by some eminent Indian philosophers of the recent past. But then there has not been any attempt to understand it, and this also is not less remarkable. Locke had a few unkind things to say about medieval or scholastic philosophy, and the modern European philosophers were largely in agreement with him. The Indian philosophers referred to could not emancipate themselves from the influence of the modern European philosophers, and consequently they either neglected the philosophies that flourished in India in ancient and medieval times and are alive even today, or paid attention to the speculative metaphysical philosophies and did not make a serious attempt to study NN or its technical terms. But contemporary studies in scholastic philosophy bring out that the observations of Locke were not only unkind but also unfounded. Thus, Prof. Henry has argued that it is true that the medieval philosophers rather liberally endowed the old words with new senses. Possibly they were of the view that a discussion of the subjects with which they were concerned could not be done in a language free from all technicalities, and so insisted on the use of a semi-artificial language in spite of the consequent difficulties in communication. So Prof. Henry thinks that their language is rather a halfway house between a jargon-free natural language and a totally artificial language, and argues that 'scholastic thought could have been better expressed in a fully artificial language'.² In recent times, because of the prevalence of

symbolic logic some distinguished thinkers appear to hold a similar view about NN or its language. But we have our reservations. We are inclined to think that the language of the philosophers of the NN school may be unordinary, but is not semi-artificial like that of the scholastic philosophers, as Prof. Henry suggests (or alleges). It is true that the language of the philosophers of the NN school is not of the kind that one uses in the market-place or in 'polite conversation'. Socrates, so it is reported, philosophized in the market-place, but from the accounts that we have of his dialogues we may assert with confidence that he did it in a language that was not intelligible to all who bought and sold in the market. Indeed, we are yet to see any philosophical treatise written in the kind of language that is used in the market-place. Every philosopher including Locke, who claimed to be a spokesman of 'unsophisticated common sense', discusses his subject in a technical language. Besides, the language of the NN philosophers did not lead to a breakdown of communication as a consequence of the abundant use of technical terms. For it was adopted by the philosophers of the other schools and also by writers of works on non-philosophical subjects. The chief reason, we think, for using technical terms was to be clear and precise. Our everyday language has many limitations, and the believers in artificial language think that they could be overcome by giving it up and adopting an artificial language. But then, they are in a way 'carried over to the ideal-language conception of artificial language'.³ Again, the NN philosophers would not even have suspected that they were not philosophizing in a natural or historical language or that they needed to be told again and again in a pontifical tone that language had many other functions besides stating a fact. So, without labouring this point further we would say that the language of the NN philosophers was, to use a rather self-contradictory expression, 'technical though ordinary', or an extension of ordinary language (as contrasted with transcending it) as required by the discussion of their subjects; and that as a consequence of it, it became the language of the academic world. To corroborate it, we propose in this paper to study some of the basic terms of NN with reference to a concrete case in which they are used to ensure precision. We also propose to say in a general way a few words

on ordinary language to bring out what the rather self-contradictory expression used by us means.

11. *Consideration of a Concrete Case*

The case we intend to consider is that of a cognition with a negation figuring as its object. It is a cognition of the kind that is articulated in a statement like 'there is no fire in the lake', and we propose to consider how the philosophers of the NN school make use of a good number of technical terms to make the statement precise or to state what exactly figures as the object of the said cognition. Thus, the statement under consideration is:

There is no fire in the lake.⁴ ... (a)

Obviously, the statement is negative. But whether negation is co-ordinate with affirmation and is directly about reality is a matter of controversy among the philosophers. The Nyāya philosophers, whether of the early or of the later period, for reasons that are in their judgement adequate, hold that negation is co-ordinate with affirmation and is directly about reality. Accordingly, they would not merely say that the presence of fire in the lake is denied, but would also add that an absence or negation resides there. So (a) should be expressed as

There is a negation of fire residing in the lake. ... (b)

In other words, (a) is a very ordinary statement and it articulates a familiar case of cognition. Now, every cognition is of an object. The cognition under consideration is also of an object. What is that object precisely? If for the sake of convenience 'lake' etc. are left out, then we should say that as negation is directly about reality and therefore a negative fact is as genuine a fact as a positive fact, the cognition is of a negative fact, viz. the negation of fire. Accordingly, we should translate (a) as (b). But this demands that it should be translated further. For the negation concerned is 'of fire' and we do not say that we have a cognition of a negation. We say we have a cognition of a negation of fire, or of a jar or of some such entity. A negation is necessarily of something—this is borne out by an inspection of our everyday thought and

speech; and that of which it is a negation is called a negatum, *pratiyogī*. The word 'negatum', or better '*pratiyogī*', is a word of ordinary language. A grammarian who considers language used by ordinary men and by writers of non-philosophical works gives its etymology and says that it is derived from the root '*yuj*'. Now, it is a time-honoured convention that to get the meaning of a word we should take into account not only etymology, *vyutpatti*, but also use, *pravrtti*, and if the etymological meaning differs from the meaning in use, then we should honour the latter. In everyday speech the word *pratiyogī* is ordinarily used to mean the rival, the competitor, or the opposed. And in the context of negation it in a way is used in this sense. But it is also used in the context of relation. Thus, when we say that the jar is on the ground, we say that the jar is in the relation of 'on and under', or of conjunction, *samyoga*, with the ground, and we specify it by saying that the jar is an adjunct, *pratiyogī*, of the relation of conjunction, the ground being its *anuyogī*, subjunct. Anyway, in our attempt to make (a) explicit, we should not only translate it into (b), but should introduce the word *pratiyogī*, negatum, into our translation. And then it would be:

There is a negation in the lake of which fire is the negatum.

... (c)

Now, (c) also needs to be explicated. For when we translate (b) into (c), we do not say much unless we also say what a negatum is, how it is identified and also what is its definition. To identify a negatum ordinarily (to enable a beginner to identify it), it is said that a negatum is that which is negated or of which the negation is a negation.⁵ But this is not elegant and really helpful even. It may enable us in most cases to identify a negatum, but it does not say what a negatum is or what it is to be a negatum. It has been observed before that in everyday life we use the word '*pratiyogī*' or 'negatum' to mean the rival or the opposed. Accordingly, to say what it is to be a negatum we should also say—so it has been thought by many philosophers of the Nyāya school—what this opposition precisely is. Ordinarily we think that what are opposed cannot reside in the same locus and so opposition consists in the impossibility of residence in the same locus. Thus, we say that water and fire or

manifest light and darkness are opposed to each other. And if we construct a definition of opposition by taking such cases under consideration, we should define opposition as stated before. It seems that some Nyāya philosophers of the ancient period defined opposition and also a negatum in this way.⁶ But it has not been thought satisfactory. Thus, Gaṅgeśa mentions a definition of a negatum in terms of opposition mentioned before and examines it.⁷ In the course of his examination he observes that the definition is defective, for it is both too wide and too narrow. In other words, the definition is applicable to what is not a negatum, viz. horseness when considered in relation to cowness, and so is too wide. It is also too narrow as it is not applicable to a negatum of a mutual negation, *anyonyābhāva*.⁸ The analysis of these logical defects, as they naturally come first to our mind, may be presented in the following way.

'Horseness' is a property that resides in every horse. So also cowness is a property that resides in every cow. In other words, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (NV) philosophers, being robust realists, hold that universals are facts that 'go about the world' exactly as do the particulars in which they inhere. Their view on the nature of negative facts is a consequence of, or spells out, their realistic attitude. Anyway, 'horseness', as these philosophers hold it to be, is a simple or *akhaṇḍa* property that resides in every horse and does not reside in what is not a horse. So also 'cowness' is an unanalysable property that resides in every cow and does not reside in what is not a cow. Besides, the class of which every horse is a member is co-ordinate with the class of which every cow is a member. And so the two properties, viz. 'cowness' and 'horseness', do not reside in the same locus. It is impossible for them to reside in the same locus. Nevertheless, *horseness* is not a negatum in respect of *cowness*. So also with *cowness*. But the above definition of what is a negatum is applicable to them, and so the definition, as Gaṅgeśa has observed, is too wide.

We have seen that Gaṅgeśa holds that the definition under consideration is also too narrow and we may subject it to the same sort of analysis as given to the contention that it is too wide. Thus, the NV philosophers divide negations into two broad kinds. They are mutual negation, *anyonyābhāva*, and

relational negation, *saṃsargābhāva*. They subdivide relational negations into three more kinds, viz. prior negation, *prāgabhāva*, posterior negation, *dhvaṃsābhāva*, and constant negation, *atyantābhāva*. The negation of a piece of cloth in the threads when it is going to be produced instantiates prior negation, the negation of a piece of cloth when it is destroyed instantiates posterior negation, and the case of negation that we have been considering instantiates constant negation. A mutual negation differs from them all. It is instantiated when it is said that a horse is not a cow. In other words, when we say that a horse is not a cow we articulate a cognition that has a mutual negation as its object. That is, the negation concerned is to be understood in the relation of identity. But the relation of identity and so also its denial are symmetrical. If A is identical with B, then B also is identical with A; and if A is not identical with B, then B also is not identical with A. A horse is not identical with a cow, and so also a cow is not identical with a horse. Accordingly, the statement that a horse is not identical with a cow expresses two mutual negations, viz. the mutual negation of a horse residing in a cow, and the mutual negation of a cow residing in a horse. So when we say that a horse is not a cow, we seem to be expressing two cognitions of mutual negations. But we do not say that exactly. We state one of them directly and the other indirectly or by way of implication. Now, we may be required to state precisely which cognition we are articulating and which mutual negation is figuring directly as the object of our cognition. The statement mentioned above is obviously inadequate. To make it adequate we may say that of the two mutual negations one is of a cow and the other is of a horse. Differently put, a cow is the negatum of one of them and a horse is the negatum of the other. Now, the observation of Gaṅgeśa that the definition of a negatum under consideration is too narrow in that it is not applicable to the negatum of a mutual negation may be analysed thus. The mutual negation of a cow resides, as has been observed, in a horse, for a cow is not identical with a horse. But the ground on which a cow stands is also different from her. So the mutual negation of a cow also resides there, viz. in the ground on which the cow stands. So it is not the case that the negatum, viz. a cow, does not reside in the same locus with its corresponding mutual

negation. Accordingly, we should say that the definition concerned is not applicable to a genuine negatum, one of the *definienda* of the definition, and is too narrow.

But a proponent of the definition may seek to reply to these charges. He may say that the charge that the definition is too wide may easily be refuted. It is true that *horseness* and *cowness* do not reside in the same locus, and it is also true that neither of them is a negatum in respect of the other. But from this it does not follow that the definition is too wide. For neither horseness nor cowness is a bonafide negative fact.⁹ So the objection rests on a misunderstanding. The definition does not merely state that if it is not possible for an entity to reside in the same locus with another, it is a negatum in respect of the other. For it is obvious that this is not the case. So also it is obvious that one of the two entities should be a bonafide negative fact. When we say that fire is a negatum to the negation of fire, we do not say merely that they do not reside in the same locus; it is a fact that they do not and it is not possible for them to do so. But we also say that of these two entities one is a bonafide negative fact. And if this is added to the definition mentioned before, it cannot be objected that the definition is faulty as being too wide. Indeed, the word 'negatum' is an 'office' word. It is applicable to an entity when it does a sort of job. So *horseness*, though not a negatum when taken in its relation to *cowness*, is so when taken together with the negation of horseness, or when occurring in sentences like 'horseness does not reside in a cow', or 'horseness is not identical with cowness'. So the objection concerned is hardly an objection, and may be ignored.

Similarly, a proponent of the definition under consideration may hold that the objection that it is too narrow may also be overcome. We may now consider how he seeks to do this. Here we should introduce a few terms that are deemed technical. They are (A) *negatumness*, *pratiyogitā*, or being a negatum, *pratiyogitva*; (B) *nirūpita*, the specified, and *nirūpaka*, the specifier or what specifies; and (C) *avacchedaka*, the limitor, and *avacchinna*, the limited or what is limited.¹⁰ We have said that the word 'negatum' is an 'office' word, and we may now state briefly what we have meant. In one context *horseness* is a negatum, and in another context it is not. So with fire, and

indeed with every entity that is spoken of as a negatum. Therefore, it may be said that the word 'negatum' does not name an entity that 'goes about the world', as fires or horses do. But then we ought to be on our guard. For when we say so, it may be thought that a negatum is something that is cooked up by the mind out of its own resources and projected into the world outside. It is true that it is a technical term, a *paribhāṣā*, and a technical term is coined by the authors concerned, *sāstra-kṛdbhiḥ*.¹¹ But then the word coined by an author or a master of the subject is accepted by the society of the masters. So it would be more proper to say that the master concerned does not coin in the sense of manufacturing, but in the sense of eliciting it. To put the point differently, a negatum is a relative term. A fire or horseness as such is not a negatum. It is so only in relation to its appropriate negation. When it is so taken it gains a status, and a fire or horseness is endowed with a property of a sort, *dharma-viśeṣa*. The property is a relational property though the relation concerned does not produce it. It is only indicative of the status of the relatum. When your brother is blessed with a child, you become an uncle or are endowed with the property of being an uncle. The property is a relational property and the person becomes endowed with it and may be so endowed without even knowing it either immediately or beforehand. And there is no special subclass of the class of man to be designated as the class of uncles of which he is a member. Similarly, a fire is a cause of smoke. But then there is no special class of facts to be recognized as a class of causes. What is a cause in relation to an event may be an effect in relation to another event, and so fire cannot be a member exclusively of a class of facts to be called a class of causes. And, because there is no special class of cause-facts or effect-facts, it should not be imagined that a cause or an effect is a concept born out of the 'additional wheel-work of our mind'. The causal relation is objective. And as a fire in one sort of relation is endowed with a property of a sort, viz. causeness, *kāraṇatā*, in another sort of relation it is endowed with a property of a different sort, viz. negatunness, *pratiyogitā*, or, what is the same thing, the property of 'being a negatum', *pratiyogitva*. Such a property is objective and relational but not produced by a relation. It is indicative of the status of the object of which it is a property. A fire is

treated as a negatum as it is endowed with the status-indicative property designated 'negatum-ness'. It may be mentioned here that in this section we are attempting to find a satisfactory definition of 'negatum-ness', and we have seen that the definition in terms of the 'impossibility of residing in the same locus' as proposed by some is held by Gaṅgeśa to be too narrow, though its proponents do not agree with him. To formulate the answer of the proponents it was necessary to introduce a few technical terms and explain them briefly. We have considered the term mentioned under (A). Now we may consider the terms mentioned under (B).

(B) To explain the terms mentioned under this head, we may refer to the observation made above that when fire is treated as a cause, it is so treated because it is endowed with the property of cause-ness. We may now dwell on this point briefly. To say that fire is a cause of smoke is to say also that fire is invariably present as an antecedent whenever any smoke occurs. Such invariable antecedence is often loosely called producing. So, to say that fire is a cause of smoke means that fire has produced smoke and is a *phalopadhāyaka* cause, or that it is capable of producing it and is a *svarūpayogya* cause. That is, if fire did not produce any smoke or was not capable of producing it, it would not be regarded as a cause of smoke. It is regarded as a cause because this is not the case. Thus, in virtue of the fact that fire produces or is capable of producing smoke, it is endowed with cause-ness. So with smoke, its effect. It is an effect and is therefore endowed with the property of effect-ness. 'Cause' and 'effect' are said to be relative terms, and in terms of the above analysis a cause has its appropriate effect, and cause-ness its appropriate effect-ness. Similarly, an effect has its appropriate cause and effect-ness its appropriate cause-ness. Now, fire produces smoke. But it may produce something else, say an explosion, as well. So the property of cause-ness as residing in fire, when smoke is an effect, is different from the property of cause-ness when an explosion is its effect. Similarly with the property of effect-ness residing in smoke and in an explosion. But how should we account for this difference? The answer is: in one case the property of cause-ness—residing in fire—is *nirūpita*, or specified by the property of effect-ness residing in smoke and not by the property of effect-ness resi-

ding in an explosion. But in the other case, the cause-ness is specified by effect-ness residing in an explosion and not in smoke. Similarly with the two cases of effect-ness mentioned before. Thus we have in this case a property specified by and a property specifying. Not only that. The property specified by also specifies what specifies it. Thus cause-ness residing in fire is specified by effect-ness residing in smoke. But then, effect-ness residing in smoke is specified by cause-ness residing in fire. This is ordinarily the case with relative terms like cause-ness and effect-ness, teacher-ness and taught-ness, substratum-ness, *ādhāratā*, and superstratum-ness, *ādheyatā*. But there are cases where this does not hold. Thus negatum-ness is specified by its corresponding negation and does not specify it. A negation is a specifier and not a specified. So also negatum-ness is a specified, and not a specifier. The case of adjunctness is similar. It is specified by its appropriate relation and does not specify it.¹² With these few explanatory words on the technical terms under (B), we may consider the terms under the head (C).

(C) The terms are *avacchedaka*, the limiter, and *avacchinna*, the limited. These two terms top the list of the technical terms used abundantly by the philosophers of the NN school. The thinkers, referred to above, who seek to state the distinguishing mark of NN in terms of an abundant use of technical terms, mention them, and in order to include the other technical terms in their statement, add 'etc.', *ādī*; and when they are in a mood to sneer at the philosophers of this school, they refer to these terms and say that these philosophers are more eager to create a smoke-screen by using these words than to dive deep into what is really philosophical. But then, these terms are not so very technical. Thus, the word '*avacchedaka*' is derived from the root '*chid*', from which words like '*chedana*' and '*chedaka*' are derived. They are words of everyday language and mean 'cutting' and 'cutter' or 'what is used to cut with', respectively. With '*ava*' prefixed to it, the word '*avacchedaka*' is derived, and '*chedaka*', a constituent of it, may be understood as it is understood in its everyday use, viz. what cuts or what is used to cut with. The prefix being added, it means what cuts or is used to cut with according to measure, or what tailors properly. The need for tailoring in a non-sartorial sense, or this need being ignored, is always felt. So an adjective or a *viśeṣaṇa* is used in our everyday speech. A

handbook of grammar thus defines the nature of a *viśeṣaṇa*: with the assistance of which a distinction or a demarcation is made.¹³ When we say 'a red flower' we distinguish the flower from one that is not red. Now, 'red' is a word that is grammatically an adjective. But what is not grammatically an adjective may function as an adjective. Thus, when we seek to distinguish a man with a wig on from men with bare heads, we refer to him as 'the man with a wig on his head'. In this case the word 'wig', though not grammatically an adjective, functions as such. So we may treat 'wig' as an adjective in an extended sense. Similarly, when we say 'a jar' we mean what is a member of the class of jars or is endowed with the property of jariness. The word 'jariness' functions as an adjective, though in some languages it is treated as a noun denoting a quality and in some others it is treated as an abstract noun.¹⁴ Anyway, we do use many words that are not grammatically adjectives but function as such. They may be said to be adjectives in an extended sense. Similarly, we may say that what is a noun is so either in a narrow sense or in an extended sense. Now, what is an adjective, whether in the narrow or in the extended sense, may be attached to what is its noun in either of the senses by means of the expression 'determined by', *viśiṣṭa*. We say that the rose is red, and this may be translated as: the rose is determined by red. So also with 'this is red', when 'this' stands for a particular red-rose; but if it stands for the particular patch of colour, it would be translated as: this has redness. And we may generalize and say that the word 'limitor' may roughly be said to do what 'determined by' does.¹⁵ It distinguishes or differentiates. Differently put in the linguistic mode, it ensures that what has been said has been said exactly and that nothing more or nothing less has been said. Thus, in the case of the mutual negation of a cow, 'a cow' is the negatum. So it is endowed with the property of negatum-ness. This property ought to be limited relationwise. For, while a cow is on the ground or is in the relation of conjunction with the ground, it would not be improper for us to say that the mutual negation of a cow resides there. But assuming that a cow as a relatum in the relation of conjunction is there and that it is proper for us to say that a cow in the relation of conjunction resides on the ground—the ordinary expression of it being the

sentence 'a cow is on the ground'—it would be improper for us to say that a negation that specifies a negatum-ness that resides in a cow and is limited by the relation of conjunction resides there. Thus, a negatum-ness residing in a cow or any negatum should be specified by its appropriate negation. But it should also be limited relationwise. Thus, while spelling out the structure of a mutual negation we should be careful to say that it is a negation the negatum-ness in respect of which is limited by the relation of identity.

With these provisional notes on a few technical terms, we may consider what the proponents of the definition under consideration say in reply to the objection that the definition is too narrow. The objection, we have seen, is that while a cow in the relation of conjunction may be on the ground, the mutual negation of it may also be there. So it is not the case that a mutual negation and its negatum, viz. a cow, do not reside in the same locus, and the definition is too narrow. Now, the proponents of the definition would argue that the objection rests on a misunderstanding or misconstruction of the definition. That a cow and the negatum of its mutual negation may co-reside is obvious, and its denial is counter-intuitive. Nevertheless, this does not make the definition too narrow. For while considering the definition we should take into account the negatum-ness limiting relation, *pratyogitāvachchedakasambandha*. In other words, if it were the case that a mutual negation and its corresponding negatum resided in the same locus, the first in the relation in which it is appropriate for a negation to reside in its locus and the second in the NSLR (the negatum-ness limiting relation), the definition would be too narrow. But this is not the case and so the objection has no force.¹⁶

We may now consider if this may be generalized and we may thus lay down a rule to the effect that no negation and its corresponding negatum reside in the same locus, the residence being in the appropriate relation for the first one and in the NSLR for the negatum. So we may first take up the case of a prior negation. We have seen that the negation of a piece of cloth in the threads out of which it is produced is a case of prior negation. Thus, its negatum is the said piece of cloth. It is categorially a substance, and a compound substance at that, manufactured out of the threads concerned in which it inheres

and which it owns. So it is called an *avayavi* and the threads are its *avayavas*.¹⁷ Again, it comes into existence when its prior negation is annihilated. This prior negation resides in the relation in which it is appropriate for it to reside in the threads. The said piece of cloth also resides there in the relation of inherence. Accordingly, it seems to be the case that even if the conditions of co-residence as given above are satisfied, the definition is not applicable to a negatum of a prior negation and is thus too narrow. This demands that the conditions of co-residence should be more precisely stated or made more specific. And this is not difficult. Indeed, it is present implicitly in the definition proposed. Thus, it should be added to the condition that negation and its negatum should not be present in the same locus at the same time. Thus, the piece of cloth inheres in the threads when its prior negation is annihilated and so they do not reside there at the same time, and the definition is not too narrow. A consideration of posterior negation would also show that this is what the definition demands.

Indeed, the definition also demands that the condition should be specified not only by 'at the same time' but also by 'at the same place'. Thus, a consideration of the case of the negatum of monkey-conjunction or of any incompletely residing entity makes it evident that such a specification is needed. In the cognition that is expressed in the sentence, 'a monkey is on the branch of a tree', conjunction figures as a relation, but no relation figures as holding between it and the monkey and the tree concerned. But then the NV philosopher holds a conjunction to be categorially a quality and not a relation. Indeed, in the NV list of categories, though inherence—*samavāya*—is included, relation as such is not. This is obviously intriguing. For the NV theory of categories is in many respects similar to that of Aristotle and in the Aristotelian list 'relation' is included along with substance, quality and others. But in the NV list it is not so included.¹⁸ Again, the NV philosophers are bitterly critical of any subjectivistic account of relation like the objective projection of some subjective faculty such as imagination or understanding. So the NV theory of relation seems to be very intriguing. It is not possible for us to explore it even briefly, though it is equally not possible not to mention it altogether.

Some NN philosophers, however, were of the view that the property of 'being a relation' was something additional and a relation could not be subsumed under any of the categories included in the accepted list.¹⁹ But this is not the orthodox view, nor does it represent the view of most NN philosophers. Anyway, this is merely incidental to our discussion. What is relevant to us is that we may take conjunction as such or as qualified by its adjunct and treat it as a relatum. Thus we ordinarily say that a monkey is on the branch of a tree. But we also say that a monkey-conjunction—*kapisanyoga*—resides in the tree.

Now, a conjunction, so the NV philosopher holds, is an incompletely residing entity, *avyāpyavṛttipadārtha*. An entity is said to be an incompletely residing one when it happens that while it resides in a locus, its negation also does. Thus, while the monkey-conjunction resides in a tree in respect of some of its branches, its negation also resides in it in respect of its trunk and its roots. This being the case, the specification of the conjunction under discussion would not be adequate if only 'at the same time' was added. For the monkey-conjunction and its negation reside at the same time in the tree, and the definition is not applicable to the negatum of the negation of monkey-conjunction. So to ward off the objection that the definition is too narrow we should further specify the conditions and add 'at the same place'.

But specification of conditions cannot stop here. For if we take into account the negatum of the negation of determinate existence—*viśiṣṭasattā*—we find that even with all these specifications the definition will not be applicable to the negatum of this negation. That is, the NV philosopher holds that the existence—*sattā*—is a class property—a *jāti*. Indeed, he takes it to be the most comprehensive class-property—*parājāti*. Being a class-property it resides in the relation of inherence in what is categorially a substance or a quality or an action. It is an unanalysable property, and it is one and the same class-property that resides in them all. But then, we may distinguish it as residing in a substance only by qualifying it as 'existence determined by its otherness from a quality or an action', *guṇakarmānyatva-viśiṣṭasattā*. Thus distinguished, it is spoken of as determinate existence. Now, it is the view of most philo-

sophers of the Nyāya school, whether earlier or later, that such determinate existence is not something in addition to existence or pure existence—*suddhasattā*—but as qualified by determinate-existence-ness—*viśiṣṭasattātva*—it differs from existence as qualified by pure existence-ness—*suddhasattātva*.²⁰ Such being the relation of unqualified determinate existence and unqualified existence, the definition of negatum-ness with all the specifications made so far is not applicable to the negatum of the negation of determinate existence. For the negatum in the case under reference is determinate existence, and as unqualified it is not something in addition to existence and like the latter resides in whatever is a quality or an action, so it co-resides with the property of 'being a quality' or the property of 'being an action'. But the definition requires that it should not. So to rule out the possibility of the definition being too narrow we should say that the negatum-ness residing in determinate existence is to be taken as qualified or limited by the property of 'being a determinate existence'. When the negatum-ness is thus treated it cannot be said that a quality or an action is a negatum and so the objection that the definition is too narrow cannot be raised.

We have spoken before of the sort of limiter that limits relationwise. Now we find that a limiter may limit propertywise as well. We may represent the two ways of using the word 'limitor' as LR and LP, and so make an attempt to bring out how a limiter enables us to make a statement precise with the help of some LP. But before that we should say a few words on some of the different ways of understanding an LP. One way of understanding it is that it is an SS—*svarūpasambandha*. It is a technical term and we may explain it, though in an imprecise way, with the help of an example of an NSLP—a negatum-ness limiting property. Thus, in a familiar case of constant negation like the negation of a jar, jar-ness is regarded as the NSLP. It is said in explanation of it that jar-ness figures as an adjective—in the extended sense—while the negation and thus the negatum are apprehended.²¹ An LP as thus understood is spoken of as an SS or an LP of the SS type. Now, when an LP is of this type, all that figures as an adjective should be treated as an LP or as constituents of the LP. When the negation is of a jar, jar-ness alone figures as such an adjective.

But when the negation is of a red jar, redness also figures as such an adjective, and so both jar-ness and redness are treated as NSLP. In the case of a negation of the conjoints like a jar and a cloth (*ubhayābhāva*), jar-ness, cloth-ness, and both-ness (*ubhayatva*) figure as such adjectives and all of them are to be treated as NSLP. Not only that. When an LP is of this kind, what does not so figure should not be treated as an NSLP.

Now in the opinion of many, when an NSLP is of the SS type, if it is the case that a simpler or a less heavy—*laghu*⁶—property is available as an LP, then it should be treated as the NSLP, and the more complex or the more heavy property—*guru*—should not be so treated. Thus, when the negation is of a jar, jar-ness figures as an adjective of the sort spoken of before, and it is a simple or non-heavy property, and accordingly it is regarded as the NSLP in this case. Similarly, when the negation is of a red jar, redness and jar-ness figure as adjectives and both of them are treated as NSLP. It is true that 'jar-ness' is a simpler property than jar-ness and redness taken together. But then, the negation of a jar is different from the negation of a red jar. When we say or cognize that there is a black jar on the ground, we may say or cognize that there is no red jar on the ground. So we may say or cognize that there is a negation of a red jar there. But we cannot say or cognize that there is a negation of a jar on the ground. The cognition of a black jar on the ground does not prevent the occurrence of the cognition of the negation of a red jar there. It is prevented when there is a cognition of a red jar there. But the occurrence of the cognition of a jar on the ground is prevented when there is a cognition of any jar whether black or red or of any other colour as present there. Thus, the two negations are different as the cognition that prevents the occurrence of one of them may or may not prevent the occurrence of the other. Now, what figures as an object of the preventing cognition is called a preventer, *pratibandhaka*, and what would have figured as an object of the cognition if it were not prevented from occurring is called the prevented—*pratibadhyā*.²² These words are relational and status indicating and thus the preventer is invested with the property of 'being a preventer'—*pratibandhakatā*—in relation to the prevented, which is also invested with the property of 'being a prevented'—*pratibadhyatā*. These two properties specify and

are specified by each other. Anyway, in the cases of the negations mentioned before, we have no difficulty in identifying their NSLP, for in none of these cases does any heavy or complex property figure as the adjective of the negatum when their respective negations are cognized.

The case of the negation of a jar that is an object of a true cognition—*prameyaghatah*—is not as straightforward as the above cases are. Thus, in this case two properties, viz. jariness and 'being an object of a true cognition', figure as the adjectives of the negatum. But the second property is an omnirelatum—*kevalānvayi*—a property of every entity and so does not distinguish as 'redness' does. Besides, the cognition that arrests the occurrence of the cognition of the negation of a jar also arrests the occurrence of the cognition with the above negation as its object. The cognition of a red jar prevents the occurrence of the cognition of the negation of a red jar, but the cognition of a black jar does not. But both these cognitions prevent the occurrence of the cognition of a jar. So the case of the negation of a red jar is not comparable to the case of negation under consideration, and we may say that while 'redness' that figures as an adjective of the negatum in the first case is not idle or dispensable, the property of 'being the object of a true cognition' that figures as an adjective of the negatum of the second negation is so. So there is no harm if it is not treated as an NSLP and 'jariness' alone is so treated.

The case of the negation of what has a conch-shaped neck and some other attributes—*kambugrīvādi-mān*—is more complicated.²³ Thus, in this case the property of 'having such a neck etc.' figures as the adjective of the negatum, and jariness does not figure at all. When compared with the negation just considered, it is seen that in the case of that negation 'jariness' so figured, though together with a property that was dispensable. Nevertheless, it has been thought by many that the said property of 'having such a neck etc.' is not an NSLP, as it is too complex or heavy, and 'jariness', a property both simple and co-extensive with it, is the NSLP in the case of the negation under consideration.

So there have been attempts at defining or analysing the concept of a limiting property in different ways. Of these the most widely known is *anatiriktavṛttitva* or 'being not more

extensive'. The expression is, however, a technical one, and so should not be understood in the straightforward sense as not residing in a wider area. In *NK* it is stated that it is to be understood in two different ways.²⁴ We shall consider the first one only. It is put as: *tacchūnyāvṛttitve sati tadadhikaraṇavṛtyābhāvā-pratīyogitvam*. Its almost literal translation would be: When it is the case that WHAT does not reside where THAT does not reside, and WHAT is also not the negatum of the negation residing in the locus of THAT, then we have a case of a limitor of this kind. This translation may appear rather monstrous, and it is possibly so on account of its attempt to be almost literal, and so in the translation, instead of using any familiar variable, pronouns have been used as is done by the NN philosophers and, to avoid confusion, they have been written in capital (the clause-introducing *that* has not been so written). So we may use some ordinary variables, like x and y and rewrite it as: When it is the case that x does not reside where y does not reside, and x is also not the negatum of the negation residing in the locus of y , then we have a case of a limitor of this kind. And if we replace one of the two variables, viz. y , by a constant, viz. negatum-ness residing in a jar and specified by the negation of a jar (*ghaṭābhāva-nirūpita-pratīyogitā*), then it would appear that x may be treated as an NSLP if it is a property that satisfies the two conditions, viz. (1) it does not reside where the said negatum-ness does not (and thus is not more extensive), and (2) it is not a negatum to the negation residing in the locus of the negatum-ness under reference (and thus co-resides with it, and is not less extensive). Indeed, after stating the nature of an LP in the way mentioned before, the author of *NK* informs us that this precisely is the case and states further that it is, so to say, a rule that a property that is either more extensive or less extensive cannot be regarded as a limiting property. Now, ordinarily when the different kinds of LP or NSLP are taken into account, an LP is said to be a co-extensive property; and it is also said that what is more extensive or less extensive cannot be treated as such a property, for then it would not do what such a property is expected to do, or for doing which it is introduced. This may be illustrated as follows: let it be assumed that there is a cognition articulated as 'there is no philosopher in this room'. 'A negation of a

philosopher' figures as the object of this cognition, and it specifies a negatum-ness residing in a philosopher, the negatum of this negation. Now, what is the limiting property of the NSLP in this case? It should co-reside with the negatum-ness concerned and thus in a philosopher. Now, the property of 'being a man' or man-ness is one such property. But it cannot be deemed to be the NSLP in the case under consideration. For it is a more extensive property. If the negation had been of men, then it might have served as an NSLP. But the negation is of philosophers, and not of men. It may be the case that though there may not be any philosopher in the room there may be many men there. Thus, man-ness cannot be deemed as an NSLP in this case as it is more extensive. Again, Greek philosophers are philosophers and the property of 'being a Greek philosopher' resides in the negatum concerned. Nevertheless, it cannot be deemed to be the NSLP in this case, for every philosopher is not a Greek philosopher, even though Martin Heidegger, a German philosopher, thinks otherwise. Thus, it is a less extensive property, and if it is treated as an NSLP, then it may be understood that what is being said is that there are no Greek philosophers in the room, but British or Indian philosophers or philosophers who are not Greek are there. But this is not being said, and the property of 'being a Greek philosopher' is not the NSLP in this case. Thus, the property that is more extensive or less extensive cannot be treated as an LP or an NSLP. So the NSLP in the case concerned is the property of 'being a philosopher'. This is the prevalent view, and when the different kinds of LP are not taken into consideration a co-extensive property is deemed an LP or NSLP. So it is only natural to ask why the second kind of NSLP should be mentioned or treated as a kind of alternative to or co-ordinate with the NSLP of the SS kind. And also why an LP of the SS kind should be admitted at all.

In reply to the two questions, particularly with reference to an NSLP, it should be said that an NSLP of the SS type and also one of the other type have some distinctive features. Thus, when it is of the other kind, it is not essential that it should figure as an adjective of the negatum in the cognition of its corresponding negation. But this is not the case with an NSLP of the SS type. In other words, if an NSLP, and so also an LP, is less extensive

or more extensive, it fails to do the job of a limiter successfully and so ought not to be treated as an LP. It does its job successfully only if it is co-extensive. But then, if it figures in the cognition as an adjective of the negatum, it is said to be an NSLP of the SS type. And on inspection it may be detected that a complex property is figuring as such an adjective and that it may be replaced by a simple property even though it does not figure as an adjective of the negatum. Accordingly, it may be said that the concept of a limiter of the SS type is the outcome of the approach to the subject from an epistemic point of view. But the concept of an LP of the other type articulates the logical or the ontological approach. These two approaches are not radically different, and they may overlap. Anyway, the concept of an NSLP of the second type is spoken of as representing the attitude of the early Nyāya philosophers—possibly the philosophers of the Nyāya school who flourished before Śīromaṇi, and who insisted that an NSLP should be the possible simple property even though it did not figure in the cognition concerned. Besides, there are reasons for holding that Śīromaṇi did not reject this way of treating an NSLP.²⁵ There is also another point of difference between the two ways of treating an NSLP. If it is of the SS type, then the limiter-ness of the NSLP is specified by the negatum-ness concerned, but if it is of the other type, it is not so specified.²⁶ And this follows from what has been said about them. That is, an NSLP of the other type may not figure as the sort of adjective spoken of and so the question of its limiter-ness being thus specified does not arise. But an NSLP of the SS type figures as the required sort of adjective and it is thus specified. Indeed, if it had not been thus specified a more or less extensive property might have been treated as such a limiter on epistemic evidence, an evidence that would be rather psychological than epistemic. Anyway, in the opinion of the later Nyāya philosophers a property, even if it is more complex but figures as an adjective of the negatum while its corresponding negation is cognized, may be treated as an NSLP without considering the case of a possible simple property co-extensive with it but not figuring in the said cognition.

The later Nyāya view on an NSLP, as has been observed before, has been formulated by Śīromaṇi. Obviously, it is not

possible to give even a near-adequate analysis of it here. Nevertheless, it cannot be left out altogether. For the concept of a limiter, and so of an NSLP, is of immense importance in NN. We therefore propose to give a simple—perhaps too simple—analysis of it after the celebrated NN philosopher Jagadīśa by only taking into consideration the simpler and the expository part of his commentary on *Didhiti*. Thus, it has been observed before that one of the jobs that an NSLP should do is to account for the non-occurrence of an affirmative cognition when a corresponding cognition of negation is there. Now, as an NSLP, in the opinion of the early Nyāya philosophers, need not necessarily figure as an adjective of the negatum in the cognition of its corresponding negation, it fails to do it, and fails because it is not an LP of the SS type. Thus, when there is a cognition articulated as ‘what has a conch-like neck and some other attributes does not reside on the ground’, it would arrest the occurrence of its corresponding affirmative cognition articulated as ‘what has a conch-like neck etc. resides on the ground’. And the point is: does the cognition of a negation arrest the occurrence of the corresponding affirmative cognition directly? Or indirectly, viz. by being routed through the simple property jarness, whatever be the analysis of ‘being routed through’? There is no reason why it should not arrest directly. Indeed, it would be counter-intuitive to say that it arrests indirectly. And so the complex property, viz. ‘having a conch-like neck etc.’, ought to be treated as an NSLP even though it is a complex property and is co-extensive with a simple property.

In reply to it a follower of the early Nyāya philosopher may say that the appeal to the intuitive or the counter-intuitive is hardly convincing. For what is intuitive to one philosopher may appear to be counter-intuitive to another. The philosophical texts of any school—and those of NN are no exceptions—are replete with instances of it. Indeed, such an appeal is in the final analysis an appeal to the firm beliefs or habitual ways of thinking of the philosopher or the philosophers concerned. It should not be resorted to to settle disputes of this kind. Besides, there should be rational considerations to support what is declared to be intuitive. And if there were strong considerations against it or if it were shown that the considerations offered

in support of the said intuitive are inadequate, then the said intuitive would cease to be really intuitive, and the claim that it is would fall through. So also an appeal to intuition would be of no consequence. Indeed, the way the NN philosopher analyses the relation of the arresting cognition and the arrested cognition, when reflected upon, shows, so a follower of the early Nyāya philosopher would argue, that the NN philosopher has not taken into careful consideration what the early Nyāya philosopher has to say on the subject and also in what respects it is insufficient. In short, the view of the NN philosopher is a consequence of not taking into consideration all that the early Nyāya philosopher has to say on the subject.

Thus, it has been alleged that the early Nyāya philosopher in some cases treats a complex property neglecting the simple one as an NSLP. In other words, when the negation in question is of determinate existence, the early Nyāya philosopher does not hold that the simple property, substance-ness-ness—*dravyatva-tva*—is the NSLP concerned. On the contrary, he treats the complex property determinate existence-ness as the NSLP. Now, substance-ness-ness is admitted to be a simple property by every Nyāya philosopher in that it resides in a class property. But the property of determinate existence-ness is not so admitted; for it resides in determinate existence, which is actually existence as determined by its otherness from a quality or an action, and being 'determined by its otherness' is also actually 'having the relation of otherness from etc.' So the NN philosopher accuses the early Nyāya philosopher of having, in this case, treated a complex property (ignoring a simple property co-extensive with it) as an NSLP. Not only that. He also thinks that if the early Nyāya philosopher did not treat the said complex property as an NSLP and honoured the co-extensive simple property by treating it as an NSLP, he would have to say what is held to be counter-intuitive by every Nyāya philosopher, whether earlier or later. Thus, he would have to say that even while a person cognizes that 'it is in possession of the negation of determinate existence', he may cognize that 'it is in possession of determinate existence'. For the simple property 'substance-ness-ness' does not figure as a part of the epistemic predicate—*prakāra*—of his first cognition, and so there is no reason why the affirmative cognition spoken

of would not occur or why the negative cognition under reference would arrest the corresponding affirmative cognition. That is, it is universally admitted that when there is a certain cognition of a negation, the negatum-ness of which is limited by a property figuring in the cognition as such a limiting property, then it is the case that the corresponding affirmative cognition is arrested. And so, if the early Nyāya philosopher to be consistent did not ignore the simple but co-extensive property and so treated it as an NSLP by rejecting the claim of the complex property, he would have asserted what is not the case to be the case.

Now, a follower of the early Nyāya philosopher would continue that the NN philosopher may argue in this way. But then, he would observe that this would only show a misunderstanding of the early Nyāya view. Besides, if the NN philosopher argues in this way, then he would betray his lack of understanding of the relation between an arresting cognition and the cognition it arrests. Thus, the early Nyāya philosopher does not deny that the property of 'substance-ness-ness'—'*dravyatva-tva*'—is less complex than the property of 'determinate existence-ness'. But then, the said less complex property does not reside in the same locus with the said more complex property. For whereas 'substance-ness-ness' resides in 'substance-ness', 'determinate existence-ness' resides in 'determinate existence'. To put it differently, 'substance-ness-ness' does not reside in 'determinate existence' and 'determinate existence-ness' does not reside in 'substance-ness'. So in the case of the negation under reference 'determinate existence-ness' is treated as an NSLP and the less complex property is not so treated. But this does not suggest that in some cases even an early Nyāya philosopher treats a complex property as an NSLP and ignores the claim of a simple property to be deemed so. Not only that. If an NN philosopher argues in the way mentioned above he would betray his insufficient understanding of the relation between an arresting cognition and the cognition arrested. For what is essential for such a relation is the kind of co-residence spoken of above, and not the figuring of a property in the cognition concerned as he suggests.

But then, the above does not represent all that an early Nyāya philosopher has to say on this subject, and a follower of

his may contend that an NN philosopher may misunderstand him; and by emphasizing the sort of co-residence spoken of above, may argue that the property of 'smoke-ness' co-resides with the property of 'dark-smoke-ness—*nīladhūmatva*—and is less complex. Nevertheless, he would argue that in the case of a negation of dark smoke, an early Nyāya philosopher treats the complex property 'dark-smoke-ness' as an NSLP and ignores the claim of the simple property 'smoke-ness'. Accordingly, a follower of the early Nyāya philosopher would argue that this is due to a misunderstanding. Indeed, the condition of co-residence spoken of above is one of the conditions that a property to be treated as an NSLP should satisfy. It should satisfy some other conditions also. And in the case under consideration it should be mentioned that the second such condition is that the property concerned should be neither more extensive nor less extensive, or, as has been said before, it should be co-extensive. Taking these two conditions together, it may be said that a property to be deemed an NSLP should be co-extensive and should also be co-resident in the way spoken of above. And if this is kept in mind, then obviously the property 'smoke-ness', though simpler and co-resident, cannot be treated as an NSLP in that there are smokes that are not dark and it is not co-extensive but more extensive.

Nevertheless, the above does not represent the position of an early Nyāya philosopher in its entirety. For when the negation concerned is the negation of such a cognition as is a relatum in the relation of conjunction and is of a jar, it may be asked which property satisfies the condition of co-extensiveness and co-residence as stated above. Apparently, a cognition may be of a jar, and also of a chair. And so the property of being a cognition, viz. cognition-ness, cannot satisfy the said condition of co-extensiveness. But then, a cognition can never be a relatum in the relation of conjunction. And so the negation under reference is an omnipresent negation. Therefore, it is reasonable not to qualify it or join some other property with it to make it co-extensive. Accordingly, a follower of an early Nyāya philosopher would argue that to appreciate his position it ought to be kept in mind that a complex property, like 'having a conch-shaped neck etc.', can on no account be treated as an NSLP because it does not figure as an NSLP.

Thus, there may occur a cognition that is articulated as: what has a conch-shaped neck and some other attributes is not there. An uncritical analysis of it may be given as: the negation of what has a conch-shaped neck etc. is there. And so one may think that the property of having a conch-shaped neck etc. is figuring in it as an NSLP. But a critical analysis would reveal that this is not the case. For the simple property jarness is co-extensive with it, and for this reason the said complex property would not figure as an NSLP, or the cognition in which it should figure as an NSLP would arrest the occurrence of a corresponding affirmative cognition. It may not be known that the said complex property is co-extensive with the said simple property and so the cognition in which it may figure as an NSLP may not be arrested. But from this it cannot be concluded that the complex property figures as an NSLP and so is an NSLP. For it is not denied that when it is not known that a negation of fire resides in the lake, a cognition of the form there is fire in the lake may occur, or is not prevented from occurring. But from this one cannot say that there is fire in the lake. It is treated as a false cognition by all concerned, and it is also held that such a cognition does not show what is actually the case. The case of the cognition in which the complex property under consideration figures as an NSLP is similar, and so it does not establish the thesis that the said complex property is an NSLP.

Now, it may be said that when a complex property figures as an adjective of the negatum (and the simple property does not figure at all) in the cognition of the negation concerned, then the view that the complex property is not an NSLP, but the simple property is, does not sound reasonable. For a cognition of a negation prevents the occurrence of its corresponding cognition of an affirmation. So, what figures as an adjective of the negatum is not merely an NSLP. It plays the role of a preventer also. Now, if the simple property does not figure in the cognition of a negation, then it is difficult to understand how it may play the role of a preventing cognition and also how the corresponding affirmative cognition is prevented from occurring. And a critic of the early Nyāya philosophy may on this ground seek to found his view that even a complex property

figuring as an adjective of the negatum ought to be treated as an NSLP.

As against this criticism a follower of the early Nyāya philosopher would contend that if it is the case that a complex property figures in the cognition and the simple property does not, then it is to be observed that both the complex property and the simple property have the same epistemic subject—*viśeṣya*, and so even though the simple property does not figure, then, if it is not unknown that the simple property is co-extensive with the complex property, not only would the claim of the complex property to be an NSLP be rejected, but also its claim to play the role of being a preventer would be rejected. To put it differently, when it is the case that a simple property and a complex property have the same epistemic subject, then to account for the relation between a preventer and a prevented and thus not to assert something counter-intuitive, we should say that as it is not unknown that the simple property is co-extensive with the complex property, the simple property would attain the status of an epistemic predicate and the corresponding affirmative cognition would be prevented from occurring. Or, to state it in a more blunt way: in the cognition of a negation a complex property may figure as an adjective of the negatum. But then, a cognition of a negation with the same epistemic subject is possible in which the simple property and not the complex property would figure as the epistemic predicate—*prakāra*. And so the claim of a complex property to be an NSLP would never be accepted. This is in essence the view of an early Nyāya philosopher.

But an NN philosopher subjects the contention of the follower of an early Nyāya philosopher to severe criticism. Thus, he says that the account of the relation between a preventing cognition and a prevented cognition as given by the follower of an early Nyāya philosopher is counter-intuitive. For it is intuitive that a cognition of negation prevents the occurrence of a corresponding affirmative cognition, and the non-controversial account of it is that it prevents only by virtue of what figures in it. To put it differently, the negation as cognized or as figuring in its cognition—*grāhyābhāva*—prevents corresponding affirmation from being cognized. The contentions that the simple property

and the complex property have the same epistemic subject and that it is not unknown that the simple property is co-extensive with the complex property are beside the point. This is also the case with the comparison of the occurrence of the cognition that fire resides in the lake when it is not known with certainty that the negation of it resides there, with the occurrence of the cognition that what has a conch-shaped neck and some other attributes when it is not known that the same complex property is co-extensive with a simple property. In other words, it is non-controversial that the cognition that fire resides in the lake is a false cognition. But this is not the case with the cognition that what has such a neck is or is not there. Indeed, what a follower of the early Nyāya philosopher says when the negation in respect of a negatum the negatum-ness of which is unavailable is obscure, and it is difficult to ascertain what he actually asserts. That is, he may assert that there is no cognition of a negation that is articulated as what has such a neck etc. is not there. Or, he may assert that there may be such a cognition but then it is false. Obviously, he does not assert the first. For he admits that such a cognition occurs. Indeed, the non-admission would be counter-intuitive. So also he does not say that the said complex property is fictitious. That is, what is fictitious cannot figure as an object of a cognition. But this is not the case with the said property, and so it is not fictitious. Again, as the said property is not fictitious, it is a property of some non-fictitious entity. In fact, a jar which is a 'furniture of the universe' has the property—the simple property—jar-ness, and it has also the said complex property. So he cannot assert what was stated above as the first possible rendering of his statement. He can only assert the second one. And this is precisely what he does. That is why he distinguishes, as was stated above, between a critical and a non-critical analysis of the cognition that what has a conch-shaped neck etc. is not there, and dismisses the non-critical analysis as wrong and compares the cognition to the cognition that fire resides in the lake or the cognition that occurs when it is not known with certainty that negation of fire resides there. It has been observed before that the comparison is unfair. The point behind his comparison is that though a false cognition is determinate, the determinate object that it claims to show does not 'go about

the world'. But whereas it is non-controversial that the cognition that fire resides in the lake is erroneous, and that the determinate object that it claims to show is not one that 'goes about the world', this is not the case with the cognition under consideration. Indeed, he does not deny that the cognition that what has a conch-shaped neck etc. is not there prevents the cognition that it is there from occurring. And the unsophisticated analysis of it lends support to the view that a complex property that figures in the cognition of a negation—the simple property not so figuring—is the NSLP and does the job of being a preventer. The follower of the early Nyāya philosopher makes the matter unnecessarily complicated. His contention that though the simple property does not so figure, yet in view of the fact that it is not unknown that it is co-extensive with the complex property and has the same epistemic subject, is beside the point. In his zeal to defend the claim of the simple property to be the NSLP, he fails to notice that he gives a very complex account of the relation between the preventing cognition and the prevented cognition. In other words, he ignores the simple account that a negation as figuring in a cognition prevents the corresponding affirmative cognition from occurring.

It is true that in every case the relation between what prevents and what is prevented may not be of the simple kind spoken of. Thus, a certain kind of gem, so it is held, may prevent the occurrence of burning even though fire is there. Or, a certain kind of drug taken at the right time may prevent a disease from occurring. But there is hardly any good reason for thinking that the case of the relation between what prevents and what is prevented that is under consideration should be understood on the analogy of the cases referred to above. Now, a follower of the early Nyāya philosopher may say that ordinarily one should not do it. But when there is no alternative, one should. That is, it is counter-intuitive to deny that when there is the cognition that what has a conch-shaped neck etc. is not there, a cognition that it is there is prevented from occurring. But in view of the fact that the simple property does not figure in the cognition of the negation concerned, and that there is again no conclusive argument in favour of the view that an NN philosopher holds (against the view of an early Nyāya philosopher), we should give up the ordinary account

as unsuitable and explain the relation between the cognition that prevents and the cognition that is prevented on the analogy of the relation between a gem and burning.

A follower of the early Nyāya philosopher may argue in this way. But then, an NN philosopher would contend that this does not in any way enable him to overcome the shortcomings of the view he so zealously defends. For, in the first place, he admits that the account of the relation between the preventing and the prevented cognitions that he gives is not the ordinary one and he resorts to this course as there is no other alternative. But on what ground does he say that there is no other alternative? Obviously, relying on the view that a complex property ought not to be treated as an NSLP. But is it not question-begging? Or, better, in view of the fact that he fails to account for what is intuitive, he argues in the above way because he notices that the view he zealously defends is untenable, though he would not acknowledge it. And this is unfair. Besides, when a case of the following kind is taken into consideration, it is seen that the view he holds cannot be defended even by having recourse to the above argument or to an argument of this kind.

Let it be assumed that a jar individual is on the ground and a person utters the sentence that what has a conch-shaped neck etc. is not on the ground. The sentence on being heard gives rise to a cognition. Now, an NN philosopher contends that whereas according to him the cognition is false, and that he can demonstrate its falsity, a follower of the early Nyāya philosopher who holds that a complex property cannot be an NSLP cannot demonstrate that it is false and so he ought to treat it as true. To analyse the contention of an NN philosopher we may consider one paradigm case of a true cognition and also one such case of a false cognition. Thus, where there is a rope, and a cognition articulated as 'this is a rope' occurs, we have a paradigm case of a true cognition. In this case 'this' or what it stands for figures as an epistemic subject—*viśeṣya*—and 'rope' (i.e. 'rope-ness') or what it stands for figures as its epistemic predicate—*prakāra*. The cognition is true as what figures as its epistemic subject is in possession of (*vān*) what figures as the epistemic predicate. Now, if the cognition were of a snake or were articulated as 'this is a snake', it would be a paradigm case of a false cognition. For then 'snakeness' would figure as the

epistemic predicate, and 'this' would figure as the epistemic subject. The cognition would claim to show that the epistemic subject is in possession of the epistemic predicate. But as a matter of fact it is in possession of ropeness and not smokeness. With this brief analysis of a paradigm case of true cognition we may consider the case of cognition mentioned above.

The cognition occurs as a consequence of the hearing of a sentence. The process of the occurrence of such a cognition may be briefly described in the following way. The words that are parts of the sentence are heard, then the entities to which they are related by the meaning-relation are recollected, such recollected entities are connected, and a primary cognition (*anubhava*) results. Accordingly it may be said that the entities, viz. 'ground' and 'negation of having a conch-shaped neck etc.', are recollected and combined. The outcome is the cognition under consideration. But the combination (*anvaya*) is wrong. The sentence has been uttered by a person who does not know what is the case. That is, the ground is in possession not of the said negation, but of its negatum. The cognition is false.

But a follower of the early Nyāya philosopher cannot accept this analysis. For he holds that a complex property cannot be an NSLP, and so he cannot also say that the ground is in possession of the negation of the negation referred to above. Indeed, he cannot properly analyse the case of cognition under consideration. But he may not admit it. He may even say that the cognition under consideration is true. For, though on the ground that figures as the epistemic subject a jar individual or an individual having the negation of the negation of the said complex property resides, an indefinite number of such individuals do not. And if one such individual is taken into consideration, then it is the case that the ground is in possession of the negation of what has the said complex property, as it is the other individual, and not the individual on the ground, that has the said property. But even if he takes such a position, he cannot save the view he is zealously defending. For he confuses between what is limited by having the said complex property as such a property and what is limited by that particular case of having the said complex property. So he may adopt a desperate position. He may say that in view of the fact that a

negation that specifies a negatum-ness that is limited by a complex property is figuring as the epistemic predicate, the cognition is false. That the position is desperate and indefensible is obvious. For by taking into account only the epistemic predicate of a cognition, one cannot ascertain whether the cognition is true or false. In reply, it may be said that a cognition like it is in possession of ether (*gagana*) in the relation of inherence may be dismissed as a false cognition just by taking into consideration what figures as the epistemic predicate; and so there is no hard and fast rule for assessing the truth or the falsity of cognition. But the reply would be futile. For ether is categorially a substance and it is not a compound (*sāvayava*) substance. Besides, only a compound substance resides in its constituent parts in the relation of inherence. So to ascertain the falsity of the cognition referred to by him, it is not necessary to take its epistemic subject into consideration, and one may dismiss the cognition as false only by taking into consideration what figures as the epistemic predicate. So the reference to it is of no help. Besides, it should be kept in mind that the cognition that what has a conch-shaped neck etc. is not there is not always false. It is so when a jar individual is on the ground. But when no jar is there, it is not so. And a follower of the early Nyāya philosopher cannot account for this. If he is consistent he should say that the cognition that what has a conch-shaped neck is on the ground is also false when no jar is there or he should say that it is true when a jar individual is there. And none of these alternatives, as has been argued, is tenable. The view that a complex property cannot be treated as an NSLP should be given up. It may function as an NSLP even when it is known that it is a complex property and that a simple property is co-extensive with it.²⁷

With the above explanatory observations on some technical terms frequently used by an NN philosopher, we may consider how a defender of the definition of negatum-ness in terms of impossibility of co-residence would seek to overcome the objection that the definition is too narrow as it fails to cover the negatum of a mutual negation, and so how he would spell out the structure of the said negation. Thus, he would spell out its structure as: it is a negation that specifies a negatum-ness that is limited (relationwise) by the relation of identity and (attri-

butewise) by cowness. When the structure of a mutual negation is thus spelt out it is obvious that the objection that the definition under reference is too narrow is overcome. Thus, when a cow, or what is limited by cowness, is on the ground, the relation holding between the cow and the ground is that of conjunction and not of identity. If the relation between them were one of identity, the objection would be insurmountable. In short, when the NSLR is conjunction the negation is a mutual negation; the objection is about the negatum of a mutual negation and so the NSLR is identity. So even when a cow stands on a stretch of the ground, a mutual negation of cow is there. So the objection has no force.

Thus, we see that a defender of the definition of negatum-ness under reference can overcome the objections that are ordinarily levelled against it. Nevertheless, for some reasons that will not be discussed in this paper the definition has not been accepted either by the Nyāya philosophers of the classical period or by the NN philosophers.

The most important name in the classical period is that of Ācārya Udayana and he, rather incidentally, gave a definition of negatum-ness. It may be stated as follows. An object that 'goes about the world' may be invested with the property of 'being a negation of its own negation'. So, briefly put, the definition is that negatum-ness is being a negation of a negation.²⁸ Two points emphasized in this definition may be mentioned. Thus, in the first place, what does not 'go about the world' is not a negatum. In other words, a fictitious entity cannot be a negatum. In the second place, a real or not-fictitious entity like a jar is treated as a negatum only when it is considered to be in possession of the negation of its own negation. This definition is not as near to common sense as the definition just discussed. Nevertheless, it is not much removed from common sense. It is true that it makes use of the rule of double negation. But then the rule is understood by the Nyāya philosophers in its intuitive sense. Thus, in exposition of it they say that when we say or cognize that there is a jar on the ground we do not say or cognize that there is no jar on the ground, and we may even say or cognize that it is not the case that there is no jar on the ground. Similarly, when we say or cognize that there is no jar on the ground we do not say or

cognize that there is a jar on the ground. This evidences that a jar is virtually identical with the negation of its own negation.²⁹ The definition, as would be evident from what has been said, seeks to be logical, or to give a logical criterion for identifying a negatum without going beyond common sense or the intuitive. Accordingly, it became almost universally accepted, and even the NN philosophers who propose another definition occasionally resort to it.³⁰ But then it has been observed by some that the definition is too narrow in that it is not applicable to the negatum of a mutual negation.

Thus, when a jar is a negatum and the negation concerned is the constant negation of a jar, we get back the negatum when the negation is negated and so we are entitled to say the jar is in possession of the property of being the negation of its (constant) negation. So the definition that Ācārya Udayana gives is applicable to the negatum of a constant negation. But if the jar is a negatum of a mutual negation it is controversial whether the definition is so applicable. For the more widely held view on the constant negation of a mutual negation is that it is not the negatum but the negatum-ness limitor. The reason behind the view is as follows. A mutual negation is a negation in the relation of identity. The relation of identity is not a locus-sense generating (*vr̥tti-niyāma*) relation. So we may say that a jar is identical with itself. But we do not say that a jar has itself. In other words, the cognition that a jar is in possession of itself, if 'being in possession of itself' is understood on the analogy of 'a jar is in possession of jarness, or colour etc.', would not be an authentic cognition. But then the cognition that in the jar there is no mutual negation of itself or that the jar is in possession of the negation of its mutual negation is authentic. So the constant negation of the mutual negation of a jar in terms of the rule of double negation is something positive in respect of its being and that it resides in the jar. Therefore the constant negation of the mutual negation of a jar is not the negatum-ness that resides in it, but the negatum-ness limitor. Accordingly, the definition as given by the Ācārya is not applicable to the negatum of a mutual negation, and is too narrow. It is too wide also, as it is applicable to the negatum-ness limitor.

Possibly apprehending these difficulties, Śiromaṇi, while commenting on the above definition as referred to by Gaṅgeśa,

observed that the first negation as appearing in it should be understood as the cognition that prevented the cognition of the negation from occurring. Thus understood, the definition may be analysed as follows. When there is a cognition in which jar-ness in the relation of inherence figures as the epistemic predicate, then a cognition that a jar or what is in possession of jar-ness in the relation of inherence is not there does not occur as it is prevented from occurring, and a jar is deemed to be the negatum of the constant negation of a jar. Similarly, when there is a cognition in which a jar in the relation of identity figures as the epistemic predicate, then a cognition in which a jar figures as the negatum of a mutual negation of a jar does not occur. It is prevented from occurring. Besides—and this is the orthodox way of interpreting Śiromaṇi—when in a cognition jar-ness in the relation of inherence figures as an epistemic predicate, then also the cognition of a mutual negation of a jar is prevented from occurring. And so jar-ness (or a jar) may be treated as a negatum of the mutual negation of a jar and the definition concerned is not too wide. Now, when it is known that the hill is in possession of smoke which is comprehended by (*vyāpya*) fire, the cognition that the hill is in possession of the negation of fire is prevented from occurring. So one may be tempted to hold that the definition as interpreted by Śiromaṇi is too wide in that it is applicable to smoke which is not a negatum of the negation of fire. Śiromaṇi was fully aware of the possibility of a such a misunderstanding. Accordingly, he said that the second negation as appearing in the definition is to be understood as *svābhāva*, its own negation. That is, if a cognition of x prevents the occurrence of the cognition of the negation of an x , the negation being of x itself, then x is to be treated as a negatum to the negation concerned. Thus interpreted, the difficulty mentioned above disappears.

However, Jagadīśa, while interpreting the verse of *Nyāya Kusumāñjali* in which the above definition occurs, observes that a negatum or negatum-ness that is sought to be defined is that of a constant negation. Thus he steers clear of the difficulties or interpretations mentioned above. Pakṣadhara Miśra, however, thought that the negation of a negation is in every case the negatum-ness limiting relation. But this has not been favoured by the subsequent NN philosophers. Again, some NN philo-

sophers have observed that the negation of a mutual negation is not in every case the NSLP but some property common to every negatum of the negation but not possessed by any other object, and so it may be treated as the outcome of the negation of a mutual negation. Some others have held that if the NSLP is a more complex property than the sort of property mentioned above, then it is not to be treated as the result of the negation of mutual negation, but if the NSLP is a less complex property it is to be so treated. Mathurānātha, however, while elaborating the definition of comprehension (*vyāpti*), mentioned first by Gaṅgeśa and rejected by him as unacceptable, observes that the constant negation of a mutual negation is, if the rule of double negation is accepted, the negatum-ness limiter. But then in course of his elaboration a few sentences later, he observes that it may be the negatum as well. This is quite perplexing. To remove it Pt. Ś. Miśra has given some notes in his edition of the text concerned. Torn out of the context of the discussion on the nature of comprehension, it may be expressed in the following way. Some early Nyāya philosophers were of the view that there was no harm if it was held that the constant negation of a mutual negation was the negatum, the mutual negation being understood as *bheda*, difference, or being non-identical with. They also held that when there was a cognition like 'not a jar (this is not a jar)', then if what figured as the object of the cognition was only the negation of identity in respect of a jar (*ghaṭatādātmyābhāva*), then it would remain unaccounted for in that the word *nan* ('not') gave rise to a cognition of difference. But then if a relation is not locus-sense generating, it cannot function as a negatum-ness limiting relation. This is a rule universally admitted. But it is also universally admitted that the only exception to the rule is the relation of identity. Accordingly, there being no other alternative we should say that a constant negation of *bheda* or non-identity yields the negatum. Anyway, there is no settled opinion among the the Nyāya philosophers on what is the constant negation of a mutual negation. The interpretation given by Śiromaṇi to Ācārya's definition saves it from being either too narrow or too wide. And Jagadīśa, as has been observed, steers clear of all these views by stipulating that the definition is of the negatum of a constant negation only.

In this connection Jagadīśa makes an observation that is of some philosophical interest. He observes that negatum-ness is that property of a real entity that entitles us to use the word 'negatum-ness'. It may be discussed briefly thus. We have seen that Ācārya Udayana denies that a fictitious entity is ever the negatum of a negation. Jagadīśa elucidates this contention of the Ācārya, and observes that negatum-ness is a property of a real entity. But while drawing up a list of the kind of entities that 'go about the world' we do not include in the list a kind of entity called 'negatum'. To put it differently, we do not say that negatum-ness or negatum-ness-ness (*pratiyogitāva*) is a categorial property comparable to and co-ordinate with substance-ness, quality-ness, etc. That some radical NN philosophers do not subscribe to such a view is beside the point. No orthodox NV philosopher will ever agree to say that negatum-ness or negatum-ness-ness is a categorial property. But then he would not deny that we make abundant use of the word 'negatum'. Indeed, there are some kinds of philosophical discussion that cannot be conducted without using it. From this it should not be concluded that a negatum or negatum-ness is just verbal in respect of its being, much as a universal is held to be by a nominalist. Nor again should we think that in respect of its being it is epistemic, comparable to the being of a universal in traditional conceptualism. Besides, it cannot be denied, so a Nyāya philosopher would say, that a negatum may be given in perception in that a negation is perceived, and there cannot be any perception of a negation which is not at the same time a perception of the negatum as well. Accordingly, he would deny that a negatum is an abstract entity or that negatum-ness is an abstract property, if by 'abstract' we understand the non-sensible. To be sure, he would admit that there are a host of negata, and also a host of negations that are beyond the range of ordinary perception (*laukika pratyakṣa*). But then he would add that there are a host of entities coming under the categories of substance, quality, etc. that are also beyond the range of ordinary perception. And we do not say that they are abstract. So it would be unreasonable to treat a negatum or negatum-ness as abstract. Nevertheless, it is a fact that in the accepted list of categories negata are not included, and with the exception of a few radical NN philosophers no NV philosopher would

agree to incorporate negata in that list. So, as we have argued before, words like 'negatum' are status-indicative words.³¹

The NN philosophers, however, do not accept the definition given by Ācārya Udayana. Thus, while admitting that when a jar is known, its negation is not known, and so there is an opposition between them—the sort of opposition that obtains between the cognition of the preventer and that of the prevented, they do not accept the rule of double negation as stated above. For they hold that the theory of negative facts which is at the heart of the Nyāya theory of knowledge and being is not honoured if the rule of double negation is admitted.³² So the question of their accepting the definition of negatum-ness does not arise. They prefer to define negatum-ness as a sort of SS. And we propose to analyse it by dwelling briefly on SS.

The expression 'SS of a sort' is so abundantly used, particularly by the NN philosophers, that a student of NN not infrequently gets confused, and has hardly any inkling of what it is and also of what the Nyāya theory of relation is. It is not possible to go into the matter in this paper. So we would here take a concrete case and refer to some of the definitions of SS that one cannot fail to come across while reading the texts. We have seen that to every negatum there is a corresponding negation. Now, the two are distinct, and when we cognize one of them we cognize it as determined or qualified by the other. But what precisely is the determination? To put it differently, the cognition of either of them is a determinate cognition, and the Nyāya philosophers, whether of the early or later period, are of the view that to account for or to spell out the structure of a determinate cognition we should introduce some relation. And so some relation is needed to spell out the structure of the determinate cognitions referred to above. And our question is accordingly: what is the relation precisely? In answer to it, it is said that it is a relation of the SS type. And some have defined SS as: when no relation in addition to the determinate relata is required to account for a determinate cognition, we have a relation of the SS type, for it is of the nature of such a relation that it permits itself to be subsumed under one or the other category mentioned in the accepted list of categories and has the fitness for giving birth to a determinate cognition without requiring a relation in addition to the determinate relata.³³

This definition brings out some of the features of a relation of this kind. Thus, in the first place, the relation has to be such as may be categorized in terms of the categories mentioned in the accepted list of categories. The importance of this feature may only be hinted at by referring to the list of categories accepted by the NV philosophers in which relation is not included. True, it includes *samavāya*, or inherence, but then the NV philosophers admit a host of relations and inherence is one of them. Indeed, to the surprise of the beginners in NV philosophy, anything, no matter what it may be categorially or in respect of its being, is treated by the philosophers of this school as functionally a relation. Secondly, the relation under consideration gives rise to a determinate cognition without the assistance of a relation in addition to the relata. And thirdly, it is the nature of the relata in this relation that functions as a relation, and the relation is thus the nature of the relata themselves. Hence the name *svarūpasambandha*.

Anyway, let us come back to the concrete case under consideration. We have two cases of determinate cognition, viz. the negatum as qualified by the negation and the negation as qualified by the negatum. The relation, so it is contended, is of the SS type. That is, to account for the relation between a negatum and its corresponding negation no relation in addition to the relata is required. But, as suggested above, it may be considered from the side of the negatum—the first case of determinate cognition mentioned above represents it, and from the side of negation—the second case of determinate cognition mentioned above represents it. Popularly, the two cases are spoken of as: (i) the negation residing *in* the negatum, and (ii) the negatum residing *in* the negation. And the question is: what do the two 'in's stand for in the two cases? And the Nyāya philosophers in answer to it say that the 'in' in the first case stands for the SS relation of the sort called *pratiyogitā* or negatum-ness, and the 'in' in the second case stands for the SS relation of the sort called *anuyogitā* or subjunct-ness.

Now, the definition is given in terms of fitness for giving rise to or causing a determinate cognition. Accordingly, the cause-ness limiting property which is in most cases an assimilating property should be considered as constituting the nature of what figures in the resulting determinate cognition. In other

words, what is fit to produce a determinate cognition is so fit by virtue of being in possession of the property referred to. And in the concrete case under consideration or when the case of negation is the negation of a jar, there are two such properties, viz. (i) jarness residing in a jar, and (ii) that negation-ness residing in the negation. So also, if the case of negation was that of fire we would have fireness and that negation-ness. Now, it cannot be denied that there are a host of negata and consequently negations that are beyond the range of ordinary perception, and it may be objected that the definition being given in terms of fitness for causing a determinate cognition and such a cognition not resulting, the definition would not be applicable to these negata and would be judged as too narrow. To overcome such an objection it is said that this is the reason for introducing the word 'fitness' in the definition, and though the negata are beyond the range of ordinary perceptions, they are not beyond the range of extraordinary perception, and the other non-perceptual kinds of cognition. But then it may be argued that when a negation of a snake is miscognized as a negation of a rope, it is ropeness and that negation-ness that claim to be the sort of properties mentioned above, and so they should go into the structure of the SS relation concerned. But then it is universally admitted that a false cognition may be determinate, but the determinate object that it claims to show does not 'go about the world'. Hence there is an anomaly. Thus, if the properties, viz. ropeness and that negation-ness that go into the structure of the SS relation in the present case, are a genuine relation, then the negation of rope should be the fact that 'goes about the world', and this would imply that the false cognition under consideration is not a false one. But then this is the case, and so ropeness and that negation-ness should not go into the structure of the SS relation under consideration. But then a determinate cognition, though false, has been produced, and how? Should we say that in ascertaining the SS relation that is at the root of the origin of a determinate cognition, only true cognitions are to be taken into account? And the answer that is usually given to the question is in the affirmative, or that the expression 'determinate cognition as occurring in the defining sentence is to be understood as a true determinate cognition'.

But the affirmative answer is hardly any answer at all. It spells out in a more emphatic manner the circle that the objection raised above, though in a roundabout way, does not answer the question to which it is intended to be an answer. The point may be put more explicitly in the following way by contrasting the case of the false cognition under consideration with one that does not give rise to the circle or anomaly as is being alleged. Thus, let it be assumed that the cognition that there is a cigarette case on the table is false in that what is there is a small box that looks like a cigarette case. This is a case of determinate cognition that claims to show a determinate object, viz. a cigarette-case-on-the-table. But such a determinate object is not there. And there is no difficulty in analysing it. For the determinate object that figures in it is so by virtue of the relation of conjunction (represented by the preposition 'on' in English) and the relation is independent of or does not owe its being to the false cognition in which it figures. But in the case of the false cognition under consideration the relation of the SS type is not independent of it. True, roteness and that negation-ness are not dependent on the said cognition. But the complex of which they are said to be constituents and which complex is the determinate object that the said cognition claims to show is. In other words, when the determinate nature of a cognition is spelt out in terms of a relation of the SS type, the determinate object is real provided the cognition concerned is true, and the cognition is true provided it is real. And this is indeed a circle. In the case of the false cognition of the cigarette case such a circle does not hold, for the simple reason that the relation concerned is something in addition to the relata. But this is not the case with a false cognition when a relation of the SS type is introduced to account for its determinate nature. And the circle is unavoidable.

Besides, the critic of the definition and therefore also of a relation of the SS type may continue that neither jarness nor that negation-ness that was spoken of while analysing the definition with reference to a concrete case is a relation in respect of its being. So it should be assumed that the determinate cognition concerned converts it into a relation. This conversion is rather a case of transmutation, and it is difficult to imagine how a cognition may do it—particularly when the nature of a

cognition is understood in a realistic manner. In reply, it may be said that not only in the case of a relation of the SS type but also in many other cases, what is not a relation categorially may figure in a cognition neither as an epistemic subject nor as an epistemic predicate, and so should be treated epistemically as a relation. In other words, for an NV philosopher, relation-ness (*sambandhatva*) is not a categorial property. But then there are determinate cognitions, and it is necessary to spell out their structure relations. He seeks to do it in terms of the nature of the relata, and so without introducing a relation in addition to the relata. He thinks that there are cases when this may be satisfactorily done. Thus, to account for the relation between a cognition and its object a relation in addition to the relata is not needed. For such is the nature of a cognition that it cannot occur without being of an object. So a relation of the SS type seems to eliminate relations in addition to the relata, at least in some cases. Besides, it silences the critic of relations who demands that to be related with its term an additional relation is required, thus involving infinite regress. But then a relation of the SS type cannot account for a large number of determinate cognitions, and so he introduces some relations that are relations only functionally and not categorially. The most obvious case of such a relation is conjunction. It is categorially a quality, but it is intuitive that it often functions as a relation. A critic of relation may argue that when a relation of this kind obtains between its relata, then some other relation should obtain between it and its relata, and that there would be an infinite regress. But then a Nyāya philosopher would argue that the very question of the relation of a relation is a pseudo-question. Conjunction itself brings it out in the most satisfactory manner. When a conjunction figures as a relation, the question of its being related to its relata by another relation does not arise. If such a question did arise, then it would not have functioned as a relation. Indeed, it may figure in many determinate cognitions not as a relation but as a quality. In such a case it is a relatum and not a relation, and to relate it a relation is needed.

But the said relation is not another conjunction, but is in ordinary cases inherence (*samavāya*). To relate inherence to its relata another relation or another inherence is not required. For such is its nature that it relates itself to its relata. Indeed, it

is with reference to inherence that the idea of a relation of the SS type was first proposed by the NV philosophers. Besides, it was noticed by them that *samavāya* or inherence could not be subsumed under substance, or quality, or any of the other categories mentioned in the list of accepted categories. So it was included in the list, and was made co-ordinate with the other categories mentioned in the list. Now, the critic may contend that all this is a consequence of not including relation in the list of categories or of holding that a cognition just shows its object but does not contribute anything to the given to make it ordered. The NV philosophers do not accept the first alternative as they think that it would go against the law of logical economy. They do not accept the second alternative as that would imply giving up realism and accepting the sort of idealism that the Yogācāra Buddhists do. But then may it not be said that they have in some important sense eliminated relations altogether? They could not eliminate inherence as that would have harmed their theories of universals, of compound substance (*sāvayava-dravya*), of causality and some other important theories dear to them. Neither could they subsume it under the other categories and say that it was functionally a relation and not categorially, as that would also have harmed these theories. Besides, that would have been counter-intuitive. But then, so the critic would contend, while examining a relation of the SS type or the Nyāya theory of relations one need not necessarily adopt a radical posture so that either idealism or a kind of metaphysical theory that treats relations as appearances and not ultimately real may be treated as more plausible. Indeed, one may even agree to admit a relation of the SS type in some cases. But it is difficult to swallow the contention under consideration that jarness and that negationness by themselves account for the concrete case of determinate cognition referred to above. For it appears that they are transmuted by the cognition concerned and so the secret of their entering into the structure of the relation lies in the cognition itself and not in them. And this is perilously like an idealistic contention. Not only that. In view of the fact that cognition plays such an important role in the case under consideration, the occurrence of visual perception that the ground is in possession of the negation of a jar becomes inexplicable. For the

relation between the ground or a locus and the negation of a jar or a negation residing there is a relation of the SS type, and in this case also it would be contended that the cognition itself enters into the structure of the relation. And a cognition is not an object of a visual perception which, when determinate, cannot occur if the relation does not figure in it, implying that it plays a causal role also. So the critic, when not radical, would say that the definition of a relation of the SS type that has been given above cannot be accepted, for it is the definition that is at the root of all the difficulties discussed.

Now, some Nyāya philosophers, as for example Pt. P. Miśra, who has been followed in the above after subjecting his text to a free and interpretative expository analysis, hold that the definition as suggested by the critic should be given up. But then Pt. Miśra does not think that a circle as such is vicious. For every Nyāya philosopher contends that the properties of 'being an object of true cognition' (*prameyatva*), 'of being a nameable' (*abhidheyatva*), etc. are omnipresent properties or properties of every real entity, and so also of themselves. And it is not thought that though a circle is involved in this contention, the circle is vicious, and the contention should be judged to be false. So also the circle referred to above need not be deemed vicious. Besides, it would be counter-intuitive to deny, as the critic himself admits, that in many cases what is not categorially a relation functions as a relation. And so one may move one step further and argue that in view of the fact that there are cases of determinate cognition that may be accounted for without introducing a relation in addition to the relata, the critic is right in claiming that the definition of a relation of the SS type given before is inadequate. He is also right in holding that the cognition concerned should not on any ground enter into the structure of the relation that accounts for its determinate character. But then he has missed an important point while considering the visual perception of a negation, like the negation of a jar, as residing in its locus, like the ground yonder. For some philosophers introduce an additional relation that is claimed to be co-ordinate with inherence, and thus the other categories mentioned in the accepted list of categories, as holding between a negation and its locus. They call it *vaiśiṣṭya*.

But this in the first place upsets the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika list of categories and gives rise to a host of insurmountable difficulties, the chief of which is that it strengthens the contention of the critics of relation, viz. that relation holds among appearances only or is an appearance as it involves infinite regress. Accordingly, no Nyāya philosopher can admit of such a relation. He would explain the relation between a negation and its locus as a relation of the SS type and would claim that the admission of a relation of this type silences the critics of relation. He holds, however, that we should give up the definition mentioned above and replace it by a relation that is of the nature of both the determinate relata (*dharmidvaya-svarūpa*), and the question of how such relata may function as relations is to be settled by an appeal to what is intuitive, exactly as how a conjunction that is not categorially a relation may function as a relation is settled by such an appeal.³⁴

Now, whether the definition as given by Pt. Miśra throws any light on the subject or mystifies it is an open question. The crucial point is that the NN philosophers were not much impressed by this definition, because no reference to it is made in any text of NN philosophy. The NN philosophers give two definitions of the relation under consideration, and we may observe that the second one is the same as the first one stated in a more elegant way. Now the statements and the analysis of the two definitions should be prefaced by a few words on the approach of the NN philosophers. It consists in accepting the contention of the critic that while giving the definition and also while subjecting the concept of relation to analysis the causal approach should be abandoned. Pt. Miśra ignored it possibly because he was interested in giving the definitions in terms of the nature of determinate relata. Thus, it is suggested that to indicate the nature of a relation one should not take into account what causes a determinate cognition. One should on the contrary inspect the structure of an ordinary determinate cognition with a subject and a predicate. When one undertakes this inspection one notices that there is an epistemic subject, an epistemic predicate, and something other than these two.³⁵ This something else is the relation in the case of the determinate cognition concerned, though it may be categorially

a quality or a substance or something that may be categorized in terms of any one of the categories mentioned in the accepted list of categories.

But it may be asked, what is gained by this approach? In answer to it, it may be observed that to account for the relation obtaining between a negatum and its corresponding negation (from the side of the negatum) one may say that the relation is just negatum-ness residing in the negatum, and one may further be inclined to argue that this does not necessitate the immediate introduction of entities like 'jarness' and 'that negation-ness' into the structure of the relation. But such an argument cannot be used by an orthodox Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher who does not admit that negatum-ness or negatum-ness-ness is a categorial property. It was from this point of view that it was observed before that negatum-ness was a property of a sort and so just a status-designating property. Now, to be consistent an orthodox NV philosopher should say that negatum-ness is in the final analysis the negatum itself or the negatum-ness limiting property. And so even when an SS is conceived as the nature of the adjunct or of the subjunct (*pratiyogi-anuyogi-anyatara-svarūpa-sambandha*) nothing substantial is gained. It is a return to the position of Pt. Miśra with the difference that whereas he conceived of the relation as being the nature of both the relata, in the just mentioned way of conceiving it the relation is of the nature of either of them, and the disjunction not being mutually exclusive, it does not substantially differ from Pt. Miśra's conception. It might technically be a logical gain, whether real or philosophical. For in this way of conceiving, it amounts to this jar (or jarness) or that negation (or that negation-ness). Accordingly, an NN philosopher would spell out the definition in what has been observed before to be the second way. The second way of conceiving an SS by an NN philosopher may be put as follows: When it is the case that what may be categorized in terms of one or the other category mentioned in the accepted list of categories and what on account of being in metaphorical possession of some properties figures as a relation, then there is a case of SS.³⁶ We may seek to analyse it in the following way with reference to negatum-ness which, as has been observed, is a relation of the SS type holding between a negatum and its corresponding negation

considered from the side of the negatum. Thus, in the definition three points have been emphasized and they are: (1) the relation concerned is of the nature of the relatum, and so to categorize it no additional category is needed; (2) it figures as a relation by virtue of being in possession of a property, and (3) the possession is metaphorical—*uparāgena*. The points may be illustrated with reference to negatum-ness. Thus, (1) negatum-ness, as observed before, is of the nature of either the negatum or the negatum-ness limitor. This, in the opinion of many NN philosophers, is of the nature of the negatum. But then ordinarily the Nyāya philosophers distinguish between specific negation (*viśeṣābhāva*) and generic negation (*sāmānyābhāva*). There are some NN philosophers who are reluctant to admit generic negation. That is, to account for the negation of colour as such which figures in a cognition articulated as 'there is no colour in the sky', the NN philosophers who admit these two kinds of negation argue that there is a difference between the two cognitions of negation expressed respectively as there is not this colour in the sky and there is no colour in the sky, and we may satisfactorily account for it if we admit that while a specific negation of colour figures in the first cognition, what figures in the second cognition is a generic negation of colour. But the Nyāya philosophers who do not admit of the two kinds of negation argue that the said generic negation may be reduced to a logical product (or sum) of every specific negation of colour. But then the more established view is that such a reduction is not possible, and the generic negation is ineliminable particularly because the cognition in which such a logical product of specific negations figures cannot prevent the occurrence of a contradictory affirmative cognition. Accordingly, one is permitted to make two contradictory statements like: there is no jar on the ground and there is a jar there. Similarly, it is intuitive that one may cognize that there is no red colour in the sky, no orange colour, no green colour, no blue colour, no indigo colour, no violet colour—that is, no other colour—in the sky (*gagana*) or empty space, and yet doubt if there is some colour there. Hence, the more widely held position is that we should distinguish between specific negation and generic negation. But if negatum-ness is of the nature of the negatum, then in view of the fact that in the case of a generic negation there

may be countless negata, there would also be countless negatum-ness, and so also a countless number of SS even in the case of a single generic negation. To articulate it we may require a disjunctive statement with countless disjuncts, and it is an open question whether such a disjunction can ever function as a relation. So it has been held that at least in the case of a generic negation, negatum-ness is of the nature of the negatum-ness limiting property. And to explain the first point here we should mention only that when negatum-ness is of the nature of the negatum or of NSLP, no additional category is required. If this was not the case, then either the SS relation would have been a fictitious entity (*apadārtha*), or a relation as such or the relation of negatum-ness would have to be included in the list of categories. But none of these alternatives are considered reasonable by the Nyāya philosophers, and accordingly they say that to categorize SS no additional category—a category not included in the accepted list of categories—is needed.

We may now consider the second point. It has been observed before that negatum-ness is a property of a sort, and if it is held further that it is of the nature of the negatum, then, there being a countless number of negata there, the number of the property concerned would be countless. And it is essential that they should be assimilated. That is, it is required that not only should the countless number of negatum-ness specified by a generic negation like the negation of a jar be assimilated, but the countless number of negatum-ness specified by every negation should also be. In other words, if the first kind of assimilation was required, 'jarness' would have been of some help; and it is obviously of no help in achieving the second kind of assimilation. To achieve this a higher order property is required. The said property is the property of 'negatum-ness-ness' residing in every negatum-ness whether specified by the negation of jar or any other negation.

Besides, it should be kept in mind that what is not a *jāti* (universal or class-property) or an *akhaṇḍa-upādhi* (a simple or unanalysable property) does not (or, if it is preferred, cannot) as such, that is, without reference to a property residing in it, figure in our cognition. Thus, when a jar figures in our cognition, it so figures as being in possession of jarness, and jarness, being an assimilating class-property, may figure (if it is not

explicitly referred to as a class-property) without a reference to the higher order property, viz. jar-ness-ness.³⁷ Similarly, negatum-ness is not a class-property or a simple property, and so whenever it figures in our cognition it figures as loaded with the higher order property mentioned above. It may be observed that it spells out the realistic attitude of the Nyāya philosophers who not only hold that this is intuitive but also argue that the denial of it would amount to the adoption of the nominalistic position of the Buddhist philosophers who hold that 'what are given are just bare sense-particulars—*nilapītādisamudaya*—the universal being due to 'the additional wheel-work of mind'—*kalpanā-janya*. Again, it has been argued before that if a relation is understood in terms of what causes a determinate cognition, then a circle is the outcome. It has been thought by some, as observed before, that the circle is not vicious. But the NN philosophers generally do not think on this line. They point out that the conception of cause is a relational conception or is intelligible only in a relation, viz. the relation of a cause with its effect. To put it differently, a certain kind of invariable relation is treated as a causal relation. Accordingly, when we seek to define a relation in causal terms we seek to define it in terms of itself or in terms of a relation of a certain kind. So the circle involved cannot be held to be non-vicious. And to overcome the said circle we may seek to define a relation like negatum-ness in terms of the higher order property mentioned above. But then also we cannot overcome the difficulty. For the higher order property, viz. negatum-ness-ness, is itself an SS and so the difficulty is not really overcome. Accordingly, it has been contended before that what figures in a determinate cognition, not as the epistemic subject nor as the epistemic predicate but as something other than them, is a relation. In the case of a relation of the SS kind a higher order property is involved, as by virtue of being in possession of such a property it figures as a relation. In other words, a relation is needed to account for a determinate cognition. Such a cognition is evidently of a complex, and the complex to be or to figure as a complex requires something that is different from what figures as its epistemic subject and as its epistemic predicate. The case of the complex figuring in the determinate cognition articulated as the jar is on the ground has been discussed before.

It is to be mentioned here that the jar and the ground by themselves cannot form the complex that figures in the cognition concerned. This is obvious. The complex has been formed by what 'on' stands for, and it is conjunction. Now, though conjunction is categorially a quality, it is in the case concerned functioning as a relation. Similarly, in the determinate cognition of the negation of a jar a complex figures as the object. 'A jar' and 'a negation' figure as the epistemic subject and the epistemic predicate of the cognition concerned. And it may be contended that the two constituents of the complex just mentioned do not require something additional for the complex to be or to figure as a complex. So the early Nyāya philosophers sought to define a relation of the SS type in the way we have discussed. But then as negatum-ness is a property of a sort and has therefore no distinct categorial status, their account lacked something. It is true that as a negation is necessarily of something or is never apprehended without reference to its negatum or to what the negatum-ness resides in, the complex figuring in a determinate cognition of the negation of a jar has some characteristic difference from the complex figuring in the determinate cognition that the jar is on the ground. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the negation concerned constitutes the complex in the way an ordinary relation like conjunction does. For it specifies the negatum-ness and is a specifier, and has the property of 'being a specifier' that is in the final analysis a relation of the SS type. Nor can it be said that the jar does the job of a relation in this case. For the negatum-ness concerned resides in it, and in the opinion of some, as has been observed before, the negatum-ness is of the nature of it. So also it cannot be said that jarness does the said job in this case. For it is the negatum-ness limitor, and in the opinion of some, the negatum-ness concerned is of the nature of it. So something additional is required. Paradoxically it is also not required. Something additional is required as the conception of a relation is that it is something other than both the epistemic subject and the epistemic predicate. And it is not required as the complex concerned is of a distinct sort and the relation is of the SS type. So the NN philosophers demand that the complex that figures in the cognition concerned should be more carefully inspected, and they hold that when this is done it is seen that the negatum-

ness figures in the complex, for to spell out the structure of the cognition we say that it is a negation that specifies a negatum-ness residing in a jar and that it does not figure as not having the higher order property mentioned. Accordingly, it is by virtue of possessing the said higher order property that it figures as a relation. This seems to be what the NN philosophers say when they insist on the second point. The third point may be immediately disposed of. The point is that the possession of the higher order property is metaphorical or *uparāgena*, and obviously, it cannot be otherwise. For negatum-ness has no distinct categorial status, and the higher order property is not of the sort; jar-ness or negatum-ness is. It may be possessed only metaphorically. Anyway, with this brief analysis of SS, and a packet of technical terms felt necessary, we may translate (c) into (d).

There is in the lake a negation that specifies a negatum-ness residing in fire and limited (relation-wise) by conjunction and (propertywise) by fire-ness . . . (d)

However, (d) also is not deemed to be as precise as the NN philosophers hold it ought to be. So they make use of the technique of inserting *pariyāpti*. This is a task by itself and would require a monograph of greater length than this one to be briefly outlined. Nevertheless, from the analysis of some of extensively used technical terms of NN, it would appear that they are not terms of an artificial or semi-artificial language. They are terms of a technical-ordinary language. We should now try to explain this rather paradoxical expression, and would say a few words on ordinary language in the section below. But we should make an observation in passing. It is to the effect that as in an artificial language some of the ambiguities of ordinary language are carried over, so also, as we have seen, in the technical language of the NN philosophers some ambiguity remains. This also has been brought out, though not directly, in the analysis.³⁸

III. *Some Observations on Ordinary Language*

In this section we would make a few observations on ordinary language to bring out that the paradoxical expression men-

tioned above is not really so and also that the treatment of the subject here has been of the kind that is expected in a paper with the title 'Navya-Nyāya and Ordinary Language'. It seems it would be convenient if the second task is undertaken first. The expression 'ordinary language' is not as ordinary as one may hold it to be when not in a reflective mood. So we should say a few words to state what we mean by it and we hope that ~~this~~ does not substantially differ from what has been held by many philosophers who have reflected on it and who have also argued that while working on a philosophical problem we may treat ordinary language as the 'begin-all if not the end-all' of our philosophical task.³⁹ In other words, it seems to us that if we succeed in stating what we understand by the expression under reference, then no argument would be required to establish the two propositions, viz. (i) that the treatment of the subject of a paper bearing the present title ought to be of the kind undertaken here, (ii) and that the said paradoxical expression is not really paradoxical. So we should say in a very general way what we understand by the expression 'ordinary language' and may do it with the help of the distinctions that Prof. Ryle makes and which are familiar to a student of contemporary British philosophy.⁴⁰

Thus, Prof. Ryle has made a distinction between (a) ordinary language, (b) ordinary linguistic usage, and (c) the ordinary use of an expression. He has further held that when we say 'ordinary language' or '(a)', we mean the 'common, vernacular, colloquial, non-technical language'. But when we say 'ordinary linguistic usage' or '(b)', we mean 'the custom, practice, vogue, fashion of using' what occurs in (a). And when we say 'the ordinary use of an expression', we mean 'any stock or standard way of using any expression whether technical or ordinary'. Now Prof. White, in his book on Prof. Moore, mentions the distinctions made by Prof. Ryle and observes that 'Moore's references to ordinary use and ordinary language are meant . . . to express his intention to speak about the ordinary use of expressions which are expressions of ordinary language, such as "know", "good", "see", "real", "time"'.⁴¹ In other words, as Prof. White has argued in an elaborate way, Prof. Moore 'respected and defended ordinary language in the sense of ordinary use of everyday language'.⁴² So he in many cases

sought to find out what was the meaning or analysis of such words as 'know' or 'real' as used in everyday language. All of us in a sense know what 'know' means, for we use it correctly and can also identify such uses of it. If anyone happens to use it in a way that disturbs us we feel perplexed, and ask if it is not due to rather an odd way of using it. Indeed, many philosophers, particularly the sceptics, seem to use it in a very disturbing way. Accordingly, it is felt that it is necessary to find out what is the precise meaning of the word 'know' as used in everyday language. To put it differently, a perusal of the disturbing uses of the word, particularly by philosophers, suggests that though in a sense we know the use of the word, in another sense we possibly do not. We know the meaning of the word, but not its analysis. And Prof. Moore, as is well known, gave considerable attention to such analysis. But then, as Prof. White has argued it at length, Prof. Moore was also of the view that ordinary language indicated what we all believed, and so he thought that when a philosophical use of the words of ordinary language was inconsistent with or incompatible with their ordinary use, it was legitimate to reject as absurd the philosophical views that involved such uses.⁴³ So a reference to ordinary use of everyday language was for Prof. Moore of great philosophical importance, and Prof. Ryle, who has drawn the distinctions stated above, as well as numerous contemporary philosophers, particularly the Oxbridge ones, would in principle agree with him.

But then, as regards the philosophical importance of ordinary linguistic usage, that is, of 'the custom, practice, vogue, fashion of using' any word of 'the common vernacular, colloquial, non-technical language', Prof. Ryle is sceptical. He thinks that any dispute about which one among the many uses of a word is the standard use is philosophically uninteresting, though it may sometimes be felt necessary by a philosopher to ensure successful communication. The position of Prof. Moore on this point is slightly different. He does not deny that a dispute about ordinary linguistic usage is rather verbal and may be left to the lexicographers and persons interested in diction or literature.⁴⁴ Indeed, he has distinguished between 'what most of us say' and 'how most of us speak', and has held that while the second is relevant to diction, and therefore philosophically

unimportant, the first is not about diction, but about what most of us maintain or believe, and therefore philosophically important.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, he did not think that an appeal to usage had no philosophical importance. Thus, he sometimes appealed to usage to assure himself or his readers that he was using a word in a stock way. Again, he also in some cases appealed to usage when the question whether the use of an expression was the stock way of using it was involved or was permissible. So Prof. Moore was not entirely in agreement with Prof. Ryle in thinking that an appeal to usage was not philosophically interesting. Similarly, Prof. Moore thought that when a term was technical a philosopher ought to refer to its technical usage.⁴⁶

But then, Prof. Moore appealed to common sense also. Prof. White has considered at length the question what Prof. Moore understood by 'common sense', and it appears from his treatment of the subject that the task of ascertaining Prof. Moore's conception of common sense is pretty difficult. Fortunately, it is not necessary for us to go into it. We should only observe here that Prof. Moore did not think, as some writers on him have thought he did, that the two appeals, viz. (i) to common sense and (ii) to ordinary language, were not two different appeals but one appeal only, and that the said appeal was to ordinary language. For though Prof. Moore did on many occasions observe that ordinary language indicated what we all believed and also that when a philosopher's use of a word was inconsistent with its ordinary use his statement containing that word was inconsistent with what common sense believed to be true, he nevertheless was against equating common sense with ordinary language.⁴⁷ Besides, there are reasons for holding that Prof. Moore thought that an appeal to ordinary language was 'subsidiary to the appeal to common sense'.⁴⁸

We have considered Prof. Moore's views at some length as we think that his contributions to contemporary British philosophy when judged from the standpoint of its development are of great importance. Indeed, contemporary British philosophy is given the appellation 'analytic philosophy' and this is to a great extent due to Prof. Moore's interest in analysis, or to the emphasis that he gave to the method of analysis. But then he, as Prof. White has made it abundantly clear, made use of

different models while using the method.⁴⁹ And it is well known that different philosophers have understood 'analysis' in different ways. Besides, as Prof. Weitz has observed:

Although analysis, in any of its contemporary forms—as real, conceptual or contextual definition, as reduction and translation of linguistic complexes into more simple or ultimate units of discourse, or as logical syntax—persists among philosophers even today, it seems to have lost its great hold on serious contemporary philosophy. Three of the great analysts themselves, Wisdom, Ryle and especially Wittgenstein, have repudiated or replaced analysis as the proper method of philosophy. Some writers, anxious to retain the term 'analysis'—perhaps because of its laudatory associations with clarification—characterize the later work of John Austin and P. F. Strawson as 'linguistic analysis' or 'ordinary language analysis'. But this extension of the term is misleading since an essential part of the recent work of these philosophers involves the explicit rejection of analysis in any of its contemporary modes as primary in philosophy. Their concern shifted from definition, reduction, or translation to description, from analysis to elucidation.⁵⁰

Nevertheless, there is hardly any reason for not subscribing to the following observations of Prof. Quinton:

Between 1945 and 1959 two related but nevertheless distinct kinds of linguistic philosophy were dominant in Britain. The first of these is the pure doctrine of the later Wittgenstein, as expressed in his *Philosophical Investigations* (1953). The second is the Oxford philosophy of ordinary language whose most prominent exponents have been Gilbert Ryle and J. L. Austin.

The two forms of linguistic philosophy share a conception of the nature of philosophy and predominating interest in questions about meaning and about the nature of mind. For both the characteristic mark of wrong, traditional, metaphysical philosophy is the collision with obvious common-sense certainties. Another link with Moore is the explanation both give of philosophical paradox: they attribute it to the misuse of ordinary words, inspired by treacherous analogies. Where they differ is that Wittgenstein and his followers were chiefly concerned to dispel confusion and paradox by any means that came to hand; they strenuously repudiated any desire to assert a contrary philosophical position. For the philosophers of ordinary language, however, metaphysical paradox is not simply a conceptual disorder to be cured; it is, rather, a convenient point of entry into the task of setting out the complex informal logic of the philosophically crucial

terms of ordinary speech, a task that Ryle has called 'logical geography' and Austin 'rational grammar'.⁵¹

From the above observations, particularly those of Prof. Quinton, it would be obvious how great the influence of Prof. Moore is on contemporary British philosophy, and we are therefore justified in dwelling on him at some length. Besides, every student of Nyāya philosophy would agree with the vast number of contemporary British philosophers, and so in the ultimate analysis with Prof. Moore, that a metaphysical statement colliding with commonsense certainties is a suspect and ought to be rejected on this ground only. Indeed, the Nyāya literature is replete with instances of clinching an issue in a debate or dispute with the philosophers of the other schools, particularly those of the Svatantra Yogācāra school of Buddhism, by appealing to *lokavyavahāra* and *lokayātrā*.⁵² The two Sanskrit words may be explained in the following way. In *NK* it has been said that the word '*vyavahāra*' means 'the using of words'—*śabdaprayogaḥ*. It has also been said that it means 'using a sentence with the intention of communicating'—*bubodhayiṣāpūrvakavākyaḥ*. Besides, *NK* states that when a sentence, as, for example, the sentence 'this is a cow', is used to articulate a cognition it may be said that a *vyavahāra* is taking place.⁵³ So we may say that *vyavahāra* means using a word or a sentence to communicate or to articulate a cognition. In other words, it means linguistic behaviour. And the compound word *lokavyavahāra* means linguistic behaviour of the common folk or of the social group. But *NK* in a different place has observed that all actions with a forward direction or actions consequent upon cognition and performed to obtain the pleasant objects and to avoid the unpleasant ones are also meant by *vyavahāra*.⁵⁴ Obviously, in this sense every volitional act is a *vyavahāra*. So the compound word under consideration refers to such actions of the common folk or of the social group. Thus understood, it stands for what the word '*lokayātrā*' also does. We think that it is permissible to treat it as similar to the English expression 'common sense'. In other words, the expression 'common sense' is not as univocal as one may fondly hope. Prof. White has made strenuous efforts to ascertain what Prof. Moore meant by it or what according to him was the criterion of common sense, and the outcome has been the contention that he did not always use it

in the same sense or that he did not always use the same criterion to identify a commonsense statement. Nevertheless, we may say that the kind of actions referred to above involve some beliefs that are philosophical and that some of these beliefs are taken to be ultimate in the sense that to question them or to reject them appears odd, and occasionally leads to a conflict, though not usually recognized, between what is said and what is done.

It is not necessary to draw up a list of these beliefs. Indeed, the task of drawing up such a list if undertaken seriously would be a strenuous one and may not be completed to the satisfaction of everyone. But a list of some of these beliefs may be drawn up, and that may be sufficient to indicate what common sense is ordinarily taken to be. Thus, the belief that the object cognized is independent of its cognition is a commonsense belief. So also is the belief that there is an external world. Similarly, the belief that a cognition is diaphanous, and when true shows its object as it is, is a commonsense belief. Again, the belief that what we saw before is now being touched by us, and that, accordingly, we do not see a colour only or touch a tactile sensum only but also a physical thing that owns the colour or the tactile sensum, is a commonsense belief. So also the beliefs that the distinction between a cow and a horse is real, and that as the class of all cows and the class of all horses are co-ordinate classes, an individual that is a member of one of them cannot be a member of the other, are commonsense beliefs. Similarly the beliefs that the distinction between the subject of a cognition and the object cognized is real, and that a cognition occurs and shows its object and is owned by the subject, are also commonsense beliefs. There are many other beliefs like these and, as has been said before, an exhaustive list of them cannot possibly be drawn. Moreover, it would be obvious from the incomplete list just drawn that such beliefs are behind the everyday actions of the common man. A philosopher may challenge them and say that there is no compelling reason for accepting them. But then such a philosopher often holds that though they have no roots in reason, yet while we act we cannot deny that our actions imply as if they were rooted in reason.⁵⁵ Now, one may hold that in philosophy such an approach to these beliefs is rather jaundiced. For it is question-

able whether the task of a philosopher is to found such beliefs on reason or to investigate into the roots of them in reason. His task is rather to find out the structure of them, to connect them and also to point out that when a philosopher challenges them or persuades us to believe in what is contradictory to them, he contradicts himself either knowingly or unknowingly. Or, as the Nyāya philosophers argue, doubting cannot be limitless. One may indeed doubt, but then one should always keep in mind that doubting cannot go on *ad infinitum*, and when it appears that doubting, if continued, would amount to a collapse of all action, and also to an inconsistency between what is being said and what is being done, one should stop it.⁵⁶

We have dwelt at some length on what the Nyāya philosophers meant when they used expressions like '*lokavyavahāra*' and '*lokayātrā*', and we think that it is permissible to interpret their appeals to *lokavyavahāra* and *lokayātrā* in clinching an issue as appeals to ordinary language and common sense. We may accordingly be permitted to say also that their approach to philosophical questions and their philosophical attitude are comparable to those of Prof. Moore. But then we should be careful and need not be over-enthusiastic and treat the Nyāya philosophers, and, for that matter, any philosopher of any school of philosophy of the ancient or medieval times, as if they were our contemporaries. We would, therefore, be rather safe if we say that the Nyāya philosophers referred occasionally to ordinary language and frequently to common sense to clinch an issue, but that they had more trust in the traditional style of philosophizing. To put it differently, they referred to ordinary language and to common sense also as part of the traditional style of philosophizing, and this was done by many other philosophers or philosophical schools with a realistic bias. Besides, to treat such references as appeals to the final court of appeal would be unfair. Thus, the Nyāya philosophers referred to ordinary language to bring out the plausibility of their view that the words '*jñāna*', '*buddhi*,' '*upalabdhi*' and '*caitanya*' were synonymous and to show the unplausible character of the Sāṃkhya view that they were not so. The Sāṃkhya view was a consequence of the cosmological and the ontological views sponsored by the school. The Nyāya philosophers did not subscribe to these views and sponsored and defended views in-

compatible with them. So they referred to ordinary language to support their view that these words were synonymous. We may, if we like, say that they thought in the manner of Prof. Moore that a denial of their synonymity was perplexing or puzzling. But then they were rival metaphysicians and would never have said that metaphysics or such metaphysics as collides with ordinary language should on this ground be deemed false. Besides, in their controversy with the Sāṃkhya philosophers about the cosmological and ontological views concerned they were not content to confine their appeal to ordinary language and would have been bewildered if they were told to do so. They produced arguments in the traditional philosophical style to establish their own views and also to disestablish the views of the Sāṃkhya philosophers. Again, the contention that the words mentioned above were synonymous was not directly aimed at disestablishing the Sāṃkhya views.⁵⁷ The Sūtra concerned, when given a liberal interpretation from the linguistic point of view, suggests, without saying it, that the Sāṃkhya philosophers deny their synonymity and thus sponsor ontological views difficult to defend. In short, the Nyāya philosophers would have strongly denied that such references to ordinary language were comparable to appeals to the final court. It should also be mentioned that they did not seek to analyse the meaning of the philosophically intriguing words as Prof. Moore did. So also they did not undertake a descriptive or elucidatory (as contrasted with the analytic) study of language as their later contemporary British philosophers do. This is a truism and is indeed trivial. But it is worth mentioning. For there is a tendency among some writers on Indian philosophy to trace all that is laudatory in contemporary philosophy to the philosophies of India that flourished in medieval and ancient times. Accordingly, we should emphasize the rather trivial point that though development and advance in philosophy are not as remarkable and as easily noticeable as they are in science and technology, yet they are facts. Indeed, the relation between philosophy and science and technology is highly complex, and that is possibly one of the reasons for there being many incompatible views on the subject, and this has provoked many outstanding thinkers to deny that there is any relation between them or to hold that metaphysical philosophies are not philo-

sophies proper. But then it is undeniable that there is some relation between them. For developments in science and technology have changes in the social structure as their consequence, which in turn changes our sense of values and world-views as its consequence. So a person philosophizing today cannot do it in the way a medieval or an ancient philosopher did. And if there is a change in the style of philosophizing, then there would be a change in the content of philosophy also. So it is not an exaggeration to say that if the ancient or the medieval philosophers philosophized today, they would have done it in a different way.

From this it ought not to be assumed that the ancient or the medieval philosophies are dead and that our task today is to give them a decent burial. For the expression 'perennial philosophy' is both useful and meaningful, though the expression 'perennial science' is not. Past science is rather discarded science, but past philosophy is ordinary philosophy, or rather philosophy out of fashion, and every student of the history of philosophy knows well that what is out of fashion today may not be so tomorrow. Thus, possibly since Plotinus, hardly had any philosopher paid serious attention to Plato's *Timaeus*, though his other works received more or less considerable attention. Possibly the kind of cosmology and also the kind of ontology that Plato sought to work out in it have not proved appetizing to the modern philosophers, or to philosophers after Plotinus. Indeed, cosmology has been an object of distrust with the modern philosophers, whether of the rationalist or of the empiricist school. Some of them have even argued that human nature being what it is, a philosophical attempt to construct a cosmological theory, though intriguing, is futile. But development in physics that undermined Newtonian mechanics and therefore the mechanistic view of the world that was subscribed to by the elites of the modern age provoked many speculative minds to construct cosmological and ontological theories, and thus to do high metaphysics that would replace the mechanistic view, and in many cases to reinstate a religious view or the Christian theistic view in its place. True, such attempts by some outstanding physicists with little or no training in philosophy have been judged to be failures. Nevertheless, speculative adventures have not been given up. And Prof. Whitehead

was of the view that cosmology was the proper province of philosophy. He was an eminent mathematician, and with Lord Russell was one of the founders of modern logic. He was also a thorough student of ancient, medieval and modern philosophy and of science and literature as well. Lastly, he was gifted with a highly speculative and rational mind. So it was only natural that he would take part in the speculative adventure. And he did so and thereby breathed new life into Plato's *Timaeus*. This has inspired many contemporary Anglo-American philosophers, who, in spite of the fact that the philosophical atmosphere in the U.K. and the U.S.A. is either antimetaphysical or unmetaphysical, do high metaphysics quite unperturbed. So the attempt at sorting out the dead and the living elements of even ancient philosophy is rather unimaginative, if not foolish. This point can be corroborated with reference to every great philosopher of the ancient and the modern times. But this is not necessary, though for the present paper it is relevant to mention that this is the case with Hume also. In other words, contemporary British philosophy that is zealously perused in the Indian universities is predominantly empiricistic even when it is presented as linguistic or analytic philosophy.⁵⁸ Green, who 'unfurled the banner of Idealism in Oxford', subjected the philosophy of Hume to such severe criticism that for some decades German philosophy or Hegelian idealism dominated the world of philosophy in Great Britain. Some great names in British philosophy are associated with this kind of doing philosophy. The philosophers concerned were called Neo-Hegelians, though they hardly philosophized after Hegel or followed Hegel in the ordinary sense of the word 'follow'. Hegel inspired them, but all of them were not inspired in the same way and they produced philosophies that were original in the true sense of the term. Besides, the philosophy of one Neo-Hegelian differed considerably from that of another, though the influence of Kant and Hegel is quite evident in all of them. The contemporary British philosophers treat these philosophies as 'exotic flowers' and this is quite appropriate in that the British philosophical soil is 'unfertile' for a philosophy of the Hegelian kind. To put it in plain language, empiricism is the dominant trend of British philosophy, and though for a few decades a philosophy not

compatible with empiricism dominated the British universities, it did not last. Hume, dead for a few decades, came back to life in a rather boisterous way. And when in this paper it is contended that philosophy has a 'perennial' aspect, what is meant is not something grandiose but something humble or prosaic. It is to the effect that philosophy develops in a tradition or an atmosphere. When they are different, philosophies also are different. The kind of tradition and atmosphere that environ the philosophies of Prof. Moore and the later analysts are different from those that environed the Nyāya and the other systems of Indian philosophy. And so the appeal to ordinary language as made by the contemporary British philosophers is different from the references that the Nyāya philosophers made. Ordinarily, they referred occasionally to everyday speech to settle a philosophical issue. But then they also argued in the traditional philosophical style. And if the question as to which was primary was raised, they, so we are persuaded, would not have hesitated to say that the reference to ordinary language was not so. Again, when they felt that some proposition held by them might be apprehended as rather odd, they referred to ordinary language to allay such an apprehension. They also referred to ordinary language to identify the different elements that go into the structure of a cognition and similar phenomena. In short, they appealed to ordinary language in the way that the ancient Western philosophers like Plato and Aristotle did, though they, like the philosophers of some other schools of Indian philosophy, had the insight that a cognition consequent upon the hearing or the reading of a sentence, though indirect, was non-inferential, and that a philosophy of grammar and language—the historical language in which they wrote—was an important part of philosophy. So also there was nothing extraordinary about their references to common sense. It was primarily a reference to what was intuitive.⁵⁹

Anyway, assuming that it is proper for us in philosophy to undertake, at least occasionally, a study of linguistic usage, we may ask what exactly we are expected to do. From what has been said before, it would be evident that different answers may be given to it and that they may not be compatible. But we have not so far considered the view of Prof. Cook Wilson, which seems to us very plausible.⁶⁰ It is not possible, nor is it

necessary, to state his view in detail in this paper. We shall be content with giving what is relevant for it. It is to the effect that for many words that are of interest to a philosopher it is true that we cannot say that we do not know what they mean. But then it is also true that we cannot say what they mean precisely. That is, the words are used by us even when we are not doing philosophy, and when we do philosophy and make an attempt to state what they mean, we find that it is an onerous task and also that the more we try the more we find that the sought for meaning or definition is eluding us. So, not infrequently we may stipulate meaning or definition. It amounts to exercising volitions and thus to abandoning the task of defining or getting the meanings concerned.⁶¹ Not only that. If it is the case that the philosopher giving the stipulated definition says that he is giving such a definition, as Lord Russell and Prof. Whitehead do in their *Principia*, and if the word concerned is of an artificial language as in the *Principia*, then the consequence is not harmful and may be willingly accepted by all concerned, as there is possibly no other alternative. But if it is the case that the philosopher concerned declares that he is giving such a definition and if the word concerned belongs to natural language, then he should also state the reasons for giving such a definition, and after considering them one may or may not accept it. In the opinion of some thinkers a large number of philosophers who use familiar words in unfamiliar senses use them in some stipulative sense without declaring it, and this creates the kind of perplexity to which Prof. Moore frequently referred. Again, it may be thought—and we are of the opinion that many a competent student of philosophy thinks so—that one cannot philosophize without using familiar words in more or less unfamiliar senses; then philosophy, whether openly admitted or not by the philosophers themselves, is as such more or less stipulative, and it seems that ordinary language is more or less insufficient for doing philosophy, and that this may explain why one great philosopher or a student of philosophy trained in one tradition finds it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to get the full or real meaning of what another great philosopher, or a philosopher philosophizing in a different tradition, says. Nevertheless, a case may be made for ascertaining ‘non-stipulative or descriptive defini-

tions of words used in ordinary language'. And Prof. Cook Wilson thinks that the classical example of arriving at such definitions is illustrated in the Socratic search for definitions.

Prof. Wilson's point may be stated as follows: The Socratic attempt to find a definition may appear at first sight to be 'paradoxical and inexplicable'. For, as is well known, Socrates inquired into what may be the meaning of such words as were quite familiar. It cannot be said that he and also the persons with whom he carried on his dialogues to ascertain the meaning of some words did not know their meaning. If that were so, there would be no dialogue. They all knew what their meaning was. They could use them, and also understand them when used by others. Nevertheless, they did not in some sense know their meaning. For otherwise the attempt to ascertain what was their meaning would have been a vain enterprise. Thus, the situation was that in some sense the meaning of the words was known, and in another and an equally important sense it was not known. Thus, all the persons with whom Socrates carried on his dialogues as well as Socrates himself knew who were brave and who were not, which acts were just and which were not, when there was a case of knowledge and when there was not, and so on. Nevertheless, it was a fact that they could not give a definition of bravery, or of justice, or of knowledge. In other words, they could say who was brave and who was not, which acts were just and which were not, when one was in a state of having knowledge and when one was not, etc. They knew how to identify the individual instances of bravery (and cowardice), of justice (and injustice), of knowledge (and belief, opinion and ignorance); but they did not know what was common to them—what was the definition of bravery that would be applicable to that particular property of every brave man and not applicable to any coward not having that property, what was the definition of justice that would be applicable to every just act and not applicable to an unjust act, and so on. And when the vaguely entertained definitions were suggested it was found that they were either too wide or too narrow, and also that to ascertain the definition that would not be either too wide or too narrow was a strenuous, though intriguing and absorbing, task.

Now, it appears that Prof. Cook Wilson recommends this

model. He seems to hold that when we undertake the task of ascertaining the non-stipulative definition of some word or words of interest to a philosopher, we should, particularly when the word is a name-word, 'start from the facts of the use of a name and shall be guided at first certainly by the name. Next, we have to think about the individual instances, to see what they have in common, what it is in fact that has actuated us. This seems . . . to be the examination of a thing or reality as opposed to a name. At this stage we must take first what seems to us common in certain definite cases before us; next test what we have got by considering other instances of our own application of the name.'⁶² If it is found that the generalization first arrived at is not applicable to some case or cases to which it ought to be, then we would hold it to be too narrow, and take appropriate steps to amend it, and thus to make the generalization more general. Then, if we should find that the generalization first arrived at or when made more general is applicable to a case or cases to which it ought not to be, we should treat the generalization concerned as being too wide and seek to remedy it. When this is done we may obtain the non-stipulative definition sought for.

This account of Prof. Cook Wilson's view closely resembles the Nyāya attempt at arriving at non-stipulative definitions. Indeed, the Nyāya philosophers and also the philosophers of those schools of Indian philosophy who are of the view that the objects that 'go about the world' are definite and that to seek for definitions is not a vain task, hold that the principal tasks of a *sāstra* or philosophy are to mention the topics to be discussed in it, to give their definitions and to examine the definitions given. It is well known to every student of Nyāya philosophy or of NN that the philosophers belonging to the school undertook that task of ascertaining the definitions of the topics concerned with great zeal, as a consequence of which they, particularly the NN philosophers, adopted a number of methods to arrive at a definition. No exhaustive enumeration—and far less an analytic treatment—of such methods can be undertaken here. We would be content with mentioning only those that cannot escape the notice of a student of even a primer of NN. Thus, (i) there is an attempt to arrive at a definition that is descriptive or is in terms of a property other than a

universal or its analogue that all the definienda have and what is not a definiendum does not have. (ii) This is in most cases found to be not quite satisfactory as some defect like 'being too wide' or 'too narrow' remains and the defects appear ineliminable. So in those cases where a simple property—*jāti* or *akhaṇḍa upādhi*—residing in every definiendum and not residing in anything that is not a definiendum is available, the definition is given in terms of it. (iii) Again, it is found that in most cases such a definition demands that it be given in terms of one of the disjuncts occurring in a disjunctive statement with a limited number of disjuncts. A large number of definitions are given in terms of a disjunct of such a disjunctive statement. In other words, the NN philosophers often refer to a definition oriented towards a common property other than a universal, as given by the early Nyāya philosophers. But on account of the fact that it is not possible in many cases to overcome the objection that it is either too wide or too narrow they give the definitions in terms of the kind of simple property just mentioned. The definition of a substance illustrates this satisfactorily. Thus, in the Sūtra of Kaṇāda a substance is defined as the substratum (*āśraya*) of a quality or an action, or as an inherent cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*)—the kind of cause in which an effect (that is positive in respect of its being and is either a compound substance, or a quality or an action) resides in the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). This definition of Kaṇāda may be treated as a unitary definition or as three definitions expressed in one sentence. Traditionally, it has been treated as three definitions expressed in the aphoristic style characteristic of a Sūtra. Now, of the three definitions the one in terms of 'the substratum of an action' is obviously too narrow for a Vaiśeṣika philosopher, for he holds that a ubiquitous substance like the soul or ether (*ākāśa*) is not the substratum of an action. Similarly, the definition in terms of 'being an inherent cause' is also inadequate, for there are many substances that have not produced an effect, though they are capable of doing it. Accordingly, the definition of a substance as being the substratum of a quality has been deemed to be the most important one. But then it is too narrow in that an occurrent substance at the moment (or at the first moment) of its occurrence is not the seat of a quality. For all the qualities that reside in it are occurrents and they reside in

it in the relation of inherence. Accordingly, the said substance is an inherent cause of them and therefore a temporal antecedent to them. So at the moment of its occurrence it is not the seat of any quality though in the next moment it is invested with many of them. Thus an occurrent substance at the moment of its occurrence is as devoid of qualities as a quality is, and the definition under consideration is not applicable to such a substance which also is one of its definienda and is too narrow.

There have been attempts at overcoming this difficulty in the following way. Thus, it has been contended that the expression 'being the locus of a quality', in the ultimate analysis, is 'not being the locus of a constant negation (*atyantābhāva*) of qualities', and when the definition is considered after taking this into account, the objection that it is too narrow because it is not applicable to an occurrent substance at its moment of occurrence disappears. That is, it is admitted that the said substance has no qualities, but this means that it is the seat of prior negations, and not of constant negations, of qualities, and so at the next moment such prior negations are annihilated and qualities occur and reside in it. Nevertheless, this defence of the definition has not been estimated highly by many NN philosophers who flourished after Śiromaṇi. For it assumes that a prior negation and its corresponding constant negation do not reside in the same locus and are opposed to each other. The assumption was treated as almost self-evident by the Nyāya philosophers who flourished before Śiromaṇi. But Śiromaṇi questioned it and contended that there was no good reason in favour of it. Some NN philosophers after Śiromaṇi were even more radical and declared that there were good reasons for holding that a prior negation and its corresponding constant negation were not opposed and did reside in the same locus. So their followers argued that the defence of the definition under consideration, though ingenious, was a failure. Accordingly, the definition of a substance in terms of a class-property gained currency, and as some philosophers, while admitting that universals were real or 'furnitures of the universe', refused to admit the universal 'substance-ness' (*dravyatva*), so the sponsors of the new definition sought to establish it as the limiter of the property of 'being an inherent cause' (*samavāyikāraṇatāvacchedaka*).

Though the above way of defining in terms of a universal does not amount to defining in terms of a disjunct occurring in a disjunctive statement with a limited number of disjuncts, there are a large number of cases when this is so. Thus, while examining one of the widely held definitions of an inferential cognition in terms of 'being a cognition produced by an application (*parāmarśa*)', it is found that the definition is not applicable to some cognitions of this kind. So it is contended that the definition consists in being in possession of the class-property that resides in the one case mentioned and is directly comprehended (*sākṣātvāpya*) by the class-property of 'being a primary cognition (*anubhavatva*)'. In this case we have a disjunctive statement with a limited number of disjuncts, viz. (i) 'being a perceptual cognition' (*pratyakṣatva*); (ii) 'being an inferential cognition' (*anumititva*); (iii) 'being a cognition of a name and its bearer resulting from previous instruction in terms of similarity and a perceptual cognition of the said similarity' (*upamititva*), and (iv) 'being the cognition consequent upon the hearing or reading of a sentence' (*sābdabodhatva*). Obviously the properties nos. (i), (iii) and (iv) do not reside in the definiendum mentioned above, and no. (ii) does in every definiendum of the definition concerned, and so the definition is held by many to be free from all the faults, the presence of any one of which may render a definition defective, and accordingly it may be accepted as an elegant definition. The same method is noticeable, though used in a more elaborate way, in the following definition of an inferential cognition. It is to the effect that an indisputable case of an inferential cognition should be taken into consideration to find out by means of inspection the class-property that resides in it, and does not reside in any one of the three other cases of co-ordinate cognition, and the definition concerned would be that the cognition that is in possession of the said property is an inferential cognition. Thus, the class-properties that reside in the cognition spoken of are: (i) 'being an inferential cognition' (*anumititva*); (ii) 'being a primary cognition' (*anubhavatva*); (iii) 'being a cognition' (*jñānatva*); and (iv) 'being a quality' (*guṇatva*) and existence (*sattā*). The said properties are related thus: the property mentioned earlier in the sequence is comprehended by the property mentioned immediately after it. So they may

be arranged in the familiar scholastic style in the form of a tree.

Thus, the property (i) is comprehended by property (ii), which again is comprehended by property (iii), and so on, and we may arrange them in order of comprehension in a hierarchical order, as the medieval scholastic philosophers were fond of doing; this is also known as the tree-type arrangement. Now, to come back to our definition. We should also take into consideration a cognition that is a member of a co-ordinate class, and we may take a case of perceptual cognition. All ^{the} class-properties listed before except the first one reside in it, and so we get the definition sought for.⁶³ We may describe this method of defining as 'conceptual cartography' which is favoured by many contemporary philosophers who are called analysts in the sense mentioned before, though we should add that these thinkers do not appreciate the tree-type arrangement of universals—or concepts, which is the term they favour—possibly because of the kind of empiricism that they avowedly or unavowedly hold. Anyway, the method adopted in this case may be said to be a variety of the method mentioned first in this paragraph, which is in terms of a disjunct occurring in a disjunctive statement with a limited number of disjuncts.

(v) A clear case of a definition given in this style is that of an ordinary sense-object contact. Thus the Nyāya philosophers draw a distinction between an ordinary perception (*laukika-pratyakṣa*) and extraordinary (*alaukika*) perception. They also define the kind of sense-object contact holding in the first kind in the style just mentioned. Thus, they mention six kinds of such contacts, and incorporate them in a disjunctive statement with six disjuncts and give the definition by mentioning that any one of them is such a contact and the resulting perception is an ordinary perception.^{63a} So also they attempt to define a fallacy (*hetvābhāsa*) in the ordinary way, and after a strenuous attempt find that a fault-free definition cannot be obtained in this way. They declare that what figures as one disjunct of the disjunctive statement in which the five faults recognized by the philosophers of the school are incorporated is a fallacy.⁶⁴

(vi) But then in some cases when an assimilating property like a class-property is not available and the different ways of arriving at a definition just considered are not relished for various reasons that cannot be mentioned here, they, so it

appears, hold that only the ordinary method of getting a definition is open to us, and that we should follow the method, and if necessary should be prepared to undertake a severe and tortuous course. Thus, they seek to define a sense-organ (*indriyatva*) in the ordinary way, for 'being a sense-organ' is, in their judgement, not a class-property (*jāti*), and even without going through a very tortuous course they seem to be successful.⁶⁵ But in giving a definition of comprehension (*vyāpti*) it is found that they are not so successful. So a large number of definitions are formulated by many philosophers of the school, and these are examined to ascertain if they are fault-free.

Now, in all the cases of definition mentioned it is known both to the preceptor and to the student that the definienda may be identified and so the definition is in one sense (or intuitively) known, but in another sense (or conceptually spelt out) it is not known. So in all these cases we may compare the Nyāya search for definition with the Socratic search as analysed by Prof. Cook Wilson. Particularly, in the attempt of the NN philosophers to arrive at a satisfactory definition of comprehension, the similarity with the Socratic attempt is too obvious to be dwelt on here.⁶⁶ Accordingly, we may with some justice claim that the NN philosophers were after non-stipulative definitions of words of ordinary language. But then, it may be objected that words like comprehension are hardly words of ordinary language. In reply to such an objection it may be said that some exponents of the contemporary ordinary language philosophy, as was mentioned before, hold that when a term is technical, a philosopher ought to refer to its technical usage. Nevertheless, there is a difference. For the instances of the use of a word may be identified not by a tyro, but by one who has some acquaintance with *sāstra* or the philosophy concerned—in our case the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy. So it would not be fair to hold that the Nyāya or the NN philosophers were after non-stipulative definitions of words of interest to a philosopher whatever might be his standpoint. And if anyone expects that an essay with the present title would contain a discussion of at least some of the definitions stated above, his expectation would hardly be a reasonable one. He may reasonably expect a treatment of the technical terms, some of which have been discussed in this paper, and which are also

ordinary in the extended sense of philosophical treatment of usage as mentioned above. And this has been done—though it ought to be mentioned that the NN philosophers did not undertake such a discussion, and that when they discussed these terms at some length, they did it in the context of the discussion of some topic that occupied the focus of their attention, and that such discussion was only marginal. On appreciating the need for a fuller discussion of these words, particularly while reading the texts under orthodox scholars and teaching them to our students, we have undertaken it with what success we cannot say, and we have tried to bring out that the words concerned are not of an artificial language, nor of a semi-artificial language. They are words, as we observed before, of ‘a technical though ordinary language’.

We think that we have discussed elaborately what we understand by ordinary language. And we may now proceed to state our reasons for saying that the technical terms discussed in this paper are terms of ordinary language. We have mentioned one such reason before. But that may not be enough. So we should substantiate it by some argument of a general sort. But before that we should briefly dispose of a possible objection to our view on the nature of ordinary language. Thus, it may be contended that in the context of this paper we have treated Sanskrit as an ordinary language, not the kind of Sanskrit that philosophers, particularly the NN philosophers, use, but Sanskrit without any qualification, or such Sanskrit as is used by poets, writers of stories and novels and such people. And it may be contended that even this kind of Sanskrit is hardly an ordinary language. For there is no strong evidence that it was used by laymen or ordinary folk. Now, we have mentioned before that Prof. Ryle has drawn certain distinctions with reference to ‘ordinary language’, and have also stated that he holds that one may treat the ‘common, vernacular, colloquial, non-technical language’ as ordinary language. And the objection under consideration is that Sanskrit as used either by the philosophers or the non-philosophers was never such a language. And in disposing of this objection we need not consider whether it is historically true. It may be or it may not be; but we are persuaded that the claim that it is historically true is more plausible. But then it

does not imply that the claim this paper is making should be rejected. For to treat a language as ordinary it is not essential to ascertain whether it is 'colloquial', or is spoken even by the 'underdogs' of society. Sanskrit, it may be assumed, was not spoken by the *prākṛtāḥ janāḥ*, the common people. English as it is spoken and written by the University men is not spoken and written by the villagers or the labourers. When Prof. Mundle in his closely argued book against the contemporary British ordinary language philosophers states that what is treated as such language by them is not the language of the common British folk but of the Oxbridge men who have been trained to write English in a more elegant way and with a dexterity that only a few Britishers can master, he, in our judgement, makes an important point, though one may differ from him on its implication.⁶⁷ Besides, it cannot be denied that some men who were not philosophers but writers on non-philosophical subjects also spoke it. Again, the sacred texts are generally written in a language that the 'common people' may understand without difficulty. The Upanishads are no exceptions, and the various hymns written by Ācārya Śaṅkara and many other writers, though composed in Sanskrit, were, and even in these days are, recited by the 'common people'. Further, when one goes through the Sanskrit dramas one notices that all dramatic characters do not speak in Sanskrit; only persons of exalted rank and higher social standing do so. The rules governing the writing of dramas do not permit it. Moreover, the *prākṛta* or the language of the 'common people' as used by persons of different social standing in the different dramas is different in character. Nevertheless one notices in the various Sanskrit dramas a not obtrusive yet marked presence of elegant Sanskrit. And finally, as in the case of an ordinary language that has some connection, remote or immediate, with the 'colloquial', there are some words that are of interest to a philosopher, about which he cannot say that he does not know what they mean, nor again that he knows them—the Socratic puzzle referred to before—so it is in the case of Sanskrit also, the question of its being a language of 'the common people' or not being rather irrelevant. Accordingly, we have used the word 'ordinary language' to refer to Sanskrit in the context of this paper.

Be that as it may, we may now make an attempt to explain

the rather paradoxical expression mentioned above. Thus, Prof. Cook Wilson has observed:*

The terms 'particular' and 'individual' are none the less technical because familiar. They are adequate and useful because we know what is meant; we forget their etymology and are not misled by it. But as soon as we treat them as explanatory designations, we are obliged to recur to their etymology and they become misleading. Aristotle has resorted sometimes to 'this' and 'that' of everyday language, but the practice though convenient is not adequate for several reasons. 'This' and 'that', though they often refer to a particular thing, do not mean particularity; moreover, they are applied to the so-called universals, although incorrectly, and by a transference from the proper use, this colour standing for this kind of colour. Now a universal can always be designated otherwise than by 'this' or 'that', whereas any particular cannot; even if we appear to do otherwise, we find, on scrutiny, that the particular in question is really designated by a relation to something only designated by 'this' or 'that'. Again this use is so far really subjective because it means the individual which I am pointing to now.⁶⁸

The above passage occurs in one of the chapters of *Statement and Inference* in which Prof. Cook Wilson has discussed the problem of universals. The relevancy of quoting it here may be questioned. But we are of the view that it is not irrelevant, though the most relevant part of it is obviously where it is stated that 'particular' and 'particularity' are technical, but as they are used abundantly, they are not noticed to be so. And we may add that this is also the case with 'universal' and 'universality'. Now, if this is granted, then the question of distinguishing between a technical word and an ordinary word becomes difficult. But the difficulty is only embarrassing and not insurmountable. To surmount it we may formulate it—as Prof. Cook Wilson has done—in terms of *anubhava* or the intuitive, and also by an appeal to the intuitive. Thus, we may consider how a perception—*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*—is articulated. When we do so we notice that sentences like 'this is a cow', 'this is a jar', are universally admitted to be examples of the articulations concerned. Incidentally, Prof. Cook Wilson also considers 'a this such', or 'a this such and such' as such examples. Now, we may seek to translate such a sentence as 'this is a member of the class of cows', or as 'this has or owns cow-ness'. The transla-

tion, however, is not as intuitive as it may appear at first sight, or to one with some training in philosophy. For 'being a member of the class of cows', or 'owning or possessing cow-ness' is an expression hardly used by a layman and it is extremely doubtful if it forms part of the 'common, vernacular, colloquial language'. Nevertheless, if a layman who uses the sentence 'this is a cow' is requested to state why he uses the indefinite article before the word 'cow', he may say that everyone does it, and if he knows grammar, he may also say that he has used it as grammar demands it. But he may also say something that would not differ from what a student with some training in philosophy would say. For he does not use the sentence only with reference to a particular cow, but also with reference to any cow he may happen to perceive, or instead of 'this' he may use 'that' with reference to a cow at a distance. He may also happen to know that at times he is mistaken, and takes a horse to be a cow. He also uses expressions like 'that cow', 'another cow', 'not that cow', 'not a cow' and so on, and he does it as an ordinary person, as one of *hoi polloi*. So it may be said that he feels or intuits that the individuals to which he applies the expression 'a cow' have a certain unity or are of the same sort or kind. The use of 'same' is of some importance, for it indicates that the intuitive apprehension, as Prof. Cook Wilson has said, cannot be translated in terms of resemblance or similarity. It should, at the conscious philosophical level, be translated in terms of identity. But then this is not relevant here. What ought to be said here is that the intuition under consideration is behaviour-oriented. The ordinary man uses the expressions mentioned above not as a reflective or contemplative being. Indeed, one may doubt or deny that such a man is ever reflective, and the expression '*hoi polloi*' was coined by the Greek philosophers for this purpose or to demarcate the aristocrat philosophers from the vast unreflective crowd. Anyway, our layman is not wisdom-oriented but behaviour-oriented, and his behaviour is towards what environs him—not only the physical environment but also the social environment, which includes even his sense of values and the culture that surrounds him and that he has inherited and to which he may contribute even as a member of the crowd. Moreover, his behaviour, though typical and different from the behaviour

of others, is scarcely his exclusively. So it may be said that our layman intuitively feels that the individuals to which he applies the expression 'a cow' have a certain unity and also that this unity is deeper than similarity and is a case of identity. Accordingly, the difference between him and a realist philosopher who sponsors and defends a realistic theory of universals is almost negligible, though undoubtedly he can neither formulate such a theory, nor, lacking training in the professional philosophical art of dispute, defend it. It may not be irrelevant to mention here that the Buddhist philosophers who reject the realistic theory of universals are contemptuous of the behaviour-oriented intuition and favour the view that reconstructing such intuition has no philosophical significance, as there is hardly any difference between a *paṇḍita*, a philosopher and a *pāmara* or a tyro, in respect of their behaviour towards what environs them.⁶⁹ Be that as it may, it is obvious from what has been said above that the word 'universal' is technical as it is introduced when a rational reconstruction of the sort of intuition spoken of above is attempted. This is true also of the word 'particular'. Moreover, when we consider such terms as 'substance' (*dravya*), 'quality' (*guṇa*), 'action' (*karma*), we find indeed that a host of terms that are abundantly used, and possibly primarily for this reason have become part of 'ordinary language', and also of the 'common, vernacular, colloquial language', are the contributions of the philosophers to enrich 'ordinary language' and are not even suspected to be technical. *But they are*. Nevertheless, it ought not to be imagined that philosophers have disfigured language and that an appeal to it is of no use in settling philosophical issues. True, some philosophers argue that this is the case, but they are wisdom-oriented and not behaviour-oriented. Rather, they seem to think that the two orientations are qualitatively different and the gap between the two is so wide that no bridge can be built to span it. The issue is a large one, and cannot be discussed even briefly in this paper. It should only be mentioned that if the said gap is unbridgeable, then not only 'ordinary language' but also most of the commonsense beliefs and the empirical world would be underestimated, and the logical outcome would be either acosmism or the view that the world of many changing objects, though ultimately unreal and so non-existent, nevertheless appears and that this appearance

is inexplicable, *anirvācya*. And a Nyāya philosopher, whether of the earlier or the later period, is dead against such a view or one like it.

Thus, it is evident that it is difficult to characterize a term as ordinary or technical. We cannot take any language used by the layman and draw a line to demarcate the zones of technical and non-technical terms in it. What passes for non-technical and is not even suspected to be technical may on careful consideration be seen to be technical. Nevertheless, as regards some expressions no consideration is necessary to identify them as technical. But even when they are carefully considered it may be evident—if the considerations advanced above are not groundless—that they are in a way ordinary also and that they have been converted into un-ordinary or technical terms by polishing their ordinary uses, either by adding something to their ordinary meaning, or by leaving out something from it, or by both adding and leaving out, or by using them, if that is felt necessary, in a metaphorical and so a rather unfamiliar sense, or in many other ways. It is not necessary that we should draw a list of the various procedures, even if it is assumed that this is possible. Nor again do we think that anyone with some training in philosophy is not acquainted with them at least in a vague way. We would only underline our contention that technical terms of NN do not transcend ordinary language and that they are extensions of it; and if any question is raised of the nature of the language of which they are constituents, and if again the answer that the language is the ordinary one is not found satisfactory, then our answer would be that our statement above is paradoxical, not really but only apparently. If any question is raised about the status or the reason for there being such an appearance, our answer would be that this paper, we hope, will provide the answer.

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

1. *AG* *Gādādharaṇi Anumiti Prakaraṇam with Didhiti and TC* (Chowkhamba, Banaras)
2. *ANJ* *Avacchedakatvanirūkti Jāgadiśi*
3. *BAP* *British Analytical Philosophy*, ed. B. Williams and A. Montifiore (Kegan Paul, 1966)
4. *BP* *Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ*
5. *BR* *Bhāṣaratnaṃ*, ed. MM Pt. Kālīpada Tarkāchāryya (Calcutta, 1936)
6. *PE* *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards (Macmillan and the Free Press, New York, 1967)
7. *PTN* *Padārthatatvanirūpaṇam* (Calcutta, 1976)
8. *SLJ* *Jāgadiśi or. SL*, ed. MM Pt. Śrī S. Śāstri (Chowkhamba, Banaras)
9. *SL* *Siddhāntalākṣaṇaprakaraṇam—Didhiti*
10. *SM* *Siddhāntamukhāvalī*
11. *SSP* *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* (Chowkhamba, Banaras, 1973)
12. *TC* *Tattvacintāmaṇi*
13. *VPR* *Vyāptipāñcakarāhasya*, ed. MM Pt. S. Śāstri (Chowkhamba, Banaras)
14. *VTI* *Prāśastapādabhāṣyam with Vyomavati Sukti, Setu* (Chowkhamba, Banaras, 1930)

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *AG*, Preface.
2. *PE*, vol. v, pp. 254-6.
3. *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 169.
4. *vahnyabhāvavān hradaḥ*.
5. *yasyābhāvaḥ sa pratiyogī*.
6. *TC*, p. 357. The opposition contemplated is between two entities, and so the opposition between two statements such that one being true the other is false should on this view be understood in terms of the opposed entities about which the statements are.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 357.
8. In this paper we propose to discuss the technical terms used by the NN philosophers. For some reasons that cannot be either stated or discussed in this paper these philosophers did not undertake any discussion of them outside of the discussion of the topics like *vyāpti*, *pakṣatā*, *hetvābhāsa*, etc. We seek to discuss them as torn from the contexts in which they were discussed by these philosophers. It is not unlikely that our discussion may not be that accurate, but we think that there is hardly any statement in this paper that has no authoritative text behind it. When we sat at the feet of the orthodox scholars we felt the need of such a discussion, and while teaching the subject to our students we felt the

need more acutely. The outcome has been this paper. It is to be hoped that the discussion of the undiscussed technical terms and also of the terms discussed here would be undertaken by them. If the paper provokes them to undertake such discussions, we would be amply rewarded, and may even claim credit for laying the foundations, however rickety, of a new branch of Indian philosophy, if not of philosophy as such.

9. By a 'bonafide negation' we understand a negation like the negation of jar. In view of the fact that NN philosophers occasionally treat a jar as a negation in that a negation of the negation of a jar is virtually identical with or is of the essence (*svarūpa*) of a jar, and so also negation-ness as an SS, which is not relished by many outstanding NN philosophers, we have introduced this expression.
10. The technical terms mentioned here have been introduced, as without using them the discussion undertaken cannot be continued in a satisfactory way. But then the discussion of them demands that this be carried on at a higher level than attempted in this paper. We are content with the minimal discussion as given here.
11. *SSP*, p. 123.
12. *BR*, p. 9.
13. *viśiṣyate anena iti viśeṣaṇam*.
14. There may be languages in which it is treated differently.
15. The reason for replacing *viśiṣṭa* by *avacchinna* is that the former is mostly used to mean determined in the sense of being related or owning a property that may categorially be a substance even.
16. Expressions like 'something is somewhere', 'resides somewhere' are to be taken in their most extended sense, so that the sentences like 'jar-ness resides in a jar', 'a red colour resides in a jar', 'the jar resides on the ground' are covered. The orthodox scholars use '*asth*', '*varatate*' in such cases, and those who use Bengali say '*etā ekhāne āchey*'. And so we have used them.
17. The discussion assumes the ontological or categorial framework of the NV philosophers. Indeed, their logical and epistemological discussions assume it, and such discussions of the other schools assume the ontological frameworks of them.
18. Prof. Thompson's article in *PE*, vol. 1.
19. *SL*, *PTN*.
20. Sārvabhauma holds a different view.
21. *BR*, p. 20.
22. This kind of opposition holds between cognitions only.
23. *kambugrīvādi* etc. means a special arrangement of the constituent parts, *avayavasamsthānaviśeṣaḥ*.
24. *Nyāya-Kośa* (3rd edn., 1928), p. 83.
25. *BR*, p. 20.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
27. *ANJ*, pp. 146-56 (MM Pt. Vāmācāraṇa's edn., Māther Khelārīlāl).
28. *Nyāya-Kusumāñjali*, referred to by Gaṅgeśa also while stating the definition discussed above.

29. *VPR*, p. 45 (Pt. Ś. Śāstri's edn.; discussed by us in *Jadavpur Studies in Philosophy* 1 (Macmillan India, 1979). *
30. Pt. S. Miśra in his edition of *VPR*, p. 45.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 45-9.
32. (a) The subject has been discussed by us at some length in the paper 'The Doctrine of Triple Negation', published in *Jadavpur Studies in Philosophy* 1.
(b) *Setu* (Chowkhamba, 1930), pp. 97-8.
33. *AG*, p. 36.
34. *Setu*, p. 98.
35. *SLJ*, pp. 138-9.
36. *līptāḥ padārthāḥ san kiñciddharmoparāgena saṁsargatā vattvaṁ*.
37. *SM* on *BP*.
38. The different senses in which the term 'avacchedaka' is used cannot be brought together with the help of a definition or a defining common property.
39. *Vide* G. J. Warnock, *English Philosophy since 1900* (Oxford University Press, 1969), ch. 11.
40. Alan R. White, *G. E. Moore: A Critical Exposition* (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958), p. 21.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 33, and the references to the writings of Prof. Moore given there.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-3.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
50. *PE*, vol. 1, p. 102.
51. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 394.
52. *Nyāya-Kośa*, p. 27.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 604; *athavā sarve ye vyavaharāḥ āhāravihārādayaḥ teṣāṁ heturbuddhiḥ*.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-15.
55. *PTI*, p. 527.
56. *TC* etc.
57. Sutra 1.1. just states that the said words are synonymous. The writers on it point out that this spells out the disagreement of the Nyāya philosophers with the Sāṁkhya philosophers. Nevertheless, they undertake a critical examination of the Sāṁkhya view.
58. C. Taylar, *BAP*, p. 233.
59. This may have as its consequence that in different cultural contexts common sense and ordinary language including the words that are philosophically intriguing would be different. This would again have as its consequence gaps in communication. It is doubtful if we can overcome such gaps by holding that what is at the core of the languages concerned is substantially identical. But this is not the place to discuss

the problem of gaps like communication gap, generation gap, cultural gap, etc.

60. P. E. White, Prof. Strawson, and others.

61. C. W. K. Mundle, *A Critique of Linguistic Philosophy* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970).

62. *Statement and Inference*, pp. 40-1.

63. and 63(a). *SM*.

64. *AG*, p. 1621.

65. *SM*.

66. See also with *pakṣatā*, *hetvābhāsa*, etc.

67. Mundle, op. cit., p. 273.

68. Cook Wilson, *Statement and Inference*, p. 712.

69. *VTI*, p. 528.

Wittgenstein *versus* Naiyāyika

Philosophical Investigations attacks throughout a theory of language. Wittgenstein, while referring to this theory, has mentioned Augustine,¹ and Paul Feyerabend has observed that this was the theory of the medieval realists.² The essence of the theory is: The individual words in language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names . . . Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.³ A student of Indian philosophy cannot help noting that this in essentials was the theory of the Indian realists, the Naiyāyikas. Accordingly, a conversation between a Naiyāyika and a follower of Wittgenstein may be worth imagining. The following hopes to give such a conversation, *N.* being a Naiyāyika, and *W.* a follower of Wittgenstein:

- W.* I have heard that the Nyāya system has a vast literature on the nature of language and contains many wise observations on words and their meanings. Will it suit you to discuss some of them with me?
- N.* It will suit me admirably and I shall be very glad to discuss the Nyāya theory of language with you. But as the range of the theory is unmanageably wide, we should, I think, select some part of it to make the discussion profitable. You were speaking of words and their meanings. Would you like to take up this point for discussion?
- W.* Why not? I think that the treatment of words and their meanings forms an important part of the theory of language.
- N.* The Sanskrit for 'word' is *śabda*, which also means sound. This, I think, is significant. Words are existentially sounds. A written word, to be sure, is not a noise coming warm from the mouth but a patch of colour, and so cannot be

said to be existentially a sound. But then the written word is the visual descendant of the spoken word.⁴ And so a word in the final analysis may be said to be existentially a sound. But though all words are sounds, all sounds are not words. Some sounds have and some sounds do not have symbolic functions. The sounds having symbolic functions are or form words. The non-symbolic sounds neither are nor form words. In Sanskrit the former are called *varṇātmaka-śabda*, and the latter are called *dhvanyātmaka-śabda*. It is one of the contentions of the Naiyāyikas that these two types of sound differ qualitatively in respect of function and not in respect of existence.⁵

W. But is it an assertion?

N. Do you suggest that a professional doubter may, but a sober man will not, doubt the truth of this assertion?

W. Exactly.

N. I am afraid, I must contradict you. The Mīmāṃsakas and the Vaiyākaraṇas, representing two important schools of Indian philosophy, assert that linguistic sounds, *varṇātmaka-śabda*, are eternal and differ qualitatively from non-linguistic sounds, *dhvanyātmaka-śabdas*.

W. I see. But do they call linguistic sounds sounds? Is not their use of the word *sound* rather extraordinary? However, asking such a question is an invitation to avoid and not to solve the problem,⁶ and so please go on with your analysis.

N. Words are symbols; so they can be said to be meaningful only if their symbolic function is discharged.⁷ So we may say that the hearing of words brings forth awareness of objects that are, so to say, presented, *upasthāpita*, by the words, and objects are meanings of words.⁸

W. Do you say like Frege that a word has meaning only as part of a sentence? Or do you say that a word, though forming no part of a sentence, may be meaningful?⁹

N. We do not say that a word forming no part of a sentence can be meaningful, though we do not deny that a sentence may consist of one word only.¹⁰

W. When can a word be said to form a sentence?

N. When it is successful in giving birth to an awareness of a *viśiṣṭārtha*, i.e. an awareness of objects as related.

W. What is a *viśiṣṭārtha*? May I understand it on the analogy of what Russell calls a fact?

- N. What is called a fact by Russell?
- W. A fact, according to Russell, is that which makes a statement true or false, e.g. Socrates is alive. But Socrates, supposing that he is a true particular, is not a fact. A fact, to put it differently, is the sort of thing that is expressed by a whole sentence, and not by a single name.¹¹
- N. I think I should not object if you take fact as the equivalent of *viśiṣṭārtha*.
- W. I see. Now tell me whether you consider it necessary to analyse a sentence to find out its proper logical form?
- N. Certainly, a logician must analyse the sentences that are used in our daily life to find their true import.
- W. May I take it to mean that a logician should analyse a sentence to make it a true picture of facts?
- N. What is this picturing?
- W. To cut a long story short, analysis is at least an attempt to rewrite some sentences. But why do you rewrite? Obviously because you consider the rewritten form to be more appropriate. But why do you consider it to be more appropriate? The answer of some analysts, the logical atomists, is, because it mirrors the form of reality, or gives an adequate picture of reality. The term picturing was coined by Wittgenstein and he told Mr Wright that the idea occurred to him on the East Front when he had been reading a magazine in which there was a schematic picture depicting the possible sequence of events in an automobile accident.¹²
- N. But why should language picture reality?
- W. The atomists thought that if there were no structural correspondence between language and fact, it would be impossible to talk about the world at all.
- N. Is language, then, between us and the world? If so, can the picture theory help us? What is this picturing exactly?
- W. A sentence pictures facts as a musical score pictures a piece of music.¹³ There is a general rule by which the musician is able to read the symphony out of the score—and there is a law of projection. It is the rule of translation of the language of the musical score into the language, say, of the gramophone record.¹⁴
- N. But if a law of projection is all that we require for similarity of structure, then the fact that we can find a law of pro-

jection connecting any drawing with any object reduces the significance of the demand for identity of structure almost to a vanishing point.¹⁵ Again, if, as I think, the structure of a sentence is defined by grammatical, conventional rules, how can we speak of any structural identity between the sentence and the fact to which it refers?

W. I smell the later analysts like Professor Ryle and Professor Ayer in your argument. Professor Ryle has argued that it is just by convention that a given grammatical form is especially dedicated to facts of a given logical form.¹⁶ Professor Ayer has also argued that structural resemblance need not hold between language and fact. The picture theory is dead.

N. Then certainly I am not advocating it.

W. So the rationale of your analysis is not that the structure of the analysed statement is identical with the structure of the fact. Is your analysis then a prophylactic against linguistic abuses?

N. What is this prophylaxis?

W. That philosophy is to be identified with analysis was the brilliant thesis of Russell and the logical atomists. These thinkers did not believe in speculative metaphysics and were of the opinion that linguistic abuses are the sources of such philosophy. With the rise of logical positivism, not only speculative metaphysics but also the metaphysics of the logical atomists fell into disrepute, and so though the positivists identified philosophy with analysis, yet their rationale of it was not, like that of the atomists, that the analysed statement shows the true structure of facts. They recommended analysis as they thought that unless we understand language thoroughly we are always liable to misuse it and to make metaphysics. So analysis is a prophylactic against linguistic abuses.

N. If to be an analyst is to be a policeman whose chief duty is to prevent bootleg traffic in metaphysics, I am not an analyst at all. I do not deny that misuse of language may be a source of some metaphysical confusion, but I cannot affirm very strongly that misuse of language is the mother of metaphysics.

W. I understand your position and do not wish to argue about

it. What I should like to know is the *how* and the *why* of your analysis.

N. Very well. Take a very simple sentence like *ghaṭam ānaya*, or 'bring a pot'. We shall analyse it as follows: The sentence is in the imperative mood and is a 'should' sentence, though the *should* is non-normative. That is, taking the speaker's attitude, the sentence should be written as 'you should bring a pot', and *should* in this sentence does not mean what it means in a sentence like 'you should speak the truth'. *Should* is here non-normative. It is a *vidhi*. But it is here indicative of the speaker's desire. So the sentence should be translated as: you are the seat of the effort that is conducive to the bringing of the object of the desire for a pot.¹⁷

W. This is the *how* of your analysis, and what is the *why* of it?

N. To show how the different objects of which one is aware when one hears the sentence are related, i.e. to show how the meanings of the words forming part of the sentence are to be *anvita*.

W. Does not the sentence itself show the relation?

N. If showing means what it ordinarily means, then how can the sentence show it? When I write, '*A* is to the right of *B*', in the sentence *A* occupies the left-side position, but to communicate this information I need not write like my friend Moulana Saheb in Arabic.

W. It seems that I see your point, and I hope that the information may interest you that some analysts went to the length of asserting that in an ideal language we should write 'this is to the left of that', 'this is to the right of that', 'this is over that', 'this is red', etc., as 'this that', 'that this', 'this that', and 'this' in red ink.¹⁸ However, why do you say, 'if showing means what it ordinarily means'?

N. I say so as the sentence must in some sense show the relation. You say that *A* is to the right of *B* and I become aware that *A* is to the right of *B*. This awareness is caused by your sentence, and so the sentence shows the structure of the fact, though it does not copy that structure.

W. But if the sentence does not copy the structure of facts, how can it show it then?

N. Because the sentence means facts. The meaning of a

sentence is the relation of facts or objects.¹⁹

W. So it seems that in your theory the individual words in language name objects which are their meanings, and the sentences are combinations of such names, and hence mean the combinations of objects.

N. This may be accepted as a statement of my theory, provided that it is not constructed atomistically. It should not be taken to imply that the world consists of the numberless unions of certain colourless simples whose intrinsic nature is exhausted by the sheer capacity for the unions in question and that the business of language is to show the manner of such unions by devising names for the simples and by arranging parallel alliances among the names. It should not also be overlooked that in my theory a word means only as part of a sentence.

W. All right. Theories of this type were advocated by Augustine and the medieval realists. It describes a system of communication. But not everything we call language is this system.²⁰

N. Why do you say this?

W. It seems that when you are formulating such a theory you are thinking primarily of nouns like tables and chairs and bread, and of peoples' names and only secondarily of names of certain actions.²¹

N. To be precise, I am thinking not of tables and chairs and bread, but—and this I say in a whisper—of cows and pots and clothes. Such words are called *nāmapadas*, name-words in Sanskrit, and we admit that when we formulate our theory of meaning we think primarily of these words. But we do not do this uncritically. We give reasons for this practice of ours. Thus, Udyotakara, a very ancient Naiyāyika, opined that as the name-words form the majority in almost every sentence, so while formulating our theory we think primarily of them. But we do not say that our theory holds good only of these words. The Neo-Naiyāyikas have affirmed that this theory holds good even of the inflections.²²

W. Inflections? Oh yes—Sanskrit is an inflected language like Greek and Latin. Tell me one thing. Do you think that this theory holds good of all words? I think that it is no good

asserting that 'slab' signifies slab, 'apple' apple or every word signifies something. Indeed it seems to me that when we say that every word signifies something we say nothing whatsoever, unless we explain exactly what distinction we wish to make, and the distinction in question should not be from words without meaning such as occur in Lewis Carroll's poems, or words like Lilliburleo in songs. Just imagine that someone referring to the tools in a carpenter's toolbox says, all tools serve to modify something, e.g. the hammer modifies the position of the nail, the saw the shape of the board, and so on. Would anything be gained by this assimilation of expressions?²³

- N. I admit that the assertion that every word in language signifies something is too vacuous to be significant, though I doubt if the vacuity of this assertion can be a compelling argument against a theory of the type we are discussing. Moreover, we do not say that every word in our language signifies some object. We distinguish between *vācaka* or significant and *dyotaka* or merely indicative words. And the information may interest you that we do not, like the Vaiyākaranas, hold that words like *ca* (and), i.e. the *nīpātas*, are indicative.²⁴
- W. More Sanskrit than I can consume; and though I cannot disown the impression that the distinction that you draw between *vācaka* and *dyotaka* words does not give me the answer that I want, yet I shall not press for any clarification. Please tell me, if a word means an object, does the word become meaningless when the object is destroyed?²⁵
- N. Why should the destruction of the object amount to a loss in meaning?
- W. Do you suggest that a name signifies only what is an element of reality? It may be admitted that an element is what cannot be destroyed, what remains the same in all changes.²⁶ But certainly experience does not show us the elements. We see the component parts of something composite (of a chair, for instance). We say that the back is a part of the chair, but is in itself composed of several bits of wood.²⁷ The elements are never experienced.
- N. But why should a word mean an element?
- W. It may mean a universal. But to say this is to manufacture

new problems. For if the verbs, adjectives, and common nouns are the names of simple nameables, then, as Professor Ryle has argued in his paper read to the Oxford Philological Society, it will be nonsense to speak of anyone knowing it or not knowing it, of his finding it out, being taught it, of his teaching it, forgetting it, believing, supposing, guessing, or entertaining it, asserting it, negating it, or questioning it.²⁸

- N.* Well, your presentation of Ryle's contention is excellent, I must say. But tell me why it will be nonsense to speak of knowing a universal, if a universal is a simple nameable.
- W.* This had been shown by Plato in his *Theaetetus*. There it has been shown that if it is admitted that knowledge entails logos, the simples which have only names (i.e. no logos) are unknowable.
- N.* But they may be perceived or truly thought of.
- W.* This is not denied. It is not denied that the simples may be perceived, may be objects of what Russell calls knowledge by acquaintance. What is denied is that they may be known.
- N.* A strange conception of knowledge. However, we say that a universal is sometimes known inferentially.
- W.* I have heard that you attempt to prove the existence of God inferentially. So I am not astonished to learn that you infer universals also. I can only remark that this is a strange way of looking at inference.
- N.* But why should it be a strange way?
- W.* I propose peace and do not wish to argue about this. Tell me if the sentence asserting that a word means a universal can be cashed. Thus, take the word *game*. There are board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? Don't say: 'There must be something common, or they would not be called "games"'—but *look* and *see* whether there is anything common to them all. For, if you look at them, you will not see something that is common to *all*, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them. To repeat: don't think, but look. Look, for example, at board-games with their multifarious relationships. Now pass on to card-games; here you find many correspondences with board-games;

but many common features drop out, and others appear. When next we pass on to ball-games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost.—Are they all amusing? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players? Think of patience. In ball-games there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games like ring-a-ring o' roses; here the element of amusement remains but many other characteristic features have disappeared. And we can go through many, many other groups of games in the same way; we can see how similarities crop up and disappear. And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.²⁹

N. Do not the games form a group?

W. They do. They are, as I said, similar, but this similarity is nothing more than family resemblance.³⁰ Do not say, like Prof. Ayer, that the question whether things have something in common is identical with the question whether there are resemblances between them. For then you give up your theory of universals.³¹ Do not say also that as resemblance or similarity is derivative, so there must be something common to them all. For, *a priori*, it is extremely unlikely that similarity is derivative, and it is good sense to say that similarity is something ultimate and a further unanalysable fact. Do not say again that as the class game is not a closed but an open class, therefore the games cannot have family resemblance merely. For a proposition with all games as its subject is not a proposition but a propositional function. Indeed, I think that if games have something in common, this something must be expressible in commonsense language, and no transcendental detour is necessary to prove it. So if you hold that the word *game* means that which is common to the games, tell me how your view will be cashed in ordinary language.

N. I believe in universals and believe also that no transcen-

dental detour is necessary to arrive at or to confirm this belief. But the word *game* embarrasses me. I am no sportsman and have no idea of many of the games you have mentioned. So permit me to substitute cows for game.

W. Cows! Why not tigers and lions—they are good game. By the way, another use of the word *game*.

N. I do not dare provoking tigers and lions.

W. Then go on with your cows.

N. Common sense, I think, feels no difficulty when it uses a common name like cow, and also when it holds that different individuals are called by the same name as they have something in common. But when philosophers attempt to analyse the use of common names they become confused and puzzled. If the reality of the universals were not presupposed in every sentence that we utter, I would probably pity the layman for his bliss. But as this is not the case, I cannot help thinking that the philosophers must be on the wrong track. They have not probably seen what the expression 'have something in common' means. When you apprehend any particular as definite you also apprehend its distinction from other particulars within the sphere of some kind of being which is common to them.³² So apprehending a particular as definite is to apprehend a universal also. When, for instance, you perceive a particular cow, and your perception is definite, you cannot help perceiving that characteristic of the individual animal which you will recognize when you will be perceiving another cow. Indeed, when we have a definite apprehension of an individual cow, we can imagine different instances of the class cow—and so a definite apprehension of a particular is never an apprehension of the particular alone. An apprehension of the particular is an apprehension of the universal also, and so of the distinction between the universal and the particular. And it seems to me that when we say that different cows have something in common, or that the same thing recurs in all of them, we are using the words *common* and *same* to state precisely the well-understood distinction between universal and particular. That is, these words do not explain the distinction between universal and particular; it is this distinction—

the distinction that is apprehended whenever a particular is apprehended definitely—that explains the use of these words. The philosopher forgets this and gets puzzled. Consider the case of a triangle.³³ We say that this triangle *A* is a triangle and what is common to it and other triangles is triangularity. That is, this triangle has triangularity, and triangularity is common to all triangles. But what is this triangularity? Having three sides? But only particular sides can be three in number, and only particular triangles can have three particular sides. *A* is a particular triangle—and its triangularity is its having its particular sides three in number. Now, obviously it has this property—but we cannot take it to be something that is common to it and the other triangles, for we cannot identify the sides of one particular triangle with those of others. So, what is triangularity as such, as distinguished from triangularity of this figure? It is having three sides and the three sides cannot be either of this triangle or of that triangle. Are the sides then of figure in general? No, for figure in general has no sides at all. So it seems that we are to distinguish between triangularity of this figure and triangularity as such by saying that one means three-sidedness of this particular triangle, while the other means the three-sidedness of any particular triangle. But this also is impossible. For the expression ‘triangularity is that which is common to all triangles’ is legitimate, but the expression ‘the three-sidedness of any particular triangle is that which is common to all triangles’ is a perfect howler. So triangularity is not that which is common to all triangles. The words *common* and *same* do not explain the distinction between universal and particular, but presupposes that distinction. A universal is a fact *sui generis*. It is a *padārthāntara*, as we say. The philosophers often forget this. They try to understand its nature on the analogy of substance, or quality, and get puzzled. But the puzzle is of their own making. The reality of universals is assumed in every sentence that we utter. Every definition, every explanation, assumes it. It cannot be explained or defined in terms of anything else.

- W. I do not know whether you have not dissolved the problem. Tell me, if the words mean universals, how we can talk

about the individuals? And if the individuals are the contents of experience, do we, as Bradley insisted, falsify experience whenever we verbalize it?

N. To be frank, I do not see your point. For the view that holds that words mean universals need not deny that we can talk about the individuals. It can hold that though the primary meaning of a word is a universal, yet it can mean individuals secondarily, by *ākṣepa* or *lakṣaṇā*. Thus, take the word *cow*. Its primary meaning, let us say, is cowness. But it can mean an individual. For when someone says 'Bring a cow', then as cowness is not an object that can be brought, we apprehend an individual. However, we do not say that the primary meaning of a word is a universal only. It is our contention that a word means a particular as qualified by a universal.³⁴

W. Why do you say this?

N. We say this because we think that it is the verdict of experience. When a man who knows the use of a word, say, the word *cow*, hears it, he comes to know not only a universal but also an individual.³⁵ A word means neither a pure universal nor a bare individual. What it means is a particular characterized by a universal. And as the contents of our experience are never brute particulars, and as, again, the universals are real and objective, we need not say, like a Bradley or a Mādhyamika, that linguistic articulation is falsification.

W. You admit that a word may mean an individual. Now, when the individual perishes, does the word become meaningless?

N. No, because the hearing of the word will give rise to a memory awareness of the object. This is the case with every word. Even when a word means a universal, the hearing of the word does not give birth to a perception of it. So if the absence of the object meant renders the word meaningless, i.e. if it is said that if the object meant is not perceived while the word is being spoken or heard, the word is meaningless, every word—not only the words meaning individuals—runs the risk of being meaningless.

W. So the meaning you connect with a certain sign is a mental picture. But we need not look, even if that were possible,

into the mind of the speaker to find out what he is saying.

- N.* We need not look into the mind of the speaker, because the words cause in us 'the mental pictures'.
- W.* Suppose that a person says 'I hate you', may it not be the case that on looking into the speaker's mind we discover something quite different?³⁶
- N.* It may be. It depends on who says this and when he says this. When Śakuntalā says, 'Let me go', Duṣyanta is right in not taking her utterance at its face value.³⁷
- W.* What is the right criterion of remembering?³⁸
- N.* Practical consequence, its ability to produce successful conation.
- W.* All right. How does an individual in your theory come to learn the meaning of a word? Do you say, like Augustine, that we learn the meaning of a word by observing the behaviour of the elders?
- N.* What does Augustine say on the behaviour of the elders?
- W.* When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this, and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered, when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shown by their bodily movements, the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movements of other parts of the body, and the tone of the voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.³⁹
- N.* I do not know if Augustine held that this was the only way of learning the meaning of words. My system recognizes other methods of learning—though it says that this is the most important, logically the most primitive.⁴⁰
- W.* Someone coming into a strange country will sometimes learn the language of the inhabitants from ostensive definitions that they give him; and he will often have to *guess* the meaning of these definitions; and will guess sometimes rightly, sometimes wrongly. Now, I think, we can say that you describe the learning of human language as if the child came into a strange country and did not understand

the language of the country; that is, as if it already had a language, only not this one.⁴¹

N. What does this suggest?

W. Nothing obviously important. However, an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in every case.⁴² Take the case of the word *red*. It is a colour word. You cannot show its meaning as you can show the meaning of a thing-word like *table* or *apple*. So to teach its meaning you are to bring a red apple or a red lobster or any other red thing. Suppose that you bring a red apple. The apple is not merely red. It has shape and other properties. The student who is being taught ostensively the use of the word *red* may understand by it the shape. How will you prevent the misunderstanding?

N. Bringing red objects of dissimilar shapes and sizes and not-red objects of similar shapes and sizes, and helping the learner to see the agreement of the sound *red* with the colour *red* both in presence and in absence.⁴³

W. I see your point. You are arguing like Russell. In his *Human Knowledge* he has observed: Ostensive definition in its earliest form requires certain conditions. There must be a feature of the environment which is noticeable, distinctive, emotionally interesting and (as a rule) frequently recurring and the adult may frequently utter the name of this feature at a moment when the infant is attending to it. Of course, there are risks of error. Suppose, the child has milk in a bottle. You may each time say 'milk' or each time say 'bottle'. In the former case the child may think 'milk' is the right word for a bottle of water, in the latter case he may think 'bottle' is the right word for a glass of milk. To avoid such errors, you should in theory apply Mill's inductive canons. . . . In time, by the use of Mill's canons the infant, if he survives, will learn to speak correctly. But I am not giving practical pedagogic advice; I am merely exemplifying a theory.

N. Exactly—not a practical pedagogic advice, but the exemplification of a theory.

W. So I can say that I have seen your point. But it is doubtful if you have seen mine.

N. What is your point?

W. My point is that you cannot teach the meaning of a word

ostensively without the use of language. One can ostensively define a proper name, 'the name of a colour, the name of a material, a numeral, the name of a point of the compass and so on. The definition of the number 'two'—pointing to two nuts—is perfectly exact. But can two be defined like that? The person to whom I give the definition doesn't know what I mean by 'two'. He will suppose that 'two' is the name given to this group of nuts. He may suppose this; but perhaps he does not. He might make the opposite mistake; when I want to assign a name to this group of nuts he might understand it as a numeral.⁴⁴ Perhaps you say, two can ostensively be defined in this way: This number is called two . . . But this means that the word *number* must be explained before the ostensive definition can be understood. . . . So we should say this *colour* is called so and so, this *length* is called so and so. But the words *number*, *colour* and *length* just need defining. Defining them by other words. And what about the last definition in this chain? Do not say that there isn't a last definition. This is just as if you chose to say that there isn't a last house on this road; one can always build an additional one.⁴⁵ It should not be said that one need not be already a master of language in order to understand a definition; all that one needs is to know or guess what the person giving the explanation is pointing to.⁴⁶ For what does 'pointing to the shape' or 'pointing to the colour' consist in? Point to a piece of paper. And now point to its shape—now to its colour—now to its number (that sounds queer). How do you do it? You will say that you meant a different thing each time you pointed. And if I ask how this is done you will say that you concentrated your attention on the colour, the shape, etc. But I ask you again, how is *that* done?⁴⁷ There are, of course, what can be called characteristic experiences of pointing to, e.g. the shape, following the outline with one's finger or with one's eyes as one points. But this does not happen in all cases . . . Besides, even if something of the sort occurs in all cases, it would still depend on the circumstances—that is, on what happened before and after the pointing—whether we should say, 'He pointed to the shape and not to the colour'.⁴⁸ Do not say that the meaning of a word is not so

much taught as learnt. For suppose that two persons belonging to a tribe unacquainted with games observe us playing chess. Now suppose that we play according to rules, but yell and stamp.⁴⁹ Would the persons then learn the meaning of the word 'chess'?

- N.* No, but the fact is that we learn the meaning of words, and this we do by observing agreements in presence and in absence. The process may be infinitely more complicated than we imagine. But we are not giving pedagogic advice. We are only formulating a theory, and it is a plausible theory as it is simple, though we must admit that learning the meaning of a word is a complicated affair. None the less there is no alternative to it, *phalabalāt*.
- W.* But has it no alternative? I am persuaded to believe that there is. To arrive at it we should give up the assumption that meanings are objects for which the words stand. We are to revise our whole attitude. We should say that the meaning of a word is its use in language. Language is an instrument. Its concepts are instruments.⁵⁰ This is easily seen in the case of orders. The meaning of the order given by *A* to *B* depends on how *B* is supposed to act in the situation in which it is uttered. We can reasonably extend this concept of meaning to descriptive sentences. For what we call descriptions are instruments for particular use.⁵¹ In short, language is an instrument and it is the use of the words that teaches their meaning.⁵²
- N.* I am smelling Guru Prabhākar. I am not sure if you are not formulating your theory like him. Anyway, tell me if this use is governed by rules.
- W.* Certainly—when playing a language game we obey certain rules.
- N.* Then you should say that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it, he is operating a calculus according to definite rules.⁵³ But is there not the possibility of interpreting the rule in a different way?
- W.* No, there is a way of grasping a rule, which is not an interpretation but which is exhibited in what we call obeying the rule and going against it in actual cases.⁵⁴ That is, a rule stands there like a signpost,⁵⁵ and it is using the signpost in a certain way, i.e. behaving in a certain way in the presence of the signpost, that gives a meaning to it. But

behaving in a certain way is also obeying the rules.⁵⁶ Obeying a rule is a practice.⁵⁷ To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess are customs, uses, institutions.⁵⁸ To understand a sentence is to understand a language. To understand a language is to master a technique.⁵⁹ Every sign by itself seems dead. In use it is alive. Use does not bring life into it. It is its life.⁶⁰

- N. An interesting theory. But I cannot help feeling that though it may account for the meanings of mathematical expressions, i.e. of the expressions of an artificial language, yet it is inapplicable in the case of natural language.
- W. The theory, I admit, describes one of the present tendencies as regards the foundations of mathematics. But this is the case with the whole analytic movement—the most influential movement in contemporary philosophy—and I do not know if you will observe like Kneale that the influence of mathematical philosophy on general philosophy has been unfortunate.⁶¹ However, I thank you for the interesting discussion and bid you goodbye.
- N. Thank you. Goodbye.

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II

KNOWLEDGE

The Nature of Philosophical Reasoning in Indian Thought .

To obtain a tolerably right understanding of the nature of reasoning as exemplified in the different systems of Indian philosophy, we would take into account at least the following:

- I. The nature and the status of the science of *pramāṇa*;
- II. The threefold *pravṛttis* of a *sāstra*;
- III. The nature of *vicāra*;
- IV. The purpose of philosophizing and some allied topics.

In what follows we shall first consider these subjects and then try to formulate a view of the nature of reasoning as exemplified in the philosophical systems of India.

I

A science of *pramāṇa* forms an integral part of every system of Indian philosophy. And it is well known that the science of *pramāṇa* as built by the exponent of one system differs from what the exponent of another system builds. This implies that the science is not autonomous. If ontology differs, this science also differs. This has two highly embarrassing consequences. This science is conceived to be a foundational science. It is supposed to lay down the rules that govern the validity or invalidity of ontological or other kinds of philosophical propositions. But if this science as built within a system is conditioned by its ontology, then how can it be said to found ontology, and so the system itself? Secondly, there being no independent science of the estimation of evidences, how would the builder of one system, who usually builds his system by showing the untenability of what the builders of the other systems hold on the issues concerned, build his system? In short, does

not this rule out the possibility of there being any dialogue among the representatives of the different systems? If, on the ground that such a dialogue does take place, it may be asserted that the non-autonomy of the science is not as rigorous as we are taking it to be, may it not be said that in reality the dialogue referred to is not a dialogue, but a monologue mistaken to be a dialogue?

Obviously, such a reply would be surprising and confusing. But this should not be regarded as an adequate reason for rejecting it as unsatisfactory. But then, mistakes are generally objectively conditioned, and if what conditions this mistake is not shown, the reply cannot be convincing. Besides, it should also be shown how this mistake is communicated, for the statement that the participants in a philosophical controversy wrongly take a monologue to be a dialogue is a philosophical statement and the question how he who presents it may show it to be adequate to one who denies it, is a legitimate one. And before we dwell any further on the science of *pramāṇa* we should briefly answer these questions.

The answer, we think, is to be found in common sense and usage, as we understand them. Common sense may rightly be said to have no philosophical shape; and that is why no philosopher has any serious quarrel with it. But we may make an attempt to give it a philosophical shape. This results in the many commonsense philosophies we have. A perusal of them makes it clear that they are generally realistic and that their argument in the last analysis is that it is the philosophy we live by. So common sense may appropriately be described as human nature in its everydayness. It is a reciprocal or dialectical relation with the physical and the cultural world. The world is to be to a certain extent the common world, and to that extent human nature is common. And it serves as the platform, though a very unsteady platform, where philosophers of every persuasion meet. Now, human nature has many dimensions and many levels. Our everydayness is disturbed by the multiplicity of these dimensions and levels. It suppresses them, ignores them, argues them away and labels them as Quixotic. It plays the role of a Sanco Panza. But then Quixote is a knight. It asserts itself and Sanco Panza has to run as fast as it can to bring the Queen to Don Quixote. That is, in free,

creative enterprises (as contrasted with habitual, conventional ways of living, which may also be termed as living in bad faith) it establishes itself and reshapes our everydayness. So our everydayness is in a dialectical relation with the other sides of our nature and the synthesis achieved is sometimes a return at a higher level to it and sometimes to some other aspect of our nature reshaping our everydayness. Ordinary language which we consider to be the linguistic form of our nature in its everydayness bears the mark of this dialectical struggle. It is imprecise and ambiguous. It is full of incomplete symbols. In it there are expressions which are grammatically alike but logically different. It is sometimes used denotatively when it should have been used descriptively. While using it, at least in philosophical discussions, one cannot write off its subjective intentions and cannot successfully make distinctions that escape the notice of the philosophers. There are other interesting points about it. But we need not consider them here. It is sufficient for us to emphasize here that common sense and usage are omnipresent. They form the starting-point of all philosophical discussions. But then it is a curious kind of starting-point. It will give way unless you build it. So while the different philosophers seem to start from common sense and usage, they build it differently. Accordingly, they all use the same language only apparently, and so while they seem to be holding a dialogue, they are not really doing so. This is realized by a critical or meta-philosophical thinker but not by the philosophers themselves. So they mistake a monologue to be a dialogue, and as meta-philosophical thinking is philosophical thinking (whatever be the system in which it works) conscious of itself, it may be communicated at the critical level.

Now, we may say a few words on the science of *pramāṇa*. All the systems agree in holding *pratyakṣa* (perception) to be a *pramāṇa*, but then they differ in their accounts of it and this difference is owing to their differences in ontology. The Buddhist logicians uphold the doctrine of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā*, and they define perception in terms of its object in order that this doctrine may permit them to hold that what is an object of perception is not an object of any other kind of knowledge. But the Nyāya logicians do not uphold this doctrine, and so instead of defining perception in terms of its unique object they

propose to define it either in terms of its unique cause, or in terms of the class-character that is present in every member of the class 'perception' but is not present in any member of the class 'inference' and, for that matter, in any member of any other class of knowledge. But the doctrine of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* is an ontological doctrine, for essentially it is concerning the nature of the objects of knowledge.

This point may be developed a little. It has been said that the Nyāya logicians also define perception and other forms of knowledge in terms of their appropriate class-character. Now the classes concerned are co-ordinate classes, and so are mutually exclusive. It is not possible for any individual to be a member of more than one such class. So the Nyāya logicians would further hold that it is not possible for a piece of knowledge to be partly perceptual and partly inferential. But this is exactly what the Advaitins hold. And they can do so as they do not believe in the reality and objectivity of a class-character in the sense the Nyāya logicians do.

Again, as the Nyāya logicians define perception and other forms of knowledge in terms of their unique causes, they cannot hold that an act of knowledge consequent upon the reading of a sentence may be a case of perception. But this is precisely what some Advaitins do. And it may be mentioned here that these differences are conditioned by differences in ontology. The Advaitins hold that Brahman is the ultimate reality and that it is pure immediacy, that is, an unobjective and unobjectifiable consciousness. But then the Advaitins, while denying that Brahman is an object of knowledge, do not deny that we may meaningfully talk about it, or that in some sense it may be said to be an object of sentential knowledge. So they not only distinguish between *ṛtti-vyāpyatā* and *phala-vyāpyatā*, but also hold that there is a kind of sentence that may give rise to immediate knowledge.

We may state here a few more characteristics of the Advaita theory of knowledge and consider what might be the observations of a Nyāya logician on them. We hope that this will bring out clearly how the differences in the accounts of perception are rooted in differences in ontology. Thus, the Advaitins, while accounting for perception, distinguish between *jñānagata pratyakṣatva* and *viśayagata pratyakṣatva*. But the Nyāya logicians

do not follow this course. They would rather say that this is redundant. For, they would say, if we succeed in accounting for the perceptual act, we may define the percept as well by saying that it is the object of this act. But the Advaitins believe in *sākṣi-caitanya*, the perceptual character of which is not conditioned by its being an object of an act of perception.

In the second place, the Advaitins think that the perceptual character of an ordinary object like a table is superimpositional and conditional (*ādhyāsika*, *aupādhika*) and not essential and natural (*svābhāvika*), this being the case only with the eternally self-shining consciousness. But this distinction between a percept essentially and a percept conditionally is unknown to a Nyāya logician, for he knows nothing about the eternally self-shining consciousness. Again, the Advaitins account for perception in terms of *vr̥tti* or modification of the internal instrument (*antaḥkaraṇa*), or of nescience (*avidyā*), or *māyā*, the magical power (which is also a state) of God, for otherwise they cannot explain how the cover of ignorance can be torn away or overpowered etc. But as Nyāya logicians do not think that objects of knowledge are either directly or indirectly covered by ignorance, they do not feel the need of accounting for perception in this way. Neither does their theory about the internal instrument permit them to do it.

It is needless to labour this point any further. From what has been said above it is clear that the science of *pramāṇa*, as stated above, is not autonomous. We may now make a brief attempt to consider how these *pramāṇas*, the accounts of which start usually with common sense and usage to which scant regard is paid as they progress, are used for metaphysical purposes.

The few cases of the metaphysical use of *pramāṇa* that we shall consider will be from the Advaita system. The reason for this is that in this system and in some similar systems metaphysical considerations govern rather loudly, if not irritatingly, the logical and the epistemological considerations. But if we study the other systems with care and attention we shall find that this is so with them also. In other words, when we philosophize, we try to articulate our own nature that builds science, behaves morally, creates art and expresses itself in a thousand and one ways, and gives us the world of which we are constituents, which we transcend and with which we are always in a

dialectical relation. But then in the philosophies which try to formalize our nature in its everydayness, the metaphysical considerations do not loudly announce themselves for the simple reason that they are common and shared, and so even while actively present are not seen to be so. But when we attempt to formalize our nature in its other dimensions and levels, they cannot be present without being seen.

Anyway, the Advaitins hold that perception evidences the proposition that ignorance is a positive fact. They argue that we have a direct awareness of the form 'I am ignorant'. Now, this argument is hardly convincing when it is torn off from the system and considered by itself. But when it is considered together with the other propositions of the system like (i) that there is a distinction between *sākṣi-jñāna* and *vṛtti-jñāna* and that the former evidences positive ignorance while the latter liquidates it; (ii) that absence may be perceived provided that its locus also is perceived; (iii) that the locus under consideration is self; and (iv) that the self is self-shining consciousness, the argument is conclusive. Thus, the perceptual evidence in favour of a metaphysical proposition requires the support of other metaphysical propositions, and it is a moot point whether such a perception and ordinary perceptions are 'perceptions' in the same sense.

A few other points may also be made in this connection. It is true that to ascertain what the content of perception really is from the philosophical point of view, one should introduce many ontological or metaphysical considerations. This is done by every philosopher of perception—Indian or Western. So what has been said above is not distinctive of the Advaitins, and for that matter, of any other representative of any other school of Indian philosophy. But then we should distinguish between a philosophical analysis of perception and an appeal to perception for philosophical purposes. And it is quite clear that while the Indian thinkers give a philosophical account of perception for confirming or disconfirming a philosophical proposition, it is not clear that the Western thinkers analyse perception with this end in view. Again, most Western philosophers would not agree with the positivists that factual considerations have no bearing on philosophical assertions and denials; yet most of them would certainly hold that the relation between

facts and philosophical propositions is quite different from the relation between facts and scientific propositions. But it is not quite clear how the Indian philosophers would understand the relation between facts and philosophical propositions, though it may confidently be asserted that they appealed to perception to settle philosophical disputes and were of the opinion that even in philosophical matters perception is the source of the strongest evidence. Now, perception not backed up by a regressive or transcendental analysis as exemplified in the case mentioned above is not of much assistance. And it is strange that they did not consider such analysis separately. True, they treat *tarka* separately. But *tarka* cannot be identified with this kind of analysis. Neither can it be identified with *arthāpatti*. For, in the first place, *arthāpatti* is not regarded as an independent *pramāṇa* in every system. And, secondly, it can hardly be regarded as a regressive reduction.

With these few words about the use of perception in metaphysics, we may propose to analyse one inference used to establish a metaphysical proposition.

The inference we propose to analyse is the one offered by the Advaitins to demonstrate that ignorance is a positive fact. Just as when the first flame of light occurs in darkness there is, preceding the occurrence, something which is not its prior absence, which covers the object it illumines, which it liquidates, and which resides where it does, so also when there occurs an act of true knowledge which is not a successor in a series of acts of knowledge knowing the same object, there is, preceding the occurrence, something which is not its prior absence, which covers the object it illumines, which it liquidates and which resides where it does. The inference is hardly demonstrative. To an outsider the assertion that there is something which is not etc. is absurd. So the inference just gives a structure of Advaita ontology. It differs essentially from what we ordinarily call an inference.

We may now conclude this part of our discussion with the following observations: (i) The science of evidences is autonomous. (ii) It is tailored to meet ontological needs. (iii) But while formulating its theories, it takes into consideration the intuitive accounts of the evidences, i.e. the accounts (not necessarily carefully formulated) in vogue in our everyday life.

(iv) But the metaphysical use of them can hardly be said to be in agreement with them. (v) So, though tailored to meet ontological needs, it does not found ontology. (vi) The foundation of the science of evidences as well as of ontology, i.e. of philosophy as such, is to be sought elsewhere. (vii) It is, as will be argued below, the human nature, or the unnoticed consciousness of our own being. (viii) It has many dimensions and many levels—the human nature in its everydayness being common and at bottom one. (ix) Philosophy is an attempt to formulate it. And (x) the science of evidence is an attempt to formulate the methods of this formulation.

II

It is held that the *pravṛtti* of a *sāstra* is threefold, viz. *uddeśya*, *lakṣaṇa* and *parikṣā*. That is, a science first mentions the topics it proposes to discuss, then it gives definitions of them, and finally examines these definitions.

It is with the examination of the definitions that this paper will be concerned. A definition, as conceived in the philosophies under consideration, is not stipulative. It should be applicable to its every definiendum. And this provokes the intriguing question how the appropriate definienda of a definition are known. We should know them, otherwise we cannot test the merit of a definition. They are not made known by the definition, for that would make the definition stipulative. Besides, if they are not known independently of the definition, the question of testing the definition with reference to them becomes meaningless. So we should hold that they are known in a way independently of the definition. But in what way? Known only to the person proposing the definition? Or, to others also? Who are these other persons? The laymen? The trained logicians? If laymen, would they be dependable, particularly when the definition is about a philosophical topic? If trained logicians, would they not be undependable because of their training? What is the guarantee that their learning has not prejudiced them?

It is not clear how the Indian thinkers would answer these questions. They often refer to social consensus (*lokavyavahāra*). But who are these members of society? And if a few of them are

scholars, difference of opinion is inevitable, and how will it be got over?

To take a few examples from the Navya-Nyāya system which labours hard to arrive at valid definitions. (i) If the inference of the form, 'There is fire here, for there is *gagan* (ether) here in the relation of inherence', is invalid, what is this invalidity due to? Is it due to the fact that the inductive *h* (*hetu*) is *gagan*? Or, is it due to the fact that the *h*-limiting relation (*hetutāvacchedakasambandha*), viz. *samavāya*, does not define the presence of *h* in *p* (*pakṣa*, the subject of the inferential judgement)? If the first question is answered in the affirmative, then a proposed definition of *vyāpti* should not be affirmative; the first being negatively answered, there is no harm if the proposed definition of *vyāpti* becomes applicable to it, that *vyāpti* is the absence of occurrence in the locus of the absence of *s*. Navya-Nyāya holds that there is no harm if this happens to be the case, though apprehending that there might be many logicians who would answer the first question affirmatively, it makes suitable insertions to account for the case. And it is well known that Mathurānātha unhesitatingly declares that the first question should be answered affirmatively on the ground that this is how all persons answer. But do they? (ii) Again, as regards the definition of *vyāpti* given above and the four others forming what is popularly known as the bunch of five, it is held by Gaṅgeśa that they are too narrow in that they are not applicable to the *kevalānvayī* cases, i.e. the cases where *s* is not the counterpositive of some appropriate constant absence. But then the author of *Vedānta Paribhāṣa* denies that such cases are appropriate cases. On metaphysical grounds he denies that a so-called inference with an *s* which is not the counterpositive of some constant absence is a case of inference. But then Raghunātha also holds that such an inference is not an inference proper, and he holds it on a logical ground which is an appeal to the law of simplicity; but, as every student of logic knows, the criterion of simplicity is hardly simple and it is plausible to argue that an appeal to this law is an appeal not to our logical, but our aesthetic nature. The case of *vyatirekī* inference is also similar. Dharmarāja rejects it on a ground which we prefer to call phenomenological. It is his contention that the structure of this kind of knowledge is different from that of an inference.

But the orthodox Nyāya philosophers do not subscribe to it though Raghunātha holds that this kind of knowledge is not felt to be a case of inference, to which Gadādhara adds that it is felt to be a kind of *arthāpatti*. When to settle the issue an appeal is made to the law of simplicity it is found that it cuts both ways. Thus, a theory of knowledge that reduces *arthāpatti* to *anumiti* is simpler in that it does not recognize *arthāpatti* to be an additional *pramāṇa*. But then the *vyāpti* and particularly the *parāmarśa* in such a case of reference which should produce the inferential knowledge are exceedingly complex.

And what this paper intends to emphasize is: how, taking the above into consideration, should we test a proposed definition of *vyāpti* or *anumiti*?

(iii) We shall give another example and then conclude this part of our discussion. Some logicians hold that *satpratipakṣa* is an *anītya doṣa*. That is, a legitimate *h* may be said to be infected with it if a counter *parāmarśa* is produced, and it would be suffering from it so long as the falsity of this *parāmarśa* is not demonstrated. And they further assert that the relation holding between the *doṣa*, viz. the contrary *vyāpti*s, and each *h* is of the nature of knowledge. But then it is universally admitted that *bādha* is a *nītya doṣa*. In other words, if one erroneously thinks that a certain legitimate *h* has this defect, *anumiti* may not occur, but the *h* is not thus defective. Now, the relation between *satpratipakṣa* and *bādha* is analogous to the relation between smoke and fire. So, if a legitimate *h* is wrongly held to have the first defect and has it, the relation between *h* and the defect being established by knowledge, then it has the second defect also for the period the error lasts, and it is not proper to say that *bādha* is a *nītya doṣa*. The logicians try to overcome the difficulty by arguing that whereas in the first case knowledge relates the *h* with the *doṣa*, in the latter case it does not. But why? Of course, because of the social consensus. But does this not substantiate what we said above about common sense and usage?

We may now conclude this part of the discussion. Of the three principal functions of a science, the testing of a definition is the most important. It consists in seeing if some appropriate relation holds between the proposed definition and its definienda. The definienda are given independently of the definition.

It is both right and wrong to think that they are given by common sense or *laukika anubhava*. It is wrong in that common sense is a shapeless thing and is only given a shape by philosophical thinking. Again, common sense is not as common as one would wish. It is right in that we cannot get it from something else. So it is fair to hold that it is not common sense in its raw state, but common sense in its course of being informed by philosophical thinking that gives the definienda. Accordingly, the concepts we propose to define are not artificial concepts. But neither are they empirical concepts. They are sought to be defined in a system which is not as systematic as a deductive system is. And even in the system they retain their open-texture character. The systems, in other words, are attempts at articulating our felt sense of ourselves, a wrestling with our sense of being which has many dimensions and many levels, and which again takes a shape while giving shape to the almost shapeless common sense. So the outcome of this part of our discussion is that the results of the first part are confirmed and elaborated.

III

We may now undertake a brief analysis of *vicāra*, i.e. of philosophical discussion. It takes three forms, viz. *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitandā*. In the first form the objective is to ascertain what is the truth and it is often given the handy description that it is the sort of dialogue that holds between the teacher and the taught. In the other two forms the primary purpose is to win: in the second by establishing a proposition one holds and by dis-establishing the contrary proposition the other person holds; but in the third an attempt is made to win by dis-establishing the proposition the other person holds. Again, while in the first no unfair sophistry is resorted to, in the second and the third one proudly does so. The first kind of discussion need not be held in the presence of a judge to opine on its merit. But in the other two cases this is essential.

The above gives a brief and over-simplified account of the nature of *vicāra*. Now, as regards *vāda* we may say that it is a case of a monologue, the teacher being the idealized self of the taught. In other words, it is the dialogue between the vanguard

of a *sampradāya* or confessional group and its other members. They share the same convictions and are posted in the same level of being and are engaged in articulating the same felt human nature. The language in which they express themselves has a distinctive character. It has been described by some as convictional language. It is also described as confessional language. This language structuralizes the user of the language. The speaker is the language rather than one who *uses* it, and he is confessionally that; the language not only measures his being but also that of the members of his group.

Analysis of the other forms of discussion corroborates it. Thus, how may such a form of discussion begin? It has been stated above that these types of discussion require a judge. But what is the function of the judge? To opine merely who is the winner? He can do this only when the discussion has been concluded. But what about starting it? The spokesmen of two different schools of philosophy state what they intend to establish or dis-establish. And should not the judge formulate the issue? But can he do this?

Thus, it is held by the Indian logicians that statements like 'if the golden mountain has fire', or 'if the mountain has golden fire' cannot be used for the purpose of formulating the issue. They are not *vipratipatti vākyas*, for there is no golden mountain or golden fire. But do not the statements formulating the issues for discussion between two participants belong to two different schools analogous to the above statements? Thus, if anyone attempts to establish that there are universals, the author of *Vedānta Paribhāsa* would reply that it is invalid *ab initio*, and is analogous to the attempt to prove that there is golden fire in the mountain. In other words, what is held to be real by one school of philosophy may be held to be fanciful by another. And it is very difficult to see how the issue to be discussed could be formulated at all.

The Indian logicians were not unaware of this. While formulating the controversial issues they, realizing that some may reject them on the ground mentioned above, assert that what is deemed unreal by some may be treated as not so for the purpose of the discussion in that it may be deemed to be given as *uparakta*. But what is this being given as *uparakta*? Those who believe in *asatkhyāti*, i.e. in the view that the unreal may be an

object of knowledge, may not feel any difficulty in answering the question. But what about others? How would they answer the question? By superimposing? By bracketing? By suspending the sense of reality? By an act of sympathetic and imaginative construction? But to what purpose? Besides, how may the judge opine? Is he not in the position of a judge in an international court where there is no common law and each nation appeals to its own laws? Again, non-elegant sophistries are permitted in such discussions, and so it is not unfair to hold that in such discussions no philosophical proposition is established or dis-established, though some contestant may win and the victory results not from the soundness of his arguments, but from his skill in arguing and other personal qualities.

The above discussion justifies us in drawing the following conclusions: (i) Philosophy is an attempt to articulate the felt sense of being. (ii) This articulation requires a group consisting of members sharing the same sense, but in varying degrees of clearness. (iii) The language of articulation is convictional or 'is'-language and not instrumental or 'use-language. (iv) Accordingly, a criticism of a philosophical proposition, not without justification, is received not as a criticism of the proposition but as an accusation of the person making it. (v) Hence, in *jalpa* and *vitandā* attempts are made to establish or dis-establish such a proposition by extra-logical methods.

IV

We may now consider the purpose of philosophizing and some allied questions. The purpose is said to be the attainment of *mokṣa* which in its minimal sense is freedom from suffering. It has been argued in recent times that a student of Indian philosophy should not take this seriously, for this is proclaimed to be a motive for cultivating the other sciences as well. But this argument is inconclusive. *Mokṣa* was regarded as the highest value attainable. This was a part of the culture in which the philosophies and other sciences flourished. So it is hardly surprising that it is proclaimed by the other sciences also to be their goal. But then it should not be forgotten that this sense of value was created by the philosophers and the immense prestige that the philosophies enjoyed. So the argument cannot refute

the proposition that the purpose of philosophizing in India was the attainment of *mokṣa*.

This entails that philosophy originates in suffering. But we should be careful to note that 'suffering' here does not mean what it ordinarily means. It is not an empirical concept. Had it been so, the idea of final cessation of suffering would have been meaningless. Besides, when we say that philosophy originates in suffering we also say (i) that we suffer; (ii) that we do not like to suffer; (iii) that we make attempts to end our sufferings; (iv) that it lies within our power to end them; and (v) that the end of suffering is not our own end; and (vi) that suffering is not our essence; and (vii) that there is no other means of ending suffering than philosophy.

Statements no. (v) and no. (vi) assert that we in a way know our real nature before we philosophize. So this knowledge is not philosophical. It is not received from an instructor. For who instructed the first instructor, the *ādī-vidvān*? And is not the instructor just a midwife? It is pre-reflective and immediate. It is intuitive (not in the mystical sense). And it produces the restlessness which we call suffering. That is, we in a sense know being as distinguished from having a definite being. In other words, this kind of restlessness cannot be cured by possessing some object. Nor can it be cured by being a definite being, say, a teacher or minister. The restlessness is caused by the fact that we know that we are not what we are, by the realization that non-being is masquerading as being. And the only way to end it is by articulating our intuitively felt sense of being, and thereby putting non-being in its place. So there can be no other means of ending suffering than philosophy.

Thus, the philosophical activity is theoretical. But how can a theoretical activity put an end to suffering or restlessness? Hegel thought that by philosophizing the spirit may overcome alienation. But he could think in this way as he held (i) that the absolute spirit to become self-conscious objectifies or externalizes itself in space and in time, i.e. in nature and in history; (ii) that in man (man of self-consciousness, as Marx said) it finds itself confronting a strange and hostile world of objects; and (iii) that knowledge is neither idle curiosity nor Platonic wonder but an insatiable lust for the spirit's self-finding; and also (iv) that by knowing the object it annihilates its objectivity

and thus overcomes alienation and self-estrangement. But it is not this kind of alienation that we are speaking of in this paper. Neither are we speaking of the kind of alienation that the earlier Marx spoke of. That is, for Marx man is essentially a free creator and his creativity is many-sided. He creates material goods as well as values. But when he creates inhumanly he becomes an alien. And this inhuman creation is in the last resort to be traced to greed or money. So alienation can be overcome not by interpreting the world but by changing it. We have already said that suffering is not an empirical concept in Indian philosophy. So, not by changing the world but by acting theoretically in a way are we to overcome restlessness.

And the question is: in what way? The answer is: by formulating the intuited pre-cognitively grasped nature of our being. But being has many dimensions and many levels. So such pre-cognitive grasps are many. They carry with them the sense of authority and demand formulation. This by itself is a restlessness and theoretic activity may overcome it. Besides, the level of being in which one lives habitually may be invaded by a pre-cognitive grasp of another level. And a restlessness is the outcome. And it has to be overcome either by challenging the invading intuition or by showing the inauthentic character of the habitual being. So a theoretic activity may overcome this kind of restlessness as well. And in our opinion, when the Indian philosophers said that philosophy alone can overcome suffering finally and completely, they meant just this. Their idea that philosophy is *atma vidyā* may also be satisfactorily elaborated from this point of view.

V

We have only a few words to say by way of concluding the discussion. It will be evident from what has been said above that philosophical or reflective reasoning follows and articulates an intuitive grasp. There is nothing necessarily mystical about this intuition. Besides, there may be many types of intuition each claiming to be authoritative and demanding an articulation of its own ontological scheme. It is a moot point whether they are all equally true. But it may only be raised and cannot be satisfactorily answered. We think that this was



behind the idea that philosophies differ as *adhikārins* differ. But we do not think that the criterion for deciding who is the *uttama adhikārī*, and formalizing the intuitive sense at its highest, has been or can be satisfactorily worked out. What may be asserted with some degree of plausibility is that though from what has been said above there cannot be any refutation in philosophy, there may be conversion. And an outsider may try to formulate such a criterion by taking into account this phenomenon of conversion.

It may be objected that the above account of the nature of philosophical reasoning in Indian thought is not objective, but unbearably esoteric. We shall not make any attempt to answer it. We would only say that this is not unbearably esoteric, and that we do not think that an objective account may be given. Again, we do not know if there is a species of reasoning which might be given the label 'Indian'. Besides, we think that we have given an account not of the nature of Indian philosophy but of philosophy as such, and this view of the nature of philosophy is the outcome of reflecting not only on the Indian philosophical texts but also on the European ones, though the applicability of it to the Indian philosophies is comparatively easy. But then it may be applied to Western philosophy as well, though this cannot be worked out in this paper.

Perception and Direct Awareness

Do we see a colour or a coloured thing? When we go to a zoological garden, do we see some two-dimensional striated patches or the tigers and the zebras? Common sense gives categorical answers to such questions. It says that we see a coloured object or a zebra, and not merely some two-dimensional striated patches. It thinks that a colour *per se* can neither be nor be perceived. A red that belongs neither to a lady's lips nor to her stick cannot be a fact. We can neither perceive nor imagine it. A colour-word like 'red' is grammatically an adjective and demands a noun. Similarly, the fact for which it stands is adjectival and should necessarily be owned by a thing. For common sense a colour is necessarily a colour *of*, and we see a colour when we see a coloured object. Now, such a commonsense view is held to be unsatisfactory by many a philosopher whom we propose to call phenomenologists. Phenomenology is perhaps as old as philosophy and has not always been formulated in the same way. But still it may be said that the phenomenologists have always held the commonsense view of things to be untenable. According to them, we cannot be said to see the coloured object or the thing. The zebra or the tigers cannot be objects of direct acquaintance. They are not the data for the senses. They are, so to say, creatures of imagination, or logical constructions, and do not form a part of the ultimate furniture of the world. In other words, according to the phenomenologists the word zebra, or any thing-word, is not demonstrative but descriptive. Common sense thinks otherwise. But the truth is that a word like zebra does not stand for a non-linguistic fact. It does not stand for a linguistic fact either. It does not stand for a fact at all. It merely describes, and it is an incomplete symbol. That is, it does not stand for any constituent of the judgement in whose

linguistic expression it appears. We can replace a statement in which it appears by one whose every grammatical element will directly represent a propositional element. It, therefore, is a symbol which is simply the correlation of such symbols as represent the propositional elements directly, and so in a logically perfect language it will not occur. Or rather, a thing-sentence is molecular and equivalent to a group of atomic sense-datum sentences. So a perfectly logical language can eliminate the thing-words completely. Now, as the thing-words are incomplete symbols, so the things are logical fictions, or constructions, or, as the Buddhists said, just imagination (*kalpanā janya*), and do not form a part of the ultimate furniture of the world.

This is the phenomenalist theory of things. Now, if phenomenalism is as old as philosophy, distrust of it is also as old or perhaps older. Common sense has never been able to give up the impression that a phenomenalist steals our solid things and palms off what is airy and attenuated and ungentelemanly. Indeed common sense has never believed that the phenomenalist's cheque can be cashed in full. Thus the earlier phenomenologists, who said that a thing was merely a conglomeration of some qualities, could not enumerate even the present qualities of a thing, and found that it certainly was puzzling that though all the qualities were not known, yet a thing, or rather what the philosopher of common sense called the identical being of the thing, was known. Similarly, the contemporary phenomenologists who say that the material object language can be fully translated into the sense-datum language cannot with success effect such a translation even of a simple material object sentence like 'This is a zebra'. Again, the earlier phenomenologists reduced a material thing to a permanent possibility of sensation, and their critics or dissatisfied common sense had argued that a thing was not a merely unrealized possibility but an actuality. Similarly the phenomenologists of today can translate a material object sentence into only a hypothetical or causal-dispositional sense-datum sentence. Thus the material object sentence 'There is a zebra in the Alipore Zoo' is for the phenomenalist equivalent to the hypothetical sentence, 'If I go there I shall have such and such sense data'. Now, the contemporary critics of phenomenalism

(e.g. Prof. Berlin) rightly deny the propriety of such a translation. Thus they argue that the distinction between a categorical sentence and a hypothetical sentence cannot be done away with. An existential indicative sentence has a demonstrative sense. It is ostensive. When in the zoo my children are looking for the zebra I may raise my finger and say 'the zebra', or in lieu of the ostensive act I may make use of such expressions as 'this is', or 'here is', or 'there is', etc. and say 'there is the zebra'. So it is obvious that when an existential indicative material object sentence describes a thing present in the sense-field, the ostensive character of it cannot be denied. And though there may be an important semantic difference between such a sentence and one that describes a thing not present in the sense-field, yet there is no logical difference between the two. Hence, it cannot be denied that an existential indicative sentence is 'actual-fact-asserting'. But a hypothetical sentence is not so. It does not assert something actual or anything that is or was or will be. It makes merely a conditional assertion and leaves it open whether the condition is realized or not. Its meaning, that is to say, is conditional or 'not-actual-fact-asserting'. Hence, though a categorical sentence may entail a hypothetical one and vice versa, yet the two cannot be equivalent. The categorical sense of an existential indicative sentence is irreducible, and so a material object sentence cannot be translated into one or more sense-datum sentences. Nor can we say that the categorical sense of a material object sentence is emotive or habitual. For the categorical form is, as Cook Wilson said, prior and independent. Again, if the meaning of a thing-sentence is hypothetical, then there is no reason for the meaning of any sentence being non-hypothetical. That is, if the phenomenalist logic of thing-sentences is applied consistently, then the sense-datum sentences should also mean implication statements. To deny this would be to hold either that the sense-datum sentences are not significant, or that there is no distinction between significance and truth. The phenomenologists seem to overlook this as they suppose that the sense-datum sentences are ultimate correctors. But, as Mr Lloyd has argued, correctors are always relative to a language, and so, though the sense-datum sentences may be the basic ones in one language, say L, they are not absolutely basic. And conse-

quently it cannot be held that while the thing-sentences mean implication statements, the sense-datum sentences do not.

From this it will be obvious that phenomenism is unsatisfactory or has paradoxical consequences. But what is interesting about it is that though it has received serious dialectical blows from the philosophers and Johnsonian kicks from common sense, yet it does not seem to die or lose its vitality. Rather the ghost of phenomenism still walks and refuses to enjoy a well-earned rest in some honoured grave. Indeed, it seems that there has been no serious student of philosophy who has not flirted with phenomenism. So the question arises: what is particularly charming or irresistible about it? The answer, we think, is its empiricism; and so if a theory alternative to the phenomenistic theory of direct acquaintance is not formulated, the ghost cannot be laid. That is, according to phenomenism, the thing cannot be an object of direct acquaintance. It is, so to say, an inferred entity, and the phenomenistic creed is, in the words of Bertrand Russell, that wherever possible logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities. It is true that the contemporary theories of logical construction are neither theories of perception, strictly speaking, nor merely consequences of them. That is, these theories are variously motivated, and the chief motive seems to be to ascertain whether the world of the scientists that is peopled by electrons, protons, photons, the unconscious, etc. is a mysterious realm that literally falls outside the world with which we have direct acquaintance. Still the advocates of logical construction construct, not the world of science, but the world of common sense or the world that is peopled by such homely objects as tables and chairs and tomatoes. Thus Prof. Ayer and others understand by external world the world of tables and chairs and attempt to analyse them into patterns of sense data. Only Bertrand Russell seems to take the world of physics as his external world, but then, as Prof. Dingle has argued, he discusses it as though its relation to sense data were the same as that of the commonsense world. Indeed, it seems that contemporary phenomenism owes much of its plausibility to the ambiguity of the name 'external world'; or, in some cases at least, it mixes up the obviously true proposition that the scientific objects are inferred entities with the proposi-

tion that tables and chairs are so..However, that a thing is not an object of direct acquaintance is the basis of phenomenalism. When we say that we see a zebra, a phenomenalist will say that we have not properly used the verb 'to see'. Hence what a student of phenomenalism must ask is whether the paradoxes of it are to be swallowed, or whether phenomenalism along with its empiricism is to be given up, or whether an empiricist, though non-phenomenalistic, theory of direct acquaintance is possible. In this paper I shall make an attempt to formulate an empiricist but non-phenomenalistic theory of perception. This theory, to be sure, is of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and has been formulated and defended with care by Vācaspati Miśra in his *Tātparyya Tikā*, Udayana in his commentary on *Tikā*, Vallabhācāryya in his *Nyāya Līlāvati*, and by many other writers belonging to this school; and the Navya-Naiyāyikas (particularly Gadādhara) often write in a way that suggests that they also accept it.

Common sense does not think that we abuse the verb 'to see' when we say that we see a zebra. Let us see if a theory of direct acquaintance can be formulated which will offer the philosophical basis of the commonsense belief. While formulating this theory we shall use the words 'sensation' and 'perception' not exactly in the sense in which they are used in Western philosophy. Indeed, I doubt if in Western philosophy these words possess any well-defined sense. However, we shall use the words to stand for *nirvikalpa* and *savikalpa* of the Indian thinkers. That is, we shall not consider sensation to be something merely abstract. We are prepared to admit that we may have no introspective awareness of a sensation, but then we do not hold that a sensation is no awareness at all. With these remarks let us develop our theory of perception. We shall not deny that perception involves, among other things, the working of the dispositions left behind by past experience; and so the real issue for us is whether the working of the dispositions left behind by past experience makes an awareness indirect, or less direct than sensation.

We know that the dispositions work in memory. But what exactly is the nature of memory consciousness? Some textbooks of psychology tell us that the dispositions left behind by the past experience of an object, being provoked by something

presently experienced, give birth to an image or a pale mental copy of the past experienced object, and with the help of this present image or mental replica we remember the past object. Now, we hold such an account of memory consciousness to be worthless. The past experienced object is as directly present to our memory consciousness as the present provoking object is to our perceptual consciousness. So what happens when we remember is to be explained in a different way. We should say that the present perception of the provoking object sets the dispositions left behind by our past experiences of the remembered object in action and this gives birth, not to a mental replica but to a consciousness that fastens itself upon the past object responsible for the dispositions. So the memory image of an object is the past experienced object present to a present consciousness, called memory consciousness, and 'I remember an object' means that the dispositions left behind by my past experience of it, being stirred, give birth to a consciousness that immediately fastens itself upon it. Now this is one way of the working of the dispositions but not the only way. The dispositions, being provoked, may generate a consciousness which makes exactly the object of sensation its object. In other words, if the sensed object or the sense-object contact loses its grip (what losing or maintaining its grip is I wish to leave underlined not only because defining it is a Herculean task but also because it is irrelevant) on the working of the dispositions, then what happens is memory or an immediate apprehension of what is not here and now. But so long as the sense-object contact has a firm hold on it, it will merely make the sensation clear and articulate, i.e. will produce a determinate cognition of what was only indeterminately cognized in sensation. So when the dispositions work under the dictation of the sense-object contact, they cause a cognition that is as direct as sensation is. If the sensed data are hard data, the perceived data are also hard data. It is true that a sensation is never erroneous. It is also true that a perception may be erroneous. And it cannot also be denied that error in perception is due to the working of the dispositions. But that does not justify us in holding that perceptual awareness is indirect, or that it refers to what is not present here and now. That is, dispositions work in memory and in perception, veridical and non-veridical. But

in the three different cases they work in three different ways. In the case of memory, they do not work at the dictation of the sense-object contact, and so generate a consciousness that is of an object not here and now. In the case of illusory perception like the mistaking of a rope for a snake, they work under the dictation of the sense-object contact; but as the dictation here is not strict, so a cognition is caused that cognizes an object that is not here and now as what is here and now. And in the case of veridical perception, they work strictly under the dictation of the sense-object contact and give birth to a cognition that cognizes exactly what was cognized in a sensation only indeterminately. So perception is not a less direct form of awareness than sensation.

Now it may be said that such a contention rests upon a particular theory of the working of the dispositions. That is, it may be said that only when it is assumed that the provoked dispositions do not always work to produce a memory consciousness, then it may be admitted that perception is also a direct form of acquaintance. But what is the evidence in favour of such an assumption? Against such a question we raise the counter question, what is the evidence against it? Why should we say that the dispositions working under the strict dictation of the sense-object contact do not make explicit the sensed content? Would it be said that, as in the case of memory dispositions give rise to a consciousness of an object not present here and now, so in the case of perception they give birth to a similar awareness? Then should we not ask, how do we know that in the case of memory dispositions give birth to a consciousness of a not-here-and-now object? Is it not due to the fact that memory consciousness is accompanied by a consciousness of the past? Now, does such a consciousness accompany perception? Obviously not. Then why should we not hold that dispositions work in one way in memory and in another way in perception? Would it be said that, as in the case of illusion dispositions give birth to a cognition cognizing a not-here-and-now object as here and now, so also in veridical perception they cause a cognition that cognizes a past object but is not accompanied by a consciousness of the past? Then we should like to know what are the conditions uncongenial to veridical perception operative here. Would it be said that though in perception dispositions

work exactly as they do in memory, yet, as perception is 'memory blended with sensation', there is here no consciousness of the past? Then we shall say that this is to misunderstand the relation between sensation and perception. That is, it is not the case that perception is sensation plus memory. It is not the case that in the case of perception, memory consciousness comes into existence, and clothes with its images the naked sensations that lie, so to say, in front of it. For when the perceptual consciousness appears, the sensation has disappeared. A perception and a sensation cannot exist side by side, and so a perception is not sensation plus memory. We are to explain the relation between perception and sensation in the following way. When there is a contact of an object, say a zebra, with the senses, say the eyes, something happens, or a sensation is born. Then the sensation functions, or cognizes the zebra as this and the universal zebanness (this cognition not being a cognition of them as related), and provokes the dispositions. This is the second moment in the life of the sensation. In the third moment, the sensation disappears and a new cognition appears. This cognition is owing to the provoked dispositions working under the dictation of the sense-object contact (which is still there though the sensation has disappeared) and gathering together the contents of the sensation. The cognition is perception. It is produced by the sense-object contact and the provoked dispositions. Now, as even memory consciousness which is caused by the provoked dispositions is direct, so this consciousness is also direct. When the conditions are not uncongenial to veridical perception, the sense-object contact gives birth to a consciousness of a here-and-now object. Hence what is called *savikalpa* in Indian philosophy is as direct as *nirvikalpa*, and expressions like 'we see a zebra' are perfectly legitimate.

7

The Nature of Knownness: The Nyāya View

Suppose that there are two objects A_1 and A_2 belonging to the same class A . Suppose further that these two objects are almost alike. In other words, let us suppose that if A_1 is red, A_2 also possesses the same shade of redness; if A_1 is hard and smooth, A_2 also is hard and smooth; if A_1 is rectangular, A_2 also is rectangular; and so on. Now, let us suppose that of these two objects one was the content of an earlier cognitive experience, while the other is for the first time becoming so. In other words, let us suppose that of these two objects A_1 and A_2 , A_1 is an old acquaintance while A_2 is a new one. If such is the case, the experiences of A_1 and A_2 will differ in a peculiar way. That is, the experience of A_1 will not differ from the experience of A_2 as does the experience of A_1 from that of B_1 . Nor again will these experiences differ from each other as the experiences of the red, hard, etc. A_1 and the not-red, not-hard, etc. A_2 differ from each other. They will differ inasmuch as one of these experiences will be characterized by the feeling of familiarity and the other will not be so characterized. Thus, the experience of A_1 will be characterized by the feeling of familiarity while the experience of A_2 will not be so characterized. This difference between these two experiences is, according to some thinkers, to be accounted for by postulating that while one is an experience of an object characterized by knownness, the other is the experience of an object which is not so characterized. Thus, though A_1 and A_2 resemble each other inasmuch as both of them are instances of the same class, possess the same colour, shape, texture, etc., yet they differ in one important respect. And this difference, according to these thinkers, consists in the fact that while A_1 is characterized by knownness, A_2 is not. And it is this character of knownness, so these thinkers contend, which is present in

A_1 but absent in A_2 , that accounts for the fact that the feeling of familiarity characterizes the experience of A_1 but does not so characterize the experience of A_2 . In other words, according to some thinkers, as we cannot deny the fact that there is such a fact as the feeling of familiarity characterizing some of our experiences and as again we cannot explain it without postulating a fact like knownness, so we must recognize such a fact as knownness that characterizes the known object. Now, the problem for this paper is: what precisely is this knownness, which is supposed by some thinkers to characterize the known object? The theme of this paper can be stated in another way: in Indian philosophy the problem concerning the nature of knownness or *jñātatā* has been very elaborately discussed. Thus, the Bhāṭṭas have declared it to be a new kind of knowable (*padārthāntar*) over and above the seven kinds of knowables generally recognized by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. That is, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas generally recognize seven kinds of knowables and declare that 'all the choir of heaven and furniture of earth, indeed everything that composes the mighty frame of the universe', can be brought under these seven heads. But the Bhāṭṭas join issue with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas as regards the number of knowables. According to them force (*śakti*), knownness (*jñātatā*), etc. are new kinds of knowables, as they cannot be brought under any one of the seven kinds of knowables that are generally recognized by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. We propose in the present paper to discuss the question whether knownness can be regarded as a new kind of knowable. That is, the present paper will be a critical study of knownness as conceived by the Bhāṭṭas but repudiated by the Naiyāyikas as an additional ultimate object of knowledge. So the problem for this paper is: what is knownness, or rather, is knownness a new kind of knowable over and above the seven kinds of knowables as recognized by the Naiyāyikas?

We have said that the Bhāṭṭas consider knownness to be a new type of knowable. They argue their position as follows. In the first place they attempt to show that there is such a fact as knownness. And, in the second place, they attempt to show that this fact cannot be brought under any one of the seven kinds of knowables that are generally recognized by the Naiyāyikas. Their procedure is quite logical, for, obviously,

before we can establish knownness as a new kind of knowable, we must establish the fact-hood of knownness itself. For, if knownness is not a fact, the attempt to establish it as a new kind of knowable would be wasted labour.

The Bhāṭṭas attempt to prove the fact-hood of knownness by means of perception as well as inference. They attempt to prove the fact-hood of knownness by means of perception as follows. When an object is perceived as known, not only is the object perceived, but the knownness of it, i.e. that it had been known before, is also perceived. In other words, when a pot is perceived as a pot, only the pot is perceived. But when the pot is perceived as a red pot, the pot alone is not perceived; the red of it is perceived also. Similarly, when a pot is perceived as a known pot, not only the pot but also the fact that it had been known before, i.e. the knownness of it, is also perceived. So the perception of an object as a known object is the perception of the knownness of the object also, and consequently, the Bhāṭṭas argue, perception proves that knownness is a fact.¹

Again, the Bhāṭṭas attempt to prove the fact-hood of knownness by means of inferences. These, for the sake of convenience, we intend to state as follows: (1) We use the name, the object of knowledge (*viśaya*). But what is the object's being the object of knowledge? In other words, what is the definition of the name, object of knowledge? When we attempt to find out a satisfactory answer to this question we come to learn that that alone is an object of knowledge which is the locus of knownness (*jñātātādhāratvameva viśayatvam*). That is, there is a distinction between the object as such and the object as object of knowledge. To recognize this distinction is not to advocate the doctrine which distinguishes between the noumenal reality in itself and the phenomenal object as known. It is simply to recognize the distinction between the object as revealed to a mind and the object as not so revealed. That is, it is to recognize the distinction that obtains between the object as considered apart from its relation to knowledge and the object as considered in relation to knowledge. Now, unless it is held that the object cannot be revealed to a mind without involving transformation and transmutation, i.e. without a radical qualitative change, or that to consider an object is to consider it in relation to knowledge, the recognition of the distinction

between the object as such¹ and the object as object of knowledge cannot mean an advocacy of the doctrine that distinguishes between noumenal reality in itself and the phenomenal known object. Thus, we can distinguish between the object as such and the object as object of knowledge without holding that the distinction is one of noumenal reality and phenomenal objectivity. But, then, how are we to account for this distinction? In other words, what distinguishes the object as such from the object as object of knowledge? It seems that the distinction is to be accounted for in terms of knownness. That is, the object as such is not the locus of knownness, while the object as object of knowledge is. So, to say that an object is an object of knowledge is equivalent to saying that the object is the locus of knownness. Consequently, it is on knownness that the object's being the object of knowledge depends; or, in the technical language of Indian philosophy, *jñātātā* is *viśayatā-niyāmaka*. So the denial of the fact-hood of knownness will amount to a denial of the fact that an object is the object of knowledge. In short, the fact-hood of knownness is to be established by means of an inference of which the ground or *hetu* is *viśayatā*. *Viśayatā* is the *vyāp̥ya* or the invariable (*avyabhicāri*) concomitant of *jñātātā*, as smoke is the *vyāp̥ya* of fire. Thus, as there is no smoke where there is no fire, so there is no *viśayatā* where there is no *jñātātā*. And consequently, as the presence of smoke argues the presence of fire, so the fact-hood of *viśayatā* argues the fact-hood of *jñātātā*.

(2) Knowledge is an activity. That knowledge is an activity is shown by the fact that it involves reference to objects. In other words, the transitive nature of knowledge (*jñādhātōḥ sakarmakatvam*) shows that knowledge is an activity. This activity is directed towards its object. Now, if an activity is directed towards something, it must introduce a change in the nature of that thing. When the activity of the blacksmith is directed through his heavy hammer towards the red hot iron placed on the anvil, some change is initiated in the red hot iron. Similarly, when the cognitive activity is directed towards its object, some change is introduced in the nature of the object.² But what is the nature of the change thus introduced?

Some thinkers hold that the cognitive activity changes the object radically and thereby creates the distinction between

the noumenal reality in itself and the phenomenal known object. But the realists—and the Bhāṭṭas are realists—do not subscribe to such a view. They think that such a view fails to account for the other important aspect of knowledge, viz. illumination. That is, in a realistic philosophy, if knowledge is an activity it is not merely an activity that is directed towards an object but also an activity that illumines the nature of the object. Knowledge, in short, is an illumining activity. It is an activity as it is transitive. And it is illumining as it is knowledge. The knowing that does not illumine the nature of the object known is not knowing, strictly speaking. Knowledge to be knowledge must reveal the true nature of the object. If a cognition fails to cognize the true nature of the object it is neither a true cognition nor truly a cognition. Thus, the cognition that cognizes a rope as a snake is neither a true cognition nor truly a cognition. So the cognition which is truly a cognition must reveal the nature of the object. This being the case, the knowing activity must bring about a change in the nature of the object and yet it should reveal the true nature of the object. That is, knowledge must change the object and yet it must not change it. But is this possible? It seems that the question can be answered in the affirmative provided that the precise nature of the change that is introduced in the object by the knowledge of it is understood. Thus, when it becomes an object of knowledge the object does not lose any one of its original qualities nor does its real nature get enveloped. So the knowing activity does not fail to illumine the real nature of the object. Still, by becoming an object of knowledge, the object comes to possess a new quality, viz. knownness, and so the knowing activity does not fail to initiate some change in the nature of the object it knows. In other words, the change which the object suffers by being an object of knowledge is the addition of a new quality 'knownness', and as this quality functions neither as a transmuting agent nor as a screen, the real nature of the object is illumined by knowledge while the object is, to a certain extent, changed by the knowing of it. Thus, we see that knowledge, which is an activity, must produce a new quality in the object of it. If it fails to do that, it would not be knowledge, strictly speaking. And as knowledge is an illumining activity, this property cannot be anything but the property of knownness.³ Consequently,

if anything is an object towards which the cognitive activity is directed it must come to 'possess knownness. So an object's being the object of a cognitive activity is the *vyāpya* of knownness, as knownness is not the negatum (*pratiyogin*) in respect of the absence that is present in the object of cognition. That is, as fire is not the negatum in respect of the absence that is present in the locus of smoke, so knownness is not the negatum in regard to the absence that is present in the object of cognition; and hence, as fire may be validly inferred from smoke, so knownness may be validly inferred from the object's being the object of cognition.

This is how the Bhāṭṭas or the advocates of knownness establish or would like to establish the fact-hood of knownness. Now, the Bhāṭṭas attempt to establish the fact-hood of knownness in the interest of their theory of knowledge. In other words, the Bhāṭṭas must recognize the fact-hood of knownness, for a repudiation of the fact-hood of knownness would also mean a weakening, if not a repudiation also, of the Bhāṭṭa theory of knowledge. Thus, the Bhāṭṭas consider novelty (*anadhigatatva*) as constituting the defining mark of a true cognition (*pramā*). On account of this, their critics⁴ argue that this is too narrow a definition of *pramā* as it fails to account for the case of persistent knowledge (*dhārāvāhikajñānam*). Thus, the critics of the Bhāṭṭas argue that when the same object is cognized by different cognitions, none but the first cognition can possess novelty. And so, if the Bhāṭṭa definition of *pramā* is accepted, all but the first cognition should be declared *apramā* or pseudo-cognitions. In other words, the Bhāṭṭa definition of *pramā* in terms of novelty seems to be too narrow a definition, as it fails in the opinion of the critics to account for the case of persistent knowledge. Now, the Bhāṭṭas make various attempts to show that their definition of *pramā* is not a narrow definition because it can account for persistent knowledge. Of these various attempts⁵ one consists in the recognition of the fact-hood of knownness. If the fact-hood of knownness is recognized, in the case of persistent knowledge not only will the first cognition be found as characterized by novelty, but the subsequent cognitions will be found to be so characterized, as the subsequent cognitions will cognize their objects as qualified by the knownness produced by the antecedent cognitions. That is, in the case of persistent knowledge,

the second cognition does not cognize the same object as was cognized by the first cognition, for it cognizes the object as changed by the first cognitive activity, i.e. as qualified by the knownness that has been produced by the first cognitive activity and is qualifying the object of it. Similarly, the object as cognized by the third cognition is not the same object as was cognized by the second cognition, for it possesses an additional quality, viz. knownness, that has been produced by the second cognition. And so on.⁶ Thus, it is seen that if the fact-hood of knownness is recognized, the difficulty concerning the Bhāṭṭa definition of *pramā* in terms of novelty due to *dhārāvāhikajñānam*, or an uninterrupted stream of cognitions, can easily be overcome. And so, in the interest of their theory of knowledge, the Bhāṭṭas would be inclined to admit the fact-hood of knownness.

Again, the Bhāṭṭas should recognize the fact-hood of knownness in the interest of their doctrine concerning knowledge of knowledge. The Bhāṭṭas recognize the knowability of knowledge and thereby display real epistemological sense. In other words, a sober theory of knowledge must admit that knowledge is known. But then, how is knowledge known? To this question different philosophers give different answers. The Prāvākaras and others hold that cognition cognizes itself, as light reveals itself. Again, the Naiyāyikas and others hold that cognition cannot cognize itself just as the eye cannot see itself. According to them, though the cognition cognizing an object cannot cognize itself, yet a second cognition which is directed towards the first cognition and makes it (the first cognition) an object of it (the second cognition) can cognize the first cognition perceptually. Now, the Bhāṭṭas do not subscribe to any one of these views, as all of them hold that the cognition of cognition is perceptual. Cognition, according to the Bhāṭṭas, is a non-perceptible entity since it is non-sensuous. There are some thinkers who believe in non-sensuous perception. But the Bhāṭṭas do not subscribe to such a view. What, they ask, does the name non-sensuous perception stand for? According to some a non-sensuous perception is one which involves no sense-organ. According to others it is one which involves a sense-organ and yet is non-sensuous as the contact between the object and the sense-organ is extraordinary or subjective. Now, as against the first view the Bhāṭṭas hold that an experience that

does not involve use of a sense-organ is no perception at all. And as against the second view they hold that the contact spoken of is unintelligible. The contact that obtains between a sense-organ and its object is always ordinary and never extraordinary. The alleged cases involving extraordinary contact are cases either of inference or of phantasy. Thus the cases of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti* and *jñānalakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti* are cases of inference while the case of Yogic perception is a case of imagination imagined as perception.

Consequently, the perception of non-sensuous objects is impossible. And this implies that knowledge of knowledge cannot be perceptual. But from the fact that perceptual knowledge of knowledge is impossible, it cannot be argued that knowledge of knowledge is impossible. For knowledge may be known by means of inference. Indeed, the Bhāṭṭas argue, knowledge is known by means of an inference of which the ground or *hetu* is knownness. That is, from the fact that an object possesses knownness we can infer that it has been known, as the object that has not been known does not possess knownness. In other words, on perceiving smoke in the forest we can know, by means of inference, the fire that is in the forest. Similarly, on perceiving knownness that is qualifying the known object we can know by means of inference the knowledge that knew the object. Thus, the Bhāṭṭa theory of knowledge rests upon their doctrine of knownness, which therefore occupies in it a very important position.

After establishing the fact-hood of knownness, the Bhāṭṭas attempt to establish that it is a new kind of knowable. For this purpose they reason as follows. The seven kinds of knowables as generally recognized by the Naiyāyikas are substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), universal (*sāmānya*), inherence (*samavāya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*) and negation (*abhāva*). Now, knownness cannot be brought under any of them. It is not a substance, for it qualifies a quality also. For the same reason it is neither a quality nor an action. In other words, if the fact that knownness qualifies a quality too prevents knownness from being a substance, it also prevents it from being a quality or an action, as a quality or an action does not qualify a quality. Similarly, knownness is not universal as a universal may be its locus. In other words, a universal cannot

be the locus of a universal; and as a universal can be the locus of knownness, so knownness is not a universal. For the same reason knownness can be neither particularity, nor inherence, nor negation. That is, knownness is neither particularity, nor inherence, nor negation, as they may be the loci of knownness. Indeed, the fact that negation may serve as the locus of knownness proves that knownness is a new kind of knowable, as negation cannot serve as the locus of any of the *padārthas* that are recognized by the Naiyāyikas.⁷

The Naiyāyikas do not subscribe to the above doctrine of the Bhāṭṭas. Thus, they do not recognize the fact-hood of knownness in the Bhāṭṭa sense. According to the Bhāṭṭas, knownness which is an attribute of the object known is a new kind of knowable. This the Naiyāyikas repudiate. According to them, what is called knownness is only the relation that obtains between knowledge and its object; and as this relation is simply the relation of *svarūpa*, it is not a new kind of knowable.⁸ To follow this let us first of all see what the Naiyāyikas mean when they say that the relation that obtains between the object of knowledge and the knowledge of objects is the relation of *svarūpa*. When an object is known, the object enters into a relation with the knowledge of it. Similarly, the knowledge of the object enters into a relation with the object of it. Thus, the knowledge of the object and the object of knowledge cannot go unrelated. If the object were not related to the knowledge of it, it would not be the object of its knowledge. Similarly, if the knowledge were not related to the object of it, it would not be the knowledge of its object. So the knowledge of the object and the object of knowledge must be related. But how are they related? The Naiyāyikas answer this question by saying that the knowledge of the object is related to the object of knowledge by the relation of *viśayatā*, while the object of knowledge is related to the knowledge of it by the relation of *viśayitā*. It is the nature of knowledge to be the knowledge of an object. A cognition that cognizes no object is no cognition at all. If a cognition cognizes nothing, it is not a cognition that is cognizing nothing, for it is a cognition that is cognizing a thing and that thing is nothing. Similarly, it is the nature of an object to be the object of knowledge. To say this is not to say that the object owes its objectivity to the knowledge of it, i.e. to its being

known. What, on the contrary, is said is that the object is not an unknowable. It can become an object of knowledge and yet be what it is. To become an object of knowledge it has not to forgo its real nature, nor has it to go through a make up. In short, to become an object of knowledge is for the object not to become something unnatural. Rather it is to be natural. So it may be said that it is the nature of the object that makes it an object of knowledge. And thus the object of knowledge and the knowledge of the object are related by the relations of *viśayitā* and *viśayatā*. That is, as knowledge is knowledge, so it must have an object and consequently the relation that puts it in relation with the object of it is its own nature to have an object or the relation of *viśayatā*. Again, as it is the nature of the object that makes it the object of knowledge, the relation that puts it in relation with the knowledge of it is its nature to be an object of knowledge or the relation of *viśayitā*. Thus, in the knowledge situation there are the relata, knowledge and object of knowledge, and the relation of *viśayatā* relates knowledge to its object while the relation of *viśayitā* relates the object to the knowledge of it. And as knownness is nothing but the relation between knowledge and its object, it is not a new kind of knowable over and above the seven kinds that are usually recognized.

But is knownness merely this relation? Or, rather, what precisely is meant when it is said that the knownness of an object is simply the relation that obtains between the knowledge of the object and the object of knowledge? To this question the Naiyāyikas give the following reply. What the name known object connotes is the object as qualified by the knowledge that knew it. To suppose that the name known object means the object as qualified by knownness is unwarranted. For this supposal rests upon the further supposal that a quality inhering in an object may be due to the knowledge of the object. And this further supposal is contrary to the nature of the object of knowledge as well as of the knowledge of objects. For the object known is independent of the knowing of it. So no quality of it can owe its being to its knowledge. Similarly, it is the nature of knowledge to know the object and not to change its nature by adding something to it. As the eye sees the object but does not change it, so also knowledge knows its object but does not change it. Hence, we can say that, as it is illegitimate

to assert that knowledge changes the object of it by adding something to it, so it is also illegitimate to assert that the name known object connotes the object as qualified by knownness. In short, the very concept of knownness is anomalous. It is a property that is caused by the knowledge of the object but belongs to the object of knowledge. As nothing that is caused by the knowledge of the object can belong to the object of knowledge, the name known object cannot connote object as qualified by knownness. What, therefore, the name really connotes is the object as qualified by the knowledge of it.

Indeed, the Bhāṭṭa doctrine of knownness, as the author of *Padārthacandrikā*⁹ has pointed out, is either lacking in confirmation or involves infinite regress. The knownness of the object is either an object of knowledge or it is not. If it is not an object of knowledge, the doctrine of knownness is wanting in confirmation. But if it is an object of knowledge, then what determines its being the object of knowledge? In other words, according to the Bhāṭṭas knownness is that which determines an object's being the object of knowledge. Now, if the knownness of A is that which determines A's being the object of knowledge, what is that which determines this knownness of A's being the object of knowledge? We must suppose that a knownness characterizing the knownness of A is that which determines the knownness of A's being the object of knowledge. But then, what is that which determines this new knownness's being the object of knowledge? To be consistent we must presuppose another new knownness, and so on *ad infinitum*. Consequently, instead of saying that an object is an object of knowledge by virtue of its being the locus of some knownness produced by the cognitive activity that is directed towards it, we should say that an object is an object of knowledge by virtue of its own nature which puts it in relation with the knowledge that knows it.¹⁰ To put it in the language of Haridāsa, that which determines an object's being the object of knowledge is the nature of the object.¹¹ So *viśayatā* is to be defined in terms of *svarūpasambandha* and not in terms of knownness.¹² And this means that the first inference of the Bhāṭṭas to establish the fact-hood of knownness falls through. Similarly, the second inference of the Bhāṭṭas falls through if it is denied that knowledge is an activity. The Naiyāyikas consider knowledge as a quality of the soul

and so the second inference of the Bhāṭṭas cannot impress them. Indeed, the act theory of knowledge is a theory of doubtful validity. For the activity which is supposed to be knowledge does not and cannot signify activity in the usual sense of the term. As Dr Stout has pointed out, 'The word act must not be taken to signify activity. It is sometimes maintained that activity is not to be found in our mental life at all and . . . I heartily disagree with this position. But in any case, I submit that if the mind is, properly speaking, active it is so only in virtue of one kind of act, that in which the mind is interested in an object, as something to be sought or shunned. Mental activity, therefore, if there be such a thing, must be identified with conation, the striving aspect of life.'¹³ Similarly, Prof. Alexander writes, 'Cognition is not a separate kind of action from conation.'¹⁴ Thus the essence of the act theory is that cognition is a kind of conation, and this is of doubtful validity. Cognition, indeed, involves conation. We indeed know through acting. But from this it cannot with certainty be concluded that cognition is conation or that knowing is acting. So the act theory of knowledge is of doubtful validity, and the second inference of the Bhāṭṭas that rests upon it cannot be in a better position. Indeed, it is in a worse position. For, from the fact that knowledge is an activity, it does not follow that knowledge will produce a property that will qualify the object of it. For it may be that the cognitive activity does not in any way change the nature of the object but simply brings what may be called the clearness and distinctness of discernment. So from the fact that knowing is an activity we cannot infer that it will produce a property which will characterize the object of it. Hence the second inference of the Bhāṭṭas also falls through.

Again, the fact that some of our experiences are characterized by the feeling of familiarity can be explained without postulating the fact-hood of knownness. That is, the advocates of the doctrine of knownness hold that those experiences are characterized by the feeling of familiarity the objects of which are characterized by knownnesses produced by the knowledges that knew them. Now, the Naiyāyikas maintain that that some of our experiences are characterized by the feeling of familiarity can be explained without holding that the objects of these experiences are characterized by knownness. For we can

explain it by holding that when an experience is experiencing an object that is qualified by the knowledge that had known it (i.e. not by the knownness produced by the knowledge that had known it), the experience is characterized by the feeling of familiarity. Now, this account of the feeling of familiarity shows that the first argument of the Bhāṭṭas that intends to establish the fact-hood of knownness by means of perception is unsound. For what is really perceived when a known object is perceived is not the object as qualified by knownness produced by the knowledge that had known it, but the object as qualified by the knowledge that had known it. So it cannot be maintained that perception proves knownness.

Thus, the Nyāya doctrine concerning the knownness of an object is that the known object is not the object as qualified by quality other than the knowledge of the object.¹⁵ Such an object is simply the object as qualified by the knowledge that had known it. And, consequently, what is perceived when an object is perceived as known is not the object as qualified by knownness, but the object as qualified by the knowledge that knew it.

Now, this doctrine assumes that knowledge can be a quality of the object which it knows and that while a known object is perceived the knowledge that knew it may also be perceived. Are these two assumptions legitimate? To this question the Naiyāyikas answer in the affirmative. This is, they maintain that knowledge can qualify the object it knows and that the knowledge that knew the object can also be perceived while the object is perceived as known. Let us see how and why they maintain these propositions.

That knowledge can qualify the object it knows may appear preposterous. For knowledge is supposed to be a quality that qualifies the soul or the subject of knowledge. In other words, it may be argued that knowledge is a quality that qualifies the subject of knowledge and so it cannot qualify the object it knows. The Naiyāyikas consider such an argument to be worthless. They point out that what the proposition, 'knowledge qualifies the knower', means is that knowledge is related to the knower by the relation of inherence. Consequently, what the proposition implies is that knowledge cannot be related to the object it knows by the relation of inherence. But it never implies

that knowledge cannot be related to the object of it by any other relation. For knowledge is related to its object and the relation that relates it to its object is its own nature to have an object or the relation of *viṣayatā*. So the doctrine which maintains that knowledge can qualify the object it knows is not absurd, as what it means is simply that knowledge is related to the object of it by the relation of *viṣayatā*. Strictly speaking, a realistic philosophy cannot raise the charge of absurdity against the doctrine that holds that knowledge may qualify the object it knows. For realism must assert that the object known can be a quality of the knowledge of it. In other words, in a realistic philosophy a cognition as such is indistinguishable from another cognition. That is, cognitions are diaphanous, so to say. They are, to use Udayanācāryya's¹⁶ happy expression, formless (*nirākāra*), or all alike, when considered as such. Thus, the cognition of blue does not differ from the cognition of yellow as a piece of cognition. Considered as cognition, one is indistinguishable from the other. We can distinguish between them, as one is the cognition of *blue* while the other is the cognition of *yellow*. Thus, we can distinguish one cognition from another by taking into account their respective objects, i.e. the objects which qualify them or are related to them by the relation of *viṣayitā*. So a realist cannot deny that an object can qualify the knowledge that knows it. A subjective idealist (*viññānavādin*) may deny this, for he does not hold knowledge to be formless. But then, the Bhāṭṭas are not subjective idealists, nor is the philosophy of subjective idealism a defensible, or at least the best, philosophy. So it seems only logical to hold that the object of knowledge can qualify the knowledge of it. Now, if it is not absurd to hold that the object of knowledge can qualify the knowledge of the object, it is also not illogical to hold that the knowledge of the object can qualify the object of knowledge. Thus, as in the case of the knowledge of the pot, the knowledge is the qualified and the pot is the quality that qualifies, so in the case of the known pot, the pot is the thing qualified while the knowledge of it is the quality that qualifies it.¹⁷ Thus we see that knowledge can and does qualify the object it knows.

Now, if it is logical to hold that knowledge can qualify the object it knows, it is also logical to hold that the knowledge that knew the object can also be perceived, i.e. be present to

consciousness while the object is perceived as a known object. For the knowledge of the object is a quality (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the object. To be precise, the knowledge of the object is a quality that is related to the object by the relation of *viśayatā*. And so the knowledge that will know the known pot will have for its *viśeṣya* the pot while the knowledge that had known the pot will in the relation of *viśayatā* be the *prakāra* of it. That is, when an object is perceived as a known object, the subject (not in the sense of the knower but in the sense of the subject of the proposition that will express the knowledge) or the *viśeṣya* of perceptual cognition will be the object while the predicate or *prakāra* of it will be the earlier knowledge in the relation of *viśayatā*. In short, to perceive an object as a known object is to perceive the object as related to the knowledge of it by the relation of *viśayatā*. And so while the object is perceived as known, the earlier knowledge is present to consciousness. To appreciate the nature of this perception let us compare it with the cognition that cognizes the cognition of an object. When a cognition is cognized, it is not cognized as a mere cognition. A cognition being diaphanous, the cognition of a mere cognition is impossible. So when a cognition is cognized, the object of that cognition is also present to the cognition that is cognizing the cognition. That is, when the knowledge of the pot is known, not only is the knowledge of the pot present to consciousness, but the pot also is so present.¹⁸ If the pot were not so present, there would not be a knowledge of the pot. So when the knowledge of the pot is known, the subject or the *viśeṣya* of knowledge is the knowledge of the pot while the predicate or *prakāra* of it is the pot in the relation of *viśayatā*. Consequently, when the knowledge of the pot is known, not only is the said knowledge perceived but the pot also is perceived as the *viśeṣaṇa* of the said knowledge. Similarly, when the known pot is perceived, not only is the pot perceived but the earlier knowledge of it also is perceived as the *viśeṣaṇa* of the pot. In other words, if it is logical to hold that the object of knowledge can be present to consciousness while the knowledge of the object is known, it is also logical to hold that the knowledge that knew the object can also be present to consciousness while the object is perceived as a known object. So it can be said that while an object is perceived as a known object, what is perceived is not the object as quali-

fied by knownness produced by the knowledge that knew the object, but the object as qualified by the knowledge that knew it. *Jñātatā* or knownness, thus, is nothing but the knowledge of the object related to the object of knowledge by the relation of *viśayatā*, and hence it is not a new type of knowable over and above the seven kinds of knowables that are generally recognized by the Naiyāyikas.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Vide* Kāmākhyānātha Tarkavāgīśa on *Nyāya-Kusumāñjali*, 4 3.
2. *Vide* Haridāsa on *NK*, 4 3.
3. *Vide* Haridāsa on *NK*, 4.2.
4. *Vide* *NK*, 4 1
5. *Vide* *Manameyodaya*, I.P.H. edn , p 4
6. *Vide* K. T. on *NK*, 4 2
7. *Vide* *Setu*, Chowkhamba edn , p. 74.
8. *Vide* *Mūlabhāṣinī*, Calcutta Sanskrit Series, p. 40.
9. *Vide* *ibid.*, p 112.
10. *Vide* *NK*, 4 2.
11. On *NK*, 4.2, *svabhāvanīśesa eva viśayatānyāmaḥa*.
12. *Vide* K. T. on *NK*, p 91
13. G. F. Stout, *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology* (Macmillan, London, 1930).
14. S. Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity*, vol. II (Humanities Press, New York, 1950), p. 118.
15. Jinavardhana on *Saptapadārthi*, Calcutta Sanskrit Series, p. 112.
16. *Vide* *NK*, 4 4.
17. *Vide* K. T. on *NK*, p 93.
18. *Vide* *Tātparyyaparīśuddhi Tikā* and Vardhamāna's commentary thereon, Royal Asiatic Society edn., pp. 632 3

8

Knowledge and Jñāna

I. Introduction

We use the English word 'knowledge' to translate the Sanskrit word 'jñāna'. Similarly, we translate the Sanskrit sentence 'ahaṁ jñāmi' into English as 'I know'. These translations, though unavoidable, are unsatisfactory, and often, i.e. whenever we try to discuss the questions of Indian epistemology in English, confound us. We shall, in what follows, try to show in what respects the translations are unsatisfactory and also that if we keep this in mind, some of the confusions may be avoided and we may have a better understanding of a basic philosophical question.

II. Knowledge and Falsehood

When we say that we know that p , we cannot say that p is false, or that we know that it is false, or that it is inadequately grounded, or that we know that it is inadequately grounded, or that it just happens to be true, or that it is doubtful.¹ To change the mode of speaking, we cannot say of a mental state, even when it is cognitive, that it is a case of knowledge if it does not show its object as it is, or if we know that it does not show its object as it is, or if it is uncertain.² In other words, the relation between knowledge and truth is such that the expression 'false knowledge' is a contradiction in terms.³ This has been the view of many eminent thinkers, and among the considerations on which it rests one is lexical or linguistic.⁴ That is, the logical behaviour of the word 'knowledge' is such that it cannot be compounded with the word 'false'.

III. 'Jñāna' and 'Mithyājñāna'

But this is not the case with the word 'jñāna'. The expression 'mithyājñāna' is not illegitimate. So the Nyāya logicians do not

hesitate to divide the class of all *jñāna* into two sub-classes, viz. the class of all *pramā* and the class of all *apramā*. In other words, if we agree to translate '*jñāna*' as knowledge, '*pramā*' as 'true knowledge' and '*apramā*' as 'untrue knowledge', the Nyāya position would be that the class of all knowledge has two sub-classes, viz. the class of all true knowledge and the class of all untrue knowledge.

That the Nyāya logicians who thus divide *jñāna* have taken usage into consideration is evident from the biverbal definitions they give of '*jñāna*', '*buddhi*' and '*upalabdhi*'. In other words, they treat these words as synonyms,⁵ and also argue that we may define '*jñāna*' as meaning what '*buddhi*' or '*upalabdhi*' means. We may elaborate it thus: the designatum of the word '*jñāna*' differs from its similars as well as from its dissimilars, that is, from everything else, in that it has also been, from time immemorial, the designatum of the word '*buddhi*' or '*upalabdhi*'.⁶ Thus, 'what smells is earth' is treated by the Indian logicians as a standard definition of earth. And it is analysed thus: what is not earth does not smell, as, for example, water. Similarly, what is not a designatum of the word '*jñāna*' is not a designatum of the word '*buddhi*' or of the word '*upalabdhi*', as, for example, colour.

Thus, by giving the synonyms of the word '*jñāna*' the Nyāya logicians seek to explain the use of the word and also to define its designatum by differentiating it from everything else. And what we should note here is that they try to do both these things by referring to the use of the word from ancient times. Accordingly, we may say that the Nyāya logicians, while using the word '*jñāna*' and so while dividing the class of all *jñāna* into two classes of which one is the class of all *apramā*, have taken into account how the word is used or has been used in Sanskrit—the language in which it occurs and in which they also think and write.

This is corroborated by the Nyāya examination of the Sāṃkhya view on the asynonymy of the three words. Thus, according to the Sāṃkhya philosophers, *buddhi* is the first evolute of *prakṛti*, the uncaused first cause, and like *prakṛti*, is unconscious. In other words, we may take it to be the mind of an individual, while not disputing the contention of many contemporary writers that it is what many speculative psycho-

logists call the collective unconscious. Anyway, this *buddhi* may transform itself and take the form of the objects an individual is said to know. Thus transformed, it is designated by the word '*jñāna*', which is an attribute or mode of *buddhi* and not of the self or *puruṣa*. Now, this *jñāna*, like *buddhi*, is unconscious, and and though it takes the form of the objects an individual is said to know, it cannot reveal them unless it borrows consciousness from the self as a reflecting medium. Thus *jñāna* may be compared to the moon which has no light of its own but which, borrowing light from the sun, as a reflecting medium illumines objects. And the unreal relation between self as reflected in *buddhi* and *jñāna*, which is a mode or attribute of it, is *upalabdhi*.⁷ So, according to the Sāṃkhya philosophers, the three words are not synonymous in that the designatum of one is not the designatum of another.

IV. A Few Observations on the Sāṃkhya Doctrine of Asynonymy

Evidently, the view of the Sāṃkhya philosophers on the asynonymy of the three words rests on metaphysical considerations. They build their metaphysics in such a way that they have to introduce three kinds of entities, and to name them they use three familiar words of ordinary language in unfamiliar senses. That is, as required by their metaphysics, they depart from the ordinary use of these words and hold that they are not synonyms. So the Nyāya logicians, to defend their proposition that they are synonyms, argue that our everyday use of the words confirms it. Thus, they say that in everyday life, while we say of an object that it is *jñātaḥ*, we also say that it is *buddhaḥ* or *upalabdhaḥ*, and we do not say that it is not *buddhaḥ* or not *upalabdhaḥ*.⁸ In other words, we agree to translate '*buddhi*' as 'understanding' and '*upalabdhi*' as 'apprehension', as we agreed to translate '*jñāna*' as 'knowledge', and then we may state their argument thus: when we say of an object that it has been known, we may also say of it that it has been understood or apprehended, and we do not say that it has not been understood or that it has not been apprehended. So, from a perusal of the Nyāya defence of their biverbal definitions against the Sāṃkhya objections it becomes evident that the Nyāya logicians, while using the word '*jñāna*', took into consideration the

ordinary use of the word in the language in which it occurs and that this language permits us to have the expression 'mithyājñāna'.

v. *A Few More Words on the Sāṃkhya Use of Jñāna*

Though the Sāṃkhya philosophers do not honour the use of the three words in ordinary language when they assert their asynonymy, they do not completely disregard the use of the word 'jñāna' in ordinary language. That is, in our everyday life we are constantly acting either towards or away from objects. Such actions are generally willed or intentional. We act towards the objects we think worth obtaining. Similarly, when we think that an object should be avoided, we act away from it. So we may say that in our everyday life objects are given or presented to us and we require a word to stand for this presentation of the objects, i.e. for what shows the objects. And 'jñāna' is that word. And a philosophy may be critical of common sense and ordinary language and may seek to go beyond them. But then it cannot go beyond them wholly. Thus, though the Sāṃkhya philosophers deny the said synonymy and depart from usage, they do not deny that there are occasions when what figures as the content of the manifestation (*prakāśa*) or of what may be said to show the object does not agree with the object.

We may dwell on the point a little longer. Thus, whatever may be the nature or status of this manifestation, it is incontrovertible that it is a fact. Objects are given, presented, manifested to us. We may, if our metaphysics so demands, say that all manifestation is due to consciousness or *caitanya*, and distinguish between consciousness and knowledge or *jñāna*, and say that knowledge (*jñāna*) being essentially material or unconscious can only show its object by borrowing consciousness as a reflecting medium. But then we cannot deny that there are such manifestations of objects and that they govern our behaviour.

Thus, our actions, when not reflex (which also, in the opinion of many competent thinkers, are unconscious descendants of conscious actions), are conscious and willed actions. That is, actions or behaviour towards or away from an object have some

will or other as their causes, and these wills again have knowledge or manifestations as their causes. Again, we either succeed and fail in our actions. Some of our actions are successful and some are not. Suppose that a man in need of silver sees some shining object. He takes it to be silver. Some silver is presented or manifested to him. He wills to have it, and acts in the appropriate way. If the object that he took to be silver is really a piece of silver, he will get silver and his action will be successful. But if it is something else, he will fail to get silver and his action will be unsuccessful. And we would not be very wrong if we say that our life consists of a stream of such successful and unsuccessful actions, and accordingly, we may hold that of the manifestations at the back of them some are of the objects as they are and some are of the objects as they are not. These are incontrovertible facts. We cannot but accept them, though we may interpret them differently.

That is, we may say, as the Sāṃkhya philosophers do, that to account for such manifestation, we should distinguish between consciousness and knowledge, and we should translate an ordinary sentence like 'a knowledge of pot shows the pot' as 'the subtle matter which can borrow manifestation or illumination from consciousness as a reflecting medium and can take the form of the pot, has borrowed the illumination and has taken the form of the pot, and is manifesting the pot'. But we may interpret it differently or in keeping with common sense if the metaphysical considerations for interpreting it in the above way are not deemed by us to be compelling. Again, we may hold that when our behaviour is unsuccessful, and so the manifestation at the back of it does not reveal the object as it is, it is one single determinate manifestation of a complex, one part of which figures as its subject and another part as its predicate. That is, in such a case also, we may hold that the manifestation is determinate and predicative. But we may deny this and hold that in such cases the manifestation is not a determinate predicative manifestation. On the contrary, we have in such cases two manifestations of which one is non-recollective and the other recollective, and they both show their objects as they are. But then, on account of the fact that some factors not congenial to the disclosure of it prevail and the two manifestations occur in quick succession, we fail to distinguish

between them and treat what is not a single predicative manifestation as such a manifestation. In short, we may interpret the incontrovertible facts differently, and thus incorporate them in different ways in our systems. But we cannot deny them.

Accordingly, it is understandable that though the Sāṃkhya philosophers depart from usage when they disagree with the biverbal definitions given by the Nyāya philosophers, they do not deny that some of our *jñānas* may be *mithyā*, and so the expression '*mithyājñāna*' or false knowledge is not a contradiction in terms. Indeed, they define a false knowledge as a case of knowledge that shows its subject as it is not.⁹

This is an intriguing point in that Sāṃkhya philosophers subscribe to the doctrine of *svataḥ prāmāṇya* or the view that truth is intrinsic to knowledge. This doctrine is also advocated by some other systems of Indian philosophy, and with the exception of the Prābhākaras none would hold that it is redundant to say that a knowledge is true or that the expression 'false knowledge' is a contradiction in terms. That is, the Nyāya philosophers do not subscribe to this view, and so their statement that the class of all knowledge has two sub-classes, viz. the sub-class of all true knowledge and the sub-class of all untrue knowledge, is not a consequence of their advocating the contrary doctrine. It is essential that this point be discussed at some length and we propose to do this in the next few sections, before we take up the principal question of this paper.

VI. *The Intriguing Sāṃkhya Position*

We have seen that the Sāṃkhya philosophers subscribe to the doctrine of *svataḥ prāmāṇya* and also hold that the expression '*mithyājñāna*' is not a contradiction in terms, or that there are *mithyājñānas*. And we have observed that this is intriguing. That is, one may be tempted to hold that one cannot subscribe to the doctrine of *svataḥ prāmāṇya* without also holding that the expression '*mithyājñāna*' is a contradiction in terms. But in English we use 'intrinsic' to translate '*svataḥ*', 'extrinsic' to translate '*parataḥ*', 'truth' or 'validity' to translate '*prāmāṇya*', 'falsity' or 'invalidity' to translate '*apramāṇya*' and 'knowledge' to translate '*jñāna*'. Accordingly, the Sāṃkhya position amounts to this: truth is intrinsic to knowledge and yet a knowledge may be

false. Obviously, this is confusing. And the confusion deepens, becomes almost overwhelming, when we observe that the Sāṃkhya philosophers further hold that falsity also is intrinsic to knowledge and yet a knowledge may be true.

That is, if truth is intrinsic to knowledge, then knowledge without ceasing to be knowledge cannot become untrue or false, just as if sweetness is intrinsic to sugar, it cannot be sour or bitter or not-sweet without ceasing to be sugar. And so, if anyone says that sweetness is intrinsic to sugar, he cannot, without contradicting himself, say that sugar may be sour or not-sweet. Similarly, he who holds that truth (or falsity) is intrinsic to knowledge cannot, without contradicting himself, say that knowledge may be false (or true). But the point is that the Sāṃkhya philosophers do this and so seem to contradict themselves. And the intriguing question is, do they really?

VII. *Do the Sāṃkhya Philosophers Contradict Themselves?*

Before we answer the question we should consider whether we are not misunderstanding what it is for truth or falsity to be intrinsic (or extrinsic) to knowledge, and whether, again, it is not the case that to this misunderstanding our confusion or our contention that the Sāṃkhya philosophers contradict themselves is due. Indeed, by 'being intrinsic to knowledge' we might understand 'being of the essence of knowledge,' or 'constituting the nature of knowledge', and possibly to such understanding (or misunderstanding) our confusion or our objection against the Sāṃkhya philosophers owes its origin. That is, if it is the nature or of the essence of knowledge to be true (or false), then knowledge without ceasing to be knowledge cannot be false (or true). And it is quite likely that when the Sāṃkhya philosophers hold that truth (or falsity) is intrinsic, *svataḥ*, to knowledge, they, as also philosophers belonging to other schools of Indian philosophy, do not mean that it constitutes the essence of the nature of knowledge, and so they could, without contradicting themselves, assert that though truth (or falsity) is intrinsic to knowledge, yet knowledge may be false (or true). Accordingly, we should consider what *svataḥ* or intrinsic actually means, not only to ascertain whether the Sāṃkhya philosophers contradict themselves, but

also to find an answer to the more general question whether a philosopher who holds that truth is intrinsic to knowledge should also hold that the expression 'false knowledge' is a contradiction in terms.

VIII. *Analysis of 'Svataḥ' and 'Parataḥ'*

To ascertain what the words 'intrinsic' (*svataḥ*) and 'extrinsic' (*parataḥ*) mean, we should consider first what the words 'true' and 'false' or 'truth' and 'falsity' mean. Now, a knowledge is true when it shows its object to be what it is. This, we may say, states in a broad way what the word 'true knowledge' or 'truth' means. But this should not stand in the way of treating 'truth' or 'falsity' as a property of knowledge. In other words, when a knowledge is true or shows its object as it is, it may be said to be in a state or condition of 'being true', and this might be treated as a property (*dharmaviśeṣa*) of it. Similarly, when a knowledge is false or does not show its object as it is, that is, when it shows its object as it is not, it is in a state or condition of 'being false' and this might be treated as a property of it. In other words, 'truth' and 'falsity' may be treated as properties of knowledge. 'Truth' is a property of the knowledge that is true—a property that it has, and that a false knowledge does not have. When we look at the subject from this point of view, we also see that it is not sufficient to say of a true (or of a false) knowledge that it shows (or does not show) its object as it is. For knowledge is an occurrent fact, and so a property of it also is an occurrent. Accordingly, as it is meaningful to ask about some knowledge what caused it or what its causes are, so also it is meaningful to ask about 'truth' or 'falsity' what caused it or what its causes are.

IX. *A Question of Cause and Philosophy*

Now, it is admitted almost by every school of Indian philosophy that knowledge is an occurrent and so has causes, and some of them try to ascertain the unique or instrumental causes of the different types of knowledge. This might be misunderstood. It might be thought that an investigation into or a discussion of causes is psychological and physiological, in short, empirical,

and is of little or no relevance to a philosophical investigation into knowledge. So we should discuss briefly whether a philosophical treatment of knowledge ceases to be philosophical when it seeks to account for some aspect of it in terms of cause. Obviously, a philosophical treatment of knowledge in terms of cause—if there be such a thing—is different from the scientific treatment, and the question of the nature of this difference is highly intriguing. But we do not propose to find an answer to the question here. We would be content with the observation that the pronouncement that some philosophers make against every causal question in philosophy may be traced to their assumption that factual considerations have no bearing on the philosophical treatment of a problem or that a philosophical analysis of experience is of no consequence to a factual question. But such an assumption is dubious. And to make this point we would outline briefly the Nyāya definition of perception. It would have been more to the point if we considered the controversy on application or *parāmarśa*. For the controversy is essential if an application is an invariable antecedent of inferential knowledge (*anumiti*). It is on a fact and also on a cause. And the participants in the controversy do not try to settle it by more careful observation either inside a laboratory or outside it. All the participants think that it is to be settled by a reflective analysis or rational reconstruction of experience. So it would have been more to the point if in our attempt to find an answer to the question whether a philosophical inquiry *qua* a philosophical inquiry cannot be about a cause, we considered the controversy over application. But then such a consideration would have made the use of many a technical term obligatory and this might not be relished either by the readers or by us. So we would consider the Nyāya definition of perception, which may also make the point.

x. *The Nyāya Definition of Perception*

The logicians of the Nyāya school define the different kinds of knowledge in terms of their unique causes, and the logicians of the old Nyāya school define perception in terms of a sense-organ, that is, as a kind of knowledge that has a sense-organ as its unique or instrumental cause (*kāraṇa*). And we think that

their treatment of perception or their attempt to define perception in this way is logical and not psychological. Obviously the definition is genetic, and may be dubbed psychological. But, in reply, a Nyāya logician would say that such a contention rests on a misunderstanding. In other words, according to the Nyāya logicians, knowledge is diaphanous. The proposition is basic to his realistic philosophy and indeed to every realistic philosophy, for the contrary proposition entails that an object is dependent on its knowledge, or that while an object-as-known is, an object-in-itself is not, though it is unknown and unknowable, and a realist cannot accept any one of these propositions. Now, if knowledge is diaphanous, to distinguish one knowledge from another we should refer either to the subject of knowledge or to its object, or to its time of occurrence, or to its cause. Thus, we may distinguish between Devadatta's knowledge of a jar from Yajñadatta's knowledge of it in terms of the subject of knowledge. Similarly, we may distinguish between Devadatta's knowledge of a jar and his knowledge of a cow in terms of the object of knowledge. Again, we may distinguish between Devadatta's knowledge of a jar occurring in the morning and his knowledge of the same jar occurring in the evening in terms of its time of occurrence. But then, though these ways of distinguishing are helpful and important, they are of no help when we seek to define and thus distinguish a class of knowledge from its co-ordinate class or classes. Thus, when the question of defining a perception and also of differentiating it from an inference or a class of knowledge co-ordinate with it arises, they are of no help. And accordingly, if we are not to give up our realism, we should frame our definition in terms of the unique cause.

The Buddhist logicians, however, hold that the object of knowledge may be of help. In other words, they hold that an object of knowledge is either *svalakṣaṇa* or *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, i.e. either a *sui generis* bare particular or a common character, i.e. a universal. And they hold further that whereas a bare or brute particular is an object of perception such that whenever a perception occurs a brute particular is known, and that whenever a brute particular is known it is known in a perception, a universal is the object of inferential knowledge such that whenever an inferential knowledge occurs a universal is known, and

that whenever a universal is known it is known by inference. This doctrine of the Buddhists is known as *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* or the doctrine that every kind of knowledge has its unique object. And obviously, if one subscribes to the doctrine, one may define perception and differentiate it from its co-ordinate in terms of its object.

But if we do not subscribe to this doctrine or hold that it is untenable, the most reasonable course of defining perception, and for that matter, inferential or other kinds of knowledge, is in terms of their unique causes. Actually, the Nyāya logicians hold that the doctrine of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* is counter-intuitive. For, as a matter of fact, what may be an object of perception may also be an object of inferential knowledge. Indeed, the distinction that the Buddhist logicians draw between the brute particular and the ghostly universal is a consequence of their distrust in the reality of the universals. That is, for them universals or class-properties are constructions of the understanding and therefore neither real nor real properties of the particulars. But in the opinion of the Nyāya logicians, the bare particulars which the Buddhists hold to be real are fictions, and the individual members of a class, the class-property, and the relation obtaining between them are real, or 'furniture of the universe'. In other words, the doctrine of the Buddhist logicians is, as has been mentioned above, counter-intuitive; and in the second place, by making classification arbitrary it makes the on-going of everyday life impossible. Indeed, every object or fact is what it is and not its opposite. But then it is not definite just by virtue of having a property which is not a property of more than one object (*ubhayavṛttidharma*). That is, though to be definite it should have such a property or properties, yet to be adequately definite it should have properties which are properties of more than one object or fact, that is, properties of a group or a class. The Buddhists think otherwise, and consequently hold that what is real is unutterable and what is utterable is unreal. But it is hard to accept such a view gracefully, and it is a moot point whether our conduct does not refute it.

Anyway, the Nyāya logicians define perception in terms of its unique cause, viz. a sense-organ. True, the Neo-Nyāya logicians hold the definition to be too narrow in that it is not

applicable to God's perception, that is, to a case of perception where the percipient has no body and therefore no sense-organ. And so they formulate a definition of perception that would be applicable to the occurrent perceptions that have human beings as their percipients, and to the non-occurrent perception where the percipient is God. But then the definition is an extension of the definition given by the Nyāya logicians of the old school, and is not as novel a definition as it is sometimes supposed to be.

xi. The Neo-Nyāya Definition of Perception

The Neo-Nyāya logicians define perception as a kind of knowledge that has no knowledge as its instrumental cause. In analysis of the definition it is said that whereas inferential knowledge and other classes of knowledge co-ordinate with perception have some knowledge as their instrumental cause, with perception this is not so. The definition, obviously, is in terms of causes covertly, though not directly. In other words, these logicians are trying to give a definition that would be applicable to occurrent as well as to non-occurrent perceptions. So they cannot construct the definition explicitly in terms of cause, as what is non-occurrent, i.e. what is not an effect, cannot have a cause. Yet their attitude to the question of defining perception and also the other kinds of knowledge does not substantially differ from that of the logicians of the old school. Like them, they also hold that perception and the other kinds of knowledge co-ordinate with it cannot be defined in terms of their unique objects, precisely because they have no such objects. Indeed, the Nyāya logicians, whether of the old school or of the new, are quite aware of fact that an object may rightly be regarded as a cause of its perception, but then they would add that such a perception is an ordinary perception.

That is, the Nyāya logicians hold that there are two types of perception, viz. ordinary (*laukika*) and extraordinary (*alaukika*); and because in the case of an extraordinary perception what is perceived may be either a distant or a past or a future object, they also hold that whereas in the case of an ordinary perception its object is one of its causes, in the case of an extraordinary perception this is not so. Again, these logicians, since

Vardhamāna, have held that when a perception is ordinary, that is, when it has its object as one of its causes, it is accompanied by or, better, followed by an introspective report of the form 'I am directly or immediately aware etc.'¹⁰ In other words, when we have an ordinary visual perception of a jar it is followed by an introspective report that we are directly aware of a jar. But when we have an extraordinary visual perception of a piece of fragrant sandalwood, it is not followed by an introspective report of this type. Anyway, the Nyāya logicians distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary perceptions, and in their opinion an ordinary perception is direct or immediate in a way in which an extraordinary perception is not.

Now, some logicians not belonging to the Nyāya school hold that perception should be defined not in terms of a sense-organ nor in causal terms, but in terms of immediacy, i.e. as immediate knowledge. And from what has been said above, it would be evident that the Nyāya logicians would not like to make an issue of it unless 'immediacy' is used in a highly metaphysical sense that would entail the self-shining character of knowledge or consciousness. And they would argue that even when we are defining perception in terms of immediacy, we are defining it in causal terms. That is, if we bracket out extraordinary perceptions, then we may say that perception is followed by an introspective report that declares it to be immediate. But then it is immediate because it has its object as its cause.

We may consider here how this account of perception given by the Nyāya logicians would compare with that of the Buddhists. The Buddhist logicians, as we have seen before, hold that whereas a perception has for its object a brute particular, an inferential knowledge has for its object a ghostly universal, and thus instead of giving a genetic definition of perception, they give a definition that states the kind of object that figures as the object of perception. And we have seen that the Nyāya logicians are agreeable to defining perception (ordinary perception) in terms of immediacy, and so in terms of its object. And this might prompt an imaginative interpretation-oriented contemporary writer on Indian logic with greater admiration for Buddhist logic to conclude that the Nyāya logicians also, while they defined a perception in terms of

immediacy, propounded a definition which in its essentials did not differ from that of the Buddhists. But we should be careful not to make such a pronouncement. The difference between the two schools of philosophy is so wide and rests on such fundamental grounds that it is not possible for one to compromise with the other without surrendering their whole philosophy. That is, a philosophy that does not believe in constructions has almost nothing in common with a philosophy that believes in them. And, obviously, the Nyāya account of perception (ordinary) in terms of its object is not in terms of its unique objects. Besides, it is also in terms of its cause. And, as we have observed earlier, the Nyāya logicians may agree to the definition of perception (ordinary) in terms of immediacy, but would point out that this is only another way of stating that a perception (ordinary) has its object as one of its causes. And they would also argue that a misperception, which is a kind of extraordinary perception but has some defect as one of its causes, that is, which occurs under conditions not conducive to true perception, is followed by an introspective report that it is immediate, though it may not have the object that figures as the qualifier or predicate of it as one of its causes.¹¹ Accordingly, when the Nyāya logicians observe that an ordinary perception is direct knowledge, or that it has its object as one of its causes, they, one may say, offer definitions of perception, but then these definitions are neither new nor independent of the definition in terms of a sense-organ.

XII. *The Neo-Nyāya Definition Is Not a New Definition*

The definition that a perception is the kind of knowledge that does not have some knowledge as its instrumental cause is also not a new one. Thus, at first sight the definition seems to be too narrow or defective. For, according to the Nyāya logicians, every perception (determinate perception, *savikalpa-pratyakṣa*), with the exception of a few cases like the perception of inherence (*samavāya*) or the perception of a negative fact (*abhāva*) etc., is invariably preceded by a sensation (indeterminate perception, *nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa*) and has it as one of its causes. And so the definition seems to be inapplicable to such cases of perception and is too narrow. Anticipating such an objection or

to guard against this defect of the definition, it has been given not in terms of a cause as such, but in terms of an instrumental cause. In other words, the definition does not state that perception is the kind of knowledge that has no knowledge as its cause. If this had been the definition, it would have been, as we have seen, too narrow. But the definition is that perception is not the kind of knowledge that has no knowledge as its instrumental cause; and a sensation not being an instrumental cause of perception, the definition cannot be faulted on the ground that it is too narrow.

But this is not sufficient. For the definition seeks to cover all kinds of perception, occurrent and non-occurrent, ordinary and extraordinary. Now, the perceptions of the yogins (saints), yogic perceptions, are regarded by the Nyāya logicians as a kind of extraordinary perception. But such perceptions are preceded by *śravaṇa*, listening to the sacred texts, *manana*, reflecting on them and understanding them to be true, and *nidhidhyāsana*, profound meditation; and accordingly these, particularly meditation, should be counted as the instrumental cause of such perception. Hence, if we take the expression 'instrumental cause' literally, the definition would be too narrow. It may also be judged to be too wide in that some Nyāya logicians hold that an inferential knowledge has *manas* (the atomic substantival mind which functions as a cause of every knowledge and as a sense-organ in cases of internal perception) as its instrumental cause and so is not the kind of knowledge that has some knowledge as its instrumental cause.

Accordingly, the proponents of the definition hold that the expression 'instrumental cause' is not to be taken literally. Indeed, they argue that what the definition seeks to state is that the class-property, 'being a perception' (*pratyakṣatva*), i.e. the property which every member of the class of all perception has, does not always coexist with the property 'having some knowledge as its instrumental cause'.¹² In other words, an inferential knowledge as ordinarily understood has some knowledge as its instrumental cause. So we may say that it has the property of 'being produced by some knowledge doing the job of an instrumental cause'. In short, it is the seat of the property 'having some knowledge as its instrumental cause'. Again, it is also the seat of the property 'being an inferential knowledge'—a

property that every member of the class of all inferential knowledge has. And thus the two properties invariably co-exist. But this is not the case with the property 'being a perception'. It may not coexist with the property 'having some knowledge as its instrumental cause'.

We may also state the above as follows: A perception is what has the class-property that resides in what is other than what has the property 'having some knowledge as an instrumental cause'.¹³ In other words, a perception is what has the class-property that is deviant (*vyabhicārī*) of the property 'having some knowledge as an instrumental cause', that is, it resides in a locus of the negation of the said property.¹⁴

Now, if we hold, as some Neo-Nyāya logicians do, that an inferential knowledge has *manas* and not some knowledge as its instrumental cause, the above way of understanding the expression 'that does not have some knowledge as its instrumental cause' will not do. That is, this will not save the definition from being faulted on the ground that it is too wide. So the proponents of the definition argue that in its depths it is a definition in terms of the class-property and ought to be stated as follows: A perception is the kind of knowledge that has the class-property present in a paradigm case of perception, but not present in a paradigm case of inferential knowledge.¹⁵ Since the class of all perceptions and the class of all inferential knowledge are co-ordinate classes, obviously a paradigm case of inferential knowledge has all the class-properties that a paradigm case of perception has except 'being a case of perception' or 'perception-ness' (*pratyakṣatva*), and the definition is said to be satisfactory from the logical point of view; that is, it is free from all the defects that a wrong definition may have.

But one cannot help asking the question how we should identify a paradigm case of perception. That is, is it possible for us to identify a paradigm case of perception without noticing that it has the said class-property? If not, then we should know the class-property and so what the perception is, independently of the definition, and it is hard to understand why the definition should not be declared useless or a case of barren repetition. The difficulty is not insurmountable, and attempts have been made to overcome it. And of these attempts the most reasonable in our judgement is the one that takes into account

the introspective report we mentioned before.

Thus, a class-property cannot be an object of perception or of any direct knowledge independently of an individual that has it. We cannot perceive cow-ness without perceiving a cow. And when we have learnt the use of the word 'cow' or learnt to identify a cow whenever we see one, we see both the individual and the class-property inhering in it. So also with the class-property under consideration, though identifying a perception may require more learning than identifying a cow. Anyway, we may or may not know what 'perception-ness' roughly or precisely is. But then on seeing an object, we may say that we are seeing it. In other words, when some knowledge occurs, we may introspect upon it, and the introspective report about it may be that it is direct or that it is not so. One need not be a man of much learning to make such an introspective report. Indeed, it seems plausible to hold that even to identify a cow more learning is required. Accordingly, we may identify a paradigm case of perception in terms of the introspective report that follows it, and is to the effect that we are directly aware. And on identifying a paradigm case of perception in this way we may also identify the class-property 'being a perception' or 'perception-ness'.

Now, we have observed before that such an introspective report follows an ordinary perception only, provided that the knowledge does not occur under conditions not conducive to its being true. Accordingly, we identify a paradigm case of perception if and only if it has its object as one of its causes. So the definition of perception given by the Neo-Nyāya logicians to cover both occurrent and non-occurrent perceptions is an extension of the old definition given in terms of a sense-organ and applicable to occurrent perceptions only. This seems to be the view of some Neo-Nyāya logicians also. Thus, some Neo-Nyāya logicians, to arrive at a definition of perception in terms of class-property, do not think that it is essential that one should consider a paradigm case of perception and compare it with a paradigm case of inferential knowledge. They would, on the contrary, advise us to identify a paradigm case of ordinary perception in the way we have mentioned before, and then to define perception in terms of the class-property that is present in it and that is also one of the class-properties in which the

more comprehensive class-property 'being a primary knowledge' is directly distributed (*anubhavatva-vibhājaka*).

Thus, the Nyāya logicians hold that the class of all knowledge has two sub-classes, viz. the class of all primary (non-recollective) knowledge (*anubhava*) and the class of all recollective (memory) knowledge (*smṛti*). They also hold that the class of all primary knowledge has four sub-classes of which the class of all perceptions and the class of all inferential knowledge may be mentioned here. Accordingly, the class-property 'being a primary knowledge' is more comprehensive than the class-property 'being a perception', and is directly distributed in the property 'being an inferential knowledge', etc. And when we identify a paradigm case of perception, our task, in order to arrive at a satisfactory definition of perception, is to identify the class-property which would be the defining property. Now, it is the seat of that property but also of other properties more comprehensive than and also less comprehensive than it. To eliminate the more comprehensive ones the proposed definition states that it is a property in which the property 'being a primary knowledge' is distributed, and this implies that this property is neither co-extensive with nor more extensive than the property 'being a primary knowledge'. A property like 'being an inferential knowledge' satisfies this condition, and so to eliminate them it is stated in the definition that it is a property present in a paradigm case of perception. Again, since the properties comprehended by the property which should be identified as the defining property (viz. the assimilating properties of the sub-classes of perception) are comprehended by the property 'being primary knowledge', this property may also be said to be distributed in them. To guard against it, and thus to save the definition from being too narrow, it is stated in the definition that the defining property should be one in which the property 'being a primary knowledge' is directly distributed, and not just distributed.

The above discussion on the definition of perception is interesting for more than one reason. In the first place, it brings out that when our definienda are such that we use words of ordinary language to designate them, we cannot give a stipulative definition. Our definition has to be inductive, should be given preferably in terms of class-properties (i.e. simple

unanalysable properties) and also "in a system, that is, by drawing a map of concepts, so to say, and by indicating the position which the concept embedded in the designating word occupies in the map. In the second place, it brings out that the definition of perception as given by the Neo-Nyāya logicians to cover occurrent as well as non-occurrent perceptions not only proceeds on the same line as the old definition, but is an extension of it, though it elevates the old definition to a new level. That is, the paradigm case of perception is identified in terms of the introspective report, and is therefore an ordinary perception having its object as one of its causes and a sense-organ as its instrumental cause. To put it differently, the Neo-Nyāya logicians do not also subscribe to the view that consciousness is non-diaphanous in that it entails a distinction between an object-in-itself and an object-as-known and also brings perception (determinate perception) nearer to inferential knowledge than to sensation (indeterminate perception). And so they cannot also define perception in terms of its unique object. They also hold that the object perceived is not a construction. Accordingly, they are substantially in agreement with the Nyāya logicians of the old school and so define perceptions in terms of cause indirectly, and then carry the definition to a new level.

XIII. *Intrinsic/Extrinsic in respect of Origin/Knowledge*

It has been seen that a philosophical treatment of knowledge does not cease to be philosophical if it occupies itself with the question of origin or cause. And therefore, as it is philosophically meaningful to ask what causes a knowledge or a kind of knowledge, so also it is meaningful to ask what causes truth or falsity. In other words, to get one meaning of the expression 'intrinsic'/'extrinsic' we should ask such a question. That is, we may understand intrinsic (or extrinsic) truth (or falsity) in respect of the origin (*utpatti*) of truth (or falsity), or in respect of its knowledge (*jñapti*). The issue of the origin of truth (or falsity), in its broad outline, is whether the causes that are adequate to produce a knowledge are also adequate to produce its truth (or falsity) as well. The subscribers to the doctrine of intrinsic truth (or falsity) hold that they are. But the sub-

scribers to the doctrine of extrinsic truth (or falsity) deny this. They contend that some additional cause, viz. excellence (*guṇa*), should be introduced to account for the origin of truth, and some additional cause, viz. defect (*doṣa*), should be introduced to account for the origin of falsity. Again, the problem in respect of the knowledge of truth (or falsity) is whether the truth (or falsity) of a knowledge is also an object of the knowledge that has this knowledge as its object. In other words, a knowledge of the form 'I see a table' is a knowledge of the visual perception of a table, and the question is whether this knowledge is about the visual perception only or also about its truth (or falsity). The subscribers to the doctrine of intrinsic truth (or falsity) will answer the question in the affirmative while the subscribers to the doctrine of extrinsic truth (or falsity) will give a negative answer. Accordingly, before we consider the general question of the paper we should consider how truth (or falsity) originates, how knowledge is known, whether the causes adequate to produce a knowledge are also adequate to produce its truth (or falsity) and whether the knowledge which has some knowledge as its object has also its truth (or falsity) as its object as well.

XIV. *The Doctrine that Truth in respect of Its Origin Is Intrinsic to Knowledge*

We have observed that in the opinion of some thinkers truth in respect of its origin (*utpatti*) is intrinsic to knowledge. We have seen that these thinkers hold that the causes that are adequate to produce a knowledge (or a knowledge-act) are also adequate to produce its truth, and so we need not assume some additional cause (*atirikta-sāmagrī*) to account for the origin of its truth. We should now consider this view at some length. But before we do it, we should say a word or two to indicate the relevance of this consideration to the subject of this paper.

The subject of this paper is the relation between *jñāna* and knowledge. We use the English word 'knowledge' to translate the Sanskrit word '*jñāna*' and this is almost unavoidable. But then it may be questioned whether the translation is happy. For it is held by many competent thinkers that the expression

'false knowledge' is not permissible. Such is the logic of the language in which the word 'knowledge' occurs that without contradicting ourselves we cannot say that we know but we may be wrong, or that (with reference to some knowledge-act) this is a case of knowledge but it may be false. But this is not the case with the word '*jñāna*'. And after taking into consideration the use of the word in the language in which it occurs, we observed that the logic of this language permits expressions like '*mithyājñāna*', which in its English rendering would be 'false knowledge'. Accordingly, one may question whether the translation spoken of above is happy.

But then, while considering the use of the word '*jñāna*', we followed the writers of the Nyāya school who hold that both truth and falsity are extrinsic to knowledge, and accordingly one may contend that if we followed the thinkers who hold that while truth is intrinsic to knowledge, falsity is extrinsic to it, we would not have held that the translation spoken of above was not happy.¹⁶ But in our judgement such a contention would rest on an imperfect understanding of the view that truth is intrinsic to knowledge though falsity is extrinsic to it. For the doctrine is upheld by the philosophers of the Mīmāṃsā school. But then all the philosophers of this school except Guru Prabhākara and his followers hold, as the Nyāya philosophers do, that the class of all knowledge has two sub-classes, viz. the class of all true knowledge and the class of all untrue knowledge. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the statement that 'false knowledge' is a contradiction in terms follows logically from the statement that truth is intrinsic to knowledge. In other words, if the relation between the two statements were of this kind, the philosophers of the Mīmāṃsā school, who accept the second statement, would not have denied the first one. Besides, they are not inconsistent in their acceptance of the second statement and denial of the first. To think otherwise is to misunderstand the doctrine that truth is intrinsic to knowledge. And so we propose to subject this doctrine and also the doctrines of extrinsic (or intrinsic) falsity (or truth) to some analysis.

It should also be mentioned in this connection that Guru Prabhākara and his followers do not challenge usage, and would not say, as some writers mentioned before do, that 'false knowledge' (or *mithyājñāna*) is a contradiction in terms. They do

not deny that we are justified in labelling some acts of knowledge (*jñāna*) as false (*mithyā*). That is, they admit *bhrānta vyavahāra*. And so what they actually deny is that the analysis of such cases of knowledge as given by the Nyāya philosophers and also by the philosophers of the rival school, which entails that the class of all knowledge is a comprehensive class and comprehends the two sub-classes, viz. the class of all true knowledge and the class of all untrue knowledge, is adequate.¹⁷ Indeed, in Sanskrit there are two words, viz. '*jñāna*' and '*pramā*', that may be translated as 'knowledge' and 'true knowledge', and while the philosophers of the Nyāya and the other schools hold that the class of all knowledge comprehends the class of all true knowledge, Guru Prabhākara and his followers hold that the two are co-extensive. But then they do not think that this may be established on lexical considerations. And it is not possible for any Indian philosopher to adopt such a course. For none of them can ignore the powerful system of Buddhist logic which asserts that while falsity is intrinsic to knowledge, truth is extrinsic to it. And so the contention that our study of the use of the word '*jñāna*' in Sanskrit, being based on Nyāya texts, has not been of the kind that a study of this type should be, and also the contention that the difference between the concept of *jñāna* and that of knowledge to which we have given emphasis is not that important, rest upon an inadequate understanding of the doctrine that truth is intrinsic to knowledge. Accordingly, we sought to subject this doctrine as also some other co-ordinate doctrines to some analysis. And while stating this doctrine in a broad way we had to mention that the question of the cause of truth/falsity was involved in the formulation and analysis of it; and as, again, it is held by many contemporary thinkers that a causal analysis is not properly philosophical, we observed that this was not true; and to substantiate our contention we considered at some length the definition of perception as given by the Nyāya logicians. Anyway, a tolerably adequate study of the subject of this paper, in our judgement, cannot be made without analysing the doctrine of intrinsic/extrinsic truth/falsity. And we may now do it.

The doctrine that truth in respect of its origin is intrinsic to knowledge may be stated in a general way as follows: the causes that are adequate to produce a knowledge-act are also

adequate to produce its truth. That is, a knowledge is an act or a state of mind.¹⁸ It is a mental fact.¹⁹ Such facts are studied by psychology, if we define it as an empirical science not of behaviour but of mental states and processes. But this does not imply that philosophy should not study it. Indeed, there are questions about such a fact that ought to be considered not by an empirical science but by philosophy. Thus, when the question of categorizing it arises, an empirical science is not of any help. That is, the question whether knowledge is an act (in the sense of activity or *karma*) or a quality or something *sui generis*, i.e. something that cannot be categorized—categorizing being limited to the realm of appearances only—is a question that should be investigated not by an empirical science, but by philosophy. Similarly, the question of the origin of truth (or of the cause of its truth) is not one that may be settled by observation inside or outside a laboratory. It may indeed be that we cannot solve such a philosophical but factual question as we can solve a factual but scientific question. But this should not be treated as an argument in support of the thesis that philosophical questions are not about facts. Obviously, this is an issue by itself and we cannot discuss it in this paper. We would be content with the observation that a philosophical investigation into the nature of knowledge considered as a fact is meaningful and worth undertaking, in that knowledge is a fact with philosophical dimensions (and this may be true of some other facts as well).

Anyway, knowledge is a fact, a mental fact (and the position is not as obsolete as some contemporary thinkers take it to be). And it is an occurrent. 'Truth (or falsity) is a property of it, and a property of a sort (*dharmaviśeṣa*). Accordingly, it is also an occurrent, and a question of its cause is meaningful (and philosophical as well). The doctrine that truth in respect of its origin is intrinsic to knowledge is one answer to it—and the answer in general terms is that the causes that are adequate to produce a knowledge (or knowledge-act) are also adequate to produce its truth.

But how should this answer given in general terms be analysed? Let us see. Thus, one may say that truth is a property that occurs, and to account for it—the occurrence of it—we should assume some cause. But the cause need not be an addi-

tional entity. It may be just itself. That is, one may say that truth—the property of a sort that resides in some knowledge-act—is self-caused. It produces itself. And this is what the doctrine that truth in respect of its origin is intrinsic to knowledge is in the ultimate analysis.²⁰

But if this is what the doctrine is in the ultimate analysis, then it is untenable. For a cause as it is ordinarily understood is different from its effect. And so we do not say that an event or an occurrent is self-caused. The statement that something is self-caused is not in keeping with our ordinary way of understanding a cause and an effect. It may be true that our ordinary way of understanding is not above criticism and it may be reasonable to hold in respect of some entity that it is the uncaused first cause and therefore its own cause. But there is hardly any good reason for holding that truth is such an entity. And so, if we analyse the doctrine under consideration in the above way, we should say that the doctrine is untenable. But before we pass this sentence, we should consider if the doctrine may not be given a different analysis. Indeed, it may be analysed in many different ways and it is quite likely that the doctrine may not be untenable or so obviously inadequate, though on the above analysis it is so.

Thus, the doctrine may be given the following analysis. When we say that truth in respect of its origin is intrinsic to knowledge we do not say that it produces itself or is its own cause, but say that the knowledge-act of which it is a property produces it or is its cause.²¹ But this is also unacceptable. For if this were the analysis of this doctrine, then it would not deserve serious consideration. In other words, if the first analysis contradicts our ordinary way of understanding the nature of an effect as also of a cause, and so does not deserve serious consideration, the second analysis also is not in keeping with our way of understanding the causal relation. Thus, if the knowledge-act providing the residence of its truth is its cause, the question that would occur and ought to be answered is what kind of a cause it is. In other words, it is held by the philosophers who seek to analyse the ordinary way of understanding a causal relation that if anything is a cause in respect of an effect, then it is either an inherent cause (*samavāyī-kāraṇa*), or a non-inherent cause (*asamavāyī-kāraṇa*), or an

efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*). Thus, when a cloth is produced out of threads, the cloth is an effect, and the threads out of which it has been produced and in which it inheres (or inhering in which it comes into existence) are its inherent cause. Similarly, the relation of conjunction that holds among the threads and is a cause of the cloth—a kind of cause that inheres in the cause in which its effect also inheres—is its non-inherent cause. And the weaver, the loom, etc. are its efficient cause. And the question is whether the knowledge-act in which its truth resides is an inherent cause of it, or a non-inherent cause, or an efficient cause. Obviously it cannot be either its efficient cause or its non-inherent cause. For the effect does not reside in a cause of this kind. Accordingly, we should say that it is its inherent cause. But then we cannot say that either. For what is not categorially a substance cannot be an inherent cause and a knowledge-act is categorially a quality (as a Nyāya philosopher would say) or an activity (as a Mīmāṃsā philosopher would say). If it is argued that this kind of philosophical thinking in terms of categories may be useful and rewarding only in a limited way, and that, therefore, when we are considering a knowledge-act or its truth we should give it up, then it should be said in reply that to be consistent we also should give up thinking in terms of cause and effect. That is, if the categories of substance, quality, etc. are relevant in the realm of phenomena or appearances and if we apply them in the realm of reality only when we are confused, then this should be so with the concepts of cause and effect as well. Besides, whether we should distinguish between appearance and reality as some philosophers do and whether we should occupy ourselves with the question whether truth in respect of its origin is intrinsic to knowledge, are moot points. And so we may conclude our treatment of the second analysis with the observation that it is so unreasonable that it cannot be the proper analysis of the doctrine, and that it is unreasonable in that a knowledge-act is not the inherent cause of any effect, nor also of its truth.²²

So we may take up the third analysis of it and consider if it is reasonable and therefore acceptable as the right one. The third analysis is to the effect that the truth of a knowledge-act is owing to or caused by the causes that produce the knowledge-

act in which it resides.²³ Incidentally, this is the popular and widely given analysis of the doctrine. But when we subject it to critical examination, we see that it is not acceptable, at least in the form in which it has been given. Thus, it is understandable that truth is a property of some sort, and that it resides in a knowledge-act that happens to be true. But then it is an assimilating property (*anugata dharma*) as well. In other words, it is a property that resides in every member of the class of all true knowledge-acts and accordingly is comparable to a property like rose-ness that resides in every member of the class of all roses. In short, truth is an assimilating property or a class-property. But then such a property neither occurs nor ceases to occur. Indeed, if such a property occurred or ceased to occur, it would not have been assimilating property and the proposition that it is not reducible to the particular in which it resides would have been meaningless. Thus, when we take an individual rose and say that this is a rose, we make a statement the logical behaviour of which is different from the statement that this ('this' standing for the rose-individual) is red or that the rose is red. Thus, the 'red' figuring as the grammatical predicate of the second statement stands for what is categorially a quality. It inheres in the individual rose, just as rose-ness does. But then there is an important difference which we not infrequently overlook and so think that the realistic theory of universals (or of class-property) is counter-intuitive. Thus, the red colour of a particular rose (say, this rose) belongs exclusively to it. Another rose may also be red. So may a fried prawn also be. But then the red colour of another rose is owned exclusively by that rose. And this is true also of the red colour of the fried prawn. It is true that we may group together many red objects, say, the red roses, the red fried prawns and the red castor oil drops. And it is also true that we group them together as all of them are red objects. But by grouping them together we do not get any real class. Such a classification would be, as it is sometimes said, an artificial classification. Indeed, some assimilating property is also present when we form such a group, and that assimilating property is red-ness, a property that is present in every member of the class of all red colours. It is also present in every member of the group of all red objects but only indirectly. That is, as a Nyāya logician would say, whereas

redness inheres in every red colour, it does not inhere in the red objects. It is present in the red objects in that it inheres in what inheres in the red objects. Thus, the red colour of a particular rose is owned exclusively by the particular rose. It is not an assimilating property. But this is not the case with rose-ness. So, whereas rose-ness is a class-property, the red colour of the rose is not. That is, though a red colour and rose-ness inhere in a rose, they are not entities of the same kind; and as the critics of the realistic theory of universals ignore it and seek to understand a universal (or a class-property) on the analogy of a colour or a quality, they hold that this doctrine is paradoxical and counter-intuitive. Anyway, rose-ness is an assimilating property. It resides in every member of the class of all roses. And, therefore, no member of the class owns it exclusively. But then it is also not the case that every member of the class shares a portion of it, for it is not the case that every rose is partially a rose. Indeed, as every rose is fully a rose, so rose-ness fully (that is, not merely a portion of it) resides in every rose. Thus, the rose-ness that resides fully in one rose is the rose-ness that resides fully in every other individual rose. In other words, it is true of a red colour that if it resides in one rose, it does not reside in another rose. Another rose may also be red, but then another red colour would be residing in it. But this is not the case with rose-ness. An identical rose-ness resides in every member of the class of all roses. If it were not so, it would not be an assimilating property.

Thus, a red colour is not an assimilating property, and as the rose in which it resides is an occurrent, it also is an occurrent, the rose being its inherent cause. But rose-ness is an assimilating property. If we hold that it is also an occurrent like the red colour, then we should also say that the particular roses in which it inheres are its inherent causes. But we cannot say this. For when the inherent causes differ, the effects in respect of which they are inherent causes also differ. It is true that a large number of threads on being combined yield a cloth, and an identical cloth, a compound substance (*sāvayava dravya*), inheres in a large number of threads. So in the case of a compound substance, though the inherent causes may differ, the inhering effect does not. But this holds good only in the case where the effect is a compound substance. But rose-ness is not a

compound substance. If we go astray when we seek to understand it on the analogy of a quality, we also go astray when we seek to understand it on the analogy of a compound substance (or treat it as a compound substance). Besides, an effect cannot outlast its inherent cause, nor can it antedate its inherent cause. But rose-ness as inhering in an individual rose both antedates and outlasts it. For, before this individual rose came into existence, it was intuited to be residing in other roses, and when this individual rose will perish, it would be intuited to be residing in other roses. That is, rose-ness being an assimilating property, one and the same rose-ness resided or will reside in the roses that existed before or will come to exist afterwards. And if the occurrence or the ceasing to occur of an individual rose does not tell on rose-ness, the occurrence or the ceasing to occur of any rose does not. In short, it is a non-occurring and also a non-perishing kind of object. In other words, rose-ness or a class-property (an assimilating property) does not occur. Accordingly, truth being a class-property does not occur and the question of assigning a cause of it (or of the occurrence of it) does not arise. So, the third analysis of it which seeks to elucidate the doctrine under consideration by assuming that truth is an occurrent property and so requires a cause is untenable. The first two analyses, even if they were free from the faults mentioned in course of their examination, would be untenable on the ground that they also assume that truth is an occurrent property, and we require a cause to account for its occurrence.

Now, it may be argued in defence of an analysis of the doctrine under consideration as given above that truth is not a genuine class-property, as the class of all true knowledge is not properly a class. For it covers partly some co-ordinate classes, but leaves uncovered portions of those co-ordinate classes. In other words, the class of all perceptions, the class of all inferences etc. are co-ordinate classes. What is a member of one of these classes is not a member of the other classes. But then it may be a member of the class of all true knowledge. Accordingly, if the class of all true knowledge is properly a class, it should be a comprehensive class or a class that comprehends all the co-ordinate classes spoken of above. And so it cannot be the case that what is a member of any one of these co-ordinate

classes is not a member of the class of all true knowledge. But then this is the case. That is, a member of a class of all perceptions will not be a member of this class if the said perception is untrue. And so the class of all true knowledge is not a class comprehending the above co-ordinate classes and, therefore, truth is not a class-property. That is, truth is a property that may co-reside with a property like perception-ness or inference-ness. And this implies that the relation between truth and a property like perception-ness is that the first is more extensive than the second, and so the class of all true knowledge is not a class co-ordinate with the class of all perceptions (or of all inferences etc.). But then truth may co-reside with the negation of perception-ness and perception-ness may co-reside with the negation of truth, and this kind of relation obtains between the class-properties of co-ordinate classes. Hence the class of all true knowledge is not a class comprehending the class of all perceptions (or of all inferences etc.). And so truth is not a class-property and the analysis of the doctrine under consideration ought not to be faulted on the ground that it is given in terms of cause.

But then such a defence cannot save the above analysis of the doctrine under reference. For though truth may not be a class-property, strictly speaking, it is an assimilating property. And the question is whether it is a simple and unanalysable property. If it is, then it is a class-property-analogue and therefore as uncaused as a class-property is. But if it is not simple and unanalysable (that is, if it is not an *akhaṇḍa upādhi*, but a *sakhaṇḍa upādhi*), then it may be said to be just the state or condition of being a true knowledge and therefore essentially (*svarūpa*) that knowledge itself. And as the said knowledge-act occurs or is caused, it may also be rightly said to occur or to be caused. But this will not do. For the knowledge-act is true as it shows its object as it is (*yathārtha*) and is a case of primary apprehension (*anubhava*). In other words, memory (*smṛti*) is not treated as a case of true knowledge even if it shows its object as it is. And so we should say that if a knowledge-act is not a case of primary apprehension, it cannot be true. Again, a knowledge-act may be a case of primary apprehension, but may not show its object as it is. Accordingly, we should also say that it should show its object as it is. In short, a knowledge-

act is true (*pramā*) if and only if it is a case of primary apprehension and shows its object as it is.

Now, we may consider whether a knowledge-act showing its object as it is, is analysable or not. And the answer to the question that is given by almost all the schools of philosophy is that it is. Moreover, there is considerable agreement on the analysis as well. The analysis in very general terms is that a knowledge-act shows its object as it is if and only if it is not contradicted. In other words, a misperception of a rope as a snake is contradicted. A misperception is not faithful to its object, and so is contradicted (*bādhita*). Accordingly, what is not free from contradiction or is not the seat of a constant negation of contradiction cannot be faithful to its object and so cannot be true. Hence, even if it is the case that truth is neither a class-property nor its analogue (i.e. a simple and unanalysable property) but is just the state or condition of a knowledge-act's being true, it cannot be said to be caused, for a constant negation is not an occurrent and so is not caused. In other words, to be in a state or condition of being true, a knowledge-act should be the seat of a constant negation of contradiction, and a constant negation not being an occurrent, this state of the knowledge-act cannot be said to be an occurrent. Accordingly, the third analysis of the doctrine under consideration is not tenable and ought not to be taken by any serious student of philosophy as the right analysis. And incidentally, the first and the second analyses of it as given above, even if they were free from the faults mentioned before, would not be the right analysis precisely on the ground the third analysis is not.

Now, if the above considerations against the third analysis (and so also against the first two analyses) are cogent, they would argue not only that the third analysis (and so the first two also) is not the right one, but also that there is really no doctrine to be analysed. In other words, we are seeking to find out what the doctrine that truth in respect of its origin is intrinsic to knowledge precisely is, and what the above considerations bring out is that truth does not occur and so the question of its origin does not arise. So we should see what is wrong with the above analyses or with the ways of stating the the doctrine under reference. That is, if we take truth as an assimilating class-property or its analogue or as what is to be

analysed in terms of constant negation, then, as the above considerations show, the doctrine under consideration is a self-contradicting doctrine and the question of its right analysis is spurious. So we should now consider whether what the word 'truth' means in this context is different from what it ordinarily means, or (what amounts to the same thing) whether the doctrine under consideration when stated in general terms is not different from what it at first sight seems to be.

Now, there is no difficulty with the statement that a knowledge-act occurs. So also there is no difficulty with the following statements: that when a person is suffering from jaundice he misperceives a white conch as yellow; that when he is greedy, he may misperceive a mother-of-pearl as silver; that if he is timid and illumination insufficient, he may misperceive a rope as a snake; that in view of the fact that he resides at a great distance from the sun or the moon—the distance not being of the sort that enables a percipient to perceive the size of the object correctly—he perceives them as being of sizes smaller than they are. In other words, we have no difficulty with the above statements because they are about some misperceptions or knowledge-acts that are false and are also caused. Now, when we say that these knowledge-acts are false, we undoubtedly mean that they do not show their objects as they are, that they do not correspond with their objects, that the relation between them and their objects is different from the relation that obtains between a true knowledge-act and its object, that it is not the case that it is about what has what figures as its qualifier (*prakāra*), that it is not the case that what figures as its qualificand (*viśeṣya*) has what has what figures as its qualifier, etc.²⁴ Now, these ways of analysing the statement that a knowledge-act is false are legitimate, as they seek to show what falsity is by definition or what the nature of a false-knowledge-act is. In other words, when we seek to define the nature of falsity or of truth, we try to see what kind of relation obtains or does not obtain between a knowledge-act and its object, and the ways of analysing under consideration articulate the relation. But then we may analyse the statements under consideration in a different way, which is also adequate, and which, though not alternative to the above analyses, is complementary to them.

Thus, we may say that perceiving a white conch as yellow is a case of misperception, and the knowledge-act has not been successful in showing its object as it is, as the percipient is suffering from jaundice and so the knowledge-act has occurred under conditions that are not congenial to its showing the object as it is. In short, some vitiating factors or defects (*doṣa*) are at work and so the knowledge-act is false. In other words, the said misperception would not have occurred if the sense-organs were not in contact with the object. But then it would not also have occurred if the percipient was not suffering from jaundice or if some defects were not operative as causal factors. So the knowledge-act is false in that it does not correspond with its object, and its falsity considered as an assimilating or class property, or as its analogue, or as one analysable in terms of constant negation may be one about which a question of origin is irrelevant. But then it happens to be false or a seat of falsity, as some defects operate as causal factors. And so, though not in respect of falsity but in respect of its being false (or in respect of its being the seat of falsity, or in respect of falsity's residing in it), a question of origin is not irrelevant.

What has been said about the misperception of a white conch as yellow holds for the other cases of false knowledge-acts spoken of above. Thus, a rope would not have been misperceived as a snake if the percipient was not timid, and also if illumination was sufficient. Similarly a mother-of-pearl would not have been misperceived as a piece of silver if the percipient was not greedy, and also if it was noticed that the object yonder was not only glittering but also bluish. And so on. We may therefore say that all these knowledge-acts are false and do not correspond to their respective objects. So they are members of the class of all false knowledge-acts and agree in having falsity—a property that may be treated as an assimilating class-property or its analogue or as one that ought to be analysed in terms of constant negation. And in respect of falsity as thus understood a question of origin is irrelevant. But in respect of their being false or in respect of falsity's residing in them (*āśritatva*), the question is not irrelevant. Accordingly, we should revise the third analysis of the doctrine in the following way, and propose one that may be said to be its fourth analysis.

When we say that truth in respect of its origin is intrinsic to knowledge, what we mean is that to account for a particular knowledge-act's being true (or truth's residence in it) we need not introduce any cause in addition to the cause or causes that produce it. In other words, the cause or causes that are required to produce a knowledge-act *qua* a knowledge-act suffice to account for truth's residence in it.²⁵ Thus, the misperception of a rope as a snake is a false knowledge-act. To account for the origin of this false knowledge-act we should say that the eyes were in contact with an object. So the contact between a sense-organ and an object is one of the causes of this knowledge-act and this is true of every knowledge-act provided it is a case of perception. Accordingly, we may say that the contact between a sense-organ and its object is a cause of a knowledge-act of this kind *qua* a knowledge-act of this kind. But then, though it is a cause of the above false knowledge-act it does not make it false. In other words, a false knowledge-act is both a knowledge-act and false. Its being a knowledge-act or its occurrence *qua* a knowledge-act of this kind may be accounted for in terms of sense-object contact. But besides being a knowledge-act it is false. And its being false is owing to some defects (as, for example, insufficient illumination etc. in the above-mentioned case) that preceded it and contributed to its occurrence. Thus, a false knowledge-act is produced when a cause of a knowledge-act *qua* a knowledge-act of this kind functions together with or as qualified by some defect. In other words, falsity's residence in a false knowledge-act, and so falsity as residing in it, is due to or produced by some defect or by a cause in addition to the cause or causes that produce a knowledge-act as such. But this is not the case with the truth of a true knowledge-act (or with truth as residing in a particular true knowledge-act). It is true that we may say that a true knowledge-act is both a knowledge-act and true exactly as a false knowledge-act is both a knowledge-act and false. But whereas falsity as residing in a false knowledge-act is owing to an additional cause, truth as residing in a true knowledge-act is not. And so when we say that truth in respect of its origin is intrinsic to knowledge what we mean is that truth's residence in a particular knowledge-act is owing to the causes that produce a knowledge-act *qua* a knowledge-act.

Now, one may argue that a false knowledge-act is also a knowledge-act and so the cause of a knowledge-act as such is also a cause of it. Thus an egg may be said to be a cause of a bird as such, but then from the egg of a crow a cuckoo does not come out. Accordingly, we should improve upon the fourth analysis in the following way. When we say that truth in respect of its origin is intrinsic to knowledge, what we mean is that truth's residence in a particular knowledge-act is owing to the knowledge-act-producing causes alone.²⁶ And this may be conceded. For what the doctrine under consideration seeks to emphasize is that we should not try to understand true knowledge on the analogy of false knowledge. That is, whereas the property of being false requires a cause in addition to the cause of the knowledge-act as such, the property of being true does not. So the above may be conceded. But then it is to be asked what precisely would be the fourth analysis thus amended—and this is what the fifth analysis would precisely be.

That is, if the defects are present, the resulting knowledge-act would be false. Accordingly, when we say that the truth is produced by just the causes that produce the knowledge-act, should we not in analysis of 'just' or 'alone' say that the defects are not present? In other words, should we not say that the causes of a knowledge-act *qua* a knowledge-act, when free from every defect, produce a true knowledge-act? If we say so, it would appear that being free from defects or negation of defects (*doṣābhāva*) is also a cause of a true knowledge-act and so its property of being true is not owing to the causes of a knowledge-act as such only, but also to an additional cause, viz. negation of defects. In that case the doctrine would not be substantially different from the doctrine that truth in respect of its origin is extrinsic to knowledge. The difficulty is genuine. It cannot just be brushed aside as a quibble. And so we should see how an advocate of the doctrine under consideration would meet it.

Thus, it may be said by way of overcoming the difficulty that a negation is not really a fact that goes about the world, and that even if it does so go about, it is not the sort of fact that may be a cause.²⁷ But this would hardly be satisfactory. Philosophers of the Nyāya school would retort that a negative fact goes about the world and that it is the kind of fact that may be

a cause. Thus, they would argue that affirmations and negations are co-ordinate and both of them are directly about reality.²⁸ Similarly, they would say that an effect cannot occur if there is something to prevent its occurrence, and that it occurs when what prevents is removed or destroyed. Accordingly, the negation of the preventing factor is a cause of an effect. The said defects prevent a true knowledge-act from occurring and accordingly the negation of them should be counted as one of its causes. Obviously, whether negation is a fact, and if so, whether it is the sort of fact that may be a cause, are issues by themselves. Similarly, what precisely is what prevents (*pratibandhaka*), is also an issue by itself. So we should not dismiss the above defence as foolish. But then we should not forget that it is controversial and so we should see whether there is no other defence or, what amounts to the same thing, whether we should not revise our analysis.

So we may consider whether it would be proper to say that a negation of defects is a cause of a true knowledge-act. It may be granted that if there is some defect a true knowledge-act does not occur. And, similarly, if there is no defect a true knowledge-act occurs. And so one may conclude that a negation of defects is a cause of a true knowledge-act. In other words, one may assert that a negation of defects is a cause of a true knowledge-act in either of the following two ways. Thus, one may hold that a negation of defects agrees in presence as well as in absence with the occurrence of a true knowledge-act, or one may argue that defects prevent the occurrence of such a knowledge-act and so a negation of them is a cause of it. These arguments appear to be convincing and have persuaded the advocates of the doctrine that truth in respect of its origin is extrinsic to knowledge to hold that the doctrine under consideration is untenable and ought to be rejected in favour of the doctrine they advocate. But the matter is not so simple.

Thus, it would be counter-intuitive to deny that a negation of defects agrees in presence as well as in absence with a true knowledge-act, and is therefore an invariable antecedent of it. But from this it does not follow that it is a cause of it unless it is held further that every invariable antecedent is a causal antecedent. And the point is that the advocates of the doctrine that truth in respect of its origin is extrinsic to knowledge—the

philosophers who hold that a negation of defects is not merely an invariable antecedent but is also a causal antecedent—are of the view that every invariable antecedent is not a causal antecedent. Thus, they argue that a potter's stick (*daṇḍa*) is an invariable antecedent and also a cause of a jar. But they also hold that since such a stick is not colourless, so its colour is also an invariable antecedent. And they do not say—and rightly too—that it is a causal antecedent. In their terminology it is an *anyathāsiddha*. That is, we can account for the occurrence of a jar without assuming it to be a cause of it. And it may be argued—and the argument ought to be plausible—that this is the case with a negation of defects.

Thus, if there are defects, a false knowledge-act will occur. And so we may say that a negation of defects prevents the occurrence of such a knowledge-act, and that in respect of a true knowledge-act it is a non-causal invariable antecedent.

Similar observations hold good as regards excellence (*guṇa*) that is treated by the advocates of the doctrine that truth in respect of its origin is extrinsic to knowledge. In other words, these thinkers are of the opinion that the causes of a knowledge-act produce the act, and its truth or falsity being its properties is to be accounted for in terms of additional causes—causes in addition to the causes of a knowledge-act *qua* a knowledge-act. Thus, while defects are to be treated as causes of falsity, excellences are to be treated as causes of truth. But the advocates of the doctrine under consideration hold that it rests upon a misunderstanding. In other words, the alleged excellences of the causes of a knowledge-act are not something over and above the causes themselves. They are not added to them, and so they are not additional causes. Besides, these excellences, if they are thought to be additional, may be said to be responsible for there being a negation of defects, and so, if they are to be treated as causes, they should be treated as the causes of a negation of defects or of there being a negation of defects. And the negation of defects arrests the occurrence of a false knowledge-act. Accordingly, though an invariable antecedent of a true knowledge-act, it is not a causal antecedent of it.

So also with the other line of argument. That is, the critics think that as defects prevent a true knowledge-act from occurring, a negation of them is a cause of such an act. But in the

opinion of the advocates of the doctrine under consideration, the role of the negation of defects is to prevent a false knowledge-act from occurring, and accordingly a defect (or a negation of the negation of a defect) is a cause of a false knowledge-act.

This, in broad outline, is the doctrine that truth in respect of its origin is intrinsic to knowledge. And the doctrine seeks to record two insights of which one may be said to be logical and the other to be concerned with the role of knowledge in life. The logical one is obvious, and it is to the effect that entities need not be multiplied without necessity, and so if we can account for the origin of a true knowledge-act without assuming additional causes, we should not assume them. As regards the role of knowledge in life it may be said that on it our actions—the actions that we do knowingly—depend. So knowledge is in a way wedded to action. We often ask questions like whether knowledge is possible, and if it is, how it is possible. Now, if we think that such questions are legitimate and should be discussed in philosophy, then it often happens that we are overpowered by the questions, and feel helpless before them. Without making any observations about the propriety of the questions, it may be said that knowledge is a wonderful fact like being, and that it is questionable if the asking of such questions is wonderful. Indeed, one may take the attitude that it is no use wondering about them.²⁹ We take knowledge as a fact. It occurs and shows its object. And it is natural or normal on its part to show its object as it is. If it fails to do this, we should ask why it fails. Just as we ask what makes a man ill, and not what keeps him well, so also we should ask why knowledge fails in some cases, and not why it is successful in others. When it is successful, it is so because of its nature, and when it is not, we should assume that some factors outside its own nature or other than its appropriate causes are at work.

xv. *The Doctrine that Truth in respect of Its Being Known
Is Intrinsic to Knowledge*

We have discussed at some length the doctrine that truth in respect of its origin (*utpatti*) is intrinsic to knowledge. Now we may consider the doctrine that truth in respect of its being

known (*jñapti*) is intrinsic to knowledge. Roughly formulated, the doctrine is that when a knowledge-act is known, it is known to be true. In other words, when we know a knowledge-act, we know not only that it is a knowledge-act but also that it is true. So the treatment of this doctrine is also a treatment of the doctrines on the nature of knowledge of knowledge. Indeed, we cannot profitably discuss this doctrine without discussing the various doctrines on the nature of knowledge of knowledge or without discussing the various answers to the question how a knowledge-act is known. In other words, it is held by some thinkers that we may, and indeed we do, know a knowledge-act. But then, in their opinion such knowledge of ours is not direct. That is, in the opinion of these philosophers a non-sensuous (*atīndriya*) or diaphanous (*nirākāra*) object cannot be perceived or directly known, and a knowledge-act is such an object. But then, they argue that though we do not know a knowledge-act directly, yet we know it. That is, in their judgement it would be counter-intuitive, if not self-contradictory, to hold that we do not know that we know. So these philosophers are of the view that we know knowledge not directly but indirectly or inferentially. But there are thinkers who hold that it is quite intuitive to hold that we know knowledge directly. The contention that knowledge is non-sensuous or diaphanous may be accepted. But it should not be interpreted in such a way as would compel us to deny the intuitively evidenced statement that we know knowledge directly. Indeed, when we say that knowledge is non-sensuous, what we actually mean is that it is not given to the external senses. But this does not justify our holding that it is not given to the inner senses. Indeed, some of these thinkers go to the length of asserting that a knowledge-act may be given to the external senses. Thus, when we perceive visually an object, say a table, as a known table, we perceive the table as qualified by the knowledge-act that occurred before and of which knowledge-act the table was an object. In other words, we cannot deny that we often perceive objects as known objects. In such cases we do not perceive the objects as such but as qualified by something, and the question is what is that thing. It is held by some thinkers—and incidentally they are the proponents of the view that we know knowledge not directly

but inferentially—that the said something is known-ness (*jñātatā*), a property residing in the said object (or objects) but produced by the knowledge-act (or acts) that occurred before and of which knowledge-act (or acts) it (or they) was (or were) an object (or objects). But the philosophers who are of the view that when an object is known as a known object, what is known is the object as qualified by a knowledge-act that occurred before and in which knowledge-act the said object figured as an object, hold that no knowledge-act produces such a property, and that, therefore, instead of analysing such cases of knowledge in terms of known-ness, we should analyse them in the way suggested, and that we should also hold that a knowledge-act may occasionally be given to external senses. Nevertheless, these philosophers do not deny that a knowledge-act is the proper object of an internal perception that may indifferently be also called introspection or retrospection.

Be that as it may, we should not interpret the statement that a knowledge-act is non-sensuous in such a way as would require us to give up the intuitively evidenced statement that we know directly that we know. Similarly, it may be accepted that knowledge is diaphanous. But then, this does not imply that knowledge cannot be known directly. Indeed, the statement that knowledge is diaphanous may be treated as one of the basic statements of a realistic theory of knowledge, viz. a theory which holds that a knowledge-act does not create or construct its object, but shows it. Whether such a theory can stand critical scrutiny is an important point. But then, the realists hold it, and some of them without contradicting themselves also hold that knowledge may be known directly. And this suggests that the statement that knowledge is diaphanous may be interpreted differently. The proponents of the view under criticism interpret it in such a way as makes direct knowledge of knowledge impossible. But it is hardly necessary to interpret it in this way. Moreover, such an interpretation requires that we should give up the intuitively evidenced statement spoken of above. So we may give it a minimal interpretation—an interpretation that would not harm realism and would not also require us to challenge an intuitively evidenced statement. Accordingly, one may accept that knowledge is

diaphanous, and without contradicting oneself hold that it may be known directly. And he would interpret the statement as follows: 'knowledge is diaphanous' means that we cannot know knowledge without knowing its object as well. In other words, when we consider cases of knowledge of knowledge we notice that in our knowledge of a knowledge-act the object of the said knowledge-act figures. To put it differently, if we try to tear off a knowledge-act from its object, we fail. Every knowledge-act is inevitably of an object. And we do not, and indeed cannot, know a knowledge-act in its purity, that is, as divorced from its object. And this is the statement that knowledge is diaphanous in its minimal sense. And when we take it in this sense we are not required to deny that a knowledge-act may be known directly.

So some thinkers reject the view that knowledge cannot be known directly, and seek to bring out how it is known directly. And the point is that in this they differ. That is, to the question how knowledge is known directly they give different answers. And we may sort out these answers as follows.

Thus, in the opinion of some Buddhist philosophers the so-called object of knowledge is not something independent of, or distinct from, the knowledge that is ordinarily said to be showing it. Similarly, it is not that the subject of knowledge that is held by many to be different from the knowledge and to be owning it is really so. In other words, the so-called subject of knowledge is not something different from knowledge. So there is neither an object of knowledge (*grāhya*) nor a subject of knowledge (*grāhaka*), and what knows being what is known, or the knowledge itself being the knower, the known and knowledge itself is self-revealing. It reveals itself through itself (*svayam svaiva prakāśate*).

This account of direct knowledge of knowledge is against common sense. And the Buddhist philosophers know it. So they argue that in settling philosophical disputes we should not appeal to common sense. Indeed, when in philosophical matters we refer to common sense we go beyond common sense. For common sense as such has no philosophical shape and the philosophers of common sense give it a shape which, when consistently carried out, becomes something that is more offensive to common sense than the above account is. Anyway,

the commonsense way of understanding knowledge goes against the above account, and it may be stated as follows.

When a person knows an object, say a jar, if he is asked what he has been knowing, he would in answer say, 'a jar', and he may articulate his knowledge as 'this is a jar' or as 'I know a jar'. In other words, if he articulates his knowledge as 'this is a jar', and if, again, this is how one articulates one's knowledge, as distinguished from one's knowledge of knowledge, then it ought to be said that when a person knows an object, he knows the object and not the knowledge-act that shows the object. In other words, knowledge is not reflexive. But if it happens that when one knows an object one articulates it as 'I know a jar', then it ought to be said that when an object is known the knowledge-act that shows it is also known. In other words, knowledge is reflexive. Obviously, at the level of common sense we do not consider whether knowledge is reflexive. Nevertheless, the philosophers who assert that knowledge is reflexive, and those who deny this, agree in holding that a statement like 'I know a jar' articulates a knowledge of knowledge. In other words, the above statement is quite a familiar statement and it is about a knowledge of knowledge. And at the level of common sense the statement is intelligible. And so when one seeks to account for the knowledge-situation even at the level of common sense, one may base one's account on this statement. And so based, a knowledge-situation would be accounted as a five-factor situation—the factors of the situation being the subject of knowledge, for which the pronoun 'I' stands; the knowledge-act, for which the word 'know' stands; an object, viz. a jar, for which the word 'a jar' stands; a relation obtaining between the subject of knowledge and the knowledge-act which is that they are different and that one of them is known as determined or qualified by the other; and another relation obtaining between the knowledge-act and the object which is that though they also are different, one of them is apprehended as determined or qualified by the other.

Thus, at the level of common sense we treat the knowledge-situation as a five-factor situation. And the philosophers who take common sense as almost sacrosanct hold that the knowledge-situation at the philosophical level also should be treated as a five-factor situation. And so they hold that the subject of

knowledge is categorially a substance and the knowledge-act is categorially a quality. Accordingly, the relation between the subject of knowledge, which is actually a soul substance, and the knowledge-act is inherence. Similarly, the relation between the knowledge-act and its object is a nature-relation (*svarūpa sambandha*). And the nature-relation, further, when viewed from the side of the object (i.e. when the knowledge-act is treated as residing in its object), is called *viśayatā* or (the relation of) being an object of knowledge, and when viewed from the side of knowledge-act (i.e. when the object is treated as residing in the knowledge-act), is called *viśayitā* or (the relation of) being a knowledge of the object. Thus, the philosophers who regard common sense as almost sacrosanct consider the knowledge-situation to be a five-factor situation, and incorporate it within their categorial scheme in terms of which they interpret the nature of knowledge as well as the nature of its subject and object.

Now, the Buddhist philosophers under consideration repudiate such a categorial scheme. Their criticism of the scheme may be presented in the style of an empiricist of the extreme kind, who holds that only the brute sense particulars are given to us—the rest being constructed by thought or imagination. This way of presenting the Buddhist view is not without objective foundation. Besides, it helps us in understanding it so far as it goes. Thus, their rejection of the soul substance is a part of their general theory on the nature of substance as such. That is, they argue that what is called a rose is not something beyond what are usually said to be its qualities. It may be said to be a collection or synthesis of its colour, fragrance, etc. (*nīlapitādisamanvaya*). And one may with justification compare them with the empiricist critics of substance, whether of the classical or of the contemporary period. That is, one may put it in the style of a classical empiricist who holds that only the sense-qualities are given and that the supposed substratum or substance is a fiction, or one may put it in the style of a contemporary empiricist who holds that a thing-sentence is meaningful to the extent it is verifiable, and that as its verification is in terms of the sense-statements, it is reducible to such statements, or that it cannot have more meaning than such statements have. Again, one may also put it like a contemporary

empiricist and say that a thing-word is an incomplete symbol, and that the so-called thing is a logical construction, or, in the language of the Buddhists, *kalpanājanya*. And when one adopts such an attitude to the category of substance, one may, while examining the category of soul substance, argue like a classical empiricist and say that while we take a careful look into what we call ourselves, we do not meet any such entity. And one may be justified in holding that this is the view of the Buddhists. For, according to them, when we analyse what we call a man, we find that he is a collection of some sub-collections, viz. the physical body (*kāya*), the immaterial mind (*citta*), consciousness (*viññāna*), etc. exactly as a chariot is a collection of wheels, axles, etc., and the more carefully we observe these collections, the more certain we are that there is no entity which ought to be named a soul and which provides some or all of the members of the collections with a support. Again, we may also say that the word 'soul' is an incomplete symbol, and is to be treated not as a name word denoting an entity but as a descriptive word that may be meaningful without denoting an entity. Thus, we may compare the Buddhist denial of substance and so also of soul substance with that of the empiricists, whether classical or contemporary, and we would be justified in making this comparison.

We have seen how the Buddhist philosophers, who hold that in view of the fact that as distinct from a knowledge-act (*jñāna*) there is neither any subject (*grāhaka*)—a soul substance owning the property of being a knower (*jñātrtva*)—nor an object (*grāhya*)—anything having the property of being an object of knowledge (*jñeyatva*)—every knowledge-act knows itself or is self-revealing, seek to eliminate the subject in which the realists, who hold that a knowledge-situation rightly analysed should be treated as one with five factors, believe. We have also observed that this attempt at elimination may be compared with the attempt of Hume and other empiricists who seek to eliminate the soul substance, and that this comparison, made by many writers of repute, is justified. Now we may try to compare this attempt of the Buddhists to eliminate the subject or knower with that of Sartre to eliminate the transcendental ego in which Husserl believed. But before we

do this we should observe that such comparisons need not be misunderstood. That is, we are not instituting the comparison to lend prestige to the doctrine of the Buddhist philosophers. Rather we are seeking to understand the doctrine in its depth. Again, we are also making an attempt to formulate this doctrine in the idiom of contemporary Western philosophy. We know that, though important, such an attempt has risks in that while instituting the comparisons and presenting the doctrine concerned in the language of contemporary philosophers we may fail to state its distinctive features, and thus instead of stating the doctrine of the Buddhist philosophers we may state only a doctrine of contemporary philosophy and take this to be that of the Buddhist philosophers and thereby create confusion. Accordingly, we should, while comparing, not only say where the doctrine compared agrees with the doctrine with which it is compared, but also say in what respect or respects they disagree and also how important the difference is.

Thus, we are justified in comparing the contention of the Buddhists with that of an empiricist like Hume. Nevertheless, we should distinguish the empiricism of the Buddhists from that of Hume. Humean empiricism has solipsism as its consequence. In our judgement this is also true of the empiricism of the Buddhists. Now, Hume, if we have understood him, was aware of it and there are reasons to believe that so were the Buddhists also. Hume thought that a solipsistic or subjectivistic position admitted of no refutation, though it produced no conviction. It is, however, not clear if he would also have said that it was true, though this could neither be shown nor said. But it is quite clear that he thought that his philosophical views were opposed to commonsense beliefs on which our everyday behaviour rested. But then, he did not think that this opposition should be treated as an argument against his doctrine, and this is why the commonsense philosophers like Reid, Oswald, Beattie and Dugald Stewart, who were reprimanded by Kant in his *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, opposed him and, to clinch the issue, appealed to common sense as if it were an oracle. And the Buddhist philosophers also were of the view that so far as everyday experience was concerned, there was no distinction between a tyro and a

philosopher (*lokavyavahāraṁ prati sādṛśau bālapaṇḍitau*), and that the merit of a philosophical proposition was to be assessed by taking into account the philosophical arguments in favour of it, and also the arguments against it—its disagreement with commonsense beliefs, however, was not an argument against it exactly as its agreement with such a belief was not an argument in its favour. Accordingly, the realist philosophers of India like the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā philosophers opposed them and argued that when a philosophical proposition, opposed to common sense but sincerely held, implied a paralysis of all action or a contradiction between what was said and what was done, that proposition should be rejected. Again, Hume was not unaware of the sort of objection the commonsense philosophers raised, and accordingly declared that though the universal and primary opinion of all men was destroyed by the slightest philosophy, yet true scepticism—the kind of scepticism he favoured and boasted of as distinguished from Pyrrhonism or academic scepticism—held that that all doubt about them was put to flight by nature every time it attempted to reappear. Similarly, the Buddhists distinguished between empirical truth and transcendental truth and would have opined that commonsense beliefs, though empirically true, were not so transcendently.

The list may be made longer. We may, if we so desire, enumerate other points of similarity between the cases of empiricism. But then, we do not think that it is necessary. Besides, what is relevant for us is not similarity but dissimilarity. And we think that we may be successful in bringing out dissimilarity if we work on the point of similarity last mentioned. Thus, Hume was of the view that the universal and primary opinions of all men were philosophically untenable. Nevertheless, he did not think that they were to be rejected, for we could not help believing them, if not as philosophers, then as men of the world.*We do not think that he would have held that this helplessness was pathological. It seems that we would properly understand him if we treat him as a philosopher who investigated into the philosophical or theoretical justification of the empirical sciences. In other words, the commonsense beliefs, in his judgement, were lacking in philosophical justification. Nevertheless, it could not be demonstrated that they were

false. To put it differently, if we take into account one commonsense 'belief', viz. the belief in independent physical objects like chairs and tables, we see that we cannot give a philosophical justification of it. All qualities of such things, secondary as well as primary, were, as Berkeley pointed out, perceptions of the mind. We ordinarily think that these qualities are of physical objects, and so when it is argued that they are perceptions of the mind, we may feel suffocated, and, to breathe freely, may argue that though they are perceptions of the mind, the physical objects of which they are qualities are not so. But such an argument cannot be of much help. For if we say of the qualities that they are not independent but are caused by independent physical objects, the question of the relation between the qualities and their causes inevitably crops up, and we do not know how to answer it. At least, this is what Hume should say (or should have said). That is, he would have insisted that whether the qualities perceived resembled or did not resemble the physical objects that we postulated as their causes and held to be independent was a question that experience alone was competent to answer; and experience was silent. Not only that, experience was equally silent on the point that such physical objects existed. So the commonsense belief under consideration was without any philosophical foundation. But then, did this imply, as extreme scepticism maintained, that the belief was false or that there were no physical objects? To this question also the answer of Hume would be that since experience was not in a position to settle it, we did not know. Indeed, the existence of physical bodies being a matter of fact was incapable of demonstration—the only objects of real knowledge and demonstration being quantity and number.

The above seeks, though in a rather roundabout manner, to make the point that Hume, like Descartes and unlike the Yogācāras, was interested in the question how physics was possible (to adopt a Kantian mode of speaking). That is, the science of physics in which the modern philosophers were interested was mathematical or quantitative. In other words, this was the kind of physics that was being built up by Galileo, Newton and others, and it banished all qualities from the physical world and came to hold that what was not treatable mathematically was not physical. Descartes and the rationalists

made an attempt to provide the philosophical bases of such a science of physics. This is true also of the empiricists. And Hume, while seeking to analyse the philosophical structure of this kind of physics, came to note that we should dethrone the category of substance and enthrone that of causality and also that the causal relation was one of regularity. Not only that. He also argued that scientific propositions by virtue of the fact that they were experientially grounded were fallible.

Be that as it may, in spite of what he said about the relation between commonsense belief and philosophy Hume would not have agreed with the Yogācāras that there are two kinds of truth, viz. the transcendental and the empirical. That is, the distinction between these two kinds of truth is not just logical or epistemological, it is ontological as well. When philosophers like the Yogācāras or the Advaitins distinguish between these two kinds of truth, they also distinguish between two types of reality, and they are justified in drawing this further distinction. For they do not just draw the distinction between two kinds of truth; they also grade them. They hold that what is transcendently true is superior to what is empirically true. We do not know of any philosopher or philosophical system that draws the distinction but does not grade them. It is not possible to dwell on this point at length. So we would be content with the following observation only: Kant distinguished between the transcendently ideal and the empirically real. That is, in his judgement space and time were empirically real but not so transcendently, and therefore not the things-in-themselves but only the objects known were in space and time. Indeed, he held that only the phenomenal was known. Scientific knowledge was of the phenomenal world. Thus he distinguished between the phenomenal and the transcendental and thereby defined the limit of scientific knowledge. And so, if we speak in the Kantian mode we do not distinguish between two kinds of truth, viz. the transcendental and the empirical. That is, we may, if we like, define empirical truth as the kind of truth that is a property of the kind of knowledge that is about objects in the empirical or phenomenal world. But then, we should add that this is the only kind of knowledge that a human being can have. A knowledge of the transcendent entities may be very lofty, but then no human being can be in possession of it. So

from the Kantian point of view we are justified in distinguishing between the realm of the empirical and the realm of the transcendental (or transcendentals?), but we are not justified in distinguishing between two kinds of knowledge or truth. The alleged cases of transcendental knowledge (knowledge of transcendent entities) are not knowledge, strictly speaking, and our awareness that some non-empirical factors are involved in our knowledge of the phenomenal, which knowledge cannot be said to be strictly empirical in the empiricist's sense, is also not a case of knowledge.

It is intriguing to compare the Kantian distinction between the transcendental or noumenal and the empirical or phenomenal with the distinction that most schools of Indian philosophy draw between the *pāramārthika* and the *vyavahārika*—the expressions that we have translated before as the transcendental and the empirical. Thus these schools of Indian philosophy draw the distinction, and they not only distinguish between two realms of being but also between two kinds of knowledge or truth. Now, whereas for Kant only the knowledge of the objects that are members of the empirical realm is knowledge, strictly speaking—and so the only kind of knowledge we, human beings, should seek to attain, for the Indian philosophers under reference every man should try hard to know his proper being, because he may be released from the beginningless chain of birth, death and birth if and only if he knows what he is properly; and as such knowledge is transcendental, this is the kind of knowledge that is the proper pursuit of a human being. In other words, from the Kantian point of view the pursuit of transcendental knowledge is a vain endeavour, a kind of Sisyphean labour, but for the Indian philosophers the pursuit of this kind of knowledge alone is distinctively human. True, in defining the limits of human knowledge Kant was also defining the limits of scientific knowledge, and so what he affirmed was that the proper being of man or the self in its noumenal aspects, and so also being-in-itself, were outside the ken of knowledge. But then, he held that what man was essentially, was not invident to our moral consciousness. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the proper being of man, viz. his freedom and immortality, was for him a postulate. So it cannot be said that Kant drew a distinction between two

kinds of knowledge as the Indian philosophers under reference did.

Be that as it may, the Indian philosophers under reference drew a distinction between transcendental knowledge and empirical knowledge and went to the length of holding that in respect of having empirical knowledge, a human being was in no respect different from an animal. In other words, we would not be misinterpreting these thinkers if we say that in their opinion commonsense beliefs and even scientific knowledge—the kind of knowledge that results from the organizing of common sense or from criticism of common sense within its ambit, the motive behind the criticism being to make commonsense knowledge more serviceable—did not differ qualitatively from the kind of knowledge that an animal may reasonably be said to own. And this kind of knowledge, though necessary to deal with our environment effectively, was of no help in attaining liberation or knowing our proper being.

So the Indian philosophers under consideration, who distinguish between transcendental knowledge and empirical knowledge (some of them may be treated as empiricists in that they are, like the empiricists, phenomenologists or disbelievers in abstract entities like the universals, relations and even substances), rate transcendental knowledge highly. Indeed, according to them, reality is transcendental, or it is transcendental knowledge that alone is competent to certify what is real. Empirical knowledge reveals only the empirically real, or appearance, or what is not reality, strictly speaking. Now, Kant draws a distinction between the transcendently real and the empirically real. We may, if we like, construct this distinction as between what a thing is as it is in itself and what it is as it is known. But then he would deny that we have any knowledge of the thing-in-itself and so he would not draw any distinction between the two kinds of knowledge. Knowledge for him, as explained above, would always be empirical. And so, while we compare the doctrine of these Indian philosophers with that of Kant or other like-minded Western philosophers, we should be careful to note that whereas for the Western philosophers scientific knowledge, though empirical, was the only kind of knowledge worth its name, for these Indian philosophers it was just the reverse. This is true of Hume as well.

He would also hold that 'only scientific knowledge, though fallible, was knowledge, properly speaking.

Anyway, a philosopher who draws the distinction between transcendental knowledge (or truth) and empirical knowledge (or truth) does not treat them as co-ordinate. And this is as it should be. If they were co-ordinate, the distinction would have been either meaningless or comparable to the distinction between knowledge of blue and knowledge of yellow.

From the above it would appear that Hume's criticism of commonsense beliefs and also of science is not comparable with that of the Yogācāras. He doubted or denied the infallible character of these beliefs. But he did not think that there was a kind of knowledge higher than common sense and science. Accordingly, whereas the Yogācāras had to invent a principle to account for the objective, neither Hume nor any empiricist philosopher of the West felt the need for inventing such a principle. That is, according to the Yogācāras, the external world was from the transcendental point of view unreal and so non-existent. But then they did not deny that it was given to us and also that we in our everyday life deal with it. That is, though unreal, it was not fictitious or unreal like a 'rabbit's horn'. So the question what was it due to was a genuine question for them. And they thought that *tṛṣṇā* or a biotic force was at its root. True, Hume held that extreme scepticism regarding the external world was put to flight by our nature. But this defence of our belief in the external nature—if it may be termed a defence—was of our belief and not an account of the origin or source of the external. Indeed, Hume would hardly have appreciated the transcendental subjectivity—a subjectivity that transcends the empirical subjectivity and objectivity and does not entail a corresponding objectivity—in which the Yogācāras believed. So the real question for Hume was neither how such a belief was to be justified—the task that had been undertaken—nor what the external and the objective is due to—a question that the Indian philosophers raise—but how we come to entertain such a belief and what such an entertaining means. And he asked these questions, and his treatment of them has been termed psychological. But with the development of phenomenology the treatment, it seems, should be termed phenomenological. And when we approach Hume from this

point of view, we find that the concept of evidence receives a dimension denied to it by strict empiricism, and the Yogācāras' elimination of the knower gains a new significance and the similarity of it with Sartre's denial of the transcendental ego becomes apparent and worthy of a careful treatment.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. To make a few random references:
 - (a) Most philosophers would agree that if we are said to know a proposition p , we must believe p . p must be true and we must have good reasons for believing in p . (D. W. Hamlyn, in his article on 'History of Epistemology', in *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, vol. 3, ed. Paul Edwards, Macmillan, N.Y., 1967, p. 36)
 - (b) The necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing that something is the case are, first, that what one is said to know is true, secondly that one is sure of it, and thirdly that one should have the right to be sure. (A. J. Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge*, Pelican, 1956, p. 35)
 - (c) A knows that p if and only if (i) p ; (ii) A believes that p ; and (iii) A can give adequate evidence that p . (D. Rynin, 'Knowledge, Sensation and Certainty', in *Epistemology*, ed. A. Stroll, Harper & Row, N.Y., 1967, p. 10)
 - (d) One cannot know what isn't so. (Rynin, op. cit., p. 10)
2. One may object to the change in the mode of speaking. But we think that every case of knowing is not dispositional. Besides, though mental acts are distrusted, we think that the naive realistic distinction between act and object may be defended and that the denial of it is counter-intuitive. Besides, when 'I know' is translated as '*aham jānāmi*', what is translated is descriptive of an 'episode'. We have reasons to think that the objections against the episodic use of 'knowledge' are to a large extent lexical. This is corroborated by what Prof. E. J. Lemmon writes: 'Aristotle contrasts two senses of "know", in the first of which a sleeping man may be said to know whilst in the second only a man who is "using" his knowledge may be said to know . . . For the second sense, I doubt whether the English word "know" can be used; perhaps the correct English word would be something like "I am currently aware of", which I shall abbreviate to "I am aware that".' ('If I know, Do I know that I know?', in *Epistemology*, ed. A. Stroll, pp. 65-6)
3. This has been said by competent persons in many seminars when I had occasion to say that knowledge may be either true or false. Obviously, I used 'knowledge' for '*jñāna*' and 'true' and 'false' for '*pramā*' and '*apramā*'.
4. (a) ' . . . it is . . . a fact of ordinary usage that what is known cannot but be true'. (A. J. Ayer, op. cit., p. 12)

- (b) '... it enters into the meaning of the word "know" that one cannot know what is not true.' (Ayer, op. cit., p. 19)
5. *Nyāya-Sūtra*, 1.1.15.
 6. *Nyāya-Vārtika*, 1.1.15: *saṁketo hi dvedhā, sārvaśāstrinā yathā gauriti gojāṭṭhīyasya vācakaḥ, prādeśikaśca yathā caitra iti puruṣabhedasya, tatra sārvaśāstrināḥ śaknoti vyavacchedabuddhiṁ bhāvayitum.* (Vācaspati, on *NV*, 1.1.15). *anādikālapravāhāyatatvena viśeṣitatvāt* (Vyomavati, Chowkhamba edn., 1931, p. 521) *buddhiritasmāt bhidyate anādikālapravāhāyetetthaṁbhūtaḥparyāyābhidyate yastvitarasmāna bhidyate na cāsāvevaṁ yathā rūpādiriti* (ibid., p. 521).
 7. *vivikṭadṛkpariṇatau buddhau bhoga'sya kathyate / pratibimbodayaḥ svacche yathā chandramaso'mbhasi* // (quoted in Vyomavati, p. 521).
 8. Ibid., p. 522.
 9. *Yogasūtra* 8 in *Samādhipāda*.
 10. *idaṁ paśyāmītyanuvyavasāya-sākṣiko laukikatva-niyāmako viśayatā-viśeṣa surabhi chandanamityādaḥ saurabhaṁ na paśyāmīti dhiḥ ataeva kusumaijālīprakāśe sākṣāt-kāratōvacchinnaviśyatāghaṭitameva laukika-pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇamuktam Vardhamānoḥpādhyaiḥ. Anumāna-didhiti-prakāśa.* (Bhavananda, Bibliotheca edn., 1910, pp. 61-2)
 11. *laukika va doṣa-viśeṣa-janya-pratyakṣe ubhayatraiva sarpaṁ sākṣāt-karomītyanubhavāditi.* (Pakṣatā: Jagadīśa. Chowkhamba edn., p. 184)
 12. *jñāna-karaṇaka-bhinnatva-samānādhikaraṇatva.*
 13. *jñāna-karaṇakatva-vyabhicāritvameva.*
 14. (a) *tad-abhāvavad-avṛttitvam tad-vyabhicāritvam.*
(b) *tad-vad-bhinna-vṛttitvam tad-vyabhicāritvam.*
 15. *yat-kiñcit-pratyakṣādvī-vyaktimādāya tad-ryakti-vṛttyanumitya-vṛtti-jāti-mattvam pratyakṣatādikam.*
 16. This was the opinion of some competent students of Indian philosophy on our analysis of the use of 'jñāna' in Sanskrit.
 17. *Vivaraṇa-prameya-samgraha* (Basumati edn.).
 18. 'That a sentence need not be exclusively performative is shown by the example of "I know that such and such" . . . In making this commitment I am also reporting what I take to be a fact about myself' (A. J. Ayer: *The Central Questions of Philosophy*, Pelican, 1976, p. 50). This kind of admission on the part of Prof. Ayer brings out that a mental act is not a superstition, and also that to overcome solipsism about other minds, which is thought to be a logical consequence of the Cartesian doctrine of private mental states, we need not give up mental acts and say what is counter-intuitive.
 19. When one considers many contemporary discussions of the nature of facts, and particularly on the nature of mental facts, one cannot help feeling that there is some deep misunderstanding on the nature of facts, on the nature of the science of psychology and also on the nature of science as such, and that this is to be traced to what may be stated in a very general way as the failure to distinguish between explanation and understanding.
 20. *svata eva prāmānyasya janma* (*Sarva-darśana-samgraha*, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1951, p. 280; hereafter referred to as *SDS*).

21. *svāstṛayajñānanyatvam* (ibid., p. 280). .
22. Ibid., p. 280.
23. *svāstṛayajñānasāmagrījanyatvam* (ibid., p. 280).
24. *tadabhāvavai-tatprakāra*: not a case of *tadvadviśeṣayaka* and *tatprakāra* knowledge-act.
25. *jñānasāmānyasāmagrījanya jñānaviśeṣāśritatvam* (SDS, 1951, p. 280).
26. *jñānasāmānyasāmagrīmātrajanya jñānaviśeṣāśritatvam* (ibid., p. 280).
27. *abhāvaḥ kāraṇameva na bhavati cettadā vaktavyambhāvasya kāryatvamasti na vā* (ibid., p. 282).
28. 'bhāvo yathā tathābhāvaḥ kāraṇaṁ kāryavan mataḥ' (Udayana's *Kārikā*, quoted in SDS, p. 282).
29. The sentence is possibly Stout's, occurring in one of his papers published in *Mind*. We are not now able to trace it, but we acknowledge the debt.

Knowledge of Knowledge: A Meta-hypothetical Study of Nyāya Theory of Knowledge of Knowledge

When a Naiyāyika says that we know or that we know that we know, no serious student of philosophy will perhaps consider it worth while to challenge him. But when he says that knowledge is known exactly as an object, say a tree, is known, most students of philosophy will challenge him and will probably find his arguments unconvincing. The Naiyāyika also will not see, even when his critics make vigorous attempts to make him see it, that what he says is untenable. Thus there is a serious difference of opinion on the nature of knowledge of knowledge, and we cannot use the term 'sceptic' in its exclusive dislaudatory import to describe a person who says that the difference is intrinsically unresolvable. The aim of this paper is therefore twofold: viz. to examine the arguments of the Naiyāyikas who are supposed to be competent to prove the Nyāya thesis, and to analyse the nature of the assertion that knowledge is known as an object. It will examine the arguments of the Naiyāyikas only to make it clear that the assertion that knowledge is known as an object or any assertion on the nature of knowledge of knowledge cannot be proved, and it will analyse the nature of this assertion only to show that it is not proof that we should demand from a person who makes such an assertion.

I

The standard Nyāya text on the knowledge of knowledge is *Anuśaṅgavākyā-Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa, and we shall confine ourselves to this text and its commentaries. The first argument of Gaṅgeśa may be stated as follows: 'I know this' is the form

of the secondary cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) and not of the primary cognition (*vyavasāya*). It cannot be said that this is not borne out by experience. That is, it cannot be said that in the interest of *pravṛtti* or purposive behaviour we should say that 'I know this' is the form of the primary cognition. For purposive behaviour demands that the object be cognized and not that the cognition also be. To deny this is to ignore the law of parsimony. Indeed we know that a cognition with the form 'this is silver' does cause purposive behaviour. So he who says that purposive behaviour is caused, not by the uncognized cognition of an object, but by the cognized cognition, conforms neither to experience nor to the law of parsimony. Nor, again, should it be said that as the view that a cognition is cognized by a cognition different from it involves infinite regress, so the so-called secondary cognition is really the primary cognition, and all cognitions are reflexive. For to say that a cognition is cognized by a cognition distinct from it is not to court infinite regress and so the cognition with the form 'I know this' cannot be said to typify all cognitions. Indeed, if it were impossible to doubt or deny the proposition that a cognition is self-manifesting, we could say that a cognition with the form 'I know this' typifies all cognitions or that all cognitions are reflexive. But as this is not so, the assertion that there are cognitions with the form 'I know this', though true, proves nothing.¹

Now the argument, besides being a little apologetic, rests upon the assertion that a cognition with the form 'this is silver' may be the cause of purposive behaviour; and as the validity of this assumption may be challenged it cannot prove what it intends to prove. Thus, a Prābhākara may say that the form 'I know' accompanies every cognition and accordingly the sentence 'this is silver' is only elliptical. The contention of Gaṅgeśa that an uncognized cognition of an object may cause purposive behaviour is not borne out by experience. Similarly, the view that where there is purposive behaviour there is a cognition of the cognition also, does not transgress the law of parsimony. Thus it is obvious that the argument of Gaṅgeśa rests upon an assumption that is not universally accepted. It is true that Gaṅgeśa declares that the assumption is universal. But we cannot rule out of court the Prābhākara contention that 'I know' accompanies every cognition. Indeed, if it were

universally accepted that a cognition with the form 'this is silver' may cause purposive behaviour, then it would also be universally accepted that there are such cognitions, and the question of the nature of knowledge should be finally settled. So one cannot cry a Prābhākara down when he says that the statement 'this is silver' is elliptical. And it is of interest that Gaṅgeśa, as Jayadeva tells us,² could not ignore this contention of the Prābhākaras. So he offered a second argument which may be stated as follows: The cognition with the form 'I know this (a pot)' is a complex determinate cognition, a *viśiṣṭa-varīṣṭyāvagāhi-jñāna*. In such a cognition some of the determinans are also determinanda. This knowledge and the pot as occurring in the cognition 'I know a pot' function not only as determinans but also as determinanda. That is, it is a cognition that cognizes the self (I), the determinandum as determined by the determinant knowledge which is determined by pot, which again is determined by pot-ness. The cognition with the form 'I know a pot' is a complex determinate cognition. It involves, though it is not compounded of, the following simple cognitions: the self is determined by knowledge, knowledge is determined by pot, and pot is determined by pot-ness. Now, as the cognition of the determinate can take place only if a cognition that cognizes the determinant takes place just before it, it is obvious that of the three cognitions mentioned above the first presupposes the second, and the second the third, and the qualifier of the third cognition is cognized in an indeterminate cognition. So immediately after the contact of the eyes with a pot, a cognition with the form 'I know a pot' cannot take place. Nor can the cognition with the form 'this is a pot' occur. The cognition that takes place immediately after the contact of the eyes with a pot is an indeterminate cognition that cognizes a quality that features as a determinans in the determinate cognition with the form 'this is a pot'. Again, a cognition is an occurrent and generally lasts for two moments. So the cognition with the form 'this is a pot' occurs when two moments have passed after the contact of the eyes with the pot. Similarly, some moments must elapse if the cognition with the form 'I know a pot' is to occur. In short, a cognition with the form 'this is a pot' must occur before the occurrence of the cognition of the form 'I know a pot', and so the distinction be-

tween the primary and the secondary cognition cannot be done away with.³

The argument is also idle in that it rests upon the assumption not universally accepted that the cognition of the determinate must be preceded by a cognition that cognizes the determinants. Gaṅgeśa recognized this, and so, as Jayadeva tells us, offered a third argument which may be stated as follows: A is cognized when it is compresent (i.e. has the 'of' relation, the contentness-determining relation, *viśayatā-niyāmaka-sambandha*) with a cognition, i.e. the cognition that cognizes it. The relation of identity cannot be such a relation. So a cognition cannot cognize itself. That is, when A is cognized, it alone is cognized, and this is so as it alone has the 'of' relation with the cognition then occurring. The other objects, e.g. B, C, D, etc., are not compresent with it, and so are not cognized. Similarly, the cognition that is cognizing A is compresent with A and not with itself, and so cannot cognize itself.⁴ Obviously the argument is inconclusive. It assumes that the relation of identity cannot be a contentness-determining relation, and if a Prābhākara challenges this we cannot quarrel with him. For so long as you do not prove the proposition that a cognition is cognized as an object by disproving the proposition that a cognition may behave as immediate without being an object, you have no right to hold that the relation of identity cannot function as such a relation. This, as Jayadeva tells us, was admitted by Gaṅgeśa, and so he offered a fourth argument which may be stated as follows.

He who says that a cognition may be immediate without being an object, or that the form 'I know' accompanies all cognitions, must admit that a cognition is cognized perceptually. That is, he cannot say like the Bhāṭṭas that a cognition is cognized inferentially. Now a perceptual awareness is aware of that which is a member of the group of causes that cause it. *Pratyakṣa-viśayatā* is *janakatva-vyāpta*. And as nothing can be a member of the group of causes that cause itself, so a cognition cannot cognize itself. In other words, the perceptual awareness of a pot is aware of the pot, as the pot is a member of the group of causes that cause it. It is not aware of the table or the tree, as it is not caused by the table or the tree. Similarly, as the cognition cognizing the pot cannot be its own cause, so it cannot

cognize itself. The argument also is far from satisfactory. For the proposition that a perceptual awareness is aware of that which is a member of the group of causes that cause it is not universally true. Thus when a rope is erroneously cognized as a snake or when a piece of sandalwood is visually perceived as fragrant, snakesness or fragrance is introduced by the cognition and does not cause it. This is recognized by Gaṅgeśa and so he modifies the argument and says that a cognition that is consequent upon the contact of a sense-organ with an object and is not due to the provoking of the dispositions (*ātmadharma-anāśrayatve sati*) cannot cognize itself, since such a cognition can cognize only that which is a member of the group of causes that cause it. But this also is not sufficient. For the Naiyāyikas believe in *sāmānya-lakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti* and hold that the mind (*manas*) is a sense-organ. So when there is an introspective awareness of awareness, we have an awareness that is consequent upon contact of sense with object and this awareness must also be aware of itself in that the theory of *sāmānya-lakṣaṇā* holds that while perceiving a particular we virtually perceive all particulars of that class as possessing that class-character. This also was seen by Gaṅgeśa and so he offered a fifth argument which may be stated as follows.⁵

The cognition resulting from the contact of the eyes with an object cognizes the object and not itself, as the eyes are in contact with the object and not with it. That is, a visual awareness is aware of that which is in contact with the eyes, and as this is not so with the awareness itself, it is not aware of itself. This argument is free from the objections mentioned above. We may even say that it happily formalizes the Nyāya attitude that there is no qualitative distinction between the direct awareness of a cognition and that of an ordinary object, say a tree. But as this is the real point at issue, the argument cannot prove it. Indeed we learn from the *Pūrvapakṣa-prakaraṇa* that a Pīṭhākara is fully aware that an introspectionist may advance such an argument against him and he knows how to meet it. According to him, the view that a cognition is cognized as an object involves insuperable difficulties and so the argument is idle. This is noted by Gaṅgeśa and so he attempts to show that the theory of introspection does not involve such difficulties. This, we think, may be admitted. But that does not prove the

Nyāya thesis, unless it is admitted further that if a proposition cannot be refuted, it must be accepted. The Naiyāyikas cannot conclusively prove that a cognition is non-reflexive, and to avoid misunderstanding it must be added at once that the proposition that a cognition is reflexive cannot be proved either. An assertion on the nature of the knowledge of knowledge is unprovable.⁶

II

We have seen that an assertion on the nature of the knowledge of knowledge cannot be proved. Now let us analyse the assertion to see that it is not proof but construction that we should demand from a person who makes such an assertion.

An assertion on the nature of the knowledge of knowledge is not empirical. That is, the truth or falsity of it cannot be determined by observation or experiment. We cannot hope that a Naiyāyika will seize, so to say, a cognition by the neck and argue that as here is a cognition that is being cognized as an object, so every cognition is so cognized. In other words, the assertion is not one whose truth or falsity may be found out by the science of psychology. If it were a proposition whose truth or falsity was capable of being decided by observation or experiment, then we could not understand why there was such an irresolvable difference of opinion on the nature of the knowledge of knowledge. The question whether knowledge is known as an object is probably as old as human thought, and in spite of the fact that many acute thinkers have attempted to answer it, a universally accepted answer is wanting today just as it was when the question was first proposed, and we cannot hope that a super-observer will in future be able to end the deadlock. The proposition that a cognition is cognized as an object is not an empirical proposition. It is useless, if not irrelevant, to observe or to experiment in mathematics. This is also the case here. But the analogy between a mathematical proposition and this proposition cannot be pushed further. This proposition is not an *a priori* proposition like 'two and two make four'. An *a priori* proposition is uninformative and this proposition has an informative air. Indeed, if the proposition had been of an *a priori* science like mathematics, there should not have been such a

deadlock. For, as Prof. Lazerowitz has observed, there is a point in the quip that mathematicians are happy only when they agree and philosophers only when they disagree.⁷ The proposition is neither *a priori* nor empirical. From this it is tempting to conclude that it is a proposition with no sense at all, and the question to which it is said to be an answer is a pseudo-question, a question that is asked when language goes on a holiday. But to yield to this temptation will be highly injudicious. For the realm of meaning and the realm of analysis and verification do not coincide. The former is wider than the latter. The positivistic theory of meaning is unduly narrow, and has been tailored, to use an expression of Prof. Lazerowitz,⁸ with an eye to what it will eliminate. Similarly, the proposition is not one that makes diplomatic claims with regard to linguistic usage. For the proposition does not admit of linguistic refutation; and we cannot say that the philosophers who do not accept it speak some esoteric language. Thus the proposition is neither linguistic, nor nonsense, nor *a priori*, nor empirical. The traditional classification of propositions must be given up here. It is a perspective proposition, and the traditional logician does not know how to classify it.

That is, the traditional classification is of scientific propositions. A scientific proposition, if it is not an absolute presupposition and hence a philosophic proposition, is either empirical, or *a priori*, or linguistic; and so if a proposition occurs in a science and refuses to be brought under any of these classes, it is only proper that it should be called nonsense. But a philosophical proposition is of a different order. Its nature cannot be understood by comparing it with a scientific proposition. To appreciate its nature we should try to see what philosophy is, or rather what a philosopher attempts to do.

Thus philosophy is an active attitude of the philosopher to the universe, and is the outcome of his attempt to live thinkingly. Science is to a certain extent the expression of this attitude, but to that extent only. For it is interested in detailed, piecemeal and verifiable results only, and so cannot be very helpful in the pursuit of wisdom or of the knowledge of the right way of life. To live thinkingly we must have a balanced and tolerably complete view of life, i.e. of the universe as a whole and of our place in it. Every philosophical system worth

the name presents a view of the universe and of man's place in it from a particular point of view, and we may understand it without believing that it is the only acceptable view or asking whether it is true or false. The system of every philosopher represents his attitude to the universe, and though this attitude is largely a creation, yet we cannot say that it is instinctive or irrational. Similarly, though it does not possess stone-wall objectivity, yet its unobjectivity is not lyrical or interjectional. The experiences that compel him to form an attitude are of objects, i.e. of events taking place in the universe, and reason does not go on a holiday when they are experienced. Moreover, he cannot have his attitude without subjecting it to the processing of reason. In short, a philosophical system is a formalized perspective and a philosophical proposition is a perspective proposition.

Now a philosophical system, i.e. a formalized perspective, is both like and unlike an abstract deductive system, and so a philosophical proposition has analogies, both positive and negative, with a mathematical proposition. Thus while building a deductive system, the builder takes some propositions as basic. These propositions, though not themselves demonstrated, afford a basis for demonstration. So though they are not axiomatic in the sense of being necessarily true, yet they may be called axiomatic in the sense of being primitive to the system they determine. Similarly, when we analyse a philosophical system we find that some propositions are basic to it. The philosopher may or may not be conscious of their basic character. That is, he may realize that these propositions must be admitted if the system is to be possible. But still he may misread their nature. He may fail to see that they are basic in the sense of being primitive, and so he may proceed either to prove them or to show that they are basic, axiomatic in the sense of being absolutely necessary. Thus Gaṅgeśa is conscious that the proposition that a cognition is cognized as an object is a basic proposition. But he misreads its nature and attempts to prove it. Similarly, the Advaitin is conscious that the proposition that a cognition may behave as immediate without being an object is basic to his system. But that does not prevent him from giving a proof of it. However, as in an abstract deductive system there are primitive as well as derivative propositions, so in a

philosophical system also there are primitive and derivative propositions. Again, as the selection of the primitive propositions in a deductive system is rather arbitrary, so the selection of the primitive propositions in philosophy also is arbitrary. The propositions that are admitted to be primitive in one system may be treated as theorems in other systems. Similarly, the propositions that are admitted to be basic to one philosophical system may have no place in the list of the basic propositions of some other system. Indeed, it may even be that they are excluded from the list of true propositions of some other system. This suggests that a philosophical proposition is unlike a deductive proposition. The primitive proposition of one deductive system may be the theorem of another deductive system. But what happens in the case of philosophical systems is that the primitive propositions of one system do not even find a place in the other system. This difference is fundamental. Building a deductive system is rather like playing a game. The system is purely formal and says nothing about the world. The manipulation of symbols is governed by syntactic rules and the propositions are analytic *a priori*. But building a philosophical system is a more earnest and serious affair. Manipulation of symbols in accordance with syntactic rules is almost useless for one who, to use a Platonic expression, wishes to study the form of the Good. The philosophic proposition must describe experience. The symbols occurring in a philosophical system must be described in terms of experience. So the primitive propositions of a philosophical system differ qualitatively from those of an abstract deductive system. The primitive propositions of a postulational system need only be mutually consistent and severally independent, and the builder of the system selects them, or rather accepts them, only to see what set of theorems can be derived from them. The selection of a set is therefore arbitrary. There is nothing in the nature of the propositions that compels him to accept them as primary. Again, as he is not interested in describing experience, there is nothing in experience or the experienced that may be said to coerce him into accepting them. His propositions are primitive because he likes them to be primitive. He could also have chosen a different set of propositions as primitive. And this he often does. In constructing a geometrical system his axiom of

parallels may be either that there exists one and only one straight line through one point parallel to any given line, or that more than one parallel may be drawn, or that no parallel may be drawn. But this is not so with the primitive propositions of a philosophical system. To an outsider the selection of the primitive propositions in philosophy may appear as arbitrary as in the case of a postulational system. But to the system-builder this is not the case. He feels that he is compelled to accept them. He will not admit that there is any room for choice here. The coercion undoubtedly is not as objective as it is in the case of the sciences. The type of coercion that we find in the sciences may be said to be factitive coercion. It is a one-valued function of facts. But the kind of coercion that a philosopher experiences while formulating his primitive propositions is a many-valued function of facts; or, rather, besides facts there are here many independent variables like interest, emotion, unconscious motives and (who knows?) even the deeds done in past life.

Prof. Collingwood once observed that cosmologies, both ancient and modern, are based on analogies.⁹ We think that we may go further and say that not only cosmology but ontology and epistemology also are based on analogy. Thus the Buddhists construct their theory of positive facts on the analogy of the passing cloud, the Advaitins their theory of the empirical world on the analogy of the illusory datum, the Naiyāyikas their theory of creation on the analogy of the production of the pot by the potter, and so on. Now, we assess the strength of an analogical argument by taking into account the comprehensiveness of the terms. Thus, that Mars is inhabited by living beings is more probable than that it is inhabited by beings like men; for the predicate of the first proposition is more comprehensive, i.e. more vacuous, than that of the second. Similarly, that all vertebrates resemble men in possessing mind is more probable than the all animals possess mind, for the subject of the first proposition is less comprehensive, i.e. less vacuous, than that of the second. In other words, taking any body of evidence as a fixed datum, we can draw a series of conclusions of varying degrees of probability according as we make the subject less and less vacuous and the predicate more and more so. In the case of philosophical analogies both the subject and

the predicate of the conclusion are most vacuous. For instance, take the case of the Buddhists. They construct their theory of positive facts on the analogy of the passing cloud. A passing cloud is a positive fact and is momentary, and so every positive fact is momentary—this is their argument. Here the predicate of the premise is more comprehensive or less vacuous. For the cloud is merely momentary, but has shape, size, colour and many other determinations. The momentariness that qualifies the cloud is determinate momentariness. But momentariness as the predicate of the conclusion is indeterminate, vacuous and so least comprehensive. So the predicate satisfies the condition of a good analogy. Can this be said of the subject of the conclusion also? It seems that the question should be answered in the negative. For the subject of the premise is less vacuous than the subject of the conclusion. So the Buddhists attempt to show that the cloud is momentary not as a cloud but as a positive fact. In other words, the Buddhists make use of an inference which runs as follows: What is not momentary is not causally efficient and what is not causally efficient is not; so *what is*, is momentary. This inference, we must be careful to note, is not an ordinary inference. That is, though it professes to prove the proposition that all positive facts are momentary, yet what it aims at is to show that the cloud is momentary, not as a cloud but as a positive fact. So the general proposition is not a generalization in the usual sense of the term, for the conclusion does not go beyond the premise. It is an individual instance de-individualized. Indeed, if generalization consisted in passing from an observation of some to an assertion concerning all, the Cārvāka or the Humean charges against induction would probably be irrefutable. At least induction or inference as it is understood in Indian logic is not generalization in its usual sense. The law that all positive facts are momentary is the individual fact, the momentary cloud generalized. The Buddhist inference is not an ordinary inference. It is a reflective analysis of the fact, the momentary cloud, and intends to show that the cloud is momentary as it is a positive fact. Or we may put it as follows: The aim of this reflective analysis is to show that the subject of the conclusion is not more vacuous than the subject of the premise, and so the analogy is good. This also is the case with the other philosophic argu-

ments. The chief philosophic argument is analogy supported by a reflective analysis of the subject term; and the primitive propositions of a philosophical system are the articulations of analogies.

But what is held to be a good analogy in one philosophical system is rejected as a bad analogy in another, and so there is no factitive coercion in the choice of analogies. Still the philosopher is not as free as the mathematician in his choice of primitive propositions. He is coerced, though the coercion is not a one-valued function of facts. The primitive propositions of a philosophical system differ from those of an abstract deductive system.

But this is not a case of difference without agreement. The primitive propositions of a philosophical system have some points of agreement with those of a formal system. Thus it is not demonstration but construction that we demand when the primitive propositions of a formal system are announced. Similarly, what we should demand of the primitive philosophical propositions is not proof but construction. That is, like the primitive propositions of a formal system they should be sufficient. The first condition that a philosophical system must fulfil is comprehensiveness. Now this is a condition that is fulfilled by all the systems.¹⁰ So a system should not be comprehensive merely but simple also. 'But', as Prof. Quine has observed, 'simplicity as a guiding principle in constructing conceptual schemes is not a clear and unambiguous idea and it is quite capable of presenting a double or multiple standard.'¹¹ So the acceptance of a philosophical system is not objectively conditioned. That is why some Indian thinkers said that *śāstra-bheda* is due to *adhikāribheda*. That is, individuals differ in respect of temperament, interest, aptitude, etc., and so a philosophical system accepted by one individual is rejected by another. However, the proposition that a cognition is cognized as an object is a perspective proposition and can therefore be neither proved nor disproved.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Bibliotheca Indica edn., vol. 1, pp. 793-5.
2. Ibid., p. 797.
3. Ibid., pp. 795-6.
4. Ibid., p. 796.
5. Ibid., 797.
6. Ibid., 798.
7. M. Lazerowitz, *The Structure of Metaphysics* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1955), p. 39.
8. Ibid., p.55.
9. R. J. Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1945).
10. That all systems are comprehensive should not be taken literally. For I believe that the materialistic systems cannot account for the facts studied by the Psychical Research Society. But a materialist may challenge them and thereby make his system comprehensive. Again, as the facts studied relate to survival, he may also explain them by saying that consciousness that emerged with the organism attaining a kind of integrity may survive the destruction of that organism. So the evidence of survival need not vex him. But he will be seriously vexed if evidence of pre-existence is found. Kamalaśīla in *Lokāyatamata-Parikṣa-Pañjikā* has argued on this line. But this does not refute the materialist. For he can yet say that the evidence of pre-existence is either false or of the emergent qualities that survive their organisms. Such an explanation cannot be called simple. But the criterion of simplicity is hardly simple.
11. W. V. Quine, *From a Logical Point of View* (Harvard University Press, 1953).

Pramā-Pramāṇa and Knowledge-Justification

1. *Introduction*

It does not escape the notice of even a non-discerning student of Western philosophy that the concepts of 'knowledge', 'claim to know', 'evidence', 'justification', 'truth', 'belief' and some other allied concepts go together and form a group, so to say. Similarly, it does not escape the notice of any student of Indian philosophy that the concepts of J/a (*Jñāna*), P/a (*Pramā*), P/n (*Pramāṇa*), P/ya (*Prameya*), T/k (*Tarka*) and some other allied concepts go together and form a group. So the task of comparing the two groups of concepts and of considering what light the comparison may throw on the question of justification would appear intriguing to a student of philosophy. This is one of the reasons for undertaking the task in this paper. Another reason is that this would be of some help in having a deeper understanding of Indian philosophy—and also of Western philosophy and the concept of justification in the two philosophies if we have neither the requisite learning nor the insight to hazard even a guess.

However, words like 'belief', 'knowledge', etc. cannot be neatly translated in philosophical Sanskrit. Sanskrit words like 'J/a', 'P/a', etc. are similarly untranslatable in English. This may have a paralysing effect upon punctilious persons. But it need not be so, for it is incredible that there is no correlation between the concepts of the two groups. Accordingly, (a) we shall consider in the first place how the concepts of the two groups may be correlated; (b) in the second place, we shall consider briefly the role that T/k plays in justification; and (c) lastly we would take up a few connected points and conclude the discussion.

11. *A Brief Consideration of the Question of Translation or Correlation of the Relevant Expressions*

We have said that the key-words occurring in the two groups are not neatly translatable either from English to Sanskrit or from Sanskrit to English. Nevertheless, there ought to be some correlation. So we would consider if the following correlation, namely between (a) 'J/a' and 'belief', (b) 'P/a' and 'knowledge', (c) 'P/n' and 'evidence' and (d) 'T/k' and 'justification' may be said to hold.

(a) *J/a and Belief*: Our reasons for considering that the two concepts may be correlated are as follows. (1) The thesis of the sceptics in Western philosophy may be briefly put thus: we do not infrequently claim to know, but in no case do we succeed in producing adequate evidence; and so we do not ever know, but only believe. Similarly, the thesis of the sceptics in Indian philosophy may be briefly expressed thus: we can in no case ground a J/a in a way that may entitle us to call it a P/a. Incidentally, though we ordinarily translate J/a as 'knowledge', yet philosophers of the Nyāya school and also of some other schools would object to it. Thus, a philosopher of the Nyāya school would say a J/a may be either true or false. Besides, he would say that a false J/a may be either dubious or a J/a of the assurance-form (*nīścayākāra*). Further, he does not think that either truth or falsity is intrinsic to a J/a in the sense that to be aware of J/a is not necessarily to be aware of it as either true or false. The philosophers of many other schools do not agree with him on these points. Some of them say that falsity is intrinsic to a J/a though truth is extrinsic to it, while others say that both truth and falsity are intrinsic to it. Further, some hold that while falsity is extrinsic to a J/a, truth is intrinsic to it. Naturally they enter into animated disputes on these questions, but then they do not refer to usage to settle their disputes and they would feel intrigued if told that one of the basic arguments of the Western philosophers to interlock the claim to know that *p* and justifying it, or showing that it is true consists in a reference to usage. (2) Anyway, the second reason for correlating the two concepts may be stated as follows: A J/a of the assurance-form, when not known to be false, is conducive (*janaka*) to a confident action (*nīṣkampa pravṛtti*); and if the J/a is a P/a, the resultant

action is successful; but if it is not a P/a, the resultant action is not successful. Thus, it appears that a J/a of the assurance-form resembles a belief in that both of them have actions as their consequences. (3) The third reason for correlating the two concepts arises out of the second reason almost like a corollary. Thus, it is sometimes said that evidence is not relevant to belief, for to say that A believes that *p* is only to say that his attitude, rational or irrational, conditions his giving assent to it. But the widely accepted view is that knowledge is justified true belief. And it has just been observed that when a J/a of the assurance-form causes successful action, it is identified as a P/a, or is justified to be a P/a. So there is some resemblance, however feeble, between the two concepts. (4) The fourth reason may be put as follows: When A claims to know that *p* and is successful in justifying his claim, it is granted that he knows that *p*. If he is then asked whether he believes that *p*, he denies, and in defence of his denial says that he knows that *p*. But some writers hold that such a denial is logically odd, and so when A knows that *p*, it may be said that he also believes that *p*. Similarly, some writers on the philosophy of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā school that holds that a J/a is self-cognizing and that every J/a is a P/a contend that the first cognitive articulation is not 'I have a J/a', but that 'I have a P/a'. And their contention may be expressed thus: they, like some Western philosophers, hold that when A knows that *p* or has a P/a, he denies that he believes that *p* or has a J/a. But the philosophers of the other schools would deny it. So it may be claimed that there is a further point of resemblance, however feeble, between the two concepts. In any case, it is not claimed that 'J/a' may neatly be translated as 'belief'. What is claimed is that with considerable reservations—the chief of them being that a doubt is also a case of J/a—the two concepts may be correlated, at least to conduct the discussion of the subject of this paper.

(b) *P/a and Knowledge*: It has been observed above that a J/a may be false and so cannot be correlated with a P/a. Now, let us consider if we may not translate a 'P/a' as 'knowledge'. Thus, a 'P/a' may be translated as a 'true cognition' and this translation is justified both by its etymology and usage. So it seems that we may translate it as 'knowledge'. But then there are some considerations against it. For it is held by some Western philo-

sophers that 'remember' is a verb of the 'know' family and accordingly 'I remember that p entails that p '. But in the judgement of the followers of almost all the schools of Indian philosophy a memory or a recollective cognition is not a P/a. Again, it is also held by many Western philosophers that verbs like 'see', 'hear', etc. also belong to the 'know' family, and accordingly 'I am seeing that p entails that p '. But what would be the reaction of a philosopher of the Nyāya school to it? It seems that to answer the question we should consider their concept of P/n and also their doctrine of 'after-perception' (*anuvyavasāya*). So we may now consider the concept of P/n and return to the matter at the proper time.

(c) *P/n and Evidence*: A P/n is defined as the *kāraṇa* or the uncommon cause (instrumental cause) of a P/a. Now, the intriguing point is that while by appealing to its P/n we may distinguish one kind of P/a, say a perceptual P/a, from a P/a of another kind, namely an inferential P/a, or one kind of perception, say visual, from another kind of perception, say tactual, we cannot distinguish a P/a from a not-P/a. This is seen clearly in the case of perception. Thus, there may be a visual perception and it may be articulated as: this is a cow. Now, the eyes would generally be treated as its uncommon cause. If the said perception be veridical or adequate to its object (*yathārtha*), the eyes would be treated as the P/n in this case of P/a. But if the said perception is not veridical, then the eyes would be treated as its uncommon cause, but not as a P/n, precisely because it is not veridical or a P/a. So it is obvious that P/a cannot be distinguished from a not-P/a by an appeal to the corresponding P/n, particularly when it is a case of perception. So it is also obvious that whether a cognition is a case of P/a is to be ascertained not by a reference to the P/n concerned, but independently or by acting upon it. From this it would also be seen that it would be unwise to translate a P/n as evidence. And it seems that some Western philosophers would not object to it, for it is also admitted by them that a person need not look into his own eyes or consult his oculist to learn if his visual perception is a P/a. It may incidentally be said that the Nyāya philosophers do not hold that a cognition is self-cognizing. But then they do not say that a cognition is not cognized at all or cognized in every case by means of an inference. That is, according to them, as a

cow may figure as an object of a perception, an ordinary perception (*laukika pratyakṣa*), so also a cognition may figure as an object of ordinary perception, though it is not external but internal. A perception of a cow is called by them *vyavasāya* and the internal perception of the cow-perception is called by them *anuvyavasāya*. This internal perception is an ordinary perception, and as the perception of a cow has the cow as its cause, so also it has the cow-perception as one of its causes. Accordingly, not only is it the case, so these philosophers hold, that the cow-perception does not cognize itself and is cognized by a second cognition, but it is also the case that the internal perception of the cow-perception does not occur while the cow perception occurs, but afterwards; for the relation between the two perceptions is that of an effect and a cause. So the said internal perception is called by them *anuvyavasāya* or after-perception. Besides, the philosophers of this school argue that an after-perception just reveals its object, viz. the prior cognition, but does not show either its truth or falsity. Thus, according to them, when A says 'I am seeing that this is a cow', he does not say anything about the truth or falsity of the cow-cognition. So it seems the Nyāya philosophers would find it difficult to accept the statement that 'I am seeing that this is a cow entails that this is a cow', and we should say that these philosophers would not agree to our proposal that P/n may be correlated with evidence or that the said statement holds.

But then, though what has been said above is based on the texts or on an almost literal understanding of them, there are good reasons for holding that this should be revised and that the texts concerned should be subjected to a deeper analysis. Thus, the philosophers of this school are of the view that what is and as it is and also what is not and as it is not are shown by their P/n (or P/a), and accordingly the relation between a P/n (or P/a) and its object is invariable (*avyabhicāri*). So also they hold that there are four kinds of P/n, and that perception is not only one of them but is also the basic (*upajīvyā*) or foremost (*jyeṣṭha*) of them. Similarly, they often quote perception in support of a proposition. They admit that a perception is not as immune to doubt as an inference is, but then, so they assert, every perception is not doubted. That is, when a perception occurs under habitual or familiar circumstances (*abhyāsada-*

śāpanna), it is not doubted, but if it occurs under unfamiliar circumstances, it may be doubted. It may be argued that though a perception occurring under familiar circumstances is not ordinarily doubted, it is not logically above doubt, for a person, when so gifted, may doubt it if he likes. As against this these philosophers would say that though a perception, as has been said above, is not as immune to doubt as an inference, yet it is not ordinarily doubted, not because ordinarily men are wanting in the critical ability or talent to doubt, but because doubt in such cases cannot be properly grounded. Indeed, there should be good reasons for a doubt, if it is not pathological, and that a perception occurring under familiar circumstances is not doubted is because good reasons for doubting it are not available. So it seems that what has been said above should be revised.

Now, this proposal for revision may not be accepted gracefully unless what is wanting in what has been said above is shown. We seek to do this as follows: In our anxiety to correlate a P/n with evidence, we did not take into account the nature of evidence and also the fact that a P/n may differ when the kind of P/a differs. This is obvious and the Nyāya philosophers also are of the view that though when a P/a is mediate (*parokṣa*) it is a cognition or J/a that functions as the uncommon cause, yet in the case of perception this does not hold. Thus, if the case of an inferential P/a such as 'therefore, there is fire in the hill yonder' is considered, it would be evident that a cognition of the relation of comprehension (*vyāpti*) holding between the comprehending probandum (*vyāpaka-sādhya*) and the comprehended probans (*vyāpya-hetu*) is functioning as the uncommon cause (*kāraṇa*) or P/n. In other words, in this case 'fire' figures as the probandum and 'smoke' figures as the probans, and if a relation of comprehension did not hold between them the inferential cognition would not have occurred, or even if it had occurred it would not have been true. But then, if the relation obtained between them but it was not known that it obtains, then also the inferential cognition would not have occurred. That is, the said relation of comprehension by virtue of its being (*sattā*) is ineffective in giving rise to an inferential cognition. But this is precisely the case when the P/a is perceptual. When the said visual cow-cognition occurs, the eyes are estimated to

be the P/n, but then an awareness of them is not involved in its occurrence. So we may without difficulty correlate a P/n or a constituent of it with evidence in the case of an inferential P/a. But if we seek to establish such a straightforward correlation between the P/n of a perception and evidence we fail. And if we generalize from this and say that a P/n cannot be correlated with evidence (or translated as evidence), then we would obviously make an observation that should be revised.

Now, it may be asked what we are to do with a perceptual P/n. To answer it we should consider some of the other factors involved in perception. Thus, when a man sees that there is a cow yonder, besides his eyes, the contact between them and the cow, proper illumination, attention, his not being ill or drunk, etc. are involved. Again, it should also be kept in mind that in the Nyāya philosophy and also in the philosophies that believe in direct perception of physical objects or in a two-factor analysis of perception, a distinction is drawn between a cognitive act or state and its object. Not only that. The cognitive state is held to be diaphanous. Now, such a state does not figure in our after-perception. It is not even possible to speak of it. Further—and this is important for our purpose—it is not the candidate for truth. It is the cognitive state as having a structure, the structure being conferred on it (*arpita*) by its object, that is the candidate for truth. In the case under consideration the object has a structure. It may be spelt out as: a 'this' (a particular) as possessing cow-ness (a universal property). This structure of the object is conferred on the said cow-cognition, and in it 'this' figures as the epistemic subject (*viśeṣya*) and cow-ness figures as the epistemic predicate (*prakāra*)—the relation-part of the object and also of the cognition being left out for the sake of convenience. Anyway, the cognition as thus structured is the candidate for truth. The after-perception of it, accordingly, is articulated as 'I am seeing a cow' or as 'I have a visual perception in which "cowness" figures as an epistemic predicate and "this" figures as the epistemic subject.' This after-perception does not, as has been said before, certify the cow-perception to be true. Now, if it is assumed that the cow-perception occurs under familiar circumstances, then it may be said that it is not doubted, but is accepted as true. The deliverance of the after-perception corroborates it. It asserts that the said perception is

of an assurance-form. So we may go further and say that 'I am seeing that this is a cow entails that this is a cow'. Obviously we should add that though the above entailment holds, yet it is not entailed that truth is intrinsic to a cognition. For if the said perception had occurred under unfamiliar circumstances, it would have possibly been doubted, and even though it occurs under familiar circumstances and is not doubted, the possibility of doubting it is there. And if such a doubt occurs, it may be overcome. So we may say that, as some Western philosophers do, the Nyāya philosophers also would hold that we do have a veridical visual perception of a cow and therefore know in the strong sense that there is a cow yonder.

But how does the above discussion throw some light on a perceptual P/n and enable us through a revision of what has been said before to correlate such a P/n with evidence? Obviously, by bringing out that besides the sense-organ other factors are involved in a perception and that the report of the after-perception not only shows the structure and the kind of the perception concerned but also indicates, without stating it, what these other factors are and also, if the said doubt occurs and a T/k is used to overcome it, along what path the said T/k would move. Accordingly, we sum up the discussion of (b) and (c) by suggesting that we may, though with some reservations, translate 'P/a' as 'knowledge' and 'P/n' as 'evidence', or if we so prefer, we may correlate these concepts.

(d) *T/k and Justification*: The subject of T/k is too large to be discussed in this paper. What we intend to do in this section is to bring out how it is of considerable help to a P/n, particularly with reference to a perception, by enabling us to overcome the doubt that may be raised with the above-mentioned cow-perception, and also to spell out the content of a perception.

Thus, it is usually said that a T/k is not a P/n. It is also said that it is a kind of cognition expressed in the form of a hypothetical proposition with an antecedent and a consequent that are not only false but also known to be so. Thus, one may say that it is an argument of the *reductio* kind. Nevertheless, it is of service to a P/n (or a P/a). So it is said that it favours (*anugrahaka*) a P/n. Now, it may do so broadly in two ways, namely (i) by removing the obstacles against the use of a P/n and so by preparing the conditions favourable to its use, and (ii) by

removing the doubts that may remain even after the use or in course of the use of a P/n. Or, as is sometimes said, a doubt may precede the use of a P/n or the discussion of it (*vicāra-pūrvā-saṁśaya*), or such doubt may be consequent upon a discussion, i.e. it may crop up in course of the discussion (*vicāra-uttara-saṁśaya*), and T/k may be used to overcome doubts of both kinds. And it is ordinarily used in a form that commits the doubter to give up what is intuitive (or what is dear to him) or to accept what is counter-intuitive (or what is harmful to him). Thus, if a man doubts that water, instead of quenching thirst, produces, when taken, a burning sensation within, then a T/k may be used in the following two ways: (i) if water, instead of quenching thirst, produces a burning sensation within, then he who doubts that water quenches thirst should not take water when thirsty (and in view of the fact that he does, his doubt is rhetorical or obsessional—that is, he entertains the doubt by dismissing what is intuitive to him). (ii) If what the doubter says is true, then he should explain why, when others take water, no burning sensation occurs within (and as he cannot explain, he accepts what is counter-intuitive).

Incidentally, a T/k may favour a perception not only by overcoming some doubts about its being a case of veridical perception but also by being useful in spelling out its precise content, particularly in the odd cases. And philosophers of all schools make abundant use of it. Thus it is well known that the philosophers of the Advaita Vedānta school make use of it to spell out the precise content of the direct awareness articulated as: I am ignorant, and know neither myself nor anything else. That is, one may admit that there is a form of direct awareness that is articulated in this way. But one may doubt whether it is quasi-positive ignorance or negation of knowledge that figures as the object of this awareness. The philosophers of the Advaita Vedānta school hold that it is the former that figures as the object of the said direct awareness, and so they seek to give the *upapatti* of it by pointing out that any alternative account of it would fail to spell out its content in an adequate manner. Similarly, it is also well known that the Nyāya philosophers make use of T/k to spell out the content of a perception articulated as: there is no jar on the ground. Thus a T/k may be used to spell out the precise content of a perception as well.

Anyway, we may now consider how to overcome any doubt that there may be about the veridical character of the cow-perception under consideration. It is obvious that to overcome the doubt a T/k would be used and we may state here one form of its use. Thus, it would be argued that if the said perception is not veridical (or if its object is not a cow), then either the eyes are defective (and there is no ground for saying so), or the right kind of contact (*sannikarṣa*) between them and the object yonder does not hold (and there is no ground for saying this either), or illumination is not adequate (this also is groundless), or the person who says that the object yonder is a cow does not know the use of the word 'cow' or is ill or drunk etc. (there is no ground for affirming any one of them). Accordingly, the doubt is rootless, the cow-perception is veridical and the person who has the said perception knows in the strong sense that the object yonder is a cow.

Incidentally, Professor Malcolm claimed that he knew in the strong sense that there was an inkpot in the dresser, for he could substantiate his claim by opening the dresser and looking into it. Professor Danto subjected this to some criticism. His criticisms may be summarized broadly in the following way. By opening the dresser and looking into it he may see something that looks like an inkpot, but in fact is not. It may be that it is an apple. If to confirm his visual perception he touches it, then he would refer one perceptual ultimate to another, and if they give conflicting reports, which report was to be accepted and for what reason? Besides, what is the point in appealing to one ultimate to check up another? Indeed, may it not be that what is in the dresser is not a real but a magical inkpot, the magician being crafty or powerful enough to deceive not only vision but touch also? So what is the point in claiming to know in the strong sense that there is an inkpot in the dresser? We do not know how Professor Malcolm replied or would have replied to these objections. But the Nyāya philosophers would have said in reply to Professor Danto that by using a T/k such doubts might be overcome. So also when Professor Ayer, Professor Woozley, Professor Lemmon and others say in defence of a knowledge claim that 'an accredited route to knowledge has been taken', 'proper authorities have been consulted', 'am in a position to know' or 'have the right to be sure' or 'give you

the guarantee', etc., they, so the Nyāya philosophers would say, are making use of T/k to justify a 'claim to know'. Thus, we may sum up the discussion in (a), (b), (c) and (d) of this section as follows: A 'P/n' may be correlated with 'evidence'. The correlation is straightforward in the case of the P/n of a mediate P/a. It is not so in the case of a perceptual P/n and so one may be tempted to hold that there is no correlation between such a 'P/n' and 'evidence' and may even go to the length of saying that this is the case with other kinds of P/n as well. But there is no reason for holding such a depressing view. For a perceptual 'P/n' may be correlated with evidence provided the other factors including T/k are taken into account. Again, we may treat T/k as justificatory reasoning or analysis, and it may be insisted that no Indian philosopher denies that T/k plays an important role in the task of justification as it favours P/n of every kind and therefore a perceptual P/n as well. Hence, we may correlate a 'P/a' with 'knowledge', though the case of memory presents a formidable difficulty. But then the Indian philosophers who deny that a memory is a case of P/a do not say that a memory as such is false. So they would not deny that if memory is true, then 'I remember that *p* entails that *p*'. Their only reason for denying that a memory is a P/a is that it is not a primary cognition (*anubhava*), and therefore when it is true, it is so on account of a 'true primary cognition' that is at the root of it. However, we are of the view that a good many Indian philosophers of different schools who deny that memory is a P/a are inclined to treat it as being so because while defining a P/a they give an alternative definition applicable to memory. And we may keep this in mind and claim that we may in an almost straightforward way correlate a P/a with knowledge.

III. *Scepticism and the Problem of Justification*

It is well known that a sceptic (a total sceptic) denies that any claim to know may be adequately grounded and that, as we have observed before, in his judgement a J/a can in no case be so grounded as to be entitled to be called a P/a. Now, there are different kinds of scepticism, and the most radical kind denies that scepticism has any thesis to be defended. So, for the sake of

convenience, we would present the arguments of the sceptics in the following way.

A Nyāya philosopher or any philosopher believing in commonsense realism holds that what is and as it is and also what is not and as it is not is shown by a P/a (or P/n), and accordingly the relation between a P/a and a 'furniture of the universe' is invariable. He also argues that to identify a P/a a person acts upon his cognition of the object, and if the action is successful he treats his cognition as a P/a. This may be treated as one of the basic contentions of a Nyāya philosopher. And a sceptic not infrequently challenges it. He argues that even a false cognition may have a successful action as its consequence. And he refers to the case of a misperception of the glow of a gem as a gem which may result in the successful action of obtaining the gem. But the reference to this sort of case is curious, if not misleading. For what is this identification of the glow of the gem as the gem? Does the gem figure in the perception concerned? If it does, how may the cognition be dismissed as false? If it does not, how does the wrong identification take place? Again, the gem may not be at the place where the glow is perceived to be, and if that is so, the alleged misperception will not be followed by a successful action. Besides, will a sceptic say that a thing is not as its P/a shows it to be, and is as it does not show it to be? If he does, then how to get the meaning of what he says? Do the sentences used by him mean what he does not say, and do not mean what he says? It seems that behind his critical examination of P/a etc., a kind of ontology—an ontology that distinguishes between the really real and the apparently real or between the transcendental and the empirical and thus between two kinds of truth—is at work, and as he cannot found such an ontology, he seeks to demolish P/n, P/a, etc. Obviously he would not relish such a contention and would claim that his case should be treated independently of his alleged ontology. But then, what would his claim amount to? He would reply that there are in-built contradictions in the concepts of P/a, P/n, etc. and present a long list of such contradictions. Thus

(1) P/n, P/a, etc. are fictitious like a rabbit's horn, for like it they are neither prior to nor posterior to nor contemporaneous with any 'furniture of the universe'. (2) If a P/n or a P/a is self-certifying, then why is a P/ya not so? If P/ya is taken to be self-

founding, a P/n or a P/a is not needed. But if a P/n (or a P/a) is not self-founding, then there would be infinite regress and this cannot be avoided by holding that one P/n (or P/a) or one kind of P/n (or P/a) is self-founding, for that would amount either to denying that the other P/n's (or P/a's) or other kinds of P/n (or P/a) are P/n (or P/a), or to holding in a dogmatic manner that it is so. And (3) a definition of P/n is given in terms of a P/a, and therefore to avoid a circle a P/a should be defined or identified independently. But this is not possible. For the attempt to do it in terms of being conducive to successful action, as has been observed before, is a failure. Besides, not only should the action be successful, it should also be known to be so. But the act of knowledge that may be assumed to do it has to be identified by another act to be a P/a. And so there would be infinite regress of a kind different from what has been mentioned first.

In their list the sceptics include many other in-built contradictions. But they are all in the same strain. Besides, they argue that there is no need to identify a P/a, for if there were any such need, some more or less fault-free method would be invented. It is not one of the primary occupations of man—such an occupation can only be to deal with the universe that incessantly invades his consciousness and demands prompt response. This seems to be admitted by many non-sceptic philosophers who argue that identification of a P/a is needed because when a doubt arrests confident response that is demanded, no such response would take place unless the cognition is identified as a P/a. But then they miss the point that it is not *samśaya* or doubt and *vyatireka-niścaya* or a contradictory cognition of the assurance-form that arrests confident response. It is rather *arthasandeha*, the foggy and ambiguous nature of the object manifested, or *arthamiścaya*, uncertain character of the manifested, that stands in the way of such response. The real *prati-bandhakas* or preventers are not the said cognitions but the objects of the kind mentioned. Anyway, so the sceptics contend, it is not merely the case that a P/a is fictitious and so non-identifiable; even if it were not so, then also there would be no genuine need for identifying it.

As against the contentions of the sceptics about the in-built contradictions of the concepts of P/n etc., a Nyāya philosopher would say that they are the outcome of not thinking thoroughly.

Thus, the first contention results from reading more into grammar than is permissible. That is, P/n etc. are grammatical terms, *kāraśabda*, and the sceptics read ontological meanings in them and thus fail to distinguish between an office-word like P/n and an entity word like 'eyes'. The outcome is the first alleged in-built contradiction. So also the charge of infinite regress as made by the sceptics has its root in their failure to see the distinctive character of an inferential cognition. Thus, such a cognition has at its root a cognition of the relation of comprehension between the probandum and the probans, and such a cognition generally results from a careful consideration of the question whether the probans is deviating (*vyabhicāri*) or involves other such faults. Accordingly, it is rather immune to doubt. To doubt the truth of an inferential cognition, a person should mention what his grounds are for doubting the probans. Ordinarily, he fails, and if he doubts nevertheless, his doubt would be rather obsessional or pathological. And if he is successful in inventing some at least apparently genuine faults and thus apprehends that the cognition of comprehension may not be true, then also his doubt may ordinarily be overcome. Similarly, a perception is not ordinarily doubted if it occurs under familiar circumstances, for it is extremely difficult to find reasons for doubting it. The contention that it is not only essential that the action consequent upon a cognition should be successful, but also that the successful consequence should figure in a cognition to identify which as a P/a an infinite series of inferences would be required, is counter-intuitive. For when, to settle the doubt if the cognition of water is true or false, a person takes what figures as water and his thirst is quenched, it is meaningless to ask how he knows that his thirst has been quenched. Nevertheless, if so asked, he would reply that he is awake, is not ill, or drunk, or in a state of dream, etc., and so he is not only sure but also has the right to be sure. If, however, he is asked how he knows that he is not dreaming, he would reply that either the question is improper or the questioner should say if he is sure that he is not dreaming or is not drunk and so on. It seems that from what has been said the third in-built contradiction mentioned above need not be separately discussed. And as regards the contention that it is not *samśaya* but *arthasandeha* or the ambiguous nature of the object that arrests

confident response, it should be said in reply that an object is definite and not ambiguous. The case of *arthasandeha* is not an exception. It is the manifestation, foggy or ambiguous, that is at fault, and confident response would take place if the doubt is overcome, or the contradicting cognition, *vyatirekanāśaya*, is shown to be false. And as a *pratibandhaka*, a frustrating agent, is what being removed the effect occurs, it is the doubt or the contradicting cognition that should be treated as so. The sceptic's contention is the outcome of not thinking thoroughly over the matter, possibly on account of his anxiety to save his ontology by demolishing P/n etc.

IV. *The Relation between a P/a and Successful Action*

We have considered how a Nyāya philosopher would refute a sceptic. It may be said that it is comparable to Dr Johnson's refutation of Berkeley. But then we do not see what was wrong with Dr Johnson's refutation. We think that Professor Moore and many contemporary philosophers do not deny that Dr Johnson was substantially right. And a Nyāya philosopher dismisses with contempt the contention that in matters of *vyavahāra* or behaviour including the use of words, a philosopher does not challenge common sense, and so it is irrelevant to dismiss a philosophical proposition by referring to the fact that it makes *vyavahāra* impossible. Indeed, he is of the view that doubt, philosophical or ordinary, is permissible so long as it does not have as its consequence a paralysing influence on action, or a contradiction between what a person says and what he does. A doubt beyond this permissible limit is obsessional—and not either ordinary or philosophical.

Anyway, we should mention here that a Nyāya philosopher does not hold that the relation between 'being a P/a' and 'being conducive to successful action' is analytic. On the contrary he takes it to be synthetic. That is why he defines a P/a in terms of *viśeṣyatā* or 'being an epistemic subject' and *prakāratā* or 'being an epistemic predicate' and not in terms of 'being conducive to successful action'. But how is such a connection that is claimed to be universal established in terms of experience? To answer it the early Nyāya philosophers like Udyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra first show that the relation is rather circular

and then resort to the doctrine of rebirth that incidentally asserts that there is no absolutely first birth. Thus, they argue that a cognition may be identified as a P/a by acting upon it and by taking into account that the resultant action is successful. But then the success of an action is assured if the cognition at its root is a P/a, and in cases of doubt the response is not confident as the cognition is not identified as a P/a. So a circle is involved. Besides, the relation between the two is one of being a cause and being an effect, and so of being an antecedent and being a consequent. Accordingly, the question is how the situation should be accounted for. In answer they resort to the doctrine of rebirth. This account is logically adequate in that in terms of the doctrine there is no absolutely first birth.

Nevertheless, the later Nyāya philosophers do not relish this account. They regard it as being formulated by some leaders of the Nyāya school—*sampradāya-vidah*, but do not consider it important. Their attempt at establishing the relation may be, freely and in non-technical language and over-simplified form, described as follows.

They first of all refer to the sceptical contention that P/n etc. are not real *nāsti* and ask what this denial involves. Thus the sceptics can deny P/n etc. provided they admit that they figure in cognition, and that what is not real or is fictitious cannot so figure. The sceptics may say that they believe in *asatkhyāti* or the doctrine that even the fictitious may figure as an object of a cognition. But the doctrine is not only controversial but also difficult to formulate. It seems that the sceptics know it. Besides they use P/n etc. if only to demolish them. Accordingly they say that they take up these expressions from ordinary language and subject them to a critical examination which they fail to pass. If this be a crime, *aparādha*, it is of the expressions' and not theirs. Besides they use them, so they claim, as *avicārasiddha* or unexamined, and so their denial does not involve anything else. Now, the later Nyāya philosophers agree with the sceptics in holding that these expressions are social, and society (*pitṛā-dau*) teaches them. But that is just the beginning of the problem. A person may learn from society that a true cognition is adequate to its object and is conducive to a successful action. But this is not sufficient. He should himself establish the relations, for otherwise he would not be successful in refuting his critic

and also in convincingly identifying a P/a. But how would he do it? Let it be assumed that he has a cognition of assurance-form and acts upon it and that the action is successful. Let it be assumed further that on a previous occasion he had such a cognition but the resultant action was not successful. So he experiences two kinds of resultant action. Now, let it be further assumed that in the previous cognition fireness figured as the epistemic predicate, but he sought heat or warmth and failed to obtain it. And after inspecting the object that was cognized as fire he found that it was water. Accordingly, he comes to entertain the conclusion, at least provisionally, that when what figures in the cognition as its epistemic predicate does not reside in what figures in it as its epistemic subject, the resultant action is unsuccessful—and thus in a way he comes to learn better or by himself what society taught him about a non-P/a. Now, in the case under consideration the resultant action is successful, and if he seeks to construct an inference, not P/a but the negation of not-P/a would figure as his probandum. And afterwards he would argue that this cognition in which fireness figures as the epistemic predicate is of an object in which fireness resides, or is not one in which what is other than fireness resides (and so on), as the resultant action has been successful or as heat or warmth that has been sought for has been obtained, and when this is not so, the outcome is not so as in a case of a false cognition of fire. It is on this line that Gaṅgeśa and his followers seek to establish the said connection or to show that expressions like P/a etc. get their life.

v. Some Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, we should mention some at least apparently odd cases that demand that the concept of P/n or evidence should be given a deeper consideration. Thus it may be that a person misperceives^a a column of dust hovering around the hill as smoke and so infers that there is fire in the hill. And it may so happen that there is fire in the hill. So the inferential cognition is true, the relation of comprehension obtains between fire and smoke, but such smoke as resides in the hill has not been perceived, and a column of dust has been misperceived as smoke. But should we say that the person knows that there is fire in the

hill? Is it not the case that he just happens to know *daivakatāt*? If asked how he knows that, he would refer to the column of dust that he misperceived as smoke. But should it not elicit the retort that what he perceives as smoke is not smoke but dust? What would be his reply? Would he say that he acted upon his cognition, reached the hill and obtained fire? But how would he distinguish his contention from that of the sceptic that even a false cognition may have a successful action as its consequence? Would he say that what is false is the cognition of smoke, and not the cognition that there is fire in the hill? But would it be satisfactory? For the said misperception has a true inferential cognition as its consequence. Besides, there are many other odd cases. Thus a person may infer that a jar at the first moment of its occurrence has smell in that it is a piece of earth. In this case the probans is a legitimate one and resides in what figures as the epistemic subject. Nevertheless, the inference, according to Śiromaṇi and his followers, though not according to Pakṣadhara Mīśra, is wrong in that in the first moment of its occurrence it is the negation of smell, and not smell, that resides there. In such a case the probans resides in what figures in the epistemic subject and is not misperceived. So it is unlike the first case. Nevertheless the inferential cognition is false. How to account for such an odd case?

Further, a person perceives that the object yonder has all the attributes that are common to a man and a lamppost, but does not perceive the differentiating attribute that one of them has and the other has not. So he comes to have a doubt whether the object yonder is a man or a lamppost. Then he comes to perceive hands, feet, etc. that are attributes of a man and not of a lamppost. So he may be said to perceive the yonder object as a man. His cognition of a man consequent upon the doubt could be a case of perception in that it is what its after-perception delivers, and again the causal conditions sufficient to produce a perception are stronger than the causal conditions sufficient to produce an inferential cognition of the same form. Now, it may happen that the perception of hands, feet, etc. transpires to be non-veridical. Nevertheless, the resultant perception that the yonder object is a man is true. How to account for such a case? It would not do to say that the true cases of cognition mentioned above happen to be true and the untrue

case mentioned above happens to be untrue. For the person cannot substantiate his claim that he knows that there is fire in the hill or that the yonder object is a man. So also he cannot dismiss the claim of one who claims to know that the jar at the first moment of its occurrence possesses smell. It may be said that in the final analysis not being contradicted is a P/n or evidence. Now it may be a necessary condition, but what about sufficient conditions? Would it be said that it is not possible to assimilate them or to give a neat formula that would cover all of them because they differ in a bewildering manner in different cases? Again, an attempt may be made to define evidence or P/n in terms of the causal influence exercised by the object. Now, this may work in the cases of perception or ordinary (*laukika*) perception but in other cases it would not. Would we say with some later Nyāya philosophers mentioned in *NK* that the definition of P/n is P/n-ness? In other words, should we say that 'being a P/n' is a simple property, a property analogous to a class-property, but for technical reasons it is not treated as such, and that what has this property is a P/n? It seems to us that the question is still open and no decisive answer has yet been given. Is it not the case that Prof. Ryle, while discussing Plato's doctrine that knowledge is belief with logos added to it, observed that Plato did not succeed in saying in what precisely the addition of logos consisted and no one has yet been successful in saying what it precisely is? It seems that a perusal of the Nyāya philosophy, as also of the other systems of Indian philosophy with their scholastic shells removed, leads to the same conclusion, and thus the light that this paper seeks to shed on the concepts of evidence and justification is, to refer to Plato again, like the sort of light that blinds like the sun's. We all know in a way what is an evidence and what it is to justify. This knowing is not vague, but too wide to be formulated neatly. It is to be hoped that someone who takes keen interest in this problem may be able to do it, and in justification of the hope it may be observed that the universe is vast and time is endless.

II

The Nature of Ignorance: An Examination of the Advaita View

Ignorance is not a definite and positive fact like consciousness. But neither is it a negative fact like the absence of a pot. It, that is to say, is a quasi-positive and indefinite fact. This is how the Advaitins opine. It is obvious that this runs counter to the commonsense view. For common sense, ignorance is absence of awareness. If I am ignorant I do not know, and if I do not know I am ignorant. But according to the Advaitins this is untenable. They analyse the phenomena known as awareness of ignorance, cognitive manifestation and dreamless sleep, and argue that ignorance is to be characterized as a quasi-positive fact. This paper proposes to study critically the Advaita analysis of the first two phenomena and to see if it is incorrect to say that ignorance is a negative fact.

Awareness of Ignorance

When we are aware that we are ignorant, the object of our awareness, according to the Advaitins, is not a negative fact called absence of awareness. For this awareness is immediate, perceptual; and absence cannot be perceived. That is, according to the Advaitins what is present here and now may be perceived. But what is absent cannot be. If we speak in the language of commonsense philosophy we may say that when an object comes into contact with a sense-organ, it may be perceived. So when there is no sense-object contact, there is no perception. This precisely is the case with absence. With absence, i.e. a negative fact, no sense can come into contact. When I look at the ground and become aware that there is no jar there, my eyes come into contact with the ground, but with the absence of jars they can have no contact. Absence cannot

be an object of perception; so what we are aware of, when we are aware that we are ignorant, is not absence of awareness.

Now, the Advaita theory of perception is not above criticism. It may be argued that absence may be perceived. Indeed this is just what the Naiyāyikas assert. They recognize absence to be objective and irreducible. The Prābhākaras argue that absence is not something more than what is called the bare locus of it. The Sāṃkhya-kāras also think that absence is merely a then-transformation of its so-called mere locus. The Naiyāyikas join issue with them. They argue that absence is ultimate and irreducible. Still they say that absence may be perceived. They, to be sure, are in sympathy with the commonsense view that when there is no sense-object contact there is no perception. But then they argue that as the objects of knowledge may differ categorially, so also the sense-object contacts may differ. Thus when I see a table which is categorially a substance, the sense-object contact is of the variety called conjunction (*saṃyoga*). But when I see the brown of the table, my eyes are related to the brown through the table. The brown of the table inheres in the table, and between the table and the eyes there obtains the relation of conjunction. So here the sense-object contact is of the variety called inherence as characterized by conjunction (*saṃyukta samavāya*). In fine, the Naiyāyikas are in sympathy with the view that where there is no sense-object contact, there is no perception. But they point out that sense-object contact is not of one sort only. The senses may come into contact with absence, for absence is related to its locus and the relation is objective, independent of the awareness that is aware of it. The absence of jars may be said to be an attribute of its locus, the ground; and I may see the absence, as my eyes will be related to the absence through the ground. Absence, in short, may be perceived; and the Advaita conception that awareness of ignorance is not of a negative fact cannot stand scrutiny.

The Advaitins are fully conscious of such an objection. They do not deny that due recognition should be given to the view that absence may be perceived. Indeed, to say that as absence cannot be perceived and so immediate awareness of ignorance is not of a negative fact is to argue cavalierly. If we are serious, we must show that this is the case even if we admit that absence may be perceived. And the Advaitins are serious. So they at-

tempt to show that even if their theory of perception is amended to cover awareness of absence, it cannot be said that we are aware of a negative fact when we are aware that we are ignorant. And this is the important point in the Advaita analysis of awareness of ignorance. If the Advaitins can show that, even if we admit that absence may be perceived, we cannot say that awareness of ignorance is of absence of awareness, then they win. But if they cannot, they lose.

But can they show this? Let us see. Perception of absence depends upon the fulfilment of certain conditions. If I am to perceive the absence of jars on the ground, I must know what a jar is. If I have no knowledge of a jar, I cannot perceive the absence of it. And this is the first condition that must be fulfilled if absence is to be perceived. Then, to perceive absence is to perceive it somewhere. We perceive the absence of the jar on the ground, of the book on the shelf, of colour in the sky and so on. Perception of absence involves perception of its locus (if the locus is a perceptible fact). Floating absence, if any, cannot be perceived. This is the second condition that must be fulfilled if absence is to be perceived. Again, when the absence of something is to be perceived, this something must not be perceived. If I perceive a jar on the ground I cannot perceive the absence of the jar there. So the absence of x may be perceived only when the percipient has knowledge of this x , perceives the locus of the absence, and does not perceive the said x in that locus. This is how the logicians who hold that absence may be perceived analyse perception of absence. Now let us, in the light of this analysis, see if awareness of ignorance is an awareness of absence of awareness, and so analyse the structure of this awareness. The subject in this awareness, i.e. the qualificand (*viśeṣya*), is the self, and the predicate, the qualifier (*prakāra*), is ignorance. In Indian Logic, the structure of a cognition is exhibited by exhibiting the qualificand, the qualifier and the relation that constitutes the content of the cognition. When I know that the pot is red, the pot is the qualificand, red is the qualifier, and inherence (*samavāya*) is the relation. So we may state the structure of the cognition thus: it is a cognition that has red as its qualifier and the pot as its qualificand.* (For the sake of convenience we have here followed convention

* *Raktaparakāra ghaṭaviśeṣyaka.*

and dropped the relation.) Similarly, the structure of the awareness of ignorance may be stated thus: it is a cognition which has ignorance as its qualifier and the self as its qualificand. Now, if by ignorance we are to understand absence of awareness, we are to say that here we are perceiving an absence that is an attribute of the self. So the locus of this absence is the self. And as there cannot be an awareness of absence if there is no awareness of its locus, so of this absence one cannot have any awareness if one is not also aware of the self. But the self is consciousness. So to be aware of the self is to be aware of awareness. And as there can be no awareness of the absence of something if this something is perceived in the locus, so there can be no perception of absence of awareness in the self. Again, cognition is self-revealing. Our awareness of awareness differs in kind from our awareness of objects. Awareness may be immediate without being an object. So when an object is cognized, not only is the object cognized but the cognition of it also is. Accordingly, when there is an awareness of absence of awareness, there is an awareness of this awareness also. And as the latter awareness is aware that awareness (of absence of awareness) belongs to the self, the awareness of the absence we are to perceive is perceived in the so-called locus of the absence. So absence of awareness cannot be perceived in the self. There cannot be any immediate awareness which will have the self as its qualificand and absence of awareness as its qualifier. Hence our immediate awareness of ignorance is an awareness, not of absence of awareness, but of a thing which is positive but indefinite.

This is the Advaita analysis of awareness of ignorance. Obviously, it rests upon two assumptions, viz. (i) the self is consciousness and (ii) consciousness is self-revealing. So the examination of it may take two forms. We may either challenge the assumptions or ask if such an analysis is the necessary outcome of these assumptions. The first task is more difficult. It raises questions that cannot be discussed within the short compass of this paper. So we shall adopt the second course. But still we shall make the following observations on these assumptions. Consciousness as experienced is an occurrent. It occurs and then ceases to exist. This is the report of introspection. But the self cannot be said to be an occurrent in this sense. Whether the

self is a substance, whether the view that the self is eternally unchanging, is an epistemological as well as a metaphysical necessity cannot be discussed here. We must be satisfied here with the remark that the self cannot be as transient an occurrent as consciousness is, and that of a non-occurrent or eternal consciousness there is at least no introspective evidence. Again, consciousness as introspected is adjectival. Our introspective reports are of the form, 'I am', 'I have', etc. We say that we know, or have knowledge of, the table. When the structure of such an awareness is analysed, it becomes obvious that the self is the qualificand and consciousness as qualified by its object is the qualifier. The self is, so to say, a substance and consciousness is its adjective, while the object of it is an adjective of this adjective. So the view that equates the self with consciousness is hardly in keeping with our introspective awareness of consciousness. Similarly, the view that consciousness is self-revealing does not fit in with the commonsense view that 'of' as appearing in the expression 'consciousness of' is always prepositional. That is, common sense holds that as we know tables and chairs, so we know knowledge. The advocates of the self-revealing theory object to it. But this, we make bold to assert, only suggests that the commonsense view should be carefully formulated. Indeed, if we are not forced to the position that the inner life is a procession of momentary events, then there is no need for assuming that a feeling feels itself, or that a cognition cognizes itself. However, the issue is a large one and we cannot thrash it out here. We should be content with the observation that the assumptions on which the Advaita analysis of awareness of ignorance rests have hardly any empirical foundation.

Now, let us see if the Advaita analysis is necessitated by these assumptions. The Rāmānujists say that as the expressions 'the sun is light' and 'the sun has light' are equally legitimate, so also are the expressions 'the self is consciousness' and 'the self has consciousness'. Thus they do not deny that the self is consciousness. But then they do not hold that immediate awareness of ignorance is of a quasi-positive indefinite fact. They, on the contrary, hold that this is an awareness of absence of awareness. So it seems that the assumption that the self is consciousness does not make the Advaita analysis inevitable.

We may analyse awareness of ignorance after the Rāmānujists. We may say that though the self is consciousness, yet self-consciousness may be distinct or indistinct. Where there is a distinct consciousness of self, absence of awareness cannot be perceived in the self. That is, distinct self-consciousness cancels absence of awareness. But this is not true of indistinct consciousness of self. It does not nullify absence of awareness. When there is an indistinct consciousness of self, absence of knowledge may be perceived as belonging to the self. So the proposition that the self is consciousness does not entail the proposition that immediate awareness of ignorance is an awareness of a quasi-positive fact. To affirm the first proposition is not to affirm the second also. Similarly, to deny the second is not necessarily to deny the first. We may affirm the first and yet deny the second.

Obviously, this analysis rests upon the assumption that self-consciousness may be distinct as well as indistinct. If this assumption is challenged, the analysis may have no leg to stand upon. But should we challenge it? Let us suppose that the self is always distinctly manifest, and that ignorance is a quasi-positive fact. Then let us ask if ignorance may be perceived. It seems that the question can be answered neither affirmatively nor negatively. It cannot be answered affirmatively, for ignorance is not immortal. It is cancelled. When there is distinct self-consciousness, there cannot be any perception of ignorance as belonging to the self. If self-consciousness is contradictory of ignorance considered as a negative fact, then it is also contradictory of ignorance taken as a quasi-positive fact. If awareness of self makes perception of absence of awareness impossible, then it stands in the way of perception of quasi-positive ignorance also. So the question cannot be answered affirmatively. But neither can it be answered negatively. For immediate awareness of ignorance is there. We are thus placed on the horns of a dilemma. To avoid this, we have to say that any self-consciousness does not cancel ignorance. Perception of ignorance may exist along with some consciousness of self. The Advaitins are not unaware of it. They also say that consciousness in its transcendental aspect (*sākṣī*) asserts (*sādhaka*) and does not cancel ignorance, while consciousness in its empirical aspect, i.e. as conditioned by the modes of the material mind

(*vyrtti*), cancels ignorance. The *sākṣī* is *sādhaka*, while *vyrttijñāna* is *nāśaka*, or ignorance.

Now, as the Advaitins distinguish between a transcendental and an empirical aspect of consciousness, so do the Rāmānujists also distinguish between distinct and indistinct self-consciousness. Therefore the distinction that the Rāmānujists draw is not necessitated by their conception of ignorance as a negative fact. What makes this distinction necessary is their view of self as consciousness. The Advaitins hold that the self is self-revealing consciousness, and therefore to explain immediate awareness of ignorance they have to distinguish between the transcendental and the empirical aspects of consciousness. The Rāmānujists do not deny that the self is consciousness, and so are forced to distinguish between distinct and indistinct self-consciousness. Hence to deny the distinction that the Rāmānujists draw is not to deny their analysis of awareness of ignorance. On the contrary it is to deny their theory of self. So the Advaitins at least cannot deny the propriety of drawing such a distinction. They should admit that the Rāmānujists' analysis of awareness of ignorance is as logical as theirs. Not only that. The distinction that the Advaitins draw is hardly in keeping with common sense. The Advaitins, the Mādhyamikas and many other thinkers distinguish between empirical and transcendental reality. But common sense knows nothing of such a distinction. Moreover, when we draw such a distinction, we create more problems than we solve. So if we are not prepared to give up the view that the self is consciousness, then to explain direct awareness of ignorance we should distinguish, after the Rāmānujists, between distinct and indistinct self-consciousness. The proposition that the self is consciousness does not entail the proposition that our immediate awareness is of a quasi-positive fact. From this it will be obvious that the proposition that consciousness is self-revealing does not entail it also. For we may say that there is some awareness that reveals and does not destroy ignorance, and it matters little whether ignorance is considered a quasi-positive fact or not. So though the Advaita analysis of awareness of ignorance proceeds on the assumption that the self is self-revealing consciousness, yet this assumption does not necessitate such an analysis.

Cognitive Manifestation

We have seen that an analysis of our awareness of ignorance does not lend support to the view that ignorance is a quasi-positive fact. Now let us see if an analysis of the phenomenon known as cognitive manifestation does this. The case of the Advaitins may be stated as follows: A cognition is light-like. It makes a hitherto unmanifested object manifest, and cognitive manifestation *qua* manifestation does not differ from such a manifestation as is due to light. So to appreciate the true character of cognitive manifestation we may analyse an ordinary case of illumination. Now when we attempt to do this we see immediately that manifestation presupposes an unmanifested state. To say that A is now manifested is to say also that so long A remained unmanifested, and that this unmanifested state has come to an end. So the analysis of manifestation is also an analysis of the unmanifested state. Indeed this is the key point in the analysis. To ascertain the real nature of manifestation we should ascertain what is meant by 'being unmanifested'. Does it merely mean absence of manifestation? Or, does it mean something more? Consider the case of the objects in a room in darkness. They are not seen. The tables, the chairs, the books, the rats and the cockroaches are all there, but covered with darkness. But what is the darkness? And how does it cover? Is it a positive fact? And does it cover like a mask? The Advaitins will answer these questions in the affirmative. They will say that darkness is a positive fact, and so when we say that objects are covered with darkness we mean exactly what we say. The expression, that is to say, is not metaphorical. As a mask conceals the face of the person who puts it on, so does darkness conceal the objects of the dark room. And as when the mask is torn to pieces the face is seen, so also when light destroys darkness objects become manifest. In short, darkness is a positive fact; the objects in a dark room remain unmanifested as they are covered by it, and their manifestation is owing to the destruction of this positive cover. This is true of every manifestation. Whenever there is a manifestation there is the removal of a positive, concealing, covering fact. So cognitive manifestation also removes a positive wrapper-like fact.

And what can this fact be except ignorance? To know is to cancel ignorance. A cognition makes a hitherto unmanifested object manifest, and this means that it removes the quasi-positive ignorance responsible for the non-manifestation of its object and manifests it. So an analysis of cognitive manifestation, the Advaitins say, shows that ignorance is a quasi-positive fact.

This analysis, it is needless to say, rests upon the assumption that darkness is a positive fact. But the question whether darkness is a positive fact is so large that it cannot be discussed in this paper. We have to be content with the observation that the Nyāya theory that darkness is simply absence of light is a more simple and so a more satisfactory theory. Indeed the hypothesis that darkness is a positive fact is unintelligibly complex. We tear the mask down and then the face is seen. But we cannot say that when a lamp is brought, darkness is destroyed and then objects are seen. That is, the introduction of light is immediately followed by a manifestation of objects—there is no third fact called destruction of darkness standing between introduction of light and manifestation of objects. Again, when the mask is torn to pieces, it is not totally destroyed. It is destroyed but the pieces remain. This is the case with every destruction. Total destruction is not a fact. But if darkness is a positive fact, the destruction of it would not be an ordinary destruction. For when darkness is destroyed, it is not broken into pieces. When darkness is removed, it does not leave behind some fragments of it. The destruction of it is a total destruction. But such a destruction is not a fact. So it seems that the proposition that darkness is a positive fact is not an intelligible proposition. Hence the Advaita theory of cognitive manifestation is not an intelligible theory, and so the theory of quasi-positive ignorance cannot fare better. Indeed it seems that the case of quasi-positive ignorance is worse. For if the non-manifestation of the objects of knowledge is owing to their being covered by quasi-positive ignorance, then it passes comprehension that they can be made manifest. For if the objects like tables and chairs are covered by ignorance, then, as the ignorance covering them is also an object of knowledge, it should be covered by another ignorance, which will demand a third ignorance, and so on *ad infinitum*. Again, does destruction of

ignorance cause manifestation of objects? Or is manifestation of objects the cause of destruction of ignorance? If ignorance literally covers the objects, then we should say that it is destruction of ignorance that causes manifestation of objects, and not vice versa. But we cannot deny that ignorance is not destroyed so long as objects are not manifested. Indeed removal of ignorance and manifestation of objects are synchronous, or rather synonymous. And this is unintelligible if ignorance is positive. So we may say that an analysis of cognitive manifestation does not show that ignorance is not a negative fact. That ignorance is absence of awareness is the commonsense view and the analysis of awareness of ignorance and cognitive manifestation does not show that this is untenable. Whether an analysis of dreamless sleep shows that this is untenable cannot be discussed here.

III ONTOLOGY

Truth, Ontology and Subjectivity

1. *Two Notions of Truth*

We would for reasons of convenience make a distinction between two notions of truth, and so would not consider the question whether the two notions are ultimate in the sense that one is not reducible to the other, or whether both of them are not reducible to some other notion of truth. So also we would not consider the question whether there are other notions of truth co-ordinate with them. Besides, we would claim, without making any attempt to justify it, that both the notions, in the language of Hegel, 'can be partially traced even in the ordinary usage of language'. Now, the two notions of truth are: (1) the epistemological notion (or the logico-epistemological notion), and (2) the ontological notion. The epistemological notion is traceable in the following uses of ordinary language:

- (a) true idea, false idea;
- (b) true belief, false belief;
- (c) true cognition (*pramā*), untrue cognition (*apramā*);
- (d) true statement, false statement;
- (e) true judgement, false judgement;
- (f) true proposition, false proposition; and such other expressions.

Now, on inspecting the list one may contend that the word 'proposition' is hardly ever used by a layman, and so it is a philosophical jargon and not a word of ordinary language. Against such a contention it ought to be said that Locke, who claimed to be a spokesman of 'the plain unsophisticated man of common sense' and disliked philosophical jargon, used the word. Similarly, if it is contended that the word 'judgement' in the sense of what is true or false is a philosophical jargon, then we would say in reply that even in an ordinary lexicon the word is

included and the sense objected to is given as one of its standard meanings. As regards the word 'idea' it would be sufficient to refer to Locke. Anyway, when we take all these uses together, we notice that in each of them the words 'true' and 'false' are used as adjectives of what claims to be true, and their nouns stand for what the different theorists of truth claim to be the logical or epistemological candidates for the said adjectives, that is, for being true or false. And thus the notion of truth underlying the above uses is logical or logico-epistemological.

We may now consider a few uses in which the ontological notion of truth is traceable. Hegel mentions a few cases, and of them three may be stated here. They are (i) a true friend, (ii) a true work of art, and (iii) an untrue state. Now, Professor Molina, with reference to the cases cited by Hegel, observes that 'it appears that truth for Hegel is an ontological notion' in that in the three cases just mentioned 'truth is . . . something ascribed to a *thing*, rather than to a belief or a sentence or a proposition'. Now, in the passage in *The Logic of Hegel* to which Professor Molina refers and which he quotes also, Hegel makes a distinction between the meaning of truth 'in common life', and 'the deeper and philosophical meaning of truth'. Professor Molina, as we have seen, pertinently observes that the second one is ontological, and to bring out the contrast we propose to call the first one logico-epistemological. We may, however, make an attempt now to distinguish between the two senses of the word 'truth' as spoken of by Hegel. Thus, Hegel thought that in common life facts or objects independent of concepts or thoughts of them were assumed, and hence truth in common life was held as consisting in the agreement 'of an object with our conception of it'. Accordingly, we may say that if the notion of truth be logico-epistemological, then truth consists in the conformity of thought to what is not a thought-content, in the correspondence of a judgement to a fact or object independent of the judgement. Now, as is well known, this theory of the nature of truth is very old, and Aristotle and Aquinas are the two outstanding proponents of it. Thus, Aquinas defined truth as the adequation of things and the intellect, and he expanded it thus: 'To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false; while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.' Experts on the subject inform us that it is

reminiscent of Aristotle, who observed that 'it is by the facts of the case, by their being or not being so, that a statement is called true or false.'

From the above it would be evident that according to Hegel the logico-epistemological notion of truth that was at the root of the correspondence theory or the commonsense view of truth, the belief in objects independent of thought, played the most vital role. But as Hegel thought that the belief was groundless, he also thought that this theory failed to give 'the deeper and philosophical meaning of truth'. Accordingly, he held that from the philosophical point of view truth consisted not in the agreement of a thought-content with what was independent of thought, but 'in the agreement of a thought-content with itself'. Besides, he thought that this notion of truth was traceable in ordinary language, and cited the cases mentioned above, and he accounted for them in terms of his view that the notion of truth was ontological in the following manner.

We speak of a true friend by which we mean a friend whose manner of conduct accords with the notion of friendship. In the same way we speak of a true work of art. Untrue in this sense means the same thing as bad, or self-discordant. In this sense a bad state is an untrue state; and evil and untruth may be said to consist in the contradiction subsisting between the function or notion and the existence of the object.

Professor Molina elaborates the Hegelian contention that the ontological notion of truth is traceable in ordinary language with reference to the expression 'true soldier' by an analysis of it as follows: A *true* soldier is a man who is a soldier in the fullest sense possible; that is, he exhibits in his professional life all the virtues of a military man; his conduct *is in accordance with* the essence of soldiering.

Thus, Hegel was of the view that from the philosophical point of view the notion of truth was ontological, and his reason for holding the view was that as there was no independent object, truth consisted not in the conformity of a thought-content with such an object, but with itself. Obviously, this is intriguing, and an investigation into the authentic character of his reason should be undertaken. We would do it as briefly as possible. But before we do that, we intend to take a quick look at the philosophies of India.

11. A Brief Reference to the Philosophies of India

In *Nyāya-Kośa* ten meanings of the word 'satyam' (which may, according to context, be translated as true or as truth) are mentioned, and we may here state and briefly dwell on five of them. They are: (i) an object of a true cognition (*pramiti-viśayah*); (ii) speaking what is not a lie (*yathārthakathanam*); (iii) a vow (*śapathah*); (iv) a cognition adequate to its object (*yathārthajñānam*); and (v) what is never contradicted (*trikālābādhyam*). The said lexicon also briefly illustrates the uses of the words in the senses given and refers to some standard texts in some cases.

Thus, with reference to the first meaning it is said that a jar, a piece of cloth, indeed all the furniture of the universe, are and are true. Or as the believers in the Upanisads say, the five elements are and are true. Now, the etymology of the word is as follows. The root concerned is the verb *as* in the sense 'to be'. The verb in present tense plural is conjugated as *santi*, meaning 'are'. And the five elements, viz. earth, water, fire, air, and *ākāśa*, are, and so they are said to be *satya* or true. Again, a reference to the Upanisadic texts makes it clear that the word *satyam* is derived from the said root, or from *santi*. Thus, there is the text that it is *SAT* that was in the beginning. He desired that He would become many and would create. He meditated and created all these (*sarvamudam*). On creating He penetrated and pervaded them all. Thus He became both *sat* and *tat*, viz. the *mūrta* and the *amūrta*—the finite and the infinite, the determinate and the indeterminate, what needs a support and what is not in need of a support, the conscious and the unconscious, the positive and the negative—indeed everything. Brahman which is Truth became all these. They are true and so Brahman is also said to be true (or the Truth).

It would be evident from the above that the notion of truth involved in the use of the word 'true' is ontological. But then the ontology is not the sort of ontology that is upheld by a commonsense realist. It is explicitly stated that the ontology is Upanisadic, and in this ontology all these, viz. the finite and the infinite, the conscious and the unconscious, the determinate and the indeterminate, the positive and the negative, the good and the evil, etc., are and are true. And Brahman who

created all these and is immanent in them is accordingly true or Truth. The use of the word 'true' primarily in regard to 'all these' or things, and secondarily in regard to Brahman is justified by reference to an etymological consideration. Now, when we consider the second sense we find that a similar process, starting not from a true cognition but from a universally admitted moral act, viz. abstaining from lying, or, affirmatively expressed, while speaking, uttering true statements or statements that are in agreement with what really happened in 'blue-blooded ontology', is at work. Thus, after saying that the word 'true' is ascribed to the utterance of a sentence that agrees with what really happened, it is said that the utterance of such sentences, or the habit of uttering such sentences, has imperishable happiness as its consequence, and a reference in corroboration of it is made to a canonical law book. But when we take into consideration the structure of the notion of truth involved in the use of the word 'true' in this sense, we see that it is not just moral in the usual sense. Neither is it ontological in the ordinary sense. It is both trans-moral and trans-ontological. It is difficult to give it an appropriate name, and we would not try it. However, we should state how the structure of the notion of truth involved is described.

Thus, it is said that the constituents of Truth are: (i) the utterance of the sort of sentence mentioned before (*satyam*); (ii) a sense of equality in all these (*samatā*); (iii) complete control of the internal and the external senses (*damah*); (iv) being above hatred and ill-will at the material and spiritual prosperity of others (*amātsaryam*); (v) forgiveness, or being above anger and the will to kill what causes bodily or moral suffering (*kṣamā*); (vi) being above boastfulness and vanity (*hriḥ*); (vii) being above imputing fault to the real merit of others (*anasūyatā*); (viii) being above being affected by heat, cold and such other things (*titikṣā*); (ix) discrimination and hence action for the sake of action without any regard for its consequences, viz. rewards and punishments (*tyāga*); (x) treating all that one owns as everyone's, and so giving it to the needy (*dāna*); (xi) being always patient and satisfied (*dhṛti*); (xii) treatment of every being as if it were his own being or self, and so being always kind (*dayā*); and (xiii) non-violence (*ahimsā*).

From the above it would be evident that speaking the truth,

or being in the habit of uttering such sentences as agree with what really happened, is not the notion of truth involved in the second sense of using the word 'true'. In other words, the notion of truth under consideration is not the logico-epistemological one. Nor is it the ontological one. It may be thought that it is ontological, though the ontology is not traditional but existential in that the truth concerned is not about being as such but about the being of a man. But this would not work. For no existential ontologist is concerned with the proper, the deeper, the ideal being of man. He takes into account the actual being of man—of a man who uses tools, whose actions are oriented towards the future, who, without wasting any argument for rejecting the notion of truth with a thirteen-membered structure, dismisses it with a shrug, and who feels that a man has been thrown into a universe that he seeks to convert into a world. So also nothing would be gained by calling the notion moral or axiological. It seems that we may have an inkling of the kind of notion of truth involved in the case under consideration if we take into account the truth experimenting with which constituted the life of Mahatma Gandhi. But then the exponents of the notion of truth with the above structure do not rest with the above exposition. They adopt the well-known strategical moves to convert this notion of truth into a regal ontological notion. The first move adopted by them consists in subordinating the laws of nature to truth—the kind of truth under consideration. Thus, while singing in praise of speaking the truth they say that it is truth that governs the actions of the elemental forces and thus of the material universe, and the person who is in the habit of speaking the truth and never deviates from speaking the truth comes to master them. His gains are infinitely more than what a man can gain by fasting, by performing the sacrifices as directed by the Vedas, by worship and prayer, etc. The next move consists in subordinating the moral laws to truth. The third move consists in equating the two laws and subordinating them to truth. The fourth move consists in holding that truth is above both the laws and is the source and controller of them. It is thus the supreme Brahman. And the final move consists in declaring that it was Truth that was in the beginning and before all the other things that have been mentioned in the exposition of the first sense of the word 'true'.

The third sense of the word 'true' is a vow or a solemn promise. It is not necessary to dwell, even briefly, on the notion of truth involved in the use of the word 'true' in this sense. For it appears that the sort of notion involved in the use of the word in the second sense covers it. Thus, most of the penalties that are said to be consequent upon not saying what is true in the second sense are also mentioned as the penalties consequent upon not keeping a solemn promise.

We may now consider the fourth sense. Ordinarily, when the word 'true' is used, particularly in philosophical literature, it is used in this sense. It has been indicated above that in this sense a cognition is true if it is adequate to its object. This compares favourably with what has been stated above in the definition of truth as given by Aristotle or by Aquinas. Indeed, the way in which some philosophers of India expand it is also similar to the way in which Aquinas did it. Now, the Indian philosophers make a distinction between a primary or non-recollective cognition (*anubhava*) and a recollective cognition (*smṛti*). And most of them are reluctant to esteem a recollective cognition as a *pramā*, a true cognition in the strict sense.

Thus, for most of them only a primary cognition may be treated as a *pramā*, and we would henceforth use the expression 'a true cognition' as the English equivalent of the Sanskrit word '*pramā*'. Again, most of these philosophers hold that a primary cognition may be untrue. Besides, they think that an untrue cognition (*apramā*) may be either certain or uncertain. Thus, a misperception of a rope as a snake is untrue, but certain nevertheless. But in the case of a cognition of a distant object and with the form 'whether that is a man or a lamppost', or, better, with the form 'whether that is a man or a non-man', we have a case of cognition that is not certain. So these philosophers, in order to differentiate a true cognition from a doubt or an uncertain cognition, hold that a cognition to be a true one should be not only primary but also certain; and in order to differentiate a true cognition from an untrue cognition that is also certain, they hold that it should be adequate to its object as well. And they would analyse the concept of adequacy in the following manner.

When the object yonder is a snake and is perceived as a snake, we have a case of a perceptual cognition that is primary, certain and adequate. That it is primary and certain is obvious.

It is adequate to its object in that the object is a determinate object, viz. a snake that owns the property 'snakeness', and it is this property that figures as the epistemic predicate of the cognition. In other words, the cognition under consideration has a structure that is gathered from an inspection of the sentence that has articulated it. The sentence is: this is a snake. The word 'this' as occurring in it may be said to stand for the object, viz. the snake as present here and now, and the word 'a snake' or snakeness for the property that the said object owns. With reference to the cognition articulated in it, it is said to be an epistemic predicate (*prakāra*). Accordingly, the cognition happens to be one in which snakeness figures as an epistemic predicate, and is about a determinate object that has snakeness as its property. And a cognition of this type is said to be adequate to its object. We may generalize it with the help of two variables, x and y . Thus, when it is the case that an object x has the property y , then a cognition of it would be adequate if y figures in it as the epistemic predicate. Again, as in the case of cognition under consideration 'snakeness' is said to be figuring as an epistemic predicate, so also 'this' may be said to be figuring as its epistemic subject (*viśeṣya*). So an adequate cognition may be defined as one in which what has y figures as the epistemic subject and y figures as the epistemic predicate. A false or an inadequate cognition may be defined accordingly. These definitions are given after a primer of the later Nyāya philosophy. And when we take into consideration a book of early Nyāya philosophy, we come across the following definition-type statement: what is and as it is, and also what is not and as it is not, are ascertained by true or adequate cognition.

We have considered at some length the fourth sense of the 'true', and in the course of our consideration we have mentioned that in this sense the word is mostly used in philosophical literature, or in the writings of the academic philosophers of the different schools. Thus, we have also outlined briefly how the philosophers of the Nyāya school have analysed the concept of adequacy. Now, the chief reason for our going into the Nyāya analysis is that the Nyāya philosophers claim to be the philosophical spokesmen of *lokayātrā* (everyday behaviour of the common folk) and *lokavyavahāra* (ordinary language), and not infrequently seek to clinch an issue by a reference to them. So

it would be within the bounds of propriety to treat them as philosophers of common sense and ordinary language, or as philosophers who attempt to ascertain, analyse, and defend the philosophical beliefs at the root of common sense and ordinary language. Accordingly, we may say that though the use of the word 'true' in the fourth sense is found in philosophical literature, yet it may be asserted that the word in this sense is also used in the everyday transactions of the common man, and thus in ordinary language. However, it is the case that no philosopher explicitly rejects common sense or ordinary language. Berkeley, who thought that he had convincingly demonstrated the proposition that the being of anything consisted either in perceiving or in being perceived—a proposition that should appear as shocking and would be refuted in the style of Johnson by kicking a stone, was of the view that he had no quarrel with common sense. Similarly, some Buddhists who denied the reality of the external world and of everything that was non-momentary—a view that a layman would hold to be absurd in that it would make everyday behaviour inexplicable and impossible—declared that in matters of everyday behaviour there was no distinction between a philosopher and a tiro. Professor Bosanquet, who, as is well known, was an absolute idealist, was fully aware of the vexing question that absolute idealism was repugnant to common sense. But then he felt that the said question might be given a decent burial by pointing out that what was against his philosophy or the philosophy of Berkeley was not common sense precisely because it was not a philosophy at all, but the so-called philosophy of common sense—a philosophy that was neither coherent nor was fully reflected upon. But a philosopher of the Nyāya school would not agree with him, just as Professor Moore did not. Indeed, he would contend that the philosophers who look down upon common sense seem to be oblivious of the fact that a large number of beliefs which are at the root of our everyday behaviour get muffled by the views propounded and defended by them. And it seems that they know it. So they seek to compromise with common sense, which is not in the least laudable. Instead of underestimating common sense they should have made serious attempts to find out what these beliefs are, what their analysis is, how they are related, and also whether the

philosophical doctrines that are against them do not, when honestly adhered to and acted upon, result in a collapse of all activities, including the activity to find fault with common sense for inventing strange philosophies. Be that as it may, a Nyāya philosopher thinks that the fundamental task of philosophy is to ascertain these beliefs and the cluster that they form, to analyse them and also to defend them against the criticism of the philosophers who mock at them and invent subtle arguments to refute them.

Now, of the various beliefs of common sense, what is most important for the use of the word 'true' in the fourth sense is the belief in independent objects. Accordingly, the philosophers of the Nyāya school use the word 'true' in this sense, and analyse the nature of a true cognition in terms of some relation between the cognition and its object. So they would also contend that the word 'true' is an adjective, its noun being a cognition, and hence the notion of truth involved in the use of the word in the fourth sense is logico-epistemological. In their language *satyatva* or truth is a simple assimilating property comparable to, but for technical reasons is not, a universal. Nevertheless, like a universal it resides in every true cognition. In other words, the property of 'being a cow', viz. cowness, is a property that resides in every cow, and is thus an assimilating property. Besides, it is intuitive that it is a simple property, and though it may reside in the same locus with a super-ordinate or a sub-ordinate property, it does not reside in the same locus with a co-ordinate property. But then, in the opinion of the philosophers, the property of 'being true', viz. truth, agrees with cowness in being simple and assimilating. Nevertheless, it differs from cowness in that it may reside in the same locus with its co-ordinate property, falsity. Thus, in the case of the paradigm of the misperception of a rope as a snake which is articulated as 'this is a snake', 'this' figures as the epistemic subject and 'snakeness' figures as the epistemic predicate. In the judgement of most of the philosophers of this school the cognition has gone wrong in respect of its epistemic predicate but not in respect of its epistemic subject. Accordingly, 'truth' resides in the same locus with 'falsity'—a property co-ordinate with it. Hence, it cannot be ranked as a universal. Anyway, as the philosophers of the Nyāya school believe in independent objects, the notion

of truth that they propound and defend is the logico-epistemological one.

It would, however, be a gross misrepresentation if it is asserted or even suggested that the philosophers of the Nyāya school only believed in independent objects. For, as a matter of fact, philosophers of many other schools also did so. However, it is not required for a discussion of our subject that the names of all of them and also their views on the nature of such objects, on the kind of cognition of them, on the type of the notion of truth involved in their use of the word 'true' and the other related points should be mentioned and discussed here. We should mention the name of one such school, viz. the school of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā. The reasons why we start with this school would be apparent in the subsequent pages. The philosophers of this school differ from those of the Nyāya school on many important logical and epistemological issues. But then the philosophers of both the schools agree in holding that the notion of truth is logico-epistemological. It is true that the philosophers belonging to some other schools and believing in independent objects also hold that the notion of truth is essentially logico-epistemological. But their view on the nature of non-veridical perception and also on the nature and status of what figures in such a perception does not differ as radically from that of the Nyāya philosophers as that of the philosophers of this school does. And the spelling out of this difference and so also of their insistence on the logico-epistemological notion of truth would, we think, be of considerable importance in appreciating the distinction between the two notions of truth. To put it differently, the fifth meaning of truth which is subscribed to by the Advaitins involves the ontological notion of truth in its majesty. Accordingly, we would devote the whole of the following section to develop it and contrast it with the logico-epistemological notion of truth as developed by the philosophers of the Nyāya and the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā schools.

III. *The Fifth Meaning of the Word 'True'*

The fifth meaning, as has been said before, involves the ontological notion of truth in its majesty. But while dwelling on the

first three meanings of the word 'true' we tried to show that the notion involved in the uses of the word in the cases concerned was ontological, and that the kind of ontology was 'blue-blooded'. So it should be said now that while dwelling on the senses and interpreting the texts concerned, we went beyond them and read into them what was not visibly present in them. In other words, the senses that we discussed were gathered from a standard lexicon of philosophical words, which also referred to some texts in which the word was used in the senses given. But the texts concerned were not, strictly speaking, philosophical. They were, as was observed while dwelling on the senses, the Upanisadic, the Paurāṇika and such other texts, and so no reasoned account of the notions involved was given in them. Besides, we felt the need of taking into account a number of statements lying scattered in a number of texts of this kind and of linking them. Accordingly, we had to read into them what was not visibly present in them. Again, the texts concerned are held in high esteem by the philosophers of all the orthodox schools, and not by the Advaitins alone, who use the word in the fifth sense. Thus, the ontological notion of truth involved in the use of the word in the fifth sense is so in quite a different way.

Anyway, in the fifth sense, *what is true is for ever free from contradiction*. This does not mean that the judgement which is once true is always true, or that a true judgement is universal. It seems that we approximate its true interpretation if we say that when the object of a cognition is essentially free from contradiction it is true. But a philosopher of the Nyāya school may contend that since beginningless, changeless and endless eternal entities like a universal, or the atoms, or the *ākāśa*, or the individual selves, or God and such other entities are forever free from contradiction in that they are beginningless etc., they are true or are candidates for being true. But an Advaitin would reject such a contention. For he holds that only Brahman is eternal or beginningless etc. Similarly, he would reject the claims of the atoms, the *ākāśa*, etc. to be the candidates for being true on this ground. As regards the claim made in respect of the individual selves (*jīva*), he would say that in reality these are not many selves. An individual self, when purified (*śodhita*) of its different adjuncts (*upādhi*) that are at

the root of 'the systematic ambiguity of I' and also of the sense of the plurality, is seen to be not different from Brahman. Thus, Brahman alone is forever free from contradiction, and only It is true.

It may, however, be contended that an Advaitin's approach to the question of the notion of truth—if the above is a faithful representation of his approach—is from the wrong side and so cannot be given a respectful hearing. For such a question should be approached from the side of epistemology. It may be that the notion of truth for an Advaitin is a regal ontological notion. It may also be that the fifth sense of the word 'true' that is being sought to be elaborated in this section involves such a notion. Besides, there may be an intimate relation between epistemology and ontology, such that if ontology differs, epistemology also does. Nevertheless, there is no sense in the denial of the relative autonomy of epistemology. So if one is serious, then one should consider the nature of truth and hence the nature of a true cognition without introducing the ontological propositions first and then deducing epistemological conclusions from them, or settling the epistemological controversies in terms of them.

It cannot be denied that the above contention has some weight. So we may now make an attempt to dwell on the fifth sense by taking into account a standard definition of a true cognition as given by an Advaitin. A true cognition is defined by an Advaitin thus: A true cognition is a cognition that is certain (*niścaya*), and is of an object (*artha*) that is both novel (*anadhigata*) and free from contradiction (*abādhita*).

The definition may be analysed as follows. If the word 'certain' is left out of the definition, then it would be too wide a definition in that it would cover the case of a doubt that is not a definiendum of it. If the word 'novel', which may be understood at the first-level analysis of the definition as 'hitherto unknown', is left out, the definition would also be too wide in that it would cover the case of a recollective cognition that is not considered by most of the Indian philosophers to be a definiendum of it. And if the words 'free from contradiction' are left out, the definition would be applicable to false cognitions that are not its definienda and so would be too wide.

Now, the intriguing point about the definition is that it

asserts that both novelty and being free from contradiction qualify or are adjectives of the object concerned, and this may be brought out as follows. Thus, the perception of a rope as a snake is a case of non-veridical perception. But an immanent inspection of it does not show that it is non-veridical. We come to know afterwards what is non-veridical. Thus, when we look at the object more carefully and under better illumination, we perceive it to be a rope. It is the second cognition that contradicts the first cognition. So the relation of 'being contradicted' and 'contradicting', or in short, of 'contradiction', holds between the two cognitions. This seems to be intuitive. So a definition of a true cognition given in terms of an object that is free from contradiction cannot but be intriguing. Rather, it seems to be counter-intuitive to hold that the 'illusory snake', or the snake that figured as an object in the said non-veridical perception, is an object not free from contradiction. So the definition given in terms of a contradiction-free object is equally counter-intuitive and therefore intriguing.

Similarly with novelty. There seems to be no valid reason whatever for defining a true cognition in terms of the novelty of its object. Indeed, a layman may make a compromise with the attempt at giving the definition in terms of an object free from contradiction. Thus, he may argue that though it is intuitive that the relation of contradiction holds between cognitions (or, if preferred, between judgements or propositions), yet one may speak metaphorically of objects as free from contradiction or as involving contradiction according as they figure as objects of true or false cognitions, and may therefore define a true cognition in terms of objects free from contradiction. But it is almost impossible even to invent reasons for defining a true cognition in terms of novelty. The proponents of the definition argue in favour of including the term in the definition by pointing out the undesirable consequence of leaving it out. We have mentioned this before. We have seen that in the judgement of the proponents of the definition, if the word 'novelty' be left out of the definition, then it would become too wide a definition as it would cover the case of memory. Now, it may be contended that this may be done in a more simple and less controversial way if the definition is given in the way the Nyāya philosophers give. Thus, it has been said that the Nyāya philosophers,

in order to exclude memory, give the definition in terms of primary cognition, and this is obviously a simpler way. For the definition is given directly in terms of a mark of a true cognition—a mark that is open to inspection and figures in its own cognition. But the definition that an Advaitin gives is in terms of a characteristic of its objects, and so it is in terms of a mark that is directly of its object and only indirectly of it. So, if a cognition satisfies the definition of a true cognition, it may be ascertained not by taking into account what its own cognition says about it, but by considering what sort of object figures as its object. This should be deemed to be a roundabout way, and the definition given by an Advaitin should be discarded on the ground that it offends against the law of logical economy. The point is so obvious that an Advaitin should be in the know of it, and therefore his definition in terms of the novelty of an object is difficult to understand.

So it is imperative that the definition is subjected to a second-level analysis, and we propose to do this briefly by subjecting the concept of novelty to such an analysis first. Accordingly, we may first consider the reasons why an Advaitin does not relish the idea of defining a true cognition in terms of a primary cognition. Thus, in his opinion the concept of a primary cognition is not as clear or as simple as the Nyāya philosophers and a host of philosophers belonging to other schools seem to think. They incorporate the expression 'primary cognition' in their definition of a true cognition to ensure that the definition does not become applicable to memory and thus becomes too wide. But then the concept of a primary cognition is not as primitive as they seem to think. Indeed, they know it. For they seek to define it, and among the various definitions given by them two are important and may be discussed. They are: (i) a cognition is primary if it is non-recollective; and (ii) a cognition is primary if the universal, 'being a primary cognition', *anubhavatva*, resides in it. Thus, the Nyāya definition of a true cognition as a primary cognition in order to ensure that the definition does not become applicable to a recollective cognition amounts to, in terms of the first definition of a primary cognition, a non-recollective cognition that is adequate to its object, and obviously this is not an elegant way of defining a true cognition. For the cases of non-recollective cognitions are in this defini-

tion being kept outside the purview of it by just asserting that they are not cases of true cognition. It seems that the Nyāya philosophers know it. So they have recourse to the second definition. But then, in the judgement of an Advaitin universals are inadmissible. It has been said before that he denies universals on the ground that the philosophers who believe in them claim them to be eternal, viz. beginningless etc., and an Advaitin holds that only Brahman is eternal. This may appear to be dogmatic. So the principal reason that a Nyāya philosopher gives in favour of his claim, and also the principal reason that an Advaitin gives in rejection of the claim, may be considered here briefly.

Thus, an assimilative cognition (*anugatabuddhi*) is intuitive, and the Nyāya philosophers seek to account for it in terms of an assimilative property like cowness. The said assimilative property, viz. cowness, is different from the individual cows in which it resides. The relation in which it resides is called the relation of inherence. It is held further that such is the nature of this relation that the one and the same assimilating property, viz. cowness, resides in a countless number of individual cows, past, present and future. Now, in the opinion of these philosophers, if the said assimilating property had a beginning or was an effect, then the individuals in which it inheres would be its inherent causes (*samavāyikāraṇa*). But then such is the nature of a cause of this kind that its effect cannot outlast it. So it would follow that when an individual cow dies, cowness as residing in that individual cow also perishes. But this would imply that the one and the same cowness does not reside in all the cows. But that is absurd. And so cowness or any assimilating property, viz. a universal, is beginningless. So also, as it is an entity positive in respect of its being, it is endless. A universal is eternal. This is in brief the principal reason given by a Nyāya philosopher in favour of the claim that a universal is admissible.

We may now consider the principal reason that an Advaitin gives for the inadmissibility of a universal. Thus, he does not deny that there are assimilating cognitions. But then he subjects to severe criticism the Nyāya account of it. He admits that there are assimilative properties like cowness. He also admits that cowness is distinct from the individual cows in which it

resides. But then he joins issue with a Nyāya philosopher when he contends that the distinction is such as necessitates the relation of inherence to relate them. For the admission of the relation of inherence is controversial. He, on the contrary, admits the relation of *tādātmya*—the relation of identity tolerant of difference (*bheda-sahiṣṇu-abheda*), and holds that most of the jobs that a Nyāya philosopher gets done by the relation of inherence are done equally satisfactorily by the relation of identity as construed by him. This suggests that the pluralistic or a sort of mosaic view of the universe that is at the root of the Nyāya theories of universal and inherence is, in his judgement, not defensible. So also he is against the causal consideration mentioned. Accordingly, he holds that universals are inadmissible. Besides these general considerations against universals, he has some special consideration against the admissibility of the property of 'being a primary cognition' as a universal.

Thus, if the property of 'being a primary cognition' is treated as a universal, there is no reason for not treating the property of 'being a perception' (*pratyakṣatva*), or of 'being an inference' (*anumititva*) etc. as universals. Indeed, the Nyāya philosophers treat them also as universals. They hold that the properties of 'being a perception' etc. are directly comprehended (*sākṣātvāpya*) by the property of 'being a primary cognition', and so they think that on the ground that a cognition is a perception (*pratyakṣa*), or an inference (*anumiti*) etc., we may infer that it is a primary cognition, and our inference would be a valid one. Similarly, on the ground that a cognition is a primary cognition we may infer validly that it is either a perception, or an inference etc. But though an Advaitin would not challenge the validity of the above inference, he would deny that the property of 'being a perception' etc. are universals. And he would advance some special reason for his denial. And we may present it in the following way.

When a person perceives that an uninterrupted column of smoke is coming out of the hill yonder and then on recollecting that smoke is an infallible sign of the presence of fire comes to have the cognition that the hill yonder has fire, he is said to know it by means of an inference. Now, an Advaitin holds that the cognition that the hill yonder has fire is not an inferential cognition in its entirety. For the hill is perceived, and what is

known inferentially is fire. This is corroborated intuitively. For we say that we are perceiving the hill and inferring the fire (the fire that figures as the epistemic predicate of the cognition). Thus, it is the case that the same cognition is partly a perception and partly an inference. Now, in the judgement of the Nyāya philosophers co-ordinate universals cannot reside in the same locus. But the assimilating properties of 'being a perception' and 'being an inference' are co-ordinate properties. They reside in the same locus, viz. in the cognition mentioned above and many other cognitions of that type. So they cannot be ranked as universals. If, however, it is insisted that they are universals, then it should be denied that the said cognition is not inferential in its entirety. But that would be counter-intuitive. Thus, an Advaitin would sum up his considerations against a universal as such and against the universal 'being a case of primary cognition' by saying that an admission of assimilating properties and a denial of a universal is in keeping with what is intuitive while the identification of assimilating properties even in the technically fault-free cases with universals is not in keeping with what is intuitive.

We have considered the reasons that are at the root of an Advaitin's refusal to define a true cognition in terms of a primary cognition. Now, we may consider his analysis of the concept of novelty and also his reasons for defining a true cognition in terms of it. What is given at the first-level analysis of the definition has been mentioned and seen to be inadequate. So the second-level analysis of it would be considered now, and in our judgement this analysis brings out the distinctive nature not only of the Advaita epistemology but also of the Advaita ontology—though the question of its being the most reasonable epistemology or ontology is different, and we are reluctant to say anything on this subject. Anyway, the second-level analysis may be presented in the following way.

A cognition is of a novel object when it is the case that ignorance that is positive in respect of its being and would keep its object covered, if not removed, remains unremoved at the moment of its unique cause that effectuates it and is followed by it, immediately or in the next moment of its operation.

From the above it would be seen that an Advaitin analyses the concept of novelty in terms of positive (or quasi-positive)

ignorance and its removal. Thus, he holds that the inmost self that is self-shining consciousness, and is not only unobjective but also unobjectifiable, and essentially free, does not appear to be so to most men in their everyday transactions with the universe, and this is borne out by many diverse views of the nature of self current among them—the views that are given different reasoned and argued structures by the philosophers of different schools. Not only that. Most men are not only not aware of their proper being, but are also reluctant to be in this awareness, and accordingly patronize the different theories of self, and without being intrigued, merrily accept what is called ‘the systematic ambiguity of I’.

Anyway, without going into the reasons for this view of the nature of ignorance and their strength and also without considering the appropriateness of making use of it in the treatment of the subject under discussion, we may elaborate the Advaitin analysis of the concept of novelty in terms of it. Thus, it has been said that ignorance covers the objects of cognition. Now, it should be mentioned that it covers directly the ever-manifesting consciousness, and thereby indirectly the objects also. That is, the objects are unconscious and do not manifest themselves and so are not in need of a cover. The inmost self being ever-manifesting and this not being evident in our everyday transactions, some positive (or quasi-positive) entity is needed to account for it. In other words, the self needs to be covered, the objects also are covered. Again, though this ignorance is one and directly covers the self in which it resides, yet it is appropriate to say that it covers a jar, or a table, or a chair and a countless number of objects. Not only that. It is also legitimate to use expressions like ‘ignorance having a jar as its object’ (*ghaṭa-viśayaka-ajñāna*), ‘ignorance having a piece of cloth as its object’ (*paṭa-viśayaka-ajñāna*) etc. and to treat them as comparable to expressions like ‘a cognition having a jar as its object’ (*ghaṭa-viśayaka-jñāna*), ‘a cognition having a piece of cloth as its object’ (*paṭa-viśayaka-jñāna*) etc. So also it is legitimate to hold that while the ignorance having a particular jar as its object covered by it has been removed, the ignorance having another jar as its object covered by it may remain unremoved.

Now, we may consider the analysis of the concept of novelty. When a cognition is not recollective its object remains covered

by ignorance, and it is removed when the most effective or the uncommon (*asādhāraṇa*) cause of the cognition operates. The cognition occurs at the moment next to the moment the said cause operates and removes the cover of ignorance. But at the moment just prior to the moment the cognition occurs, that is, at the moment the said cause is about to operate, it remains unremoved. So the said cause and the particular ignorance are present at the same moment, and they interact, the outcome of which is the removal of that ignorance and the disclosure of the object (or the occurrence of a cognition of the object).

But in the case of a recollective cognition this does not hold. For it is consequent upon the provoking of the disposition left behind by the cognition that occurred before, and the most effective cause (*lāraṇa*) of that cognition removed the particular ignorance that kept its object covered. Thus, when a person has a non-recollective cognition of a particular jar, the particular ignorance that has that particular jar as its object and keeps it covered remains intact at the moment the most effective cause of the cognition is about to operate. But when he has a recollective cognition of a particular jar, the particular ignorance that kept it covered was removed before, and so when the most effective cause of the recollective cognition operates, that particular ignorance is not present at that moment. To put it differently, the most effective cause (*lāraṇa*) of a recollective cognition is the prior (past) non-recollective cognition, and the dispositions left behind by the latter being the link between the two, the particular ignorance having the object of the recollective cognition as its object has been removed, and the two are not present at the same moment, as one of them is a past occurrence and the other is a present occurrence.

We may now subject the concept of being free from contradiction to a second-level analysis. ('Forever' and 'object' would also be analysed in due course.) We may begin with the commonsense analysis of the concept, and take the stock example of the misperception of a rope as a snake and its correction. Thus, in the case under consideration 'a snake' figures as the epistemic predicate of the cognition and 'this' which refers to the rope figures as the epistemic subject. Now, when the person who misperceived looks more carefully and under better illumina-

tion he perceives that the yonder object is a rope. This veridical perception of the object yonder corrects and cancels his previous non-veridical perception. So from the point of view of common sense the relation of contradiction, or that of being contradicted and contradicting, holds between the two cognitions. But it may be asked now whether the relation holds between the cognitions *qua* cognitions. In reply to it no one, not even the ardent champion of common sense, would say that this is the case. He would say that the two cognitions are of their respective objects, and as being of their objects they are in the relation of contradiction. So the question that should be asked is: what role do the objects play in the matter?

To answer the question, an Advaitin would insist that we should give careful consideration to the ontological status of what figured as the epistemic predicate of the non-veridical, and so the cancelled, cognition. It may be mentioned in this connection that the other schools of Indian philosophy also give such consideration to the question of the ontological status of the illusory datum and so would not possibly quarrel with him on his insistence. And as we think that it would be convenient to state the Advaitin's answer to the question by spelling out his attitude to the answers given by the philosophers of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā school and the Nyāya school, we shall outline their answers and contrast them with the answer the Advaitin gives.

Thus, the philosophers of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā school deny that there are erroneous cognitions, at least in the sense many laymen and a large number of philosophers hold that there are. With reference to the above-mentioned case of the misperception of a rope as a snake, it is widely held that this is a case of predicate or judgemental cognition comparable to the veridical perception of a snake as a snake. In other words, the veridical perception is a case of determinate cognition. It is, so to say, a unitary perceptual act in which the determinandum or what is determined, the determinants or what determine, and the relation in which the determinants determine and the determinandum receives the determination, figure as objects and the act asserts it. And it is held both by the laymen and by many philosophers that this is also true of a non-veridical perception. The philosophers of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā school

deny it. They contend that a non-veridical perception like the misperception of a rope as a snake should be understood rather as a case of perception of the object yonder as a 'this', and a recollection of a 'snake' that follows it immediately, and because of it and because of the operation of many assignable and unassignable causes the two cognitions of which one is perceptual and the other is recollective are not discriminated, and the said cognition passes for one. Their principal reason for analysing the two cases of perception in two different ways consists in the fact that in the case of a veridical perception of a snake, it is given here and now, but in the case of a non-veridical perception of it, it is not so given. Indeed, if it were so given, the perception would not have been a non-veridical one.

Now, an Advaitin does not accept the above analysis of a non-veridical perception. He argues that an immanent inspection of a non-veridical perception does not show that it differs as a perception from a veridical perception. Besides, an immanent inspection of the two kinds of cognition shows that they are cases of determinate cognition. A philosopher of the Nyāya school agrees with him on this point. And against the contention of the philosophers of the Prābhākara school that in the case of the non-veridical perception mentioned above no snake is given here and now, he argues that the condition of being here and now should be satisfied in the case of an ordinary perception (*laukika pratyakṣa*), and not in the case of an extraordinary (*alaukika*) perception—the non-veridical perception being an instance of a kind of extraordinary perception. But then an Advaitin does not accept the Nyāya theory of extraordinary perception. He would not deny that the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsāka is right in demanding that the said condition should be satisfied in the case of a perception. But then he would join issue with the latter when he says that no snake in the case of the non-veridical perception under consideration has been given here and now. For, though no ordinary or empirical (*laukika*) snake has been so given, an extraordinary (*alaukika*) or magical (*māyika*) snake has been, and the said snake has been produced by the ignorance residing in the consciousness of this or of the yonder empirical object.

Thus, in the judgement of an Advaitin the ontological status of an illusory datum is that it is magical, and though magical it

is competent to arouse in the person under illusion all the responses that it would have aroused if he were not so. But then this is not the full account of the status of the illusory datum as given by him. To get the full account we consider the case of the correction of the illusion, and connect it with the account that has been given. Thus, when the yonder object is observed carefully and is seen to be not a snake but a rope, that is, when the determinandum figures in its veridical perception, it is said that the snake that figured in the non-veridical perception is not real. Not only that. It is denied that it is a snake with a different spatio-temporal configuration, or that it is a snake that is present somewhere else and was perceived in an extraordinary fashion, or that it is a memory image that was not seen to be so. Indeed, no such account is intuitive. For when the illusion is corrected, it is declared that the said snake is a 'never was', 'never is' and 'never will be' snake. In other words, past, present and future reality is denied to the snake. This kind of denial indicates that the magical snake that figured in the non-veridical perception and so was a given to it is the negatum (*pratiyogī*) of a constant negation (*atyantābhāva*). So, in a sense, the snake is indescribable. It cannot be said to be fictitious (*asat*), as it is given, or as it is a presentation. Neither is it real (*sat*). It is different from both the real and the unreal, and is thus indescribable. Besides, the non-veridical perception that is cancelled or contradicted is of the form 'this is a snake'. So the structure of it may be spelt out thus: a cognition in which snakesness (a snake) figures as an epistemic predicate in respect of which the epistemic subject that figures is a *this*. Again, when it is contradicted it is seen that the said snake is a 'never was', 'never is' and 'never will be' sort of snake, and so the snakesness that figured as the epistemic predicate of the false cognition is the negatum of a constant negation. Accordingly, the structure of the false cognition may be further spelt out thus: a cognition in which the negatum of a constant negation of snakesness figures as the epistemic predicate in respect of which what figures as an epistemic subject is a *this*. A cognition of this structure involves contradiction, and a non-illusory cognition like perceiving a snake as a snake is free from contradiction. This, however, according to an Advaitin, is to speak from the empirical point of view. But from the transcendental point of

view, that is, from the point of view of a person who is posted in Brahman and has realized his deepest nature, viz. its identity with the Brahman, the empirical world has been cancelled exactly as the snake in the ordinary rope-snake illusion is; only Brahman is forever free from contradiction and is true.

However, it would appear from the above that an Advaitin does not deny that the relation of contradiction holds between cognitions. But then he adds that the nature of the objects figuring in them should also be taken into account. The other schools of Indian philosophy do not deny it. So they differ in their accounts of the nature of the objects figuring in them. As most of them do not admit that ignorance is quasi-positive, so they also deny that the object of a non-veridical perception is magical. Similarly, they do not think that the distinction between the transcendental and the empirical is tenable. Neither do they think that the three levels of reality, or existence (*sattā*), viz. existing transcendently, existing empirically and existing magically (*pāramārthika*, *vyavahārika* and *prātibhāsika*), are admissible. Again, as they believe in universals and do not admit quasi-positive ignorance, they would prefer to define a true cognition in terms of a primary cognition, and not in terms of novelty. That we have dwelt at length on the fifth sense of the word 'true' is due to the fact that we feel that, particularly as analysed by an Advaitin, it appears paradoxical to common sense, though not totally counter-intuitive. Similarly, we have also dwelt at length on the second sense as it is rather unfamiliar. Again, after mentioning in the first section that Hegel thought that the two notions of truth were at least partially traceable in ordinary language, we proposed to make a reference to the philosophies of India, and consequently the expectation that we proposed to consider how the philosophies of India traced the different notions of truth to ordinary language was possibly created. And this expectation has been frustrated by the inclusion of the treatment of the notion of truth by the philosophers of the different schools, though the notions as traceable in Upanisadic, Paurāṇika and similar literature have been dwelt on. There are various reasons for this. Thus, the term 'Indian philosophy' usually stands for the philosophies of the schools that developed in the Middle Ages and were written in Sanskrit. And Sanskrit, like Latin, was not the

language of ordinary men, and the philosophers, while respecting what was said in non-philosophical moments, did not seek either to found their philosophical views on ordinary language, or to trace them in ordinary language. Besides, the philosophical views shaped the whole course of life for countless men and so the key philosophical terms filtered down into the various languages used by even the humble laymen of this subcontinent, through songs, psalms and lyrics, but hardly in prose. Indeed, elegant prose is a modern phenomenon. This is true not only of the modern languages like Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, etc. but also of English, French and such other languages. It is not true that in the modern Indian languages elegant philosophical books have not been written. But then it is also not untrue that they have been written mostly by persons who are not academicians. It is the academicians who, under the influence of linguistic philosophy current in the United Kingdom, pay serious attention to ordinary language, and, rather strangely, they mostly write in English, and treat not their own vernacular but English as ordinary language. So we had no other alternative but to refer to the treatment of the notions of truth by the philosophers of some schools and also to semi-philosophical literature.

IV. *Conclusion*

In the first section we have mentioned the distinction drawn by Hegel between the two notions of truth, viz. the popular and the philosophical, and we have called them logico-epistemological and ontological. But neither in the first section nor in the other sections of this essay have we considered the reasons for which Hegel held that when the use of the word 'true' involved the ontological notion of truth, it was used in 'the deeper and the philosophical' sense. It has only been said that when the word 'true' is used in everyday life, what is meant is the 'agreement of an object with our conception of it', and so the belief in objects independent of our thoughts of them is involved in our everyday use of the word 'true'. But when the word is used in the deeper philosophical sense, what is meant is the 'agreement of a thought-content with itself'. Again, as Hegel thought that the ontological notion was involved in the deeper and the philo-

sophical sense of the word, so it may be surmised that he held also that only this notion was reasonable from the philosophical point of view and so acceptable to a philosopher. And this would undoubtedly provoke the question: what was the attitude of Hegel to the other notion of truth? Was it, in his judgement, not at all acceptable to a philosopher, though a layman with no philosophical gifts found it acceptable? Or, was it not unacceptable to any philosopher except the bad philosophers? Or, since it has been accepted by many outstanding philosophers, was it acceptable to philosophers who, though outstanding, did not think as thoroughly as a real philosopher should? Was it therefore a false notion to be discarded by a real philosopher, or was it to be improved upon and incorporated by him in the ontological notion? If so, how? By striking out the independent objects? Would not that amount to what is known as subjective idealism, or as empty idealism having solipsism, a self-refuting view, as its consequence? Again, if not by striking out the independent objects, then by converting them to thought-contents? Would not that amount to a forfeiture of the essential nature of either the independent objects or the thoughts of them, or both of them? These questions and others like them arise by reason of Hegel's equation of the ontological notion with the philosophical one. In our treatment of the subject of this paper, we have tried to show the insight contained in the remark of Hegel 'that the Absolute alone is true or that the true alone is absolute'. Besides, equally seminal is Hegel's view that the Absolute is Reason and a system in which the opposition of the subject and the object, of thought and being, is transcended and unified.

Though Hegel's rationalism has been sharply criticized by Kierkegaard, his notion of subjectivity could easily be shown to be an upshot of the unity of the subject and object and of transcendence of the seeming distinction between thought and being.

It is in this way that one has to understand Kierkegaard's anti-Hegelian observation: subjectivity is truth, subjectivity is reality. We may, however, without harming the spirit of this observation, isolate the first part of it and rewrite it thus: the truth is subjectivity. This contention of Kierkegaard, though opposed to the view that 'the true is alone absolute', i.e. the

rational system is Hegelian in the sense that the notion of truth is also considered by him to be ontological, may be reviewed as the de-absolutized ontology of Hegel brought closer to his philosophy as expression of thought—thought of spirit, rather thought as spirit. By de-absolutizing and de-systematizing the nature of the subject, Kierkegaard lost nothing of Hegel's distant reaches. He thought that he got them back through authentic consciousness of subjectivity. Kierkegaard's doctrine of subjectivity has exercised considerable influence upon many contemporary continental philosophers known as existentialists. The passage from Hegel to Kierkegaard and Heidegger is logical and continuous. Heidegger's *Dasein*, for example, is also an open-ended abyss like Kierkegaard's subjectivity. In Sartre's notion of 'my death' one hears the echo of Kierkegaard's morbid but luminous philosophy of subjectivity. Understood in this way, the notion of truth stands very close to Mahatma Gandhi's view as expounded in his autobiography entitled *My Experiments with Truth*. The primary relation of truth is not with proposition or judgement but with man, the being of man, or subject. Truth is a mode of subjectivity. In brief, truth is subjectivity.

A Characteristic of Indian Philosophies and Its Interpretation

This paper proposes to state and interpret a characteristic of the philosophies which flourished in India in ancient and medieval times and which are studied with care even today, not only by orthodox scholars and Indologists but also by avid students of philosophy. The task is undertaken in the belief that it would make the meeting of metaphysicians from different countries more meaningful and might facilitate such dialogues as would be rewarding to those who study, teach and write on these philosophies.

Two Misinterpretations

Students of these philosophies, though impressed by their astonishing richness, find to their dismay that not infrequently they are either over- or underestimated. Some scholars seem to hold that almost all the interesting and intriguing questions of philosophy were asked and finally answered by the ancient and medieval thinkers of India, and that the task today consists simply in understanding them. Obviously, these scholars overestimate these philosophies. Others, in view of the fact that science was either non-existent or in an incipient stage when these philosophies flourished and also because these philosophies were heavily loaded with mythology and religion, think that they have ceased to be of importance, and are therefore hardly worth studying by the students of philosophy today. Clearly these scholars underestimate the philosophies.

An honest student of philosophy cannot accept either of these views. He cannot fail to see that not only are they not in keeping with facts, but they are the results of a failure to appreciate the critical character of philosophical activity, which can exist and

assume a form only in a society. The scholars of the first group are unrealistic in that the ancient and the medieval philosophers did not do one kind of philosophy. Indeed, they built mighty systems of philosophy, one of which was often not compatible with another. Accordingly, even if they had asked all the intriguing questions, they did not give unanimous answers. There is no single philosophical system of ancient and medieval India and the scholars who overestimate these philosophies are quite aware of this. Nevertheless, it appears from what they say and write that the system of philosophy they study, to which they subscribe and according to which, in some cases at least, they govern their life even today, is the only true philosophical system, and that the other systems either articulate this truth in varying degrees or are merely instrumental in understanding the glorious truth embodied in the system they favour. In other words, in the opinion of these scholars, of all the various systems of ancient and medieval times only one was a system of philosophy, the others being just ideologies. No honest student of philosophy should think in this way.

These scholars are also not quite aware of the fact that philosophizing is a social phenomenon. Though it takes place in the superstructure of a society, it is conditioned by the substructure. Hence, because in contemporary times the social structure has changed, these philosophies, at least in the way in which they were formulated in ancient and medieval days, do not have even a *prima facie* claim for acceptance or careful consideration by students of philosophy. In other words, reformulation and considerable critical analysis are required on account of this change.

Similar observations are applicable to the scholars of the second group. They do not seem to be aware of the fact that the philosophers of ancient and medieval India did not do one kind of philosophy only and that one may find in ancient and medieval India traces of the kinds of philosophies done in contemporary times. This is said not in order to deny progress, but only to assert that philosophical thinking, whenever it functions freely, cannot be content with one kind of philosophy. Depending on the experience and preferences of scholars, it may take a multiple—though limited—number of forms. Again, some of these scholars do not seem to have a clear idea of the social

character of philosophy. They identify the substructure with the economically productive class and thus fail to see how the entire society by its sanctions and approved and graded values etc. functions as the substructure conditioning philosophical activity. To a degree this substructure, while evolving, retains an identity; accordingly, the new is hardly ever bewilderingly new and the gap between the past and the present in never total.

One should not, therefore, either overestimate or underestimate the past philosophies of India. An honest student of philosophy would do well to study them and to link them up with the contemporary ones. If he is an Indian he should seek his identity and a deeper understanding of his times and society in such a critical, reflective and interpretative study.

When one peruses the works of the leaders of contemporary Indian thought and culture like Bankimchandra, Rabindranath, K. C. Bhattacharyya, S. Radhakrishnan, Sri Aurobindo, Swami Vivekananda, Jawaharlal Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi, and others he finds this to be precisely the kind of work they did or were seeking to do. Most of them, however, were not university men and were hardly interested in seeking their identity in a metaphysical enterprise. It is, therefore, for us who are actively engaged in teaching and research in the universities to take up this task. We are in need of acquiring a deeper understanding of the metaphysical ideas handed down to us from the past by assimilating them with the ideas of metaphysicians from different countries with different backgrounds and traditions. Such an understanding presupposes a dialogue which essentially is a give-and-take activity of the rational side of our being. Therefore, this paper proposes to state and interpret one characteristic of the past philosophies.

Philosophy as System

The characteristic we propose to state and interpret is that in India philosophies developed as systems. This is well known, but its import or the interpretation we intend to give it may not be so. Besides, nowadays philosophers are sceptical of systems. They prefer to treat a concept in isolation; when they write they take care that, like a short story, their work has a beginning, a

middle and an end. That this is hardly satisfactory can be clarified by an analysis of the systematic characteristic of Indian philosophies. Besides, Indian philosophers themselves mislead us on this point. Every system-builder at first formulates a theory of *pramāṇas*—a theory on the estimation of evidences—and proceeds to found his metaphysical theory upon it. This creates the impression that the theories of evidences as formulated by the Indian philosophers are prior to, and independent of, the metaphysical theories they hold. Actually, however, this is not the case. The theory of evidence as formulated by one system differs from that of another precisely because their metaphysical theories differ. This would be evident to anyone who would read these theories, between the lines. The present paper does not explore this point further. In order to spell out the point that metaphysics occupied the central position in Indian philosophical thought, one question will be considered briefly.

The question concerns the nature of darkness. Obviously, one who has not read Indian philosophy would not treat it as a philosophical question. But Indian philosophers gave considerable attention to it and their treatment makes it abundantly clear that they held it to be an important philosophical question. To make the point, the Nyāya and the Advaita answers will be noted. Thus, while the Nyāya philosophers consider darkness to be a negative fact, the Advaitins consider it to be positive; and the point of interest is that their views are integral parts of their systems. Thus, a Nyāya philosopher cannot accept the proposition that darkness is a positive fact for the following reasons:

(a) If it be a positive fact, it is also a perceived positive fact having qualities.

(b) Accordingly, it is a compound substance which occurs, ceases to occur, and is divisible.

(c) If it be divisible, then, when divided, it should leave behind fragments.

(d) But it does not leave behind fragments.

(e) And so either the being of darkness is instantaneous, for, as the Buddhist philosophers argue, an entity with instantaneous being may be destroyed but may not leave behind any fragment, or it is not a divisible compound substance that

occurs and ceases to occur, i.e. it is not a positive fact.

(f) But the theory of instantaneous being is counter-intuitive and unacceptable.

(g) And so darkness is not a positive fact.

Thus, the Nyāya theory of darkness is an integral part of a system.

The same can be said of the theory of the Advaitins, though they would not argue the proposition that darkness is a positive fact in such a direct way. Nevertheless, their philosophy would be injured if they do not hold it to be so. They hold that ignorance is positive and make attempts to bring out one of its aspects by comparing it with darkness. That is, consciousness which is opposed to ignorance manifests its object by removing the cover of ignorance, just as light which is opposed to darkness illumines objects by removing the cover of darkness. They take the cover literally in both cases and are quite clear that language or metaphor is not misleading them. Their metaphysics does not permit them to understand the cover of ignorance metaphorically; that would amount to the position that ignorance is absence of knowledge or consciousness, i.e. a negative fact. But if ignorance is a negative fact it would not play the role their metaphysics assigns it, for it would then neither cover nor be a material cause of the empirical world. Hence, they take the expression 'covered by ignorance' literally. Similar considerations are behind their taking the expression 'covered by darkness' literally. In other words, of the various evidences they produce in favour of the proposition that ignorance is a positive fact, one is inferential, which in the opinion of the Indian logicians requires an instance that yields and confirms the grounding proposition. In the case of the inference under consideration such an instance is provided by darkness. That is, light illumines an object by destroying the darkness that covered it; so whenever an object is manifested, whether by light or by consciousness, the manifestation is preceded by the destruction of the positive cover. Thus, either darkness is a positive fact or the proposition on which the inference under consideration rests is instanceless and so groundless. Thus, the Advaitins' treatment of darkness is an integral part of their general philosophical or metaphysical system. In other words, the question of the nature of darkness is philosophical, as the answers to this question are

integral parts of the metaphysical views held by the Indian philosophers. Their treatment of the being of darkness was not that of the scientist, but of the metaphysician.

System and Metaphysics

Thus, the philosophies in India developed in the form of systems in which metaphysical doctrines occupied the central place. Why did they develop in this manner? The obvious answer seems to be its subject matter. That is, the subject matter of metaphysics may be said to be all that is; and in view of that fact they form a system. Hence, the science of metaphysics cannot but be a system. It should be noted that Indian philosophers would have stated the subject matter of metaphysics in a slightly different way. Instead of saying that metaphysics is the science of *all that is*, they would have said that it is the science of *all that is man*. In other words, for them man epitomizes the universe, or the microcosm is the macrocosm. To know man is to know all that is. The purpose or *prajojana* of philosophy was said to be liberation, and an essential condition for attaining liberation was thought to be knowledge of the proper being of man. To know man fully one should know what he is in essence and also in relation to the universe into which he is, so to say, thrown, and where he suffers. In short, the science that seeks to know *all that is man* also seeks to know *all that is*, and metaphysics is primarily this science of the proper being of man. This being the subject matter of philosophy, philosophy cannot but be cultivated in the form of a system.

Though the above answer is quite reasonable, I would propose a different, though not incompatible, answer which in my judgement is equally reasonable. In brief, it lies in the nature of a philosophical belief. In other words, whenever we have a philosophical belief we have a cluster of such beliefs, and they are of diverse kinds: some logical, some epistemological, some ethical, some religious, some ontological, some of no exclusive type, and others such that they cannot be labelled. This can be corroborated by an immanent inspection of such beliefs. Beliefs forming a cluster are not unrelated, but are parts of a whole or a system. The system, however, has a character of its own. It is not deductive; one cannot hope to exhibit the character of the

system by picking up one or two beliefs to be treated as axiomatic and then, by some accepted or formulated rules of deduction, obtain the other beliefs forming the system. This should be evident to anyone who would peruse any such system; and to one who does not accept a particular system it appears that the arguments of its advocates move in a circle. Thus the critics of the Vaiśeṣika system argue that their theory of universals presupposes their theories of inherence, substance, quality and action; that their theories of substance, quality and action presuppose their theory of universals; and that their theory of inherence presupposes all these theories. In short, philosophical reasoning is in a way circular. This cannot be cited as a ground for denouncing metaphysics and embracing scepticism, though it substantiates the result of immanent or phenomenological inspection of metaphysical beliefs, namely that the beliefs form a cluster with a structure, though the structure is not deductive.

What precisely is the structure? That the beliefs are closely connected is beyond reasonable doubt, but what precisely is this connection? To answer that question it is necessary to consider of what sort these beliefs are and how they obtain their structure.

These beliefs are not of the ordinary kind, but are firm convictions, or dogmas in the original Greek sense of the word, as Professor Zahner states in another context. They are as sure and certain for the individual who holds them as is knowledge; for him the distinction between such belief and knowledge ceases to be real. Further, one acts according to these beliefs and this action in some sense lends structure to these beliefs. Hence, it is not possible that one would hold a set of philosophical beliefs and not live in accordance with them. If his actions are not in keeping with his beliefs, if the relation of *vyāghāta*, as the Indian logicians put it, obtains between his beliefs and his actions, then he really does not hold the beliefs, though he may say that he does. At any rate, unless philosophy is in a reciprocal or dialectical relation with life, which it shapes and by which it is shaped, it does not deserve to be called philosophy. Because Indian philosophers were quite aware of this, philosophy for them was not a mere intellectual pastime or adventure. Considered carefully, the conclusion is irresistible that they philo-

sophized as they were in quest of their identity—their philosophies represented what they were.

Today we find that they do not satisfy our quest if we take them literally or exactly in their original form. We feel the need to reformulate them and hence to be in dialogue with the types of philosophy that flourished elsewhere and are more closely associated with the recent developments in science, technology and social economy. It is our hope that such a dialogue can take place in today's troubled world where we are desperately in search of our identity and that we can at least find the path along which we should move.

Metaphysical Systems

Introduction

The greater part of contemporary philosophy, when not anti-metaphysical, is either unmetaphysical or metaphysical in a low key, and consequently metaphysical systems, when not dismissed as curious examples of primitive philosophizing, are looked down upon. Not only that; second-order philosophical questions receive more attention than first-order ones do. This, in our judgement, is hardly satisfactory and is a symptom of the ill-health of contemporary philosophy. So we propose in this paper to say a few words in defence of metaphysical systems. Accordingly, we shall in the first place consider briefly the Kantian criticism of metaphysics and then try to build up a case for metaphysical systems. Our reason for starting with Kant is that his criticism of metaphysics was more informed and more full of insight than most contemporary criticisms. Besides, the contemporary attitude to metaphysics is directly or indirectly related to the Kantian criticism in that either the contemporary philosophers themselves link up their philosophy with that of Kant, or writers on them do so. And it is also true that they write more approvingly on Kant than they do on Hegel or Marx. Anyway, we shall here try to make out a case for metaphysical systems, and so consider first the Kantian criticism of metaphysics, emphasizing his two contentions that in our judgement bring out the strength as well as the weakness of metaphysical systems. Then we shall study their implications. And lastly, we shall argue that the Kantian treatment of metaphysics is also a request for doing metaphysics in systems or, to borrow a term from the ecologists, for systemic thinking in metaphysics, and that this is a request to which every serious thinker should respond favourably.

1. *The Kantian Criticism of Metaphysics*

Kant was of the opinion that while physics and mathematics existed as sciences, metaphysics existed as a natural disposition. The criterion that he used to decide whether a certain discipline existed as a science was that if it was not just a vestibule of the sciences, it should yield synthetic *a priori* judgements. And in his opinion, while physics and mathematics yielded such judgements, metaphysics did not. So he held that physics and mathematics existed as sciences, and that the intriguing philosophical question was how that was possible. And as metaphysics existed not as a science but as a natural disposition, the intriguing philosophical question was how it was possible for metaphysics to exist as a natural disposition and not as a science. In his first critique he attempted to answer these questions. It is with his answer to the latter question that we shall be concerned in this paper and it may be outlined as follows.

An object to be known ought to conform to mind that intuits, understands and reasons. In other words, some subjective factors or elements not derived from experience are involved in knowledge. The said subjective factors at the level of intuition are space and time, the *a priori* forms of intuition or sensibility; and at the level of understanding they are the categories or the primitive concepts of the understanding. At the level of reason there are some subjective factors or ideas of reason, but it is not essential that objects to be known should conform to them. To put it differently, knowledge involves some subjective factors, and so we may say that if an object is known, it has conformed to some subjective factors. But we cannot reverse it and say that if some factor is subjective, an object to be known conforms to it. That is, the subjective factor may be just subjective. It may not be objectively valid. Now, it is evident that an object without conforming to the *a priori* forms of intuition cannot be given. Thus space and time, though subjective, are given-ness determining factors. Besides, they are not applied to what is not given; so no demonstration or transcendental deduction is required to establish that they are objectively valid. But the categories of the understanding are not given-ness determining factors and they are also applied beyond the given; so a transcendental deduction is required to

establish that they are objectively valid. And such a deduction may be given or worked out. It is to the effect that, though not given-ness determining factors, they constitute the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience as such. But the ideas of reason are not such subjective factors as condition given-ness or the possibility of experience of objects. A transcendental deduction to establish that they are objectively valid cannot be given. And the ideas of reason constitute the proper province of metaphysics, and as it is impossible to establish their objective validity, metaphysics is not possible as a science.

But it is possible as a natural disposition. For such is the nature of our mind and such again is the importance of the metaphysical questions that we cannot help considering them. This helplessness on our part should not be thought of as pathological. For a transcendental deduction of the ideas of reason to show that they are regulative, though not constitutive, may be given, and with their help what we aim at 'is a secure foundation for the systematic unity of our experience—a unity indispensable to reason, advantageous to the understanding, and promotive of the interests of empirical cognition'.¹ Thus, the psychological idea of reason, viz. the Ego considered as a thinking nature or soul, does not directly relate to objects, but serves the purpose of connecting 'all the phenomena, actions and feelings of the mind as if it were a simple substance'.² Treated as an as-if-object or an ideal object having a sort of 'hyperbolic existence', it helps us in systematizing the different psychological laws, though we should on no account try to deduce the internal phenomena of mind from it. Similarly, the theological idea enables us 'to regard the whole system of possible experience as forming an absolute but dependent and sensuously-conditioned unity and at the same time as based upon a sole, supreme and all-sufficient ground existing apart from the world itself'.³ But then 'we ought not to deduce phenomena, order and unity of the universe from a supreme intelligence but merely draw from this idea of a supremely wise cause the rules which must guide reason in its connection of causes and effects'.⁴

Again, when we grant the ideas an objective and hyperbolic existence, we get involved in antinomies only in the case of the

cosmological idea. Thus, when solely on the authority of speculative reason we admit them, we grant them only 'a comparative reality—that of a scheme of the regulative principle of the systematic unity of all cognition',⁵ and 'we cogitate something of the real nature of which we have not the least conception but which we represent to ourselves as standing in a relation to the whole system of phenomena analogous to that in which phenomena stand to each other'.⁶ So these ideas do not really extend our knowledge beyond the objects of possible experience, but they enable us to extend 'the empirical unity of experience, by the aid of systematic unity, the scheme of which is furnished by the idea which is therefore valid—not as a constitutive but as a regulative principle'.⁷

This represents briefly the Kantian criticism of metaphysics and in it two contentions demand that they should be carefully considered. They are (when stated in plain language):

- (a) Metaphysics is not co-ordinate with the sciences; and
- (b) Metaphysics enables us to introduce into our experience a higher degree of unity than science or understanding could of itself do.

And in the two sections that follow we shall make an attempt to see what they imply or what is their moral.

II. *The First Contention of Kant*

We have seen that the first contention of Kant is that metaphysics is not co-ordinate with the sciences. We may also state it thus: a metaphysical statement is unlike a scientific statement. Or thus: we cannot do metaphysics as we do science. Such statements may be deemed truisms. But we cannot brush them aside as trivial. For the pre-Kantians, if we are to trust Kant, were unaware of it and did metaphysics in a dogmatic way. And we think that in contemporary times the empiricists—whether the logical empiricists or the analysts who, as Charles Taylor has observed, have rediscovered and re-emphasized certain aspects of classical British Empiricism⁸—either do not take notice of it or give it an interpretation that is hardly tenable, and the consequence has been that a student of contemporary philosophy gets vexed with the frequent occurrence of expressions like 'meaningless', 'metaphysical muddle', 'lin-

guistic confusion', etc. Not only that; the discussion of second-order philosophical questions, with which many an outstanding contemporary philosopher is almost exclusively occupied, would not have otherwise acquired such immense proportions, and possibly the question of articulating our *Weltanschauung* would not have been treated with disdain or left in the hands of the religious and the political fanatics. Anyway, an empiricist does not, because he cannot, give a satisfactory interpretation of the very reasonable Kantian contention.

Thus, the logical empiricists noticed, as Kant did, that a metaphysical statement is quite unlike a scientific statement. But then they did not think, as Kant did, that metaphysics is 'promotive of the interests of empirical cognition' and so dismissed metaphysical statements as meaningless. The philosophical movement known as 'empiricism' or 'logical positivism' is long dead, but it is doubtful if its ghost does not keep appearing. The same observations are applicable to Russell's attempt to apply the scientific method to philosophy. Anyway, the ghosts of these movements haunt our philosophizings today. For we almost unquestionably accept the proposition that philosophical (metaphysical) statements are not factual, and though we cannot argue the point here, the correct attitude is that they are not factual in the way scientific statements are. Kant was more careful in this respect. For what he denied was that reason or the ideas of reason are directly applicable to sensibility. But as he noticed that 'the production of systematic unity in all empirical cognitions of the understanding is the proper occupation of reason'⁹ and also that 'although it is impossible to discover in *intuition* a scheme for the complete systematic unity of all the conceptions of the understanding there must be some *analogon* of the schema',¹⁰ so he held that reason was indirectly applicable to sensibility. To put it in plain language, it is not the case that a metaphysical statement has no root in facts, though it cannot be uprooted in the way a scientific statement may be. Thus we do not have alternative sciences, though we do have alternative metaphysical systems. But the existence of alternative metaphysical systems cannot be accounted for in the way the alternative formal systems are. So ~~it is not~~ ^{it is not} 'advantageous to the sciences' in ~~the way the alternative formal systems are~~. But this does not argue that a

metaphysical statement has no cognitive meaning. What it indicates is that we human beings who do metaphysics have varieties of experience, varieties of interests, etc. and in selecting the crucial experience we differ as our primary interests differ. Besides, though there are many competing metaphysical systems we do not think that one person can wholeheartedly embrace more than one—and to embrace a metaphysical system is either to embrace it wholeheartedly or not to embrace it at all. And this was also noticed by Kant when he spoke of moral actions and practical reason, in short, of ‘the destination of man’.

Be that as it may, the idea that philosophy does not study facts is deep-rooted. And so the view that philosophy is linguistic analysis has come into existence almost inevitably. For if philosophy does not study facts it should study concepts, and concepts dissociated from words in which they are, so to say, embodied or incarnated cannot be studied. So it should study language, and the language should be ordinary language, and not an ideal language.¹¹ This way of conceiving philosophy has to face many questions like: what distinguishes philosophy from lexicography or an ordinary, say, the Fowlerian, way of treating usage? How would philosophy transcend the particular language the uses of which it studies and become universal? We would not take such questions into account, though we feel that linguistic philosophers cannot answer them satisfactorily. We are keen on making the point that the analysts try to model philosophy on natural science, though their image of science is simplistic and false. But before that let us incidentally make an observation and it is that though Russell expressed his displeasure at Wittgenstein’s later philosophizing and so at linguistic analysis as practised in Oxbridge, yet he was one of precursors of this movement, and in a sense the movement is the consistent outcome of the view that every factual question is in principle exclusively scientific—a view which he tirelessly pleaded.

It does not require much effort to bring out that the analysts model their philosophy on the natural sciences. When we read carefully what Ryle wrote in his introduction to *The Revolution in Philosophy*, we see that he and the analysts conceive of treating their subject in the way their colleagues in the

science departments treat their subjects in laboratories and journals and conferences.¹² His reference to 'the professional practice of submitting problems and arguments to the expert criticism of fellow craftsmen', his 'growing concern with questions of philosophical technique', etc. create the impression that if we are to make our subject as prestigious as the sciences are, we should do what the scientists do, even though philosophy may never bake any bread. And Austin, on being asked to define the methodology of contemporary British philosophy in a conference held at Royaumont, said this in so many words.¹³ What he said in the conference may be briefly outlined to make the following points: (1) that we are not attributing to the analysts a view they do not hold; (2) that they have a false image of science; and (3) that they rely on the old Lockean view that the mind is a *tabula rasa* and are therefore empiricists of the most extreme kind, and thus fail to do justice to the kind of distinction Kant drew between science and metaphysics.

The gist of Austin's observation is: we have to look for our subject in the less sceptic regions and so reach an agreement on the question 'what we should say when'. On this question carefully considered, we may reach an agreement and obtain a 'datum' that would enable us to arrive at statements that would also be equally agreed to by all concerned. Obviously, we should see to it that our inventory is quite complete and at the same time sufficiently limited. This would do away with all bias in philosophy, and the scandal that in philosophy we quarrel, never knowing how to settle the quarrel and occasionally not even knowing what we are quarrelling about, would be stopped. And though there are many reasons for adopting this method, the principal one is that this is what is exactly done in physical or natural sciences.¹⁴

From the above it would be evident that no argument is necessary to make the point that Austin seeks to model philosophy on physics and thinks that 'there is no other way to proceed'. And this is not Austin's personal opinion, for Ryle and Ayer were also present at the conference. The second point, we think, has been convincingly made by Mezaros, who has shown that it is not true that scientists like Newton or Einstein had no concern with comprehensive schemes and that progress in science is due to the limited problems dealt with by

them.¹⁵ It seems that Austin and the analysts, on observing that in sciences the predecessors bequeath some solutions as well as some problems to the successors, think that in philosophy also we may do it. But this is a delusion. Every philosopher should start afresh. And the practice of linguistic philosophy since the second world war has not been successful in arriving at any agreed solution that may be bequeathed to the successors, some of whom, let us hope, would survive to philosophize if—God forbid—there be a third world war. And a perusal of their writings creates the impression that they are making prescriptions about uses and not describing them. The requirements laid down by Austin only show that this cannot but be the case. Thus, he says that the inventory should be complete or representative, and we feel helpless when we find that what one analyst holds to be representative another does not, and naturally we think that all of them are interested in making prescriptions about use or in doing *a priori* linguistics. Besides, it is not clear how the other requirement, viz. that the inventory should be *sufficiently* limited, is to be satisfied.

All this ought to be obvious to the linguists also. But then, it is not so. This may be due to the fact that they consider uses, not to find out the philosophical wisdom they contain but rather to present their views formed independently of consideration of uses through such a consideration. It may also be due to the fact that they are unwilling to take cognizance of the fact that only through a perusal of the uses one cannot arrive at any interesting philosophical proposition. Besides, they are overpowered by the *tabula rasa* view of mind. This becomes transparent when we seek to understand the indifference of the British philosophers to Marxism. Thus, a Marxist believes in *praxis* and so holds that there are different ways of looking at the world. But an empiricist would treat it as unintelligible.¹⁶ He would say that we are passive in respect of the given, and that we differ is due to the fact that we arrange the given—the same for all of us—differently, and this may be sorted out by discussion. So, whereas an empiricist may claim that there are 'hard data' or the same given for every man, a Marxist, or an idealist, or a philosopher who holds like Whitehead that even in perception interest plays an important part, cannot do so. Now, Charles Taylor is of the view that an empiricist, what-

ever may be the mode of his philosophizing, holds it more or less on the ground that Locke did.¹⁷ And when an empiricist thinks that our choice of ordinary language is a natural choice, he is not an exception. That is, a linguist does not deny that choice plays a role in the selection of the uses of the word to be studied. Indeed, Austin says that 'it is essential that the *choice* be representative enough'. So the linguist does not dismiss choice. But then he does not notice that every choice—the choice of ordinary language included—is preferential. And he does not notice it; as the mind, he, at least unconsciously, holds—such is the weight of the tradition in which he philosophizes—is a *tabula rasa*.

So we may conclude this section with the observation that Kant made a valid distinction between science and metaphysics and that though the distinction is made also by the empiricists, they cannot account for it and so fail to see that metaphysics may be 'promotive of empirical cognition'. Now we may consider if the Kantian way of accounting for the distinction is satisfactory and pass on to a consideration of his second contention.

III. *The Second Contention of Kant*

The second contention of Kant, as we have observed before, is that metaphysics introduces more unity into our cognition than the sciences can do of themselves. So we may consider the nature of this unity. It is said that the unity is systematic unity. So we may say that metaphysics is of assistance to the sciences in that it enables them to be systematic. But then we should be careful. For we may be understood as having said that metaphysics constructs such formal systems or models as includes all legitimate scientific statements and excludes everything else. So to analyse the Kantian understanding of systematic unity we may borrow some ideas from Hegel, and see how they look when expressed from the Kantian point of view.

Thus, while concluding his treatment of Hegel's 'Logic', Acton observes:

The argument of Hegel's 'Logic' can be very briefly summarized. The least that can be said about anything is that it is. More is said about it when it is qualified, numbered or measured, still more is

said about it when it is explained in terms of essences, grounds or causes. Most is said about it when it is placed in the context of life, purpose, will and value.¹⁸

The above Hegelian idea is substantially Kantian. To make this point, we would briefly dwell on the Kantian treatment of the theological idea of reason. Kant had no doubt that if we are to do physics or mechanics in the Newtonian style, we should not introduce the concept of purpose or teleology in scientific explanation. Indeed, Kant was a thorough student of the physical sciences of his time, and also of their development from Galileo onwards. He was fully aware of the fact that the physical sciences become scientific by dismissing the question of final cause as spurious, or by abandoning the Aristotelian way of understanding cause. Nevertheless, he felt that an account of cause in terms of regularity—an account that received its classical structure in Hume—hardly did any justice to the concept as involved in the very possibility of the physical sciences. But then he did not think that a scientific treatment of the physical universe—the universe that is explored by physics—would be enriched by introducing the concept of final cause.

Notwithstanding that, Kant held that 'the hypothesis of a supreme intelligence as the sole cause of the universe . . . is always of the greatest service to reason'.¹⁹ And if we keep to the hypothesis, as a principle which is purely regulative, even error cannot be detrimental. For in this case error can have no other serious consequence than that when we expected to discover a teleological connection (*nexus finalis*), only a mechanical or physical connection appears. In such a case we merely fail to find the additional unity we required but do not lose the rational unity which the mind requires in its procedure in experience.²⁰ Thus, the systematic unity as contemplated by Kant is to be achieved 'by the aid of a causality according to design in a supreme cause'.²¹

Again, Kant was also of the view that though in physics teleological explanation had no place, in the bio-sciences it had. Accordingly, he distinguished between external teleology and immanent teleology and was careful to point out that the theistic argument from design was useless, as the concept of teleology behind it was external teleology. Moreover, he argued

that as the bio-sciences could not proceed without presupposing immanent teleology, and as, again, it was unlikely that the universe was partly teleological and partly non-teleological, the reasonable position was not that the inanimate nature was non-teleological but that 'to keep itself within limits, physics abstracts from the question whether ends in nature are intentional or unintentional, for this would mean intruding into an alien territory'.²²

Possibly, we would not be digressing if we consider here how some contemporary thinkers estimate the role of teleology in scientific investigation. So we may refer to a few observations made by Lucas, Waddington and Longuet-Higgins, the Gifford Lecturers of 1972-73. Thus, in the opinion of Lucas the official philosophy of science has standardized itself on the regularity paradigm, and this has given rise to a characteristic but distorted world view.²³ Accordingly, the loyalty of a biologist becomes divided. For, as a scientist, he respects the physicists and cannot offer a straightforward teleological explanation.²⁴ But then he cannot also deny the importance of a functional or teleological explanation as there are many good reasons for offering such an explanation. For, in the first place, a functional explanation opens up the possibility of putting forward more basic regularity explanation. In the second place, such an explanation being in the form of a scheme enables him 'to gather together a whole lot of features and make them into one coherent and intelligible whole'.²⁵ And, in the third place, he uses it as he notices 'a certain homostatic quality in the biological world around him'.²⁶ Similarly, Waddington is of the opinion that if we seek to understand the universe in terms of Newton's billiard ball physics, we find it difficult to introduce the concept of purpose, and that when ignoring the difficulty we introduce it, we can do so by inventing a purposeful creator who 'injects purpose' into a purposeless universe. But when we try to understand the universe we perceive, and 'notice that our perceptive apparatus that involves our mental abilities has some self-stabilizing properties that make it possible for us to recognize something when it comes to our experience for the second time, then we speak of the universe as having a structure—the structure being as we perceive it; and we come to hold that 'the components of the universe are not simple material

bodies quite independent of ourselves but are the types of things we perceive with this apparatus which involves properties similar to purposes', and that 'the structure of the universe involves cosmic purpose'—though it is a matter of terminology or of taste if we would like to go further and 'say that cosmic purpose involves some sort of a God'.²⁷ Longuet-Higgins expresses his agreement with the views of Waddington and adds that the distinction between the conventional theistic position and any other position, even the atheistic one, is that while from the point of view of the former the universe has been created by somebody outside it, from the point of view of the latter it contains within itself all matters of significance to us. Besides, he expresses his preference for the second view as it permits him to think of 'life growing outwards as it were until the universe was in such a tight intimate relationship with itself that you can think of the whole thing as a living organism'.²⁸

The views of Lucas, Waddington and Longuet-Higgins as given above do not differ substantially from that of Kant. And when, in reply to Kenny who holds that while the statement that the universe is rational in the sense that it is intelligible to rational creatures like ourselves is non-controversial, the statement that the universe is rational in the sense that there is an end or purpose in the universe is not so, Lucas observes that, as when talking about other people 'it is difficult to distinguish between the overt behaviour patterns from the mind behind them', so while talking about the world intelligible to rational creatures like us it is difficult to distinguish the talked about from the talk, which, though not quite legitimate, is yet 'almost a necessary conflation of terms', he in our judgement approximates Hegel.

Anyway, metaphysics seeks to introduce a rational and systematic unity in the sciences and so is not co-ordinate with them: this is the second contention of Kant in the ultimate analysis.

IV. Limitations of the Kantian Account

We have seen that in the opinion of Kant the ideas of reason which form the subject-matter of metaphysics enable the sciences to have systematic unity as contrasted with 'technical

unity'. Now, though this accounts for the distinction between sciences and metaphysics and also for the relation between metaphysics and facts in a happier way than an empiricist account does, yet it has limitations of its own. The limitations are primarily due to Kant's views about the ideas of reason and hence to the distinction that he draws between phenomenon and noumenon. Without disputing his principal contention that when in science we frame our explanations in terms of the ideas of reason and thus avoid the laborious and careful investigation of events, we cease to do science and fail to understand how the universe surrounding us behaves, we should insist that the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon is hardly tenable. While we do natural science, we may not feel the need of treating the systematic unity of nature and thus the idea of a supreme intelligence as something more than a heuristic or regulative principle. But while we do social sciences or, as Kant would say, give serious consideration to the 'destination of man' and hence to moral philosophy, we cannot retain the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon.

The Kantian distinction between phenomenon and noumenon has been challenged by philosophers of diverse persuasions, and we know that Kant's immediate successors, particularly Hegel, made serious attempts to show that the distinction was hollow, and that the reactions to Hegel's views have been diverse. But the most prevalent reaction is that he abandoned the caution of Kant and formulated a kind of metaphysics that Kant would have labelled as dogmatic and that he had had recourse to a kind of argument which cannot be outdone either in obscurity or in abstractness, and which is therefore metaphysical in the pejorative sense of the term. And this is an irony of fate. For Hegel was never tired of expressing his distrust of the abstract. However, we are not Hegelians nor are we interested in this paper to make out a case for Hegelianism. To be candid, we should say that our acquaintance with Kant is poor and with Hegel poorer. Nevertheless we refer to Hegel because we are of the impression—the impression has been created by Hegel-lovers and Hegel-haters²⁹—that Hegel had a great concern for the history of his times and for history as such. And we cannot do history or social sciences (that is, not

only moral philosophy, as Kant thought) if we retain the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon and do not in some sense introduce the concept of teleological determination.

Thus, as Plant and others have shown,³⁰ as a consequence of the industrial revolution new classes came into existence and this created a kind of disorder in the social structure of Germany. That is, the unity of the social being was disturbed. It became fragmented and consequently the personal being of the individual living in a fragmented society also became fragmented. This fragmentation of the social as well as of the personal being of man was noticed by poets and philosophers alike and received in their writings powerful expressions that read as cries of tormented souls. Thus Holderlin wrote:

I can think of no people as torn apart as the Germans . . . Craftsmen are to be seen but no human beings; masters and men but no human beings; young people and old but no human beings. Is it not like a field of battle where hands and arms and other limbs lie scattered in pieces while the blood of life drains away into the soil?³¹

Similarly, Schiller observed:

Eternally tied to a single fragment of the whole, man himself develops into nothing but a fragment. Everlastingly in his ears is the monotonous sound of the wheels which he operates. He never develops the harmony of his being and instead of stamping the imprint of his humanity upon nature he becomes no more than the imprint of his occupation and specialized knowledge.³²

And in the opinion of some, in the writings of Kant

Man appeared as an inwardly shattered being—a profound bifurcation existed, Kant argued, between reason and passion, duty and inclination, the autonomous self and the heteronomous self, between the cognitive, conative and affective sides of man's nature.³³

There are reasons to believe that to Kant's successors it appeared that Kant sought to overcome the bifurcation by introducing another, though broader, bifurcation, viz. that of phenomenon and noumenon. So they made strenuous attempts to overcome it; and Hegel sought to remedy this bifurcation or divisiveness not by idealizing the old Greek culture as some have done, nor by having recourse to religious feeling uncontaminated by reason, nor also by denouncing in-

dustrial revolution, but 'by following the path of reason and reconciliation'. He argued that a man felt alienated when he treated his own creations—the objectified mind—as independent objective realities curbing his autonomy, and that to overcome it what was needed was an intellectual reorientation that would make it clear that the historical process was a rational process or an unfolding of reason such that the social, political and economic structures articulated, or were embodiments of, the rationally co-ordinated purposes of society and its members, and that in the last analysis what resulted was the self-finding of the spirit. And Marx sought to rectify Hegel by substituting the concepts of struggle and revolution—and thus by assigning to reason a creative role—for the Hegelian concepts of reconciliation and co-ordination. Anyway, it is obvious that the Kantian way of distinguishing between science and metaphysics that entails a distinction between phenomenon and noumenon is unsatisfactory, as it goes against the intuitions on which the social sciences and social behaviour (including moral behaviour) rest.

v. Conclusion

It is difficult to accept without demur the Kantian distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. But it is not less difficult, in the opinion of many, to accept monistic systems built in the style of Hegel or Marx. Similarly, the concept of reason or purpose introduced to interpret history or to give more unity to our experience may be thought to be one that does not lend itself to an intelligible analysis. And such a line of thinking becomes strengthened when the difference of opinion among the Hegelian scholars on the exact interpretation of necessity, or among the Marxist scholars on the nature and importance of 'praxis', is taken into account.³⁴ Besides, one may think that the kind of unity that we seek to introduce into our experience may not be that of reason, but just of a system—a unique kind of unity resulting from the fact that the metaphysical beliefs come in clusters. In other words, there are many metaphysical systems. And it is not possible to formulate a criterion for deciding which is genuine and which is not. Which metaphysical system would be acceptable to which individual or society of

individuals depends on the individual or the society of individuals, and the condition of acceptability is not logical, but that of growth—that is, the individual or society of individuals grows out of and also through reflection, systematic reasoning, rationalization and even conversion into the metaphysical system. And it is almost obvious that no individual or society of individuals grows into the unity that science gives to experience, though it contributes a good deal. For science is not concerned with the whole of experience or with all dimensions of it, and hence, though proud of science, we are also critics of it. The point is Kantian, though the Kantian way of making it, viz. by limiting science to the phenomenal world, is not happy. It may be that Kant made the point in that way because the development of science in his days created a distorted image of man—an image that imperilled the existence of man as a moral being. And so instead of rejecting the Kantian point we should interpret it in the light of the development of science in our times, for the very existence of man is at stake today in consequence of the vast development in science and technology—a development that is accompanied by the belief that science is value-neutral. And we should think seriously over the question whether science that unsettles our sense of values is really so. Again, what is popularly known as ‘crisis in science’ is more or less a consequence of our worshipping science instead of understanding it. Thus it is a curious fact today that the scientists themselves are not sure about their own sciences. We have mentioned before the divided loyalty of the biologists. And Dingle informs us that the physicists, because of their preoccupation with mathematics, are not usually aware of the fact that a mathematical interpretation of experience does not amount to a physical interpretation of it, and as a consequence of it many physicists mistake the special theory of relativity of Lorenz for that of Einstein.³⁵ The expression ‘mass of an electron’ does not mean exactly what the expression ‘mass of the lead balls of Cavendish’ means and also the expressions ‘change’, ‘position’, etc. do not mean in quantum physics what they do in ordinary physics, precisely because electron ‘enters physics in a different way’.³⁶ All this has resulted in confusions about our understanding of space, time, the universe we live in, freedom, responsibility, etc. And

it is a pity that many leaders of contemporary philosophy are indifferent to such questions lest they should be involved in some 'metaphysical muddle'. True, the task is one of immense magnitude and Kant was perhaps right when he observed that a philosopher existed nowhere. But then he also noticed that the ideal was in us.³⁷ And so we have Platos and Kants, Hegels and Whiteheads and Marxes and others who may not be philosophers or *ῥῆσι*. Possibly there has not been any *ῥῆσι* at any time. Nevertheless, they are approximations to the ideal of a philosopher, or there are and have been *ῥῆσικαλπας*. And we may try to understand them in a creative, that is, non-scholastic, way. Besides, we have the poets, the historians and others with creative talents or concern in man's integration to help us.

Again, whether we know it or not, we are in possession of some kind of philosophy or metaphysics, and why should we not subject it to reflective consideration? For if we do not, ideologies will be showered upon us by interested persons who are, even when most generously judged, usually charlatans. Be that as it may, metaphysical systems are not outmoded. They have not outlived their utility. Possibly at some time in the future, which Ellul reckons to be the year 2000,³⁸ what is needed will pass directly from the machine to the brain without going through consciousness; technology may stay, but neither science nor poetry nor philosophy, i.e. nothing creative or expressive of the creative man, will be there. Till then, so long as we are what we are, viz. creative and in perpetual quest of identity, we should do metaphysical or systematic thinking because we have to.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 2nd edn., Micklejohn's translation (Everyman's Library, 1946), p. 393.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 388.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 389.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*, p. 390.
7. *Ibid.*
8. 'Marxism and Empiricism', in *British Analytical Philosophy*, ed. B.

- Williams and A. Montefiore (Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 230.
9. *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 385; hereafter referred to as *CPR*.
 10. *Ibid.*, p. 385.
 11. G. J. Warnock, *English Philosophy since 1900* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1958), pp. 161-2; A. Flew, *Essays in Logic and Language*, 2nd series (Blackwell, 1953), p. 9; A. R. White, *The Philosophy of Mind* (1967), p. 11, etc.
 12. A. J. Ayer, *The Revolution in Philosophy* (Macmillan, 1956), Introduction.
 13. I. Mezaros, 'The Possibility of a Dialogue', in *British Analytical Philosophy*.
 14. *British Analytical Philosophy*, pp. 319-25.
 15. *Ibid.*, pp. 324-5.
 16. *Ibid.*, p. 233.
 17. *Ibid.*, p. 233. True, Taylor refers to the sense-data theoretics. But he also says that 'it is the cradle of a number of other views even when we have ceased to discuss the philosophical problems of perception in these terms.' And a linguist may deny that he is an empiricist in that he refuses to be labelled. But we do not think that we should estimate anyone in terms of his own opinion about himself. Besides we are not in bad company when we say that the linguists are empiricists or crypto-empiricists and we have good reasons for saying this. For they, in some form or other, make use of the VP (Verification Principle), and not infrequently do not distinguish the question of learning the use of a word from the question of the meaning of a word. Ayer, in his Inaugural Address at the University of Oxford in 1960, observed that a pattern of the argument of the ordinary language philosophers 'rests on a theory of meaning which its advocates commonly fail to make explicit . . . the verification principle on which the logical positivists relied in their elimination of metaphysics.' Hampshire, in his review of *The Concept of Mind* (*Mind*, 1950), observed that in some form VP formed a suppressed premise of Ryle's argument in most cases. Mundle, in his *A Critique of Linguistic Philosophy* (OUP, 1970), has observed that VP in some form—verification-by-me, verification-by-anyone, verification-by-others—is present in Wittgenstein's treatment of language. Lewis, in his paper on 'Mind and Body' (*Journal of the Department of Philosophy*, Calcutta University, 1976-7), has pointed out that the discussion on the relation of mind and body has assumed immense proportion in recent British philosophy on account of the 'severely empiricist views' of the linguists. And we think—though we cannot argue the point here—that the choice of ordinary language on the part of the linguists is comparable to Locke's choice of the unsophisticated plain man.
 18. The article on Hegel in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. P. Edwards (Macmillan, 1972), vol. 3, p. 441.
 19. *CPR*, p. 398.
 20. *Ibid.*, p. 397.
 21. *Ibid.*
 22. I. Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, tr. Bernard (London, 1931), p. 289.
 23. A. J. P. Kenny and others, *The Development of Mind* (Edinburgh University Press, 1973), p. 18.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*, p. 121.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 122. The following sentences of E. Gilson may also be quoted here: 'The assumption that nothing can be rationally known unless it be scientifically known is far from an evident proposition. . . . By accepting design or purposiveness as a possible principle of explanation a scientist would introduce into his system of laws a ring wholly heterogeneous with the rest of the chain. He would intertwine the metaphysical causes for the existence of organism with the physical cause he must assign to both their structure and functioning. Still worse, he might feel tempted to mistake the existential causes of the living organism for their efficient and physical causes. . . . If the only intelligible way to explain the existence of organized bodies is to admit that there is design, purposiveness at the origin, then let us admit it, if not as scientists, at least as metaphysicians. And since the notion of design and of purpose are inseparable for us from the notion of thought, to posit the existence of a thought as cause of the purposiveness of organized bodies is to posit an end of all ends or an ultimate end, that is God.' (In *The Search for Meaning in Life*, ed. R. F. Davidson [Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1962], pp. 283-7)
29. J. Warnock, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-3.
30. R. Plant, *Hegel* (Unwin University Books, 1973).
31. Quoted by R. Plant in his *Hegel*, p. 19.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-3.
33. R. Plant, *Hegel*, p. 20.
34. The great divide in contemporary critical Marxism is the concept of *praxis*. Gajo Petrovic and some others put emphasis on Marx's humanism and widen the concept of *praxis* and hold that the philosophy of Karl Marx is not only not identical with dialectical materialism but also incompatible with it. But Mihailo Markovic and some others take Marxism as a positive science, and like the logical positivists and analysts hold that 'only scientific knowledge is objective and reliable'.
35. H. Dingle, *A Threefold Cord* (Allen and Unwin, London, 1961), pp. 61-9.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 166-71.
37. *CPR*, p. 475.
38. Cf. J. Ellul, *The Technological Society* (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1964).

East and West in Philosophy

It is obvious that the subject 'East and West in Philosophy' is too general to be profitably discussed in one paper. Besides, the subject has a strong emotive structure. So the discussion should avoid gleaning pointless similarities and dissimilarities, nor should it turn into an exercise in rhetoric and exhortation. It is therefore essential that the right method for exploring the subject should be adopted, and it seems that it consists in asking what a student of Western philosophy misses in Indian philosophy and vice versa. It is likely that there are other good methods also. Thus, one may propose to explore the subject by asking what refreshing and reassuring light the study of Indian philosophy throws on Western philosophy, and the other way round. But this method cannot be adopted in a brief paper. Besides, it may fail to be a study in contrast which this paper considers essential not only for appreciating the different philosophical enterprises, but also for appreciating philosophy as such. For when it is forgotten that philosophy is not impersonal and universal like the sciences, the philosophical disagreements are not looked at from the right point of view, and the sceptical thesis that philosophy is a useless subject becomes convincing. Anyway, this paper, after saying a few words by way of introducing the method it considers desirable, may immediately make an attempt to apply it.

A student of Western philosophy may miss many things in Indian philosophy, and the same may be said of a student of Indian philosophy studying Western philosophy. But to catalogue them all and to work out their implications may not be profitable. The missing concept should be of distinctive importance. It should be such that it would be pivotal and distinguishing for the philosophy concerned and illuminative of the mind that not only philosophizes but also builds science,

creates art and objectivizes in social and political institutions. Besides, the missing concept should be absolutely missing, i.e. it cannot be introduced smoothly in the philosophy in which it is not found. Accordingly, the question for this paper is: is there any such concept in Western philosophy which is not to be found in Indian philosophy, and conversely?

One may be tempted to challenge the propriety of the question, and though the best way of meeting it is by working out an affirmative answer, the paper proposes to do this after considering some initial doubts and objections so that it may indicate in a broad way the kind of answer it holds appropriate.

Thus, it may be asked if any of the philosophies concerned has any such concept, particularly because philosophical disagreements are notorious. And the answer is that if the key concept is understood as containing its denial also, there is no reason why it should not be there, though, it may be added, one may miss it if one adopts the inductive, i.e. the historian's descriptive method. It may be taken as non-controversial that the development of philosophical thought, in individuals or in schools, is not arbitrary, but has a pattern of its own, i.e. it centres round some key concepts, and that as philosophical revolutions are not as revolutionary as some would wish us to believe, it is not infrequently the case that what is often claimed to be an absolutely new concept is, when looked at carefully, only an old one with a new name and at a different level, probably enriched with some new but not too remote connotation. So it is only reasonable to assume that Western and Indian philosophies have some key concepts. The question posed by this paper should not therefore be brushed aside as improper. A sincere attempt at answering it may be of immense help in studying its subject from an academic point of view.

It may be argued that it has been said above that different philosophies have different sets of key concepts, but the question here is about one concept, and it is difficult to reconcile the two. In answer to it, it may be said that the key concepts are not discrete. They are rather the different facets of the logical core of the insight at their root. So it is immaterial whether one speaks of one concept or a set of concepts. Incidentally, if a key concept of one system is found missing in another, the two philo-

sophies are completely different, even if the concept of one may seem to have a place in the other. The converse of it is not true, for the concept of one system can only apparently occur in another system. This may be against the natural way of looking at the philosophical systems. But then this is the real point at issue. The natural way requires that the concepts are discrete, and this ought to be challenged. It should not be forgotten that the philosophical concepts imply one another in a unique way. They are the different facets of the intellectual content of the insight at their back. So it is immaterial for this paper whether it speaks of one concept or a set of concepts.

Another possible objection may also be considered. It is to the effect that there is no Western philosophy, but there are Western philosophies, each differing from the rest, and that this is true of Indian philosophy also. So, is not the question about the key concept an instance of question begging? The answer to it is that the statements are all right, but they do not justify the question. For the key concept, as has been said, makes room for its denial.

Let us now take up the question. Thus, to a student of Western philosophy, mathematics is conspicuous by its absence in Indian philosophy. Not that the Indian philosophers had nothing interesting to say about number, quantity, measurement and facts like these. Nor, again, can it be said that the Indian philosophers did not fall back on mathematics to support their metaphysical thesis. For did not the Buddhists utilize differential calculus to defend their doctrine of instantaneous being? And did not the Naiyāyikas hold that this was to hypostatize an abstraction? But then, on the whole, the Indian philosophers were neither mathematically responsible nor mathematically inspired. A philosophy is mathematically responsible if it philosophizes on mathematics, i.e. on its wider philosophical implications. It is mathematically inspired if it tries to build philosophy on the model of mathematics, either by applying the mathematical method to philosophy, or by trying to build an ontology as well as a cosmology in terms of objects which, when seen through, are the mathematical objects given an ontological habitation and a name. And no argument is necessary to confirm the above remark about Indian philosophy. But it is necessary to mention that the in-

difference of the Indian philosophers to mathematics is not casual and has far-reaching consequences, the most important being the non-synonymy of *darśana* and philosophy. This paper will work it out. But before that it should show (1) that neither the non-existence nor existence in an undeveloped form of the science of mathematics in India explains this indifference, and (2) that in Western philosophy the concern about mathematics is not a recent phenomenon.

The first proposition is historical and it is to be hoped that the experts will not deny that the following statements in confirmation of it have a claim to truth. The concept of zero that revolutionized the science of numbers was an Indian invention. The Indian mathematicians' knowledge of geometry and trigonometry was of an advanced kind. Algebra also was built by them. They invented differential calculus. The natural scientists, the astronomers particularly, made ample use of mathematics. So it may be assumed that mathematics was in a fairly advanced stage to draw the attention of the Indian philosophers. But it failed to do so, not because it had not the necessary charm but because the Indian philosopher was after an intelligibility conditioned by then subject which was not mathematical.

The second proposition is not historical like the first—at least it is not as historical. It raises a point that demands careful scrutiny, partly historical and largely analytic. Thus, it may be admitted that the preoccupation of contemporary Western thinkers with mathematics is such as may not escape the notice of any student of Western philosophy, though that of the early thinkers would have escaped the notice of everyone except the discerning students. But this does not imply that the Western philosophies of the early days were not mathematics-loaded, or that the preoccupation of the early thinkers was personal, i.e. not *qua* philosophers. For it is a historical fact that Western philosophy has been loaded with mathematics all through. Thus, admission to Plato's Academy was restricted to those who were proficient in mathematics. In the Platonic scheme of education, instruction in dialectics, i.e. philosophy, was recommended only for those whose thirst for knowledge remained unquenched even when they had been provided with a thorough schooling in mathematics and the natural sciences.

These are important facts. They help us to understand the Greek mind that built mighty philosophies which, incorporating some Christian and Jewish ideas, have been streaming into the West and providing the basic structure of the Western philosophies. Western philosophy has been mathematically inspired throughout. He who misses it is to be pitied as much as the poor woodcutter who could not see the wood for the trees.

But then the concern of the early thinkers with mathematics does not as easily draw our attention as that of the recent thinkers. There are various reasons for this. Neither the mathematical nor the natural sciences were as developed in the early days as they are today. A consequence of this development is the philosophers' attempt to work out the philosophical implications of alternative geometry, so that the problem of perception, the nature of logic and even the nature of philosophy may be appreciated better. Besides, recent advances in symbolic logic have equipped the thinkers of today to deal with the questions of mathematical philosophy more effectively. So it is not surprising that a contemporary thinker pays more attention to mathematics than a thinker of the old days did. Again, philosophical disagreements, in the opinion of many, argue philosophy's not being on the sure road to science, when contrasted with the necessary propositions of mathematics and the steady progress of the natural sciences. This persuades some gifted minds to build philosophy in the manner of mathematics, and it is no wonder that the attention given by contemporary thinkers to mathematics does not escape notice. There may be other reasons also. But the most important reason—and this paper wants to emphasize it—is the contemporary distrust of the formalism or essentialism of the Pythagorean-Platonic type which was to a great extent the translation of mathematics in the language of ontology to fulfil a cosmological demand and was successful in giving a fairly good account of the foundation of mathematics and also of the legitimacy of the application of mathematics in understanding empirical data. But many thinkers of today have no trust in this kind of essentialism, and so they reopen the question on non-essentialistic lines, which, as is usual in such cases, is so full of enthusiasm that it may stand in the way of looking at it from

the right point of view, and may create the impression that contemporary philosophers are more interested in mathematics than in philosophy. Though this may hold good in some cases, it is not a fair way of looking at contemporary philosophy. What the paper intends to underline is that these thinkers hold, like Plato and Pythagoras, that in certain realms of experience intelligibility means mathematical formulation. Indeed, this is the pivotal idea of Western philosophy, and the controversies in Western philosophies are over the precise interpretation of it. The great divides in Western philosophy are: in ontology, essentialism and existentialism (using 'existentialism' in a non-contemporary sense), and in epistemology, rationalism and empiricism. And they are over the precise nature of the ontological status of mathematical objects and the logical character of mathematical knowledge.

The point needs working out a little. The Ionians who fathered Western philosophy were cosmologists. But they were mathematicians also. However, they failed to connect the two. Rather, they were not sure if the wedding of mathematics to cosmologies would yield any good result. So their cosmological speculation got stuck in a morass. They failed to find an answer to the dilemma that if the primary stuff was determinate, i.e. of one kind, it was not intelligible how it assumed many determinations, particularly the determinations that were its negations, and if it was indeterminate, it was not clear how it was to be distinguished from the void and was to function as the primary stuff after all. The connection between mathematics and cosmology was seen by Pythagoras and he advanced the idea that the qualitative differences in nature were based on differences in geometrical structures. He applied the idea to music and it worked. The Eleatics improved it and argued that a form, or essence, or being was one and completely real, and not many, or changing, or a subjective construction. Socrates saw that there were non-mathematical forms as well. All these were gathered together in Plato and the result was the cosmology that is *Timaeus*. So the forms (i.e. essences in Plato) in Greek philosophy fulfil a cosmological demand, though the doctrine of essences is ontological with its roots in mathematics. And it is a commonplace that philosophers after Plato are either Platonists or critics of Platonism. Accordingly, the con-

cept of form or essence (or reason) is the pivotal concept of Western philosophy that this paper is looking for.

It is advisable that the point should be worked out briefly. Now, it may be mentioned at the outset that 'essentialism' etc. are boundary expressions. They stand for some ideal tendencies of which individual philosophies are more or less imperfect approximations. One philosophy may be nearer essentialism than existentialism, and the converse may be true of another philosophy. Taking this into account, one may rightly call the first an essentialist philosophy and the second an existentialist one. Even the blue-blooded essentialist or existentialist philosophy is not wholly so. But then the real point at issue between the two philosophies is the priority or relative importance of essence and existence. Keeping this in mind, the paper may make an attempt to show that the concept of essence, which, as per the insertion made above, accommodates the concept of existence, is the pivotal concept of Western philosophy that this paper is looking for.

The pre-Platonic philosophers need not be considered, for they are gathered together in Plato. Aristotle also does not pose a problem. For his questions also are Platonic, and though his answers are one step removed from the essentialistic answers of Plato, his philosophy may, with some justice, be described as a kind of Platonism or essentialism. Thus, if the cosmology of *Timaeus* may with some justification be described as a cosmology without matter, the Aristotelian cosmology may also be so described. True, none of them deny matter. But then both of them hold that in reflecting on the origin and development of the universe no useful purpose is served by raising the Ionian question on the primary stuff—the question, the perusal of which is rewarding, being on the nature of the forms or essences, their relations and their actualization in existence. Looked at from this point of view, Aristotle is a Platonist, and so are the modern scientists in that they dismiss the question of the nature of light, matter, etc. and provide us with equations. This paper, however, has no intention of denying the distinction between Platonism and Aristotelianism. It would rather insist on the distinction. For one is reminded of the quip that a philosopher is either a Platonist or an Aristotelian. And does not this quip in a different and unacademic way stress

what this paper is struggling to formulate? Thus, Aristotle's concept of essence and its relation to existence differed from that of Plato. Whereas the Platonic tradition in ontology holds the being continuum theory or the view that the more and more an essence perfects itself the more and more it is real, i.e. really exists, the Aristotelian tradition believes in the disjunction that a thing either exists or does not exist and that there is no question of there being any difference of degree in existence. This is the great divide in Western ontology, and it is traced back to Plato and Aristotle; it is clear that the concept of essence is the pivotal concept for both these great thinkers, if not for the whole of Western philosophy. This, it seems, is a fair working out of the implication of the quip, and this is precisely what the paper is struggling to formulate. But it is desirable that it should not be content with the quip and its implication, but should make an honest attempt to show, by taking into account the important philosophers individually as well as the chief philosophical movements, that this is the case. It has considered Aristotle. It may now consider briefly the mediaeval thinkers.

The doctrine of analogical predication, the controversy over universals and the ontological argument: it is sufficient if the paper selects these for consideration from medieval philosophy. That the doctrine of analogical predication christens an Aristotelian doctrine is obvious. Aristotle was of the opinion that though there were many senses in which a thing might be said to 'be', they were related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and did not merely have the epithet 'being' in common. Similarly, St Thomas declared that certain things were said of God and creatures analogically and not in a purely univocal or in a purely equivocal sense, i.e. in a sense which was a mean between pure univocation and pure equivocation. Thus, the doctrine of analogical predication is in the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition. Similarly, the controversy over universals. For this controversy, when looked at from the right point of view, is over the nature and status of essences with its obtrusively formalistic and ontological character softened down. On the controversy over the ontological argument it is sufficient to observe that it accentuates the difference on the relation between essence and existence referred to earlier. Thus, if exist-

ence is a function of essence, the most perfect essence exists most. But if no difference of degree in existence is recognized, a thing either is or is not, and from an essence's being most perfect, nothing as regards its existence can be concluded. So it is clear that medieval philosophy was in the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, and the concept of essence was the key concept for it.

We may now consider the modern philosophers. Modern philosophy is not directly ontological as the early philosophers were. So the reason-sensation controversy, and not the essence-existence one, easily engages the attention of its students. But this does not alter the situation substantially. For, as has been already mentioned, the rationalism-empiricism dispute corresponds fairly to that between essentialism and existentialism. Thus, the reason-sensation dispute is not uniquely modern. It is found in Greek philosophy also. And there the correspondence is easily noticed. Plato, an essentialist, was a rationalist. But Protagoras, who did not believe in the essences, was a sensationalist. Similarly, the concern of the modern empiricists over abstract ideas argues the same point. Hence, the epistemological interest of the modern philosophers does not alter the situation substantially. The shift in the interest is largely due to the introduction of the subjective factor, and to a certain extent this blurs the ontological picture, but does not demolish it. Besides, subjectivity may be construed differently, and this, while requiring different construing of the ontological scheme, does not demand that it be abandoned altogether.

Thus, Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, introduced the concept of subjectivity. This introduction was ambiguous in character. There were two different motives behind it, and the two motives, though complementary at first, proved in the long run to be conflicting. Thus, one of the motives was to work out the consequences of the developments in the physical sciences of his days, and the other was to provide them with a philosophical foundation. The physical sciences in those days became quantitative, and, discarding the teleological organism-analogue view of nature of the Greeks, worked upon the idea that nature was a machine. This raised two important philosophical questions: (1) Whether qualities like colour etc. as experienced really qualified the physical objects, and, if the

answer was in the negative, what was their status; and (2) whether the application of mathematics in the sciences to the total exclusion of all qualitative considerations was justified, not pragmatically, but theoretically. Descartes attempted to answer both these questions and the result is well known. This paper may confine its attention to two doctrines of his philosophy. (1) Qualities like colour etc. were not the primary properties of matter; they belonged to the union of minds with bodies. And (2) mathematics was true in that mathematical ideas were clear and distinct, or were evidenced by the self-certifying *cogito*. The first had as its consequence the notorious Cartesian dualism, and thus introduced a subjectivity which was psychological, or a synonym of being private. The second had as its consequence a subjectivity intending objectivity as such, and so was not empirical but transcendental in character. Descartes was not in full possession of this distinction and, hence, of the subjective he introduced, and that is why, while proposing to build up a universal science to be written obviously in the language of mathematics, he had to rely on God for ensuring the objectivity of this science, in that the self-certifying consciousness was not found sufficient for bridging the gap between the internal and the external. But then the Greek idea that intelligibility is the function of the essences, and that when the essences are natural it is mathematical, remained unaltered. The implication of the introduction of the subjective factor was more carefully worked out by Kant who subjectivized the essences, and in view of the fact that the subjective was transcendental, the Cartesian problem of bridging the gap between the internal and the external did not exist for him. But then he had to accept the conclusion that intelligibility was not absolute but conditional, for the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon was the inevitable consequence of the subjectivizing of the essences. Accordingly, Hegel went back to Plato. But this was not a simple going back. Hegel could not disown the Christian idea of a cosmology without matter. So he made use of the Aristotelian concepts of *nisus* and potentiality. This made the essences dynamic, and persuaded him to formulate the doctrine of externality which, as interpreted by Collingwood, looks like an anticipation of Whitehead's denial of simple location. Spinoza's *determination* was taken over in his

doctrine of the portentous power of the negative and this was used to relate the dynamical essences in the dialectical way; and the Spinozistic substance became the absolute thought from which everything could be derived, though neither deductively nor with the help of sense experience. Indeed it was a strenuous attempt to assimilate all the seminal ideas of the past philosophies. It is not necessary here to go into it, or to discuss its merits. What should be emphasized is that its title to universal philosophy may be questioned, but its universal sweep, its sincere attempt to collect all the leading ideas of the past cannot be denied, and what made it possible is that the groundwork of the structure was Greek, viz. reason and essence. It may also be mentioned here that the outstanding post-Hegelian cosmologist Whitehead is also in the Platonic line.

But contemporary philosophy whether in England or in the continent has no sympathy for cosmology. But then it is either Platonism or a criticism of it at a new level. Thus, as far as continental philosophy is concerned Husserl is the prime inspirer. Bochenski in his survey of contemporary philosophy places Husserl in the chapter entitled 'Philosophy of Essence', and this is quite right, though the phenomenological method of which Husserl was the inventor is practised by the existentialists also. That is, Husserl is a Platonist in the phenomenological terrain where Descartes' 'intuition' and Kant's 'constitution' camp together and sit by the same fire indistinguishably. In other words, the problem that haunted Husserl was that of foundation—foundation of mathematics, of logic, of sciences and even of philosophy. He began by taking up arms against the anti-essentialists like the nominalists and the psychologists, and with a theory of consciousness which was constitutive in the Kantian sense, as it gave the structures of the intended world and the unity of the intentions, but which was also intuitive in the sense of Descartes in that it was not formal but concrete. The phenomenological study revealed to him not the cogito, but the ego-cogito-cogitatum. And it is clear that if one step beyond is taken one arrives at Heidegger, or at existentialism. Curiously, the urge to take the step is there in the phenomenological method. For one may propose to seek the foundation of consciousness, and find it in *Dasein*, the forecourt of Being, and thus arrive at Heidegger. One may also for the

same reason liquidate the transcendental ego which may be felt as the death of consciousness and arrive at the contentless consciousness of Sartre. If, again, one holds that such a consciousness is indistinguishable from the unconscious, and that the truly transcendental is the world—not the external world of the traditional philosophers, the object of cosmology, but what engages man in ambiguity, chance and risk—one comes to Merleau-Ponty. So the transition from essentialism is intelligible. It is not necessary that this paper should dwell on these points. It should draw attention to the point that contemporary continental philosophy is occupied with the question of the relation between essence and existence.

This is true also of contemporary British philosophy, though it should be mentioned here that the question is epistemologically, or linguistically, oriented. That the British thinkers are suspicious of existentialism has no implication to the contrary. For, as has been mentioned before, if 'existence' be not understood in a subjectivistic and personal sense, empiricism may rightly be called a form of existentialism. Anyway, philosophizing in Britain is reminiscent of Hume and sometimes of Aristotle. Thus, some of the problems that engage their attention are: the problem of the universals, the verification of a law statement, the meaning to be assigned to any factual statement in an empirical language, the nature of the mathematical statements, etc. And their treatment of these problems is on the Humean, i.e. anti-Platonic, line. Again, they try to give an informal analysis of language, putting great emphasis on the equivocal character of words that are generally held to be univocal, and are in the Aristotelian tradition that gave the doctrine of analogical predication. Hence, the pivotal problem for them also is the problem of essence.

The rickety outline of Western philosophy given above intends to show that the concept of essence is pivotal in Western philosophy. An attempt may now be made to see how it illumines the Western mind. Thus, it is an undeniable fact that science considered as an institution is exclusively Western. In India there were scientific developments; but it is doubtful if science ever developed as an institution, i.e. if it ever became a part of Indian life. It has been said by some that foreign rule accounts for the absence of growth of science in India. But it

is not certain that it is a good account, precisely because one does not know how to check it. It is true that the sciences did not develop in India and that India was under foreign rule. But one may be at a loss to connect the two. Indeed, one may with some show of reason argue against it. For arts and architecture developed and philosophy flourished, though it is curious that neither the Hindu nor the Moslem philosophers paid any attention to each other's writings. This is more curious inasmuch as the orthodox thinkers and the Buddhist thinkers gave serious attention to each other's writings. It is still more curious that religious leaders like Kabir and Nanak made an attempt to have an understanding of the rival and contending ways of life, but the scholars neglected and persecuted them. So foreign rule is not the explanation. Besides, it should be noted that to a contemporary mind like Whitehead the Greek mind appears wonderfully modern. But an Indian counterpart of Whitehead would hardly say this of the ancient Indian philosophers. The failure in the development of science in India was not accidental, nor due to some historical cause. The Indian mind was not scientific. There were natural scientists, mathematicians and cosmologists in India. But there was no Pythagoras or Plato. The lack of responsiveness on the part of Indian philosophers to mathematics was to a great extent responsible for India's failure in science. And, negatively, this responsiveness which means the concept of the essences explains the birth and growth of the sciences in Europe.

If the concept of essence is at the basis of Western science, it is at the basis of the Western social and political institutions also. For, to an essentialist, a particular is just an imperfect approximation, and the essences form a whole such that the whole is supremely real. Translated into political language, it means that the individuals are for the state and not the state for the individuals. And it is a historical fact that all advocates of totalitarianism fell back on essentialism when called upon to defend their political theories. Plato and Hegel are illustrious examples. And Russell in his essay 'Ancestry of Fascism' has brought out how the Fascist concept of the state is to be traced to Fichte's doctrine of absolute ego. Similarly, it is also a fact that the more one deviates from essentialism the more one becomes a democrat, or a liberal. That in England empiricism

and democracy find a favourable soil has a philosophical implication of its own which gains in weight when it is noted further that neo-Hegelian idealism which was rather exotic in its character provided the philosophical foundation of her imperialism.

The relation between social and political life being very close, it may be assumed that the concept of essence in some important way accounts for the artistic creation of the West. Thus, in a closed society or state art has to comply with rules laid down by the politicians or the leaders of society, though this may mean the death of art. The Platonic proposal to banish the poets from the ideal state illustrates this point clearly, and it is well known that many states founded on essentialistic principles have attempted to approximate the Platonic ideal state. The Platonic criticism of poetry raised another point which cuts through Western aesthetics. It is to the effect that aesthetic consciousness is non-cognitive. It has its roots in Platonic essentialism, and forms the putative premise of the Platonic proposal. The aesthetic writers, with a leaning to essentialism but also with a soft corner for art, make an attempt to defend art in a way which is not at all edifying to it. Aristotle's *catharsis* is a case in point. He had no doubt that an experience to be cognitive should have an essence-structure, and he could not deny that aesthetic consciousness was wanting in this structure, and so the only course open to him to defend arts was by pointing out the useful purpose that it may serve. This at last in the hands of the lesser thinkers took the form that the poets were deficient philosophers catering philosophical dishes to the children and the intellectually unadvanced in a form they might stomach. So Croce, to give a better defence of art, placed the aesthetic activity before the cognitive one. And the other writers on aesthetics who do not believe either in the idealism of Croce or in his theory of language distinguish sharply between cognitive and aesthetic meaning. This paper need not go into them. It should only emphasize that the analysis of aesthetic consciousness in the West means primarily that attitude which one should adopt towards Plato, i.e. the essences. The concept of essence is illuminative of the Western mind.

It is clear that the concept of essence is the pivotal concept of Western philosophy. To show that it is the concept this paper

is after, it should be shown that it is missing in Indian philosophy and that it cannot be introduced smoothly in it. Clearly, the second task can be undertaken after the Indian concept of philosophy has been analysed. So we may now undertake the first task.

A priori, the concept of essence should be missing in Indian philosophy. For the concept results from the wedding of Western philosophy with mathematics. But Indian philosophy did not respond to the charms of mathematics. So it is inconceivable that the Indian philosophers debated ever the essences.

The *a priori* argument given above may not be convincing. So it is desirable that some empirical considerations should be adduced in favour of it.

Thus, the Indian philosophers debated enthusiastically on the problem of universals. But the problem of universals differs in some important respects from the problem of essences. Indeed, as universals are involved in every predication, it will be extremely surprising if the problem of universals was missing totally from any philosophy. So what should be considered is that a universal which lends intelligibility to a discourse, lends to it mathematical intelligibility also. Obviously, the qualitative universals cannot do this. But when a universal is such that its qualitative appearance is due to the exigencies of language merely, it being really a mathematical principle, it is a non-qualitative essence. And when comparing a universal with an essence, this fact should be borne in mind. The universals which were debated hotly by the Indian philosophers are powerless to account for the transition of the qualitative sciences into quantitative ones. It is on this point precisely that an essence differs from a universal. Secondly, a universal, so to say, wraps up the particular, but an essence is what a particular approximates. Thirdly, an essentialist may use the ontological argument to prove the existence of God, but this can hardly be the case with a universalist. Fourthly, an essence is in an important sense formal which a universal is not. The Indian philosophers had subtle arguments on the universals, but it is doubtful if they were ever impressed by the power that a form possesses, or were conscious of the necessity that a form may impart. The controversy over *avayava*, or the members of a

demonstrative syllogism, is a case in point. The constituent propositions are said to be *ucita ānupūrvika*, i.e. in a serial order that is proper. But it is doubtful if this propriety is logical. If it were so, *upanaya* and *parāmarśa* should not have been correlated by some logicians. Indeed, the absence of the use of symbols in Indian logic is almost scandalous, and a logician conscious of the power of form and the convenience of symbolism ought not to have resisted the temptation to use symbols. The non-use of symbols is certainly surprising. It is more so when we find its use in India in esoteric language. The only plausible explanation seems to be an absence of confidence in second-order symbolism in intellectual discourse. This diffidence cannot be expected from one who is conscious of the power of forms. One may argue over universals but may have no inkling of an essence or form.

Another interesting point may be made in this connection. The controversy over the reality of the universals finally boils down to the question whether a universal may be sensed. The Naiyāyikas believed in the reality of the universals and answered the question in the affirmative. This must have shocked the Western essentialists. They do not deny that a universal is given. But then the statement that it is given in sensation is hardly intelligible to them. An essence is not a universal. The concept of essence is missing in Indian philosophy.

But if essence is missing, rationalism also should be. And so also empiricism and criticism. How would one characterize the Indian theories of knowledge then? Besides, is it not a fact that the Bauddha theory of knowledge anticipated that of Kant? Such questions are tricky. They have persuasive power and so they should be answered. But it is not clear how one should answer them briefly. Let counter-questions be asked. Thus, are the Naiyāyikas rationalists or empiricists? They believe in the reality of the universals, and all knowledge for them is derived from sense experience. Are the Buddhists critical philosophers? But then 'criticism' receives its meaning by contrast, and there being no rationalist or empiricist theories of knowledge, how can the question be meaningfully tackled? Does not their theory of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* correspond to the Kantian dichotomy of sensibility and reason? But was not the Bauddha view against the doctrine of *pramāṇa-samplava* which

had nothing to do with the denial of the dichotomy of sensibility and understanding in that their advocates held the universal to be sensible objects and had no idea of reason or understanding? It is needless to produce more questions to render the persuasive power of the other questions abortive. It may safely be said that the Western controversy between rationalism and empiricism has no Indian parallel.

Now, an attempt may be made to find out the key concept of Indian philosophy. Thus, an orthodox student of Indian philosophy may be at a loss to find out the *prayojana*, i.e. the purpose, of philosophizing in the Western style. The Western authors do not, as the Indian philosophers invariably do, clearly mention what will be the net result of going through them. The prefaces or the introductions are there. But they do not meet the demand. At best they can give the *prayojana* of the different texts, but not of the subject as such. It cannot be assumed that this is well known. For every student of Western philosophy knows that this is a problem. And a student of Indian philosophy cannot but be surprised when he comes to learn that the question of the nature of philosophy is the most important philosophical problem in Western philosophy. And his surprise knows no bounds when he learns that it is the considered opinion of everyone who counts that it is a question to which there is no definitive answer. They are all agreed that philosophy is a high-level reflection. But then they differ as to the subject, or the purpose of it. And this renders the agreement pointless. And it is a fact that philosophers have non-philosophical preoccupations, and these may be called the forecourts of their philosophies. And these are carried over into their philosophies in such a way that the different philosophies are the different forecourts in the different philosophical enclosures. Thus, one may enter philosophy via mathematics and his philosophy is essentially mathematics in a philosophical dress. This is also the case when the forecourt is biology, or psychology, or psychiatry, or sociology or politics, or any special science. That is why one recent writer has remarked that philosophy is a form of imperialism—linguistic imperialism—in that what it does is to extend in a rather pontifical manner the way of speaking suitable to one science to all sciences. Put differently, philosophers agree that to philosophize is to reflect seri-

ously on the foundations, or first principles, or the basic questions of life. But then the outcome of it is that every philosophy begins by considering the foundations of the science that is its forecourt and ends by recommending that it be the forecourt of every science, even of life and philosophy. It may be objected that such observations on Western philosophy are superficial, particularly in view of the argument given in this paper to show that the problem of essence is its pivotal problem. But then it may be said in reply that the objection rests on a misunderstanding. Thus, it is true that every Western thinker while answering the question he deems truly philosophical adopts an attitude towards the essence which he may or may not take the trouble of defending. But the point is, is the problem of essences the immediate problem of every philosopher? And does he think that the best way of defending his subject is in terms of essences? So the centring of the Western philosophies round the problem of essence has no bearing on the above observations. Besides, it should be stressed that in view of the fact that philosophies, and so the concepts of philosophy, differ when the purpose of philosophizing differs, the philosophers should at the very beginning state not only the problems they intend to discuss but also the purpose of their philosophizing and what one may hope to gain from perusing their philosophies.

This should not be judged philistine or unacademic. For what a student of philosophy feels missing in Western philosophy is the intimate connection between life and philosophy. That philosophy as understood in the West has a connection with and bearing upon life need not be denied. But the point is whether the connection is as close as between *darśana* and philosophy. Socrates philosophized in the market-place, Kierkegaard has nothing but contempt for Herr Professor, and Sartre felt most free in the *Republic of Silence*. But these and a few other instances argue nothing. For philosophy has been an academic subject all through and the idea that the more it becomes technical the more it progresses is not infrequently held. One comes across the idea in India also. The lure of sophistry and scholasticism is universal. But the question is: is the forecourt of philosophy, like that of *darśana*, a way of living? Is a philosopher, like a *dārśanika*, a protector of his *sampradāya* (order), which means not a school of thought, or a sect, or a religious

order, or some social and political institution, but something deeper and wider, a fully alive way of living based on some prelogical insight into the nature of true being, viz. the self; and the whole reflective enterprise being the fulfilment of the intellectual obligations of the philosopher to his *sampradāya*. When the question is put in this form it is clear that the answer is in the negative. Distrust of philosophy, which is as old as philosophy but which has become a phenomenon these days, has a moral which the orthodox philosophers of the West are unwilling to learn. It is to the effect that philosophical disagreements are not like the scientific ones, that philosophy is not impersonal and universal like the sciences, that philosophy is not a study in the foundation in the traditional sense, but a fulfilment of the intellectual obligations of our nature to the basic insights, that philosophy is not 'philosophy' but '*darśana*'. The Western philosophers are unwilling to take this lesson. On the contrary, they present an interesting spectacle in that whenever the distrust becomes widespread it is found that some very gifted minds make a methodological innovation and claim that they would make philosophy a rigorous science and settle all disputes forever in such a way that if in future any dispute occurs, it may be dissolved by tracing it to the confusion that gave rise to it, or solved by referring to their works much in the manner that a dispute about the arrival or departure of a train is solved by referring to the railway timetable. This shows that philosophy cannot give up its claim to be a science, and is not as close to life as *darśana* is.

This point deserves a little elaboration. Thus, spiritual disquiet is at the root of both *darśana* and philosophy, but then it is at the root of the sciences also. The disquiet is not one uniform thing. Let it be said for the sake of convenience that what conditions science is non-aporematically theoretical, and there it may be said that whereas non-aporematically theoretical disquiet is at the root of philosophy, what originates *darśana* is aporematically theoretical. So whereas philosophy like the sciences will make an attempt to resolve a doubt once and for all by moving forward, *darśana* will attempt to settle it by digging backward. *Darśana* is not a theoretical activity in the sense philosophy is.

Philosophy originates in doubt or wonder and aims at wis-

dom, but *darśana* originates in suffering and aims at liberation. Clearly, suffering is not cognitive like doubt or wonder, and liberation is not a theoretical goal like wisdom. So what a student of Indian philosophy misses in Western philosophy is something genuine, and it would not be wise to dismiss him as a philistine. One should attempt to understand him.

Thus, suffering, in spite of what has been said about it by the ancient and modern writers, is not an empirical psychical state. Had it been so, the idea of final release from it would have been an empirical idea, i.e. a product of wishful thinking. It is transcendental. It is a kind of restlessness that results from a prelogical awareness that we are what we are not, and that we are not what we are. In other words, there is an insight into the true being of ourselves and this does agree with what we ordinarily think ourselves to be. This generates a restlessness that suffering denotes. The reflective activity is an attempt to put an end to it by raising the insight from the prelogical to the logical level.

Such being the nature of *darśana*, it is clear that a distinction between appearance and reality, or between the false ideas about self and the true ideas about it, is at its beginning. And Indian philosophies are essentially attempts to uncover the true nature of the self. They are *ātma-vidyās* which the Western philosophies are not. The statement is very sweeping in its character and it is essential that cogent arguments should be offered so that its claim to plausibility may be granted.

It is obvious that the arguments should fall into two groups: one purporting to show that all the systems of Indian philosophy are attempts at formulating satisfactory theories of self, and the other purporting to show that the Western philosophies do not make this attempt.

The arguments of the first group may be presented in the following way. Every *darśana* aims at liberation which implies at least the final ending of restlessness. One of its conditions is the establishing of the prelogical insight at the logical level. What conditions prelogical insight is an interesting question, but this paper need not go into it. It may take it as ultimate and may also record that such insights may and do differ. However, when one looks carefully into the insights that the Indian philosophers have attempted to establish at the logical level, one

cannot help noting that they fall into two broad groups. Thus, one demands that it be formalized reflectively in a system in which the self will be regarded as a pure and free and eternally accomplished ontological subject, while the other demands that it be formalized in a system in which the self is a determinate substance. In other words, for the first, the self is a pure subject in that it is neither an object nor objectifies itself. It is a free subject in that it has no determination and one cannot talk of it in a subject-predicate (i.e. substance-attributive) language, or a language that is relational. The self having no determination, consciousness cannot be a determination of it. It is not a substance of which consciousness is an attribute. It is consciousness, a consciousness that lights up the empirical psychical modes called knowledge and thus illumines everything. The source of all illumination is self-illuminating. It is an eternally accomplished subject, as it is self-illuminating ontologically. When considered epistemologically, it is a function of its ontological nature. It is an ontological subject. That is, it is not a subject in relation to an object. It may be spoken of as the knower of objects. But then it should be stressed that this way of speaking, though legitimate as far as it goes, cannot go very far. If there are no objects it would not cease to be, and would not remain as an object. Subjectivity is its very being—and this subjectivity is not a correlate of objectivity. For the second, on the contrary, the self is a substance, and a determinate substance at that. It has some inseparable determinations. It also receives new determinations. Consciousness, or knowledge—there being no reason to distinguish them—is one of its determinations, though there may be some difference of opinion whether it is a separable or an inseparable one. It is an object epistemologically and ontologically, and though it is an elegant object by virtue of the fact that it is determined by more valuable determination, in respect of objectivity it does not differ from a humble object, say a tree. Thus, it is not a pure and free and eternally accomplished ontological subject. Now, these are the models of Indian philosophy, and the different philosophies are attempts at approximating either of them. Accordingly, the crucial question of Indian philosophy is whether the self is such a subject. The pivotal concept of Indian philosophy is such subjectivity.

It should not be supposed that this paper to be persuasive is unjustly brushing aside the various logical, epistemological and metaphysical theories that the Indian philosophers built. For, in the first place, this paper is not a historical account. Secondly, it is not doing this. Without denying that these theories may be considered independently and for their own sake, it should be stressed that it is not unlikely that such independent studies may fail to situate them. Thus, the logical systems of the different schools differ as the ontological insights at the basis of their philosophizings differ. The logical doctrine of a school states the criterion that the philosophers of the school honour when wrestling with the ontological insights at their disposal. Similarly, the great divide in Indian epistemology is over the being and knowing of knowledge. While in Western epistemology the controversy is between a rationalist and an empiricist, which in the final analysis is over the nature and status of mathematical knowledge, in Indian epistemology it is between the believer and the non-believer in the self-illuminating character of knowledge, and clearly, it is the ontological dispute mentioned before in the sphere of epistemology. Again, if the self is held to be determinate, i.e. categorizable as a substance, it is necessary that a categorial scheme should be drawn up, and if some of the objects thus categorized occur and cease to occur, a theory of causes as well as an account of their origin and destruction should also be formulated in conformity with the categorial scheme. But the thinkers who believe in free subjectivity would take up arms against the scheme. Thus, there will be a hot debate on substance, universals, cause, atoms, relations and similar topics of epistemology and metaphysics. They are situated when studied together with the basic controversy mentioned above. Again, if the self and the not-self be radically different, the question how one may be mistaken for the other is pertinent. So in answer to it some philosophers of this line of thinking introduce the concept of positive ignorance, which again requires a distinction between two types of knowings one of which establishes it and the other liquidates it. Besides, a particular theory of the nature of illusory *sensa* is deemed necessary. But the philosophers who do not think that the self and the not-self are as opposed as light and darkness will challenge all these views. So it is not un-

reasonable to hold that the major topics discussed in Indian philosophies branch out of the pivotal topic mentioned earlier.

The arguments of the second group are as follows. The concept of subjectivity in European philosophy was introduced by Descartes. But from what has been said above, it would be clear that neither Descartes nor his successors were concerned with the ontological subject. In Descartes subjectivity was ambiguous, in Kant it was constitutive, in Husserl it is of man-experiencing-the-world, in Heidegger it is further enlarged, and not merely consciousness but *Dasein* as a field is said to be intentional. Sartre in his pathetic attempt to tear away consciousness from the fullness of being reduces it to nothing, and Merleau-Ponty holds the world to be the truly transcendental.

This may be confirmed by another kind of consideration. Thus, an attempt was made to link up the major topics of Indian philosophy with the concept this paper holds pivotal for it. Now, it should be stressed here that some of these topics are ignored by the Western thinkers and this implies their unconcern for subjectivity. That is, the question of knowledge of knowledge is not given the attention that an Indian thinker holds it deserves, by the Western philosophers. Similarly with the question of positive ignorance. Indeed, a perusal of Indian philosophy shows that for the Indian thinkers the problems of knowledge and ignorance go together. This was noticed by one Western writer, viz. Ferrier, but none of the important Western thinkers seem to be aware of this. The same is true of the question of illusory datum. In Western philosophy the thinkers who believe in a searchlight theory of consciousness show some interest in the question, but for an Indian thinker it is more pressing for the idealist. Again, the Indian thinkers debate enthusiastically on the nature of darkness, but it is not clear if a Western philosopher will immediately see the philosophical character of the controversy, far less the intimate relation that it has with the controversy on the nature of self. Arguments in this line may be multiplied but are unnecessary. It is sufficient to observe that the thinkers who believe in a pure self-illuminating subjectivity have to explain why it is not immediately seen to be so, and accordingly they have to introduce something that will cover it and will create the illusion that what is, is an

object. The topics referred to above are the consequences of a belief or disbelief in the ontological subject. And since these are missing in Western philosophy, the concept of the ontological subject should also be missing.

An attempt may be made now to show that the pivotal concept of each philosophy is missing in the other absolutely. It is hoped that a few remarks on how the Indian philosophies came into existence will be sufficient to establish this. Thus, Indian culture makes a distinction between *pravṛtti-mārga* (the path of following one's nature as given) and *nivṛtti-mārga* (the path of withdrawal from this nature). The goal of the first path is said to be heaven, a kind of existence which is elegant but not substantially different from everyday existence, and the values recognized by a person on this path are on the whole moral and religious. He worships God and saintly men, makes sacrifices, helps others, cultivates friendship, performs rituals, etc. There are reasons to believe that in India there was a time when this path was held to be the only path that one should follow. But then the idea dawned that heavenly existence is also not lasting. Not heaven, but the final ending of restlessness is the goal of life. The age when this idea became widespread is known as *dharma yuga* (the age of justice), or *satya-yuga* (the age of truth). The Indian philosophies came into existence in this age. Now, the dawning of this idea was not abrupt. This was the work of the *yogins*. The *sāṃkhya* or the *yoga* is the most ancient philosophy of India. This proposition is not only analytic. It may be historically confirmed. This paper need not go into the historical evidence. And it is the close connection between *yoga* and Indian philosophy that gives it its distinctive character. It is *ātma-vidyā* in a sense in which Western philosophy is not and cannot be. And to Indian philosophy the concept of form or essence is useless.

So the two philosophies are quite different. The idea of a synthesis when given a trial leads to lazy eclecticism with a failure to follow the distinctive nature of both. A study of the problems of Western philosophy from the Indian philosophical point of view results only in confusion. This is also true of the study of Indian philosophy from the point of view of Western philosophy. But then, though paradoxical, a study of Western philosophy by a student of Indian philosophy is rewarding and

vice versa, for an awareness of the contrast deepens the appreciation. And secondly, when the purpose of philosophizing is clear, one may philosophize in a more profitable way. Thirdly, of the two paths mentioned above, each when followed blindly may give rise to some uncongenial consequences. The Western philosophers are following the first path, and a dose of subjectivity may be of some benefit. The dose cannot be logically taken. But then life is wider than logic. Similar considerations may be offered in favour of the proposal that a student of Indian philosophy should study Western philosophy. Lastly, today we cannot speak of two philosophies and two worlds. There is only one world, viz. the Western world. The Western values and ideals are being accepted uncritically almost everywhere. There is no Indian philosophy worth the name. Studies in ancient systems are exegetical and hardly creative. There are a few original minds, but it is doubtful if they have been successful in creating any new climate of opinion. So, will the recommendation that every student of philosophy, Western and Indian, should take occasional dips in Indian philosophy in the ancient style sound bigoted and dogmatic?

Philosophy and History of Philosophy

Philosophy (by which is meant metaphysics) is something personal, and so it is historical. This paper proposes to argue this proposition without entering into any controversy. The proposition is about metaphysics, and is metaphysical, or shares some of the characteristics of a metaphysical proposition. Like a metaphysical proposition it also uses familiar words in unfamiliar senses. Thus, it does not use the connector in any one of its elegant familiar senses. The connector is 'so', or 'as . . . so' (the function of 'and' being not logical but punctuational). This suggests that there is a 'premise-conclusion' relation between the propositions it connects. But then the second proposition does not follow from the first proposition in the recognized sense of 'follows from'. The proposition under consideration does not assert that its second constituent proposition follows from its first constituent proposition as 'it is an angle' follows from 'it is a right angle'. So it does not assert that the first proposition entails the second proposition. It may be said that the first proposition implies the second proposition, but then it should also be said that this asserted implication is not material implication. So it is neither formal implication nor strict implication. The connector is not used in any one of its elegant senses. It stands for something. It does not connect the two propositions. It asserts that the relation between the two propositions connected by it may be called a 'premise-conclusion' relation. Thus, it asserts that a persuasion in favour of the first proposition is in favour of the second proposition also, though the first proposition differs from the second proposition and does not entail it. But it also asserts that while the acceptance of the second proposition is facilitated by the acceptance of the first proposition, the acceptance of the first proposition, if not combined with the acceptance of the second proposition, be-

comes insignificant and places the first proposition nowhere. It is not asserted that there is any vicious circle involved here, and that this is a sign of the aristocratic character of the proposition that forms the thesis of this paper. For the acceptance of the first proposition may be said to be logically independent of the acceptance of the second proposition in that the second proposition need not form a part of the considerations that condition the acceptance of the first proposition. Still to accept the first proposition without accepting the second proposition is to pour scorn upon philosophical propositions and not to describe their nature. So the acceptance of the second proposition may be said to condition the acceptance of the first proposition. That is, the first proposition asserts that philosophical truths are personal and subjective. This does not mean that they are foolish and unimportant. They are in some important sense objective and impersonal also. And they become objective and cease to be the exclusive and unimportant possession of some isolated individual by becoming historical. In their genesis and formation, historical considerations play an important part. So also in the objectivization of them. They become impersonal, are made impersonal by the application of the historical criterion. Accordingly, the acceptance of the first proposition when not accompanied by the acceptance of the second proposition leaves the first proposition nowhere and tends to create a wrong impression about the nature of philosophical propositions. This is what the connector asserts. It is not used in its familiar senses. This is the case with 'historical' as occurring in the second proposition. The second proposition asserts that philosophical truths are historical. But this assertion should be distinguished from that made in existentialized Marxism or in classical Marxism to the effect that a philosophy is true only if it represents the point of view of the rising class. Indeed, the second proposition does not contradict, though it is not necessary that this should form a part of the content of its assertion, the traditional view that to link up philosophical truths with the fortunes of a class is to offer a strange notion of truth. Similarly, the assertion should be distinguished from that of Prof. Collingwood that metaphysical questions are about the 'absolute presuppositions' that have been made on certain occasions and that the task of the philosopher is the analysis of the

thought of the natural scientists to unearth these presuppositions and to determine if they are absolute. Indeed, the second proposition does not deny (though it does not make it a part of its assertion) the orthodox view that the absolute presuppositions are not contingent, or things that by an analysis of the propositions of the sciences may be seen to be just so and so. Again, the second proposition does not assert, as is done by the journalists and the popular writers, that the philosophers are the voices of their ages. It does not use 'historical' in its familiar senses. But it does not mean that it uses the word in a Pickwickian way. The sense in which it uses it, though not familiar, is not too remote and is intelligible, though it refuses to be translated into some easy-to-manage compact expression. This is true of 'personal' as occurring in the first proposition. It asserts that philosophical truths are personal. But it should be distinguished from the assertion that they are foolish and unimportant. It should be distinguished also from the assertion that they are private and cannot be socialized. Similarly, it should be distinguished from such assertions as 'metaphysicians are musicians without musical ability' and its like. 'Personal' as occurring in the first proposition does not stand for any one of its familiar senses. It does not stand for nothing. Neither does it stand for something too remote or unintelligible. However, the thesis that this paper proposes to defend is that in some not-too-familiar and not-too-remote sense of the words mentioned above, philosophy is something personal and so it is historical. The motive behind the defence of the thesis is to establish the conclusion that the relation between philosophy and history of philosophy is so close that one is at a loss to ascertain whether it is too emphatic to assert that philosophy is history of philosophy.

The thesis has been stated. Now it may be argued. The general plan of the argument is clear. The first proposition will be argued first. Then some considerations will be offered to relate it to the second proposition. The argument in favour of the first proposition will consist of two analyses. Thus, the concept of meaning will be analysed to arrive at the position that a theory of meaning is a theory of Being also. Then the concept of Being will be analysed. It will try to establish the conclusion that Being is something immediate and unobjective, and

that the task of philosophy as the science of Being is to show this, and thus to be instrumental in the endeavour of human beings to be posted in Being. The analysis will also make the point that non-Being has many levels, and accordingly, the desire for Being will be so differently felt at different levels that the desire and also the instrument used for the fulfilment of it may rightly be called personal. Lastly, attempts will be made to establish the position that what is personal is historical also.

The Concept of Meaning

The analysis of the concept of meaning may conveniently begin with the logical empiricists. It is well known that the logical empiricists distinguish between two kinds of meanings, viz. the cognitive and the non-cognitive. Thus, they hold that a statement has a cognitive meaning if it is purely formal, or logico-mathematical, or empirical. Such statements have an informational function. A statement with non-cognitive meaning has no such function. It is emotive and imaginative in character and has an appeal function only. In mythology and in subjects that have originated from mythology, viz. poetry, theology and metaphysics, copious illustrations of such statements are to be found. They are often charged with high emotional overtones but have no assertive content. A statement with cognitive meaning is empirically verifiable if it is factual. This, in brief, is the analysis of the concept of meaning as given by the logical empiricists. It is not necessary to subject this analysis to any thorough examination. This has been done by competent thinkers. This paper will select two of them and will elaborate them to reach its conclusions. Thus, it will first mention and independently elaborate the point made by Dr Zuurdeeg.¹ He has argued that this classification of meanings into cognitive and non-cognitive cannot account for a statement that expresses the conviction of the person making the statement. A statement that articulates 'a Communist's dedication to his cause, or a Moslem's loyalty to Allah' is not just emotional or volitional. It has not an appeal function merely. Much more is involved in it. In the formation of it, not only his emotion, will and persuasive intentions come into play, but his intellect and the other factors of his personality also do. Indeed, it involves the whole

person. Will, emotion and similar other factors of his personality are subordinated to something else. Such a statement expresses the whole person. It records his unnoticed consciousness of his own Being. He does not utter the statement. He does not use or employ it. He is his statement. He is Marcel's 'man of proper pride'. There is an 'irrefragable unity' between his being and the word that he utters. The statement is an 'is-statement', and not a 'use-statement', or an 'employ-statement'. To contradict it is not to convey a difference in opinion but to condemn the person. Such a statement cannot be said to have cognitive meaning. The structure of the meta-language of the language in which this statement finds place is non-logical. But this does not mean that this is illogical, or that the meaning of such a statement is just non-cognitive. The point is that the classification of meaningful statements into cognitive and non-cognitive is not exhaustive. The principle behind this classification is inadequate. To arrive at a more satisfactory classification it should be given up. A new classification should be proposed and this is to the effect that the major sub-classes under the class 'statements' are 'is-statements' and 'use-statements'. The analysis of the concept of meaning as given by the logical empiricists is inadequate.

The inadequacy may be more clearly indicated and the concept of meaning as envisaged in this paper may be less negatively formulated if the question of the relation between these two kinds of statements, or, what amounts to the same thing, between these two languages, is briefly discussed. Thus, use-language which is apparently indicative and non-convictional in character develops within the framework of is-language (convictional language). Convictional language informs indicative language. This is seen when the language of the sciences is analysed. It offers the best example of indicative language, and it is not just indicative. It can grow when nursed by convictional language. Thus, the sciences have their presuppositions. But what are these presuppositions? Prof. Collingwood tells us that they are not propositions. But is it possible to stop at this? Is it not a fact that they are accepted? And what conditions their acceptance? They are not empirical generalizations hitherto unrefuted, or grounded on uncontradicted experience. Neither are they self-evident, nor are they accepted on

the ground that their falsity is inconceivable. Similarly, they cannot be described as hypotheses accepted on the ground that they work, or that they help the scientists in discovering the simplest arrangements of experience. And when it is said that they are prescriptive injunctions, nothing important is said if it is not also said that they record convictions, or are statements in convictional language. Indicative language is informed by convictional language. Use-language involves is-language. When analysing the statements of science one may fail to come across a statement of is-language. But when analysing the realm of scientific presuppositions one cannot help meeting them. Use-language draws its nourishment from is-language.

This raises the important problem of objectivity. Thus, the statement that indicative language draws its nourishment from convictional language seems equivalent to the statement that even in the sciences interpretation-free objectivity or purely impersonal truth is not attained, and this, it may be argued, is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the view that is-language informs use-language. It is not possible to discuss the objection fully. Only the following observations can be made. First, the alternative to absolutely objective and impersonal truth is not irrational bias and prejudice. The observation of Heidegger that 'thinking only begins at the point where we come to know that Reason glorified for centuries is the most obstinate adversary of thinking'² cannot be dismissed with a shrug. It need not be said that Heidegger is unfurling the banner of irrationalism. The alternative to impersonal truth is not irrational prejudice. Secondly, it is not objectivity but inter-subjectivity that controls scientific behaviour. In the scientists' checking up of prejudices and testing of theories the most important role is played by discussion in which eminent scientists take part. True, facts are marshalled and experience is appealed to. But neither are the facts brute, nor is experience neutral. Thirdly, 'truth' is a word in convictional language. When a statement in indicative language is described as true, room is made for it in the convictional language. An analytic study of the different philosophical theories of truth establishes this point. Thus, the correspondence theory of truth believes in the interpretation-free given, and so is not a theory of truth merely. It is also a theory of reality and its relation to thought. This applies to

the other philosophical theories of truth. They record consciousness of Being also and accordingly they are formulated not in indicative language but in convictional language.

This assertion should be distinguished from that made by Tarski and some other contemporary thinkers that 'true' is a predicate of object-language sentences, but the sentence 's is true' belongs to meta-language. Indeed, the two assertions are as different as is possible for any two assertions to be. The semantic theory of truth seems to go beyond the different philosophical theories of truth by being philosophically neutral, or, what amounts to the same thing, by being non-philosophical. Thus, the adherents of the different philosophical theories of truth will not quarrel with its principal contention that 'snow is white' is true, if and only if snow is white. But then they will ask: what does the object sentence 'snow is white' designate? Is it an unadulterated given? Or is it a construction? Such questions are metaphysical, and the semantic theory of truth ignores them. It succeeds, if it succeeds at all, in being such a theory of truth as is not a theory of reality also, only because it is not a philosophical theory of truth. And whatever value it may have as a contribution to the exact study of formal deductive systems, it does not offer, as it claims to do, a philosophical reconstruction of the pre-analytic concept of truth. Besides, if the technique of recursive definition recommended by Tarski is successful in deciding in a finite number of steps whether any given formula belonging to an object-language is a sentence, it is successful also, as Prof. Black has observed, in introducing the term 'true' in object-language.³ This suggests a 'No truth' theory, that is, a theory which holds that 'true' is an incomplete symbol. Accordingly, the semantic theory of truth cannot be said to be a philosophical theory of truth. Anyway, 'truth' is a word in convictional language, and a theory of truth is not just a theory of truth. It is a theory of Being also.

What is true of truth is true of meaning. A theory of meaning is not a theory of meaning only. It is also a theory of Being. Like 'truth', 'meaning' is a word in convictional language. The statement that states the empiricists' theory of meaning is in convictional language. It is not an empirical generalization. It is also not a tautology. It is not an important piece of nonsense. Neither is it a truism elucidated. It is not a proposition at

all. It is a proposal. The empiricists' definition is a persuasive definition. The statement that the meaning of a statement is the method of its verification is, as Prof. Wisdom has pointed out, a metaphysical statement.⁴ Thus, in the first place, like every metaphysical statement it uses familiar terms in unfamiliar senses. And, in the second place, it is 'the generalization of such theories as: A cherry is nothing but sensation and possibilities of more; A mind is nothing but a return of behaviour; There are no such things as numbers, only numerals, and the laws of logic and mathematics are really rules of grammar; Beauty is nothing but the features in respect of which a thing is beautiful and the feelings they rouse'.⁵ That is, this theory of meaning has an approved grade of facts. It is not a theory of meaning merely; it is a theory of Being as well.

This applies not only to the verifiability theory of meaning, but also to all recent analytic theories of meaning. True, the analysts will disclaim this. They will argue that they are applying the 'look and see' method and have no metaphysical or categorial commitment. But such a disclaimer will not stand scrutiny. The analysis of meaning as given by the formalist as well as by the informalist is not an analysis of meaning merely. Thus, the logical atomists analysed language to find out the facts that go about in the actual objective world, and so their analysis of language was more than an analysis of language, and their theory of meaning was more than a theory of meaning. Indeed, the *Tractatus* is replete with metaphysical statements, and though it may appear at first sight that *The Logical Syntax of Language*, by distinguishing between the formal and the material mode of speech, succeeds in avoiding metaphysics, yet on closer analysis it will be found that the success is a failure in disguise. For 'it is easy', as Prof. Hall has observed, 'to turn the tables on Carnap'.⁶ That is, a statement in the formal mode of speech hardly translates a so-called pseudo-object statement in the material mode of speech. Thus, when the statement 'the evening star and the morning star are identical' is translated as 'the words "evening star" and "morning star" are synonymous', a Pickwickian treatment is offered to the concept of synonymity. An appeal to the thesis of extensionality will serve no useful purpose. For the thesis is largely metaphysical. Besides, when the statement 'Babylon was treated in yesterday's

lecture' is translated as 'the word "Babylon" occurred in yesterday's lecture', what is given is not a translation but a howler. These translations, in other words, do not translate but offer syntactical correlation. But a correlation is just a correlation and does not justify the preference for one form of expression as against the other. When Carnap substitutes syntactical translations for the so-called pseudo-object sentences, his speech is in the transposed mode. As Prof. Hall puts it, 'he is trying to say with Wittgenstein that the world contains only the objects asserted and characterized in the scientific statements, but he realizes that he cannot say *this* so he says something else, something correlated, about syntax, and so of course he is deceiving himself.'⁷ Analysis of language in linguistic formalism is more than an analysis of language. This is true of the linguistic informalist's analysis of language. He discards the name-relation theory of meaning and puts emphasis on use. But this means, as Prof. Hall has argued, that he 'ought either to cast aside entirely the concept of truth and falsity as nonsensical, or in any case thoroughly misleading, or to accept a success-in-behaviour theory of truth. On the latter alternative, he would plainly be committed to pragmatism. On the former he would need something to take the place of the true false distinction. What could it be? Effectiveness for using language for whatever purpose one had? This, one suspects, would just be pragmatism with a change of dress. And wouldn't any other choice as truly enmesh him categorially?'⁸ Besides, the metaphor of language-games as used by the informalist is unhappy, for language is not just a game, it is something given, and if no given language involves Wittgenstein in metaphysics, 'the whole business, as a whole, and as he means to use it, does'.⁹ Indeed, every language has its own semantic dimension. A language modelled on the so-called uninterpreted calculus is no exception. The attempt at constructing a language having a syntax and sign-vehicles merely is void *ab initio*. Accordingly, to use a language is to be ontologically committed. This does not mean that all the sentences that a person makes, commits him ontologically. Nor again does it mean that he commits himself only by the use of bound variables. Everything depends on the context, on the point for using the sentences. It is not possible to avoid what Prof. Hall calls 'categorio-centric predicament', or what this

paper proposes to call the recording of one's unnoticed consciousness of Being. A theory of meaning is a theory of Being also. A statement *s* may be in indicative language, but the statement that '*s* is a meaningful statement', or a statement on the nature of meaning, is in convictional language.

The first point has been mentioned and elaborated. Now the second point may be taken up. It is to the effect that as the verification theory of meaning entails solipsism, so it is unsatisfactory. The point is well known. So this paper need neither formulate the objection nor make any attempt at assessing the merit of the replies to the objection as given by the logical empiricists. It may study the point in the light of the analysis of language as given by Heidegger. This it proposes to do. Thus, according to Heidegger, communication is an incidental and consequential trait of language and does not indicate its essence. Language, in other words, is not a tool at man's disposal. It is a possession in a more fundamental sense. It is what disposes of the supreme possibility of human existence. Only where there is language, is there world, i.e. the perpetually alternating circuit of decision and production, of action and responsibility, but also of commotion and arbitrariness, of decay and confusion.'¹⁰ The actual life of language consists in conversation, which is something different from the mere transmitting and receiving of information. It implies both speech and listening. It means that one person speaks with another about something, and this brings the participants in conversation closer. It should be noted that conversation does not just bring them together. It makes the relation between them more close. But it does not bring the relation into existence. The participants are not Leibnizian monads. Neither are they Newtonian particles. They are in a field. They are human beings, and the distinctive characteristic of a man is that he is a Being-in-the-world. All human activities go on within an 'overtness'. This distinguishes men from animals. The animals live in an environment and respond to the stimuli that are showered upon them. But men live in a world. To him the objects are not the aims of desires and instinctive care, or the causes of fear. He lives in 'overtness'. The great realm of beings is flung open to him. What was closed becomes disclosed. The participants in the conversation do not just exchange informa-

tion. Each discloses his own being to the other. They participate in conversation, in each other's being. They converse not only when they speak and listen but also when they are in silence and feel. This silence is not non-verbal gestural speech. It is speech, but it is speech in silence, and in symbols. Language as ordinarily understood, viz. words and the rules of grammar, is the foreground of it, the background being the unenclosed Being. Using the terms of Gestalt psychology, it may be said that what is ordinarily called language is the figure of language, Being being the ground. And all figure is against a ground, and all conversation presupposes the participation in each other's Being. In less high-flown terminology, there must be an unexpressed context of mutual understanding if there is to be any conversation.¹¹ Now, though every figure has its ground, it is easy to detach the figure from the ground, and so to ignore and to forget the ground. Though what is ordinarily called language is only the foreground, it is easy to forget this. So also it is easy to forget or to misinterpret the role that silence plays in conversation and to consider communication as constituting the essence of language. And if communication be the essence of language, and if feelings and the other non-intellectual contents are incommunicable, then only an intellectual language, viz. the language of logic, mathematics and the sciences, becomes language par excellence. When anyone talks in this language, he is talking. Otherwise he is indulging in the transposed mode of speech. Accordingly, truth is an intellectual thing. It is propositional. Only a sentence in the indicative mood can claim truth. Obviously, this expresses the position of many contemporary thinkers, and it formalizes the detaching of the foreground of language, the incidental and consequential trait of language, from its existential background. But this is not a contemporary phenomenon. Heidegger assures us that the Greeks started this game. They ignored the original meaning, viz. unhiddenness, of the Greek word for truth and started defining it as the correctness of intellectual judgement, and this was the corollary of their detaching of beings from the vast environing ground of Being. It is on this shift in the meaning of truth, that is, on this separation of beings from Being, of the incidental trait of language from its essence, of man from nature, that science, the unique and distinguishing charac-

teristic of Western civilization, is founded. Not being rooted in Being, science uproots man from Being. It detaches objects from the enveloping ground of Being and takes the road of 'calculating objectivation'. Indeed these two procedures go together, or better, are two aspects of the same procedure. The detached object alone can be measured. Being cannot be objectivated either by thought or by being produced like a machine. It is apprehended not in calculation but in 'essential thinking'. Thus, science studies objects and misses their Being, and the subject becomes conscious of himself as cut off from the object. Thus, dissociation of the subject from the object, from which subjectivism and solipsism take their rise, is at the source of the sciences. The Greeks were not subjectivists in the modern sense. They philosophized in the market-place. But then Greek science was not much advanced. In the Renaissance period 'the bifurcation of nature' was made complete, and the philosophers of science had to wrestle hard with the problem of overcoming subjectivism and solipsism. Accordingly, it may be observed that solipsism is the consequence not only of the verification theory of meaning, but of every theory that detaches language from its existential background. By making some minor alterations solipsism cannot be overcome. The whole attitude should be revised. Truth should be treated as not merely propositional. Words and rules of grammar should not be detached from their ground in Being, nor should the problem be construed as an epistemological or a linguistic problem.

The Concept of Being

What is this Being to which all truth and meaning point? Is it a concept? No. Being is not a concept. It is not something that can function as a predicate in a judgement. It is not an object of abstract thinking. Indeed, it is not an object at all. The proposal to treat it as an object is self-defeating in that it is a proposal to know. Being in terms of beings, that is, in terms of things that are, and so as a genus, is indeed regarded as the highest genus. It becomes, in the language of St Thomas Aquinas, 'the first object of the understanding, that which the intellect conceives when it conceives of anything'. But this first object is the poorest object. It is doubtful if it is an object at all.

Being the highest universal, it does not differentiate, and so does not make anything definite. Accordingly, it also is indefinite. It has no definite content. It is, as Hegel said, indistinguishable from nothing. Such an object is not an object. It is not something that stands over against the subject as an instrument to be used, or as an obstacle to be overcome. Or, as some Indian thinkers would like to express it, it is not something that can bind (*viśiṣṭvanti viśayināmavavadhanti*) the subject, or make it engaged. It is too poor to be an object. It is not an object at all, but a fiction. True, the contention will not hold if the nature of a universal is construed after the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, and Being is declared to be the highest universal. But then difficulties of a more metaphysical character will be felt. Thus, there is a distinction between the objects, like tables and chairs, that a man uses and the man who uses them. The objects are at hand, close at hand. But this is not the case with the man who uses objects. A man uses but is not used. The Being of human beings is not like the Being of beings. The distinction between making use of and being used is not a distinction in respect of office or function merely. It is a distinction that cuts deeper. He who uses is a person and what is used is a thing. It is not to be said that the person is also a thing with the differentiating properties of willing, enjoying, planning, etc. A person is not a thing. Its Being is not a being that is. It is a Being which is to be. Being when used to designate the being of things is a noun. But in respect of person it is a verb. The Being of human beings is a 'to be' being. A thing either is or is not. It is not the case that while it is, it also is not. But this is just the case with human beings. We are not while we are. Negation in respect of things is plain denial. It is annihilation. But this is not the case with a person. His Being projects into non-being. So it is a mistake to treat Being as a universal, meaning by 'universal' what a Naiyāyika or a Cook Wilson would mean. Being is not a universal. It is not a concept. The science of Being is not, to use a happy expression of Mr Barret, ontology, but einai-logy.¹²

But what is this Being then? It is not being. It is not a thing-like thing. It is a 'to be'-ing. But what is this 'to be'-ing? An inspectional analysis of human behaviour is necessary to find out an answer to this question. Thus, human beings try to be. They make attempts at the actualization of their potentialities.

So it seems that the nature of Being will be uncovered if human behaviour is analysed with care and attention. All human behaviour is rooted in some sense of want. Human beings behave when they suffer from some sense of dissatisfaction, keenly feel some want. This behaviour also issues from some sense of want. But what is this sense of want? The behaviour is for Being. So it issues from a sense of non-Being. What it intends to bring about is Being. This is its goal. Towards this it moves. So it does not start from this, but from its absence. The sense of want is the sense of non-Being. Nothing high-flown or metaphysical is intended by this statement. 'Non-Being' here does not stand for any obscure metaphysical stuff. The statement is on a par with an ordinary uninformative statement like 'he intends to be a lawyer, as he is not a lawyer'. True, it has a metaphysical look. But this is not the outcome of the failure to follow the logical grammar of language. Similarly, it is not a pseudo-object statement in the material mode. Neither does it state in ontological language a psychological state of free-floating neurotic obsession. It does not say that the sense of want is a sense of not being a lawyer, or a doctor, or something similar. But it is legitimate. The non-Being it speaks of is something indefinite precisely because Being which this non-Being negatives is indefinite. But this indefiniteness does not suggest that Being is a fiction. What it suggests is that it is unobjective. It is not an object, and so is not definite as an object is. Similarly with the non-Being spoken of in the statement under discussion. The sense of non-Being at the root of human behaviour is not the sense of some definite kind of non-Being. The statement cannot be said to be the logical sum or product of an indefinite number of statements like 'It is the sense of not being a lawyer'. It is a statement *sui generis*. It records something genuine. It is not trying to palm off something intellectually unclean in some highly obscure terminology. Human beings suffer from a sense of non-Being. It is the root of their behaviour and the nature of Being is grasped when this sense of non-Being is correctly analysed.

So attempts may be made to analyse it. The first thing that strikes us about it is that it has a high affective tone. It is a state of uneasy restlessness, distinctly unpleasant. It is a gnawing sense. It is painful. But what sort of pain is it? What re-

moves it? One may be in a state of uneasy restlessness if one is wanting in health, or wealth or some similar thing. Such restlessness is caused by not-having. As one is not in possession of this or that object of desire, one feels pain, suffers from a state of uneasy restlessness. But the restlessness in question is not of this kind. It is not possible to end it by coming to possess some object of desire or other. Similarly, it is not possible to end it by being some definite being, that is, by being a lawyer, or a doctor, or a professor. Such definite beings are not Being. They are also forms of having. The sense of not-Being under consideration is not the sense of not-having. It is also not the sense of not being some definite being. It is painful. It is a state of restlessness. But this state of pain or restlessness has a distinctive character. The theory that the psychologists formulate to account for pain does not fit it. Thus, the psychologists regard feeling as dependent on conative tendencies. When such tendencies are favoured or furthered, there are pleasant feelings. But when they are thwarted or obstructed there are painful feelings. This theory of feeling cannot account for the state of restlessness that the sense of non-Being generates. This suggests that the *desire to be* is not an ordinary desire. It is not *trṣṇā*, as the Indian thinker would like to put it. Non-Being is not non-having. Accordingly, Being is not having. It is not an object of some desire. The desire to be is an undesiring desire.

But how can any behaviour have its roots in such a desire? How can Being which satisfies such a desire be said to be the Being of human beings, who, as has been previously said, are persons who use but are not used? Obviously, these questions are raised on the assumption that to behave is to seek a goal—a goal that stands outside in the form of a more or less definite object. But the assumption is of doubtful validity. Indeed it is a generalization from the observation of human beings in what Heidegger calls their state of fall, or, to use another expression of Heidegger, in their engagement with inauthentic everydayness. It fails to account for some of the distinctive characteristics of human behaviour. Religious behaviour is a case in point. Human beings sometimes behave religiously. Their praying is an example of this kind of behaviour. It has its roots in some kind of restlessness. But is this state of restlessness conatively conditioned? Certainly not. If it were so, it would be superfluous,

if not meaningless. That is, if this restlessness were conditioned by not-having, and so capable of being removed by the possession of some objects, religion would be replaced by the sciences. True, prayer often expresses itself in a language that suggests that it is for objects, and so springs from a sense of not-having. But this does not undermine the thesis maintained above. It only shows that to unreflective consciousness, to a philistine, for whom there is no distinction between authentic being and inauthentic everydayness, the distinction between Being and having is not clear. For him Being is a kind of having. Be that as it may, religious behaviour springs from a sense of restlessness that is not conatively conditioned. The desire at the root of it is an undesiring desire. Similar conclusions may be reached when the moral and the aesthetic behaviour of human beings are analysed. The assumption that only desiring desire finds its outlet in behaviour is not warrantable. So the objection that no human behaviour can have its roots in an undesiring desire is not an objection at all. It may be said to be a welcome objection, an *istāpatti*. It is helpful in bringing out the distinctive character of the human attempts to be. Such attempts are not for realizing some transcendent goal. As the state of restlessness from which behaviour for Being springs is unique, so is this behaviour. If the desire for Being is an undesiring desire, this behaviour is a non-behaving behaviour. The desire implies cessation of all desires. This behaviour implies cessation of all behaviour. To put it differently, to be posted in this desire is to be dissociated from the conatively conditioned desires. Similarly, to be engaged in this form of behaviour is to be disengaged from inauthentic everydayness.

Another point may be made in this connection. It has been observed that a philistine does not distinguish between Being and having. So it seems reasonable to hold that the sense of restlessness from which he suffers is conatively conditioned. But this is not the true picture. If he experienced only this kind of restlessness, the other kind of restlessness would have been something foreign to human nature, a later acquisition, something imported and so not the sense of non-Being. He should also experience non-conatively-conditioned restlessness. Not only that. If human behaviour is analysed with care and attention, the conclusion becomes imperative that he feels non-conatively-

conditioned restlessness, though he interprets it wrongly, and the interpretation being creative, he comes to possess the conatively-conditioned restlessness. This point may be elaborated a little, and so the statement that human beings are persons who use and not things that are used should be subjected to a brief analysis. The statement that man is a tool-using animal who contrives plans to overcome obstacles, and behaves, if not like the rats of Thorndike, then like the apes of Kohler, does not give its analysis. For his behaviour is conditioned not only by his needs, his intelligence and his environment, but also by his sense of values. If he suffers from the frustration of desires, he also suffers from the conflict of desires. If he pines for what is not, he also pines for what he is not. He not only acts in this way or that way but also feels guilt and experiences the call of conscience. He feels restless not only because he *has not* but also because he *is not*. And of these two kinds of restlessness, the second is basic and prior. For the second kind of restlessness is a symptom of the conflict between one desire and another desire, between one universe of desire and another universe of desire, between one self and another self, between one apprehension of Being and another deeper apprehension of Being, between the inertia of continuing in one level of Being and the call of a deeper level of Being, between the evidently actual Being and the inevidently actual Being. Hence so long as the conflict is not somehow resolved, a desire will be a floating desire. It will not be recognized as the agent's desire, that is, as a desire that expresses the agent's apprehension of his own being, and so is deemed by him to be worthy of being satisfied. Consequently the question of its being thwarted or not having its object will not arise. The second kind of restlessness is primary. It belongs to man as man. The philistine under discussion experiences it, but overpowered as he is by his fall, he gives it a wrong interpretation. To put it differently, he does not distinguish clearly between Being and "having. He treats himself as a thing, and interprets the call of deeper Being as a call for having more. He thus interprets the non-conatively-conditioned restlessness as conatively conditioned. This is his *avidyā*. His *tṛṣṇā* is thus due to his *avidyā*. The proper analysis of the statement that a man is a person who uses and is not a thing that is used is that he, guided by his apprehension of his

Being, certifies some desires as his. Using is a form of the apprehension of Being. In the language of *Yoga-Bhāṣya*, *dṛśasyo-palabdhir yā sā bhogaḥ*.

Now, if the restlessness that infects the sense of non-Being is not conatively conditioned, how is it conditioned then? It cannot be unconditioned, for then the question of ending it would be meaningless. And as every sense of restlessness invites us to put an end to it, this particular one also does. The question of ending it cannot be meaningless. It is not unconditioned. But what conditions it? How is it conditioned? It has already been said that the state of restlessness is a symptom of the conflict between the inevidently actual Being and the evidently actual Being. The restlessness is there, as there is the call of conscience, the call of the deeper level of Being to the surface level of Being. Hence it seems that if the nature of this call is analysed, a satisfactory answer to the question may be had. So it may be formulated as: What is the nature of 'the call'? Is it occasionally given? Is it occasioned? Or is it always there? What is the relation between the caller and the called? How is the call given? What is its medium?

An analysis of the starting-point of Indian philosophy will be helpful in finding out answers to these questions. Thus, the starting-point of the Indian philosophical systems is the state of painful restlessness, *duḥkham*. But what is this *duḥkham*? The question has not been discussed analytically either by the ancient builders of the systems or by the recent writers on Indian philosophy. Accordingly, the impression is created that the restlessness in question is such as can be removed by having, and this is strengthened by the accounts of the three kinds of sufferings as given even by the standard writers like Vacaspati. But the impression is wrong. For this kind of restlessness can never be finally ended, and the final cessation of misery, which according to the Indian thinkers describes the *prayojana* or the objective of philosophy, would become an expression without any assignable meaning. It may be observed here that the idea of the final cessation of all sufferings is not an empirical idea, or in the new-fangled terminology, in a language constructed on the strict empiricistic principles the expression 'final cessation of all sufferings' can have no place. It is true that human beings suffer. It is also true that they know that sufferings con-

sidered as individuals come and go. But the idea of the final cessation of all sufferings cannot spring from this experience. For it is also common experience that one suffering yields place to another, one evil is cured by a second. The idea of the final cessation of all sufferings cannot be an empirical idea. To treat it as empirical is to describe it as the product of wishful thinking. A confirmed empiricist may say this. But this course is not open to the more sober thinkers. They will think twice before asserting that the Indian thinkers were the victims of wishful thinking. They will like to trace the idea to some 'essential knowledge'. They may also opine that the idea is rooted not empirically, but transcendently. Anyway, the proposal to put an end to all sufferings is not an ordinary proposal. He who makes or accepts it, accepts also the following propositions: (i) Human beings suffer; (ii) they do not like to suffer; (iii) they make attempts to end their sufferings; (iv) and they know that it lies within their power to end them; (v) and that the end of the sufferings is not their own end; (vi) and that the sufferings are not their essence; (vii) and there is no other means of ending sufferings than philosophy.¹³

This is the analysis of the origin of Indian philosophy. Steps nos. (v) and (vi) of this analysis deserve special consideration. They argue that human beings, in some sense of knowing, know their real nature, or Being, before they philosophize. But what kind of knowledge is this? Obviously, this is not the kind of knowledge that the liberated person, or the person posted in his own Being, has. It is not knowledge in position. Similarly it is not the kind of knowledge that the unliberated philosopher has. It is not knowledge in exposition. Human beings have not obtained it from their elders. For though *śravaṇa* plays a part in knowing Being, the *ādi-vidvān*, the first among the liberated ones, was not instructed by others. Besides, if human beings had not had some knowledge of Being independent of the instruction of others, such instructions would have been unavailing. Instruction in respect of Being is not giving some information. It is a drawing out. The instructor is, to use a Socratic analogy, a midwife. So the question of God or of an angel putting the idea into their head is also ruled out. This knowledge is essential knowledge. It is a pre-cognitive grasp. It is not mediate like knowledge in exposition. It is immediate. It is as immediate as

knowledge in position is. Indeed there are reasons for holding that this knowledge is knowledge in position imperfectly established. That is, knowledge in position is not an occurrent. But this knowledge is. The call is not always heard. It is occasional. But this does not belong to its essence. It is not always heard, not because it is not always there, but because the ear that hears it does not always function. In other words, it is unobjective, and so uncaused. It cannot be said to have either a beginning or an end. It is interrupted. But this interruption does not belong to it. It is like the interruption of the sun by the passing clouds. Being an occurrent does not belong to its Being, but to its association with an Other, to its fall. Knowledge in position is precisely this knowledge with the interrupting association removed. It is an attainment of the attained, a realization of the realized. True, this account will not be accepted in those systems that believe in *asat-kārya-vāda*. But this should not be treated as an objection. To do this would be to miss the point. This doctrine of causality is an ordinary empirical doctrine. It is successful in explaining the causal relation of the objects. But when it is applied in the context of the self, the distinctive character of the self is lost. We get either nihilism or objectivism. This does not mean that to provide for the distinctive character of self, the doctrine of *sat-kārya-vāda* should be subscribed. For, viewed properly, the self is unobjective and is neither a cause nor an effect, and hence to subscribe to this doctrine is to hold that the category of causality is a category of objectivity, of non-Being.¹⁴

Anyway, the original and unobjective knowledge of Being is not different entitatively from the knowledge of Being in position. It is immediate, unobjective, indefinite and self-certifying. It puts the objects in their proper places. It shows that if the objects are to be described the language that Sartre uses to describe the second sex should be used. It should be said that they are soft, sticky, viscous, corpulent, flabby, excessive, fruitful and blooming. They belong to *prakṛti* which, in the language of the *Yoga-Bhāṣya*, is *niḥ-sattā-sattam*, *niḥ-sadāsat*, *nirāśad*, *avyaktam*.¹⁵ The objects are *heya*, to be shunned. The thing-like Being in the state of fall is non-Being. It is the Other transformed, but due to its proximity (*sānnidhya*) with true Being has the appearance of Being. The task of philosophy is to

work out this suggestion and so to be instrumental in achieving the achieved knowledge in position.

This is the analysis of the starting-point of Indian philosophy, and it is clear that it answers the questions raised above. Thus it is seen that the call is occasional but not occasioned. It is immediate but not an object. Besides, this immediacy is interrupted, but this interruption does not belong to its nature. It is incidental and is a consequence of the state of fall. It generates the sense of restlessness in that the surface level of Being is seen to be inauthentic and so something that belongs to *prakṛti*, and not to Being. The sense of restlessness will come to an end when the authentic Being will be finally dissociated from the inauthentic beings or the various non-Beings, which by virtue of their proximity with the authentic Being appear to be not inauthentic. Only when one is posted in authentic Being, in pure and uninterrupted immediacy, one finds complete release from restlessness.

But what kind of statement is this? Who makes it? Being does not make it, for it is pure immediacy, and does not make any statement. Non-Being does not make it, for it claims to be authentic. It appears that it is not a statement at all, but a sign of conceptual confusion. It is not necessary to take such a depressing view. It is possible to come out of the impasse by introducing *buddhi* as understood in the Yoga system. Thus, *buddhi* belongs to *prakṛti*. It is its first evolute. It is the unlimited I-sense (*mahattatva*). 'I' stands for it when freely used. It is the content (*alamvāna*) of *sasmita samādhi*. The expression 'I am' may be said to stand for it, if 'am' be not a predicate. It is just am-ness. It is the phenomenal ego divested of egoism (*ahantā*) and the sense of mine (*mamatā*). When it is invested with these attributes it is transformed into *ahamkāra*, the dynamic ego. 'I' in expressions like 'I suffered this', 'I have done this', stands not for *buddhi* but for *ahamkāra*. The sense of mine extends further. It gets attached to the subtle body, the gross body and even to the objects standing out there. So 'I' may stand even for them. This is the systematic elusiveness of 'I'. But the point of interest is that it does not articulate *puruṣa*, though this does not mean that we should be silent about *puruṣa*. For *buddhi* may be *puruṣa-viśaya* also. It may apprehend *puruṣa* also. To be sure, it is not *puruṣa-viśaya* as it is *ghaṭa-viśaya*. It does not know *puruṣa*

as it knows a pot. It knows a pot by being modified as a pot, and it is modified as a pot as the pot is one of its transformations and is a definite object. But this is not the case with *puruṣa*, and so it cannot be said to know *puruṣa* as it knows a pot. Indeed, if it knew *puruṣa* as it knows a pot, *puruṣa* would have ceased to be *puruṣa*. It would have become an object. But how does it know *puruṣa* then? The answer to this question is that it is seen by *puruṣa* and so it sees *puruṣa*. It is *puruṣa-viśaya* as it is *puruṣa-prakāśya*. It sees *puruṣa* as its seer, and asserts the seer mirrored in it as 'I'. It knows itself as conditioned knower, and so can assert the unconditioned knower. Accordingly, *buddhi* is *grahīṭṛ-puruṣa*. It is the knower-being. Strictly speaking, *puruṣa* is not knower in that knowledge does not modify it. It is a spectator, the knower being *buddhi*. Hence it is called knower-being. Besides, it is the knower of Being, and for this reason also it is to be called knower-Being.

The Sāṃkhya concept of *buddhi* as *grahīṭṛ-puruṣa* helps us to come out of the impasse. It is also important for two other reasons. It shows, in the first place, that what transcends thought can be asserted by thought if it is the knower of thought. Mystical silence is not the only treatment to be meted out to the transcendent entities. The unspeakables are not so absolutely. They may be spoken of by what is technically known as *abhi-kalpana*. In the second place, it shows that there are grades of non-Being. It is not necessary to follow the Sāṃkhya grades of objectivity rigidly. The journey from non-Being to Being may be described in the language of the earlier Upanishads as from *jāgrat* to *turiya*, or from *annam* to *ānandam*. The contention of the later Upanishads that there are sixteen (seventeen) levels of non-Being need not be deemed unreasonable. The Tantric conception of circles of non-Being (*chakra*) or of knots (*granthi*) of Brahma, Visnu and Rudra may also be recommended. An inquiry into this is not relevant. What is relevant is that it is possible for us to follow the philosophies that formulate the doctrine of the levels of non-Being, and assert that 'the call', though always and essentially the same, may be differently felt and heard. That is, 'the call' comes from the deeper level of Being to the surface level of Being. It may also be said that it issues from Being but is received by one or the other non-Being. This non-Being is the *grahīṭṛ* or the reci-

pient of the call. As there are different levels of non-Being, so there are different recipients, different kinds of recipients. Hence, 'the call' will be heard differently. 'The call' is the call of pure immediacy. It is non-linguistic. But this is not the case with its recipients. There are reasons to hold that language provides for the structure of non-Being. Different levels of non-Being have different linguistic structures. They have different convictional constitutions. They are different convictional languages. Accordingly, 'the call' will be given a linguistic orientation in keeping with its recipient. That is, 'the call' will show its recipients to be inauthentic. It will make it clear that the convictional language that constitutes its structure has to be left behind. So it will be given a linguistic structure, and at different levels different linguistic structures will be given. 'The call', though always and essentially the same call, will be felt and heard differently, and philosophies which attempt to formalize it will be different.

In short, Being is not a concept. It is not a thing-like thing. It is not a being. It is 'to be'-ing. It is not an unrealized possibility. It is essential actuality. But there is the inexplicable state of fall. In this state its call is heard, and though the 'call' is always the same call it may be heard differently.

The Task of Philosophy

The call of Being is not occasioned, but is occasional. It comes and goes away. It is not always audible, and when audible, is not distinctly so. It is like a midsummer night's dream, 'a quick bright thing which comes to confusion'. It shows the recipient non-Being to be inauthentic. But this showing is not a documented showing. It has to be documented. It should be given a local habitation and a name. It should be given a negotiable form. This is done by a *kavi*—a poet who is a philosopher, or a philosopher who is a poet. The *ṛṣi*s of the Upanishads were such persons. Tagore was one such person. Anyway, the poets and the philosophers document 'the call' by articulating it in language. Their articulations differ. They use language in different ways. The poet speaks in the language of *rasa*, of feeling and enjoyment. But the philosopher speaks in the language of *vicāra*, of reason and contemplation. The philo-

sopher conceptualizes 'the call'. This does not mean that he subjects it to a conceptual scheme. For the conceptual scheme at his disposal is provided by the level of non-Being that 'the call' seeks to show as inauthentic. It also does not mean that he digs up the conceptual structure of 'the call'. For it is essentially an immediacy and has no conceptual structure. So this conceptualization is so only metaphorically. Thus, the philosopher may seize upon the language of the poet and work out the logic of this language. That is, the poet does not use the words in senses that are either too remote or too familiar. He makes use of *dhvani* or the suggestive power of the ordinary words. The philosopher works upon it and gives it a logical structure. He may do this in two ways. He may propose to treat the poetic texts as revealed texts and so to study them by taking into consideration their *upakrama*, *upasaṃhāra* and similar other *liṅgas*. He may also propose to replace the poetic metaphors by the logic of analogy. Then the philosopher may attempt to show that the conceptual scheme at his disposal is not as perfect as it is ordinarily taken to be. He may follow in the footsteps of Nāgārjuna or Śrīharṣa. Thirdly, he may translate this call into a conceptual scheme, and propose to defend it against criticism. It is to be remembered that the philosopher works from the level of common sense which records the collective level of non-Being felt as authentic Being. But this common sense is not something absolutely there. It is the construction of the poets and the philosophers. The philosopher in his attempt to formalize 'the call' proposes to replace this construction by another construction. This will continue up to the penultimate stage. When he will be posted in what the Sāṃkhya philosophers calls *buddhi* or *saṃsāra samādhi*, this construction of conceptual scheme will come to an end, and Being will be felt as the spectator of non-Being. But so long as this stage is not reached conceptualization will continue. And this is the fundamental task of philosophy.

Thus, the Sanskrit equivalent of philosophy is '*darsana*', which etymologically means both vision, or immediate apprehension, and the instrument for it. This paper recommends the use of 'philosophy' in these senses, and records its disapproval of its use as the cool pursuit of the savant engaged in research. This should not be dubbed Orientalism, which is a curious mixture

of lofty mysticism and gross practicalism. For the reason for making this recommendation is to emphasize that philosophy originates not from such wonder or doubt as is satisfied by scientific enquiry but from a spiritual disquiet, from a state of non-conatively-conditioned restlessness. The great questions that the philosophers ask are not intellectual questions. But neither are they spurious questions. They are expressions of spiritual disquiet. This becomes evident from statements that the philosophers make. Some of them distinguish between appearance and reality, and assert that appearances are or exist but are not real. Is it not quite puzzling? Does not one sympathize with Prof. Moore when he confesses that he cannot understand how it is possible for anything to exist and not to be real at the same time. Indeed, the distinction between appearance and reality is not easy to understand. But this does not mean that the philosophers who make the distinction are like flies in a fly-bottle. It is also not just a use of familiar terms in unfamiliar senses. It has a deeper import. It indicates the philosopher's appreciation of the distinction between authentic existence and inauthentic existence and his endeavour to formalize it. To put it differently, the hearing of 'the call' makes the philosopher restless, and inspires him to evaluate the recipient of the call as inauthentic. This is the phenomenological analysis of the distinction, and it argues the proposition stated above, that the great questions of philosophy and the statements that are made in answer to them are signs of the kind of restlessness that is at the root of the Indian philosophies. Anyway, philosophy is both an instrument for achieving immediate apprehension and the apprehension itself. It formalizes 'the call' and replaces one convictional language by another convictional language, one am-truth (that is, a truth that one is, and not a truth that one has) by another am-truth. It disengages the seeker of Being from one level of non-Being, posts him in another level of non-Being, and finally in Being. And it should be mentioned that this formalization is not, strictly speaking, an intellectual affair. It is the work of *dhyāna*, contemplative meditation. The essence of it consists in *rāga apahati*, annihilation of attachment. That is, 'the call' shows its recipient to be inauthentic. Philosophy proposes to document the call. It formulates propositions which will at first sight appear

to be axiological propositions expressed in the ontological mode. The recipient will be seen to be lacking in value. And then this lapse of value will generate lapse of givenness. However, philosophy replaces one convictional language by another convictional language. It is an instrument in this task of replacing and it is also the convictional language that replaces. In philosophy, there is neither any proof nor any disproof. But there is conversion, the substitution of one convictional language by another convictional language. This substituting process goes on so long as one is not posted in the state of *sasmita samādhi*, which being an unlimited I-sense, *rāga* is at its minimum, and does not stand in need of any philosophic or linguistic reflection to be liquidated.

Philosophy Is Something Personal

From the above it will be clear that philosophy is something personal. That is, philosophy is an attempt to formalize 'the call'. But 'the call' is differently heard. It is also differently formalized. It is heard at different levels, and the philosophical systems can be arranged hierarchically. Vijñāna-bhikṣu, Udayana and some other Indian thinkers made attempts at giving this arrangement. In the West some advocates of the doctrine of degrees of truth also accept this in principle. It is not necessary for this paper to present such an arrangement. It is sufficient for it to mention the statement that there are different systems of philosophy as there are different *adhikāris*—a statement that was current in the orthodox academic circles of India in the Middle Ages, and was neither formally consented to nor resisted.¹⁶ In our language it means that there are different philosophies as there are different recipients of 'the call'. And this argues the proposition that philosophy is something personal. This may be put in the following way also. The philosopher hears 'the call'. This creates in him a state of restlessness. This can be removed either by accepting or documenting the call or by liquidating it. If he accepts 'the call' he proposes a new convictional language, described as 'the splendour and glory' of a new conviction. But if he liquidates it he gives it a therapeutic analysis, linguistic or psychological. His philosophizing consists in his attempt at reconciling

himself with himself. His philosophy is something personal. In the language of Nietzsche, it is a form of personal confession.

Philosophy is Historical

The clue to this is given by the word 'confession'. Dr Zuurdeeg has presented De Graaf's ideas about confession,¹⁷ and when this is given a brief but independent elaboration the statement that philosophy is historical as it is personal is seen to be plausible. Thus, confession takes place in a group. It also makes use of a language. The group may be called the confessional group, and the language the confessional language. Each confessional group has its own confessional language. This language expresses the common convictions of the group and the members co-operate to articulate these convictions in a way which no single member of the group can achieve singly. Each group has its own vanguard who takes the lead in the formalization of the convictions, in guiding the group in effecting suitable changes in its languages, if and when this is felt to be necessary, and also in awakening the convictions in the junior and the future members of the group. Each group may have its own sub-groups which may develop into independent groups and the parent group may be there only in name. When this group is religious, it gladly accepts some authority. When it is political, there is also to be found such an acceptance of the authority, though the nature of the authority will be of a different character. But when it is philosophical, such open and joyful acceptance of authority will not be found. Here it will appear at first sight that reason has replaced all authorities. But on reflection it will transpire that reason here is in the service of something else, that is, of 'the call' of Being. The members of a non-philosophical confessional group either will not listen to the members of other confessional groups or will decry them. With this end in view they may make use of any means. They may put the members of the rival groups in concentration camps. But this is not the case with the members of a philosophical confessional group. They will make use only of civilized methods. They will try to defeat the members of rival groups in argument. When the members of the groups will confess to each other they will be resorting to what in Indian logic is

called *vāda*. But when arguing with the members of the rival groups they may resort to *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*. And here the philosophical 'confessional group' will come to resemble the other groups, and the other groups also may find out their philosopher warriors. Anyway, this is the analysis of confession and confessional groups—philosophical and non-philosophical. It helps us to see how a philosophy which is a form of personal confession is historical also. Thus, it has been seen that different philosophers try to formalize 'the call' differently as 'the call' itself is heard differently. These philosophers are not isolated individuals. Two persons posted in the same level of non-Being will hear 'the call' in the same way; and so will formalize it also in the same way. Accordingly, persons who are posted in the same level of non-Being will form a confessional group with a vanguard, the chief spokesman of the group. An inquiry into the history of the Indian systems brings this out quite clearly. The systems are seen often to start from some *sūtras*. But the *sūtras* are not the first things. They are preceded by unrecorded speculations of different thinkers. There were many confessional groups in the days before the *sūtras*. The members of each group confessed their convictions to the members of their own group and argued with the members of other groups. The authors of the *sūtras* were the vanguards. The subsequent *āchāryyas* and the principal defenders of the systems were also such vanguards. The different systems originated from different confessional groups. In the formation of the groups, the important part was played by the hearing or non-hearing of 'the call'. Those who heard the same call became members of the same group. The different philosophical systems took their rise from the different confessional groups. They are different confessions. They are personal. But they are also historical. Their confessional origin is also their historical origin. Their development in different confessional groups is also their historical development.

To put it differently: the philosopher makes an attempt at formalizing the call. But the call that he hears is not heard by him alone. Today with him many are hearing the same call. And in the past there were many who heard it and tried to formalize it. So he enters into conversation (using the term conversation in Heidegger's sense as given above) with the past

and the present members of his confessional group. This helps him in hearing the call more distinctly. Indeed, it is not improbable that unassisted by others he might have missed 'the call'. As he is a member of a confessional group, and as he is thus historically situated, he feels the authority of 'the call'. In course of his conversation with the other members of his confessional group his convictions take shape and are formalized. Hence what is a personal confession is also the confession of a group. Besides, as the group is not the product of some contingent causes, no confession belongs to one particular age. It transcends history and so courses through all history. Just as mathematics fits every kind of experience precisely because it is not derived from experience, so every confession finds a place in every age, as it is not the product of any particular age. The confession that is the product of a particular age is not a genuine confession. This is the historical criterion that should be used for finding out if a personal confession is impersonal also. That is, a philosophical proposition is to be treated as a personal confession. It is personal, but it is a confession also and so is not something foolish and private. It originates in confession, and so it is not the product of any particular age. Being conditioned by confession, it is conditioned by historical conditions also. But such conditions are not contingent on or peculiar to any particular age. It develops historically, but not as any empirical historical institution does. It is the product of no particular age, and so it fits every age, and provides the pattern of empirical history. It is confessionally historical, and philosophy is history of philosophy. To study it is to converse with the different vanguards of the different confessional groups, to participate in the sense of Being (or non-Being) which they record and formalize. Obviously, the student will converse successfully when he converses with the vanguards of his own confessional group. But when he converses with the vanguards of the confessional groups of which he is not a member, the conversation will not be fruitful. But this does not entail any depressing consequence. For the aim of philosophy is not to propound propositional truth. It is to help the student to be posted in Being. But this is the ultimate objective—the immediate objective being to post him firmly in the level in which he is. The fruitful

conversation with the vanguard of his own confessional group achieves this. Then he may wait for a fresh 'call', and so for a conversion. Anyway, philosophy is a historical subject. But it is not a historical subject in the sense sociology or economics or politics is. It is historical because it is confessional.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Zuurdeeg, *An Analytical Philosophy of Religion* (Allen and Unwin, 1959). The point is given an independent elaboration. For Dr Zuurdeeg is hostile to metaphysics, and his hostility is not less severe than that of the logical empiricists. But he admits: 'Some ontologies represent the outcome of a person's serious struggle for meaning and value; he has been moved existentially, his whole being was involved. Such a system is not mainly a product of the playful constructing intelligence, but expresses insights gained by painstaking convictional struggling with what are for such a man the deepest and the highest realities. It would be boorish to deny that Plato's, Hegel's and even Tillich's efforts are of this kind. This is undoubtedly true of the ontological convictions of primitive and ancient religions. Such ontologies demand our respect, even if we regard their method as invalid' (p. 164). And, as regards what he calls 'the hard' and 'the double hard' ontologies, his observations are reasonable.
2. Quoted by William Barret in his *Irrational Man* (Heinemann, 1960), p. 184.
3. Max Black, *Language and Philosophy* (Cornell, 1949), p. 105.
4. John Wisdom, *Philosophy and Psycho-analysis* (Blackwell, 1957), p. 51.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
6. E. Hall, *Philosophical Systems* (Chicago, 1960), p. 56.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
10. M. Heidegger, *Existence and Being* (Vision Press, London, 1956), p. 300.
11. How pregnant these observations are is seen when the analysts' wrestling with the problem of ostensive definition, e.g. in Lord Russell's *Human Knowledge*, or in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, 1, 28, 29, 30 and 31, is kept in mind. Those who have studied Navya-Nyāya will also appreciate them.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
13. Reference may be made to *Tattva-Kaumudi*.
14. The distinction between Being and non-Being should not be treated as equivalent to the distinction between Reality and Appearance.

15. Strictly speaking, this statement from *Yoga-Bhāṣya* does not bear the intended interpretation. It is mentioned to suggest that the use of the word *prakṛti* to stand for the second sex has a metaphysical grounding.
16. *Adhikāri-vibhedena sāstrānyukta-nyāśesataḥ*; and MM Pt. P. B. Tarkavāgiśa assures us that Bhāskara in his commentary on *Vāmakeswara-Tantra* worked out this idea in detail.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

